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THE LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS OF GENERAL LEE.

21649

BY HIS NEPHEW,

EDWARD LEE CHILDE.

TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH, WITH THE CONSENT AND APPROVAL OF THE AUTHOR,

BY GEORGE LITTING, M.A., LL.B.

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London:
CHATTO AND WINDUS, PICCADILLY.
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Ανδρα ἀρχὴ δείκνυσι.

Proverb.

Power reveals the man.

Δεινή τις ὀργὴ καὶ δυσίατος πέλει,
ὅτ' ἐν φίλοι φίλοισι συμβάλωσ' ἔριν.

Euripides: Medea, 520–521.

Terrible is anger, and without remedy,
When discord breaks out between friends.

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*** With regard to *most* of the letters, quotations, and other extracts in the following pages, the translator has been able, through the kindness and courtesy of the author, to avail himself of the original English texts. In the few unimportant instances where a comparison with the original text was impossible, the passages have been retranslated from the French as literally as can be desired.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

THE following pages, written with all the impartiality possible, have, for their object, to make known in France one of the most remarkable personages of the New World—General Lee, commander-in-chief of the Southern armies in the great Civil War, which desolated the United States for four years, from April, 1861, to April, 1865.

In our age there is a want of *character*. The one we are going to describe is like that of the ancients in its simplicity, true, full of humility, deeply Christian, and having for its only motive a sentiment of duty. In the midst of the general abasement of the moral level, in these times, when success excuses and consecrates everything, the greatness of General Lee's soul, lifting itself a hundredfold above those of his contemporaries, soothes and fortifies troubled consciences.

The most prejudiced reader cannot but admire this life, entirely devoted to the idea of duty. Greater in adversity than in success, this man of worth struggled on to the end without despair, and yielded without a sacrifice of his honour. From the time of Hannibal, no captain has been seen to support a struggle more unequal, with forces more disproportionate, and having before him the prospect of a more gloomy future.

All this period of four years recalls, by the magnitude of the means employed, the number of the combatants, and the importance of the interests at stake, the most celebrated wars of antiquity. It forms a great epoch in history. The final interview between Lee and Grant involuntarily calls forth the recollection of that which took place between Hannibal and Scipio, with this difference, that the latter preceded the battle instead of following it. Like Hannibal, seeking to induce his fellow-citizens to accept the hard conditions of the conqueror, Lee, in his retirement, after 1865, did all that depended on him, by words and example, to appease resentment, and re-establish harmony. "His character and life," says an English author, "afford a complete answer to the reproaches commonly cast on money-grabbing, mechanical America. A country which has given birth to men like him, and those who followed him, may look the chivalry of Europe in the face without shame, for the fatherlands of Sidney and of Bayard never produced a nobler soldier, gentleman, and Christian, than Robert E. Lee."

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

THE same motive which animated the author in writing a life of his uncle, has animated the translator in rendering that life into English. It is not well that the memory of a man like General Lee should fade away without the world being made acquainted with his character and virtues.

This must be the translator's plea to justify him in the course he has taken. He is well aware of the existence of more than one life of General Lee, compiled in English; but they were written by Americans, published in America, and, therefore, are more or less imbued with the American style and mode of feeling. So far, they are unsuitable to European taste. They are, besides, long, and somewhat tiresome in their description of battles, and in their general minuteness of details.

The present work is of a different stamp: political dissension, apart from a candid inquiry into the real causes of the Civil War, is, as much as possible, avoided, and there is a scrupulous desire evinced throughout to wound no one. The man's life and doings are presented in naked truthfulness; the dignity and nobility of his character are made fully apparent; he stands before us as one of the world's heroes, whose fame should be not merely national,

but cosmopolitan, yielding an undying example for all times and peoples.

To the English, a life of General Lee should be peculiarly acceptable. He belonged to a State where the population is, in race and manners, more thoroughly English than in any other part of America, and where it is the pride of the people to keep to the customs and traditions bequeathed to them by their fathers. Without entering into a discussion as to whether the Virginians, and Lee among them, were right or wrong in the cause they espoused, leaving, in fact, each reader to his own opinion on the merits of the case, one cannot but admire the burning patriotism, the unflinching loyalty, the continual perseverance, the indomitable *pluck* with which the Southerners, amid untold difficulties, bore the brunt of a struggle so unequal for the long space of four years—conduct in striking contrast with some more recent events in Europe. Such virtues, so displayed, are enough to convince us that British courage will flourish transplanted into other soils; the branch is not unworthy of the trunk, and we may well be proud of the relationship existing between ourselves and the comparative handful of men whose deeds are commemorated in the following pages.

The conviction that the character and achievements of General Lee, although in England he is justly esteemed a great man, are not so widely known and appreciated as they ought to be, has led the translator to offer this recital, compiled by one having peculiar facilities for the work, to the English public. The opportunity seems a fit one, inasmuch as the scenes in which the hero acted, and, indeed, the hero himself, belong now to the past, and passions and feelings on both sides of the Atlantic, although not dead, have somewhat subsided. It is only at such times, in

periods of calm, which, indeed, may be but intermittent, that characters can be duly estimated. Undoubtedly, every man in this world has a mission to fulfil—if he will. That of Lee was a great one, and he fulfilled it well. There is no knowing what may be the complications to arise in any one's lifetime; they may be such as to need, if not call forth, such characters as the one under consideration, and it is the translator's wish—as it was that of the author—to leave on record a worthy account of a worthy example.

A MAP OF THE MILITARY MOVEMENTS IN VIRGINIA IN 1862-3-4-5.



London: Chatto & Windus.

THE LIFE AND CAMPAIGNS

OF

GENERAL LEE.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

WITHOUT entering into a searching discussion of the origin of the American Civil War, it is impossible for us—since we have it at heart to set forth in relief his character who, on the side of the Confederates, was commander-in-chief—not to say, in a few words, what were in our opinion the causes of this war.

Coleridge used to say of the United States, that they were splendid materials out of which, at some future time, several great countries would be constructed. The Civil War of 1861 has been the first sign of dislocation, the first token of breaking-up, the first trembling of the soil—forerunners of the commotion yet to come. According to the party of separation, the Federal union had served its time. The interests of the Southern States demanded a distinct and independent government. The Federal system, founded at the epoch of the Revolution, admirable in its early form and application, had been subsequently perverted, giving birth to a dismal rivalry between state and state, and becoming the source of all kinds of intestine dissensions. The Federal principle regulated the American Union, but this union was only a confederation of States: this principle operated on an equality with another prin-

ciple, that of the States' internal government. Often, therefore, there was a confusion between their attributes, or rather encroachments, sometimes on the one side, sometimes on the other. Hence a multitude of abuses. It was easy, after this, to foresee how many causes of decay and death the system concealed in its bosom.

In the early years of the Federal agreement, the different political parties, only having in view the advantages which they could draw from it, did not fail to work what defects there were in the new system to their own profit. It was no longer the calm and dignified judgment of Washington which presided over the destinies of the republic. Under Jefferson, the third President, it became subject to the meddling of democratic passions.

Whatever may be the tradition in America to regard the authors of this Constitution of 1787 as public idols, sad experience has proved to us that their work comprehended enormous deficiencies. It witnesses to a want of foresight and an absence of solicitude for the changes which the future would bring beyond all idea. Only to speak of the question of slavery, no precaution was taken in view of the complications which were sure to arise. It was only said that persons *held for service or labour* who attempted to escape should be given up to their masters.

If the Constitution had explained itself on this question without ambiguity, in a few clear and precise words, what misfortunes might have been avoided!

Another article provides that: "Each state shall retain its sovereignty, liberty, and independence, as well as all the powers, jurisdiction, and rights with which, by this act of confederation, the United States assembled in Congress are not expressly invested."

At the time of the discussion of the Constitution of 1787, there were in the convention three political parties. Some wished to confine themselves to a review of the provisional confederation which had existed during the war. Others desired to abolish the division into states entirely, and absorb them into one great cen-

tralized country. The third party sought to conciliate the interests of the smaller and larger states; whence sprung the representation, in two grades, of the people and the states, each having its separate chamber. The amendments made in the Constitution introduced, on certain points, a clearness which was wanting to the original work. For instance: "The enunciation in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be interpreted in the sense of a negation or lessening of certain other rights reserved to the people."

Another article: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, or not interdicted by it to the different states, are reserved to each state individually, or to the people."

The union thus constituted formed neither a nationality, nor a simple republic divided into provinces, nor a league of states without any power over individuals. In separating from the British Empire, the Americans had preferred to retain their thirteen sovereignties distinct, rather than to form a single state. This fractional division guaranteed them their lives, property, and municipal rights. On its side, the Federal Government was to serve for their defence against the foreigner in time of war, and, in time of peace, to protect the smaller states against the ambition of the larger.

This Constitution was adopted only by a certain number of the states forming part of the first Confederation, that which had victoriously brought to a conclusion the contest with the mother country. The other states took to it later, at different epochs, each in its quality of a sovereign state; so that the second union was formed from states withdrawing from the first, and three of them *expressly* reserved to themselves, when ratifying the act of this second Confederation, the right to withdraw from this also, if it seemed good to them. Virginia, when giving its assent, said, "We, delegates of the people of Virginia, duly elected, &c., &c., declare and make known in its name that the powers granted according to the Constitution, proceeding from the people of the United States, can be resumed by it, in case any abuse be made

of them to do it wrong or oppress it." The States of New York and Rhode Island made analogous declarations.

It is a great mistake to think that the act of union was an inauguration of new principles. Each state had long enjoyed civil institutions which left nothing to be desired. The Federal tie had been merely conceived as a convenient means for mutual extension and protection. That was its mission. Principles guaranteeing individual liberty, or protecting the rights of each, had been defined five hundred years previously, with as much precision as vigour, in England, in the great charter of Runnymede; they had passed from thence into all the colonial charters, and formed at all times the basis of English institutions in America.

What was new, and what had a real value in the Federal Constitution, was the delicate adjustment of the relations between the state and the central government, whence resulted a harmonious whole. The division of powers between the States' Governments and the Federal Government, the first reserving to themselves their internal affairs, and all that affected the interests of the citizens, the second holding sway over all relations with the foreigner, and between the states themselves, was the triumph of local self-government, the importance of which was recognised. The two great political schools of America, the partisans of centralization and those of states-rights, naturally arose from the different manner of looking at the relations existing between the Central Government and the states. Now let us here touch on the question of slavery.

According to the idea of the centralizing party, all Northerners, the Federal Government, which exercised the power, had also the responsibility of it; and the existence of slavery ought to be regulated according to the greater or less extent of power which the Federal Government might have to restrain or abolish it. The partisans of states-rights replied, that each state had reserved to itself the sovereignty for the precise purpose of not

allowing to the Central Government the least pretext to meddle with internal affairs, of which slavery was one of the chief.*

These latter regarded the union as a contract *between* the states; the centralizing party looked upon it as a government *above* the states, and, consequently, superior to them.

The question of slavery must not be separated from what renders it complicate. It has got so entangled in all the past of the country, that, to study it from an æsthetic point of view, to make it the thesis of a declamation on morality, would be in the highest degree unjust. In the development of the political rivalship between the two regions of the American Union, North and South, it has been a mere incident imported with a good deal of cleverness, but with little caution. Slavery furnished a most seasonable battlefield to the opponents; it served as a line of demarcation ready traced; it was the most marked difference between the two rivals. Like the Trojan horse, it offered a very convenient vehicle by means of which to introduce discord and confusion into the heart of the edifice of the Constitution. Every one found there arms to his taste, offensive and defensive; the North saw in it a fact damaging the South, a ground on

* The Legislative Assemblies of Virginia and Kentucky, in 1798, passed some resolutions which very clearly defined, from the states-rights' point of view, the idea of people who foresaw the dangers of the future. Here is the first of these resolutions: "The different states composing the United States of America do not acknowledge themselves as obliged to a submission without limit to the Central Government. Under the name of Constitution of the United States, and amendments to that Constitution, they have established a General Government for a definitive end, delegating to this Government certain definite powers, but each state reserving to itself, for its own self-government, all the rest of its attributes. When, therefore, the General Government arrogates to itself powers not delegated, its acts are unauthorized, null, and of no effect. Each state is associated to this contract in its quality of sovereign state. The Government created by this agreement can in nowise be constituted a judge without appeal of the powers conceded to it, since, in that case, it would be its moderation, and not the Constitution, which would fix the limit of its attributes. It follows, therefore, that, as in all contracts between parties not having a common judge, each party will have an equal right to judge for itself, both with regard to damage and redress."

which it would have for itself the sympathies of Europe; the South, exasperated because the North, formerly its ally (since it was associated with it in a participation of the cause), thrust in its face a disgrace, the responsibility of which mounted far back into the past, found in this proceeding a want of good faith, a case of the accused become accuser. In the long run the discussion grew envenomed; the attention became concentrated on this question; it threw all others into the shade; the occasion was substituted for the cause, and what at first was only a secondary incident came to be regarded as the principal subject of the strife.

In the early years of the new confederation, all measures relative to slavery were always voted in Congress without discussion, almost unanimously. Louisiana and Florida, slave territories, received their definitive organization without giving place to the least agitation. Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, and Alabama entered into the Union without the fact of their being slave states making any difficulty. Not till 1820, upon the admission of the State of Missouri, whence resulted a compromise limiting slavery to a degree of latitude fixed beforehand, did the true nature of the controversy on slavery burst out; what had existed in a latent state for a long time then first became apparent, a political organization in the North opposed to another political organization in the South.

Slavery was an evil, a great evil, a frightful misfortune for that part of the American Continent afflicted with it. What endeavours have not been made, by Northerners and Southerners, with equity, charity, and moderation, to root out, little by little, this scourge; to restrain it within limits narrower and narrower; to accentuate still more the marked progress in the increase of the number of states, formerly slave-holding, which renounced the maintenance of negroes in slavery! At the time of the declaration of independence, in 1776, Massachusetts was the only state which had no slaves. In 1861, of the thirteen original states, six,

Connecticut, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey had abolished slavery. Two others of the states which founded the Union, Delaware and Maryland, were on the eve of doing so. A great majority of the more recently admitted states, some detached from the old states, others new territories promoted to the rank of states, had never known slavery. Missouri, Kentucky, the West, could hardly delay following the example of Maryland, so that the space occupied by slave states tended to diminish from year to year by an inevitable law. To wish to force events, and precipitate an issue already foreseen, was a criminal act, when one thinks of the interests at stake, the lives that were about to be put in peril, the complexity of the problems which would have to be solved. The ardour, the fury, the stubbornness, the injustice of the abolitionists, provoked the same ardour, the same fury, the same stubbornness, and the same injustice among their adversaries. Did the North appeal to the Bible and to the authority of the Scriptures? The South did likewise. Did the school of Mr. Sumner, the chief of the abolitionist party, cite acts of cruelty in the slave states? The partisans of the South recalled to it the condition of the free negroes in the North, where they were treated as a pestilence, absolutely forbidden to ride in a wagon or omnibus, to go into a church, temple, or theatre, or to rest in a cemetery reserved exclusively for the use of the white race. In Illinois, the foot of a negro could not tread upon the soil of the state. He exposed himself to be whipped and led back to the frontier. In other states, if he married a white he was soundly thrashed. The North forgot too readily, in attacking slavery, that it had long been *particeps criminis*. Only from the day when a considerable party in the free states believed it would be able to make use of the fact as a powerful lever against its associate, now become its rival—only from that day did it bethink itself to be shocked at the profound immorality.

The rivalry of interests between the two districts of the country,

North and South, between the manufacturing and the agricultural states, powerfully contributed, on its side, to hasten the explosion. The North, having to protect fabrics of every kind and numerous manufactures, was protectionist to the utmost. The South, on the contrary, producing only raw materials, would have every inducement to exchange them for the manufactured products of Europe, and was for free trade. The Southern ports would have acquired a great development if they had been able to hold direct relations with the Old World. In the colonial era these relations had existed; the prosperity of Virginia was then much greater than that of the Northern States. But the protectionist tariff, imposing excessive duties on European products, prevented all direct trade between the South and Europe. Thus the South saw itself compelled to sell its raw materials in the North, at a price which suited the latter, which, by skilfully devised duties, had succeeded in removing all foreign participation from American markets.

After the war of 1812-1814 against England, manufacturers in the Northern States acquired a great development. In 1816 the duties on foreign objects were raised, as well to protect indigenous manufactures as to pay the national debt, the legacy of the late war. This protectionist tariff met with a lively opposition in the country. Its adversaries at once made the remark, that the Constitution did not recognise in the Federal Government any right to create imposts to protect one branch of national industry to the detriment of another; and then, that these protectionist laws injured the interests of the states producing raw materials, and deprived the inhabitants of those states of their legitimate right to sell in the dearest and buy in the cheapest market.

Prohibitive duties received, in 1824, a new augmentation, to the great displeasure of the Southern States, which, however, resigned themselves to it, hoping that, the public debt once paid, these imposts would disappear. In 1828 the adoption of a series of prohibitive laws in favour of the hemp and wool of the West, the iron

of Pennsylvania, and the cotton goods of New England, highly exasperated the Southern States, which saw well that the majority had resolved to render this system of imposts permanent.

In 1831, the debt having been discharged, and Congress refusing to reduce the duties on goods of foreign manufacture, the people of South Carolina met and appointed delegates to a State Convention. These there set forth the grievances of the Southerners. "Of what importance to the Southern States is the creation of a government highly centralized? These states will never form anything but a minority in the country. They differ from the states of the majority in institutions, industry, and interests;—their interests, indeed, are incompatible with those of the North. It will happen, therefore, that they will not be governed according to their own interests, or according to their own views and sentiments, but according to the interests and prejudices of the states of the majority. . . . Under the pretext of obtaining the means of liquidating the public debt, and of providing for the defence and well-being of the entire country, certain laws have been adopted, the avowed end of which is to preserve the monopoly of our market exclusively to American manufacturers, to the great detriment of those among us who produce commodities much sought after in European markets. Although a tax of ten or twelve per cent. suffices for all the legitimate expenditure of the government, a tax of fifty per cent. has been imposed on all the woollen and cotton goods, the cast and wrought iron, the sugar, salt, and nearly all other articles which the foreigner sends us in exchange for the cotton, rice, and tobacco of the South, in order to benefit those Northern manufacturers who produce the same articles. . . . The industry of the North is protected, and that of the South discouraged."

This was the language already prevalent in 1831. There was, after the South Carolina resistance, a passing appeasement, but the protectionist tariff did not the less continue till the Civil War, and was, indeed, one of the causes bringing it about.

Another reason which greatly influenced events was the long standing antipathy between the inhabitants of the North and those of the South. The population of the United States is far from being homogeneous. From the early times of the colonization a great diversity has shown itself. Cromwell's Roundheads, sectarian Puritans, emigrated in a crowd at the restoration of Charles II., in 1660. And they went to join their co-religionists in New England, who settled there under James I. and Charles I. Nearly all these Puritans belonged to the middle classes. This part of the United States, now subdivided into six small states, but still known under the general name of "New England," is a cold, barren, and stony country, on a subsoil of rock and granite, beaten by the waves of the Atlantic, under a rigorous sky. The Puritans who took refuge there, having hearts of rock and granite also, had to struggle against the rigour of the elements, after having suffered so much from the rigour of their fellow creatures. Persecuted, they founded there a society of persecutors. The exile of Roger Williams, and the hundreds of poor sorcerers who were burnt there, are sad proofs of this. The Civil War in 1861 testified that the old Puritan leaven had lost nothing of its harshness. Little by little its strong will has absorbed the social liberty of the individual for the profit of the mass, and imposed on all the North and West its scriptural phraseology, nasal accent, and meagre type, pale, angular, persevering, laborious, calculating, cold and agitated at the same time.

The American of the Northern States has further undergone the influence of a climate very different from that whence came his ancestors. In the South the sky is more clement; those long colds which strain the nerves are rare. Consequently the people here are more inclined to enjoy life. In the North the population is much mixed with German or Irish blood, without speaking of other varieties. Its type has been affected by it, sometimes approaching the Teuton or the Celt, sometimes, under the influence of climate, recalling the red-skins who were indigenous.

to the country. Lincoln was a striking example of this; a true Cherokee white, with straight hair, high cheekbones, unfathomable aspect, with a stony nature in the large hands, destined to manual labour, a nature withdrawing from intellectual work as much as possible. A mind of mediocrity, honourable and upright through the absence of passions, vulgar, but by no means wicked, loving allegory in the manner of common people, full of self-confidence, a believer in his own mission, a true representative of the most recent form of American democracy.

The Southern districts, on the contrary, were first colonized under the auspices and by the influence of the Court. Elizabeth, James I., and the two Charleses, granted to different noblemen territorial concessions on the banks of the Potomac and the river James. These sent, or, like the lords Baltimore and Fairfax, themselves conducted, thither numerous colonists—farmers, tradesmen, servants born on their English estates, or younger sons of good families seeking to better their condition. Very naturally, this society was a reflection of that which it had left behind it. Founded by the Cavaliers, it carried into Virginia toasts to the confusion of the regicides, and continued to be essentially aristocratic—the antipodes, consequently, of the neighbouring colonies of New England. The refugee Huguenots in Carolina, Louisiana, an old French colony, and Florida, peopled by Spaniards, came in time to join the Southern States, and render still more marked the contrast between the Southern and Northern parts of the United States.

By the introduction of negroes from Africa, a new element was introduced, which increased the features of difference between the Virginians and Puritans. The Southerner had not, like the Northerner, to struggle against a harsh and barren nature. Field-work, the cultivation of the vast territories granted by the crown, was in the charge of this African race, introduced apparently in such a providential manner. It is proper to say here that, for a long time, the colonial assemblies of the South

protested to the mother country against this traffic; but too many people profited by it, and many a large fortune in Old and New England proceeds from this impure source.

Thus it is not doubtful that the great qualities of the Northerners, the companions of the Winthrops and Cottons, were developed in this contest against so many difficulties; they extended their influence over the neighbouring colonies, and everywhere established the foundations of that power which has become the United States.

The Southerner, on the contrary, a planter and hunter, of open nature, and not mercenary, living in a more enervating country, and preserving entire the good qualities of the English race from which he descended, did not acquire new traits. He remained a European transplanted into Virginia, while his New England neighbour identified himself thoroughly with his new country, and worked incessantly to subdue and appropriate it, to develop all its riches. The first seemed somewhat denationalised in this nineteenth century, the second was a most faithful expression of his origin. Thus the diversity of race, the difference of habits, manners, and occupations, methods of education absolutely opposed—all have contributed to render the discord to which the Union has been a prey the more profound.

The great qualities of the English colonists who founded the United States, and of their descendants, have been described by the most eloquent writers of the two worlds; consequently, we only seek here to seize the contrast between the two branches of the English race who have peopled the North and the South.

But there were other causes which rendered the relations between the two halves of the Union more difficult. The contest between them dates back to a period long before the Constitution. On two important questions their rivalry had been great. One had reference to the territory of Virginia, the other to the navigation of the Mississippi. No question could be dearer to the American colonists than that which touched their territory; it

was their future. It shows clearly the little agreement there was between the North and South, without recourse being had to the troubled question of the plague of slavery, thrust continually to the front by too many writers as the veritable and only cause of the war.

The Virginian territory, before the formation of the American Union, would of itself have sufficed for a vast empire. Its limits extended to the Mississippi, comprising all Kentucky, and beyond the river Ohio to the Great Lakes, embracing an area equal to two-and-a-half times that of all France. In more modern times the following states have been formed out of it:—Ohio (39,971 square miles in area); Indiana (33,152 square miles); Illinois (54,336 square miles); Michigan (55,149 square miles); Wisconsin (53,728 square miles); Minnesota (84,457 square miles); Dacotah (about 154,450 square miles); which, added to the two Virginias, East and West (32,704 square miles, and 23,253 square miles respectively), and Kentucky proper (36,936 square miles), gives a grand total of 531,200 square miles, while the whole of France occupies but 209,428 square miles.

It may be easily imagined that, with such a territorial preponderance, all union with the neighbouring colonies, some of them very small, would have been impossible. This obstacle was removed by an act emanating from Virginia itself, an act of which history probably offers no other example. Not only did it, in 1783, cede to the United States all its territory north-west of the Ohio, but, by an ordinance of 1787, it consented further that slavery should be excluded from all these vast dominions in perpetuity. The states which have been formed of these ceded territories were, as is well known, nearly all ranged against Virginia in the vehement and pitiless war of 1861. The North has never exhausted its eulogies on this great act of generous disinterestedness, on the sacrifice which Virginia made to the Union. Why did it not follow such an example, not according to the letter, but according to the spirit? The order, harmony, peace, and

prosperity of the New World would not then have been so cruelly and foolishly troubled.

Virginia, it is true, had fixed two conditions to this concession. The first was, that the country ceded should never form but *five* states. The second was, that all fugitive slaves who were found on this territory, or on states subsequently formed from it, should be given up to their owners. In 1784, however, there was already a thought in the North of dividing the territory under consideration into *ten* states, and to admit each state into the Union when its population came to equal that of the least populous of the states already in the Confederation. This project was intended to augment, as much as possible, the relative power of the free states, that is to say, of the North. Thus, from the earliest disagreement, we see the Northern party displaying its intention of increasing its preponderance, and the Southern party seeking only to preserve its independence in the Union, and make it respected.

The two conditions which Virginia had made were treated as if they did not exist. It has been pretended that that which had reference to fugitive slaves was immoral, and consequently ought not to be observed.

As to the Mississippi question, it will suffice to recollect that, in 1786, this river marked the boundary between the United States and the countries dependent on the crowns of France and Spain. When, in 1787, the Convention assembled at Philadelphia to discuss the new Constitution, the *seven* Northern States only appeared disposed to cede to the Spaniards the exclusive right of the navigation of the Mississippi, which step would have paralysed in its infancy the development of the Western and Southern States, and for a long time rendered safe the political predominance of the North.

It was under the influence of sentiments awakened by these conflicts that, on the 15th of May, 1787, the representatives of the North and of the South were opposed to each other, resolved on either side, if a more intimate union was to be established between

them, to take care that, in the Confederation, their rights, interests, independence and liberty should be efficaciously regarded. At that epoch slavery afforded no obstacle, and ruffled no one. But it was not easy, even then, to conciliate people whose interests agreed so badly. All that could be accomplished was to slip over difficulties which were insurmountable. When one reads afresh the history of this Convention, and remarks all the precautions taken by the North against the South, and by this against its rival, there can only be astonishment at the ignorance of those writers of the Old World who pretend that slavery was the only cause of the Civil War of 1861.

Neither of the two parties wished to regulate definitively the powers to be entrusted to the Central Government, before ascertaining what portion of the control over these powers would return to each of them, and what influence each would have on the course of the government. As, in order to refine this control and influence, it was necessary first to decide the proportion and mode of representation of each region in the Federal Congress, it followed that, of all questions debated in the Convention, none was discussed with more violence and obstinacy than that which had reference to the manner in which the representatives would be elected. More than once, in connection with this question, they were on the eve of a total misunderstanding and a dissolution of the Union.

The relation between population and the number of representatives offers some very curious comparisons. Thus, in 1789, there was one representative to 33,000 inhabitants; according to the census of 1860, each delegate represented 127,381 inhabitants. In the first chamber of representatives, under General Washington, ten members sat for the State of Virginia, as against six for the State of New York; in the last, under Buchanan, Virginia had eleven members against thirty for New York. South Carolina at first nominated one-thirteenth of the representatives sitting in Congress; in 1860 it was no longer represented but by four

members in a chamber of 233. The North, therefore, had in Congress the disposal of a majority so crushing, that it had only to act unanimously in order to nullify all opposition coming from the South. Mr. Lincoln, at the presidential election of 1861, polled 1,858,200 votes. The other candidates had combined, Douglas, 1,276,780, Breckenridge, 812,500, and Bell, 735,554. Here was a total of 2,824,874, or nearly a million more than Lincoln. But, having obtained the relative majority, the latter was declared elected. His election was purely geographical. All the Northern States, except New Jersey, had voted for him; all the Southern States against. He was not nominated for himself, being unknown, but his name possessed a significance which caused great fear to the South. In Congress, the North counted 183 votes, the South only 120. In 1840, the abolitionist party had been able to assemble only 7,000 votes; in 1860, it gathered together nearly 2,000,000, and succeeded in carrying its candidate for the presidential chair. There was nothing to be hoped for from the conservative democratic party, the Southern ally in the North; it no longer existed. In critical times there was a place only for extremes.

The South has been severely blamed for having retired from the Union when its preponderating power escaped it, after having wielded it without interruption from the foundation of the United States. This is true; the South had exercised at Washington a great political preponderance, but it did not thereby menace any of the institutions established in the North, it demanded from it no sacrifice, it did not seek to bring about any revolution on its own behalf. Its political projects never had anything aggressive in them. The South was continually on the defensive.

"Do not forget," said Senator Hammond, of South Carolina, answering Mr. Seward, who bragged in the Senate that henceforth the North would govern the country; "Do not forget—for that would be impossible, for it is one of the most brilliant pages in the history of mankind—that we slave-owners of the South took charge

of our country from its cradle, and that after having governed it for sixty years out of the seventy it has lived, we give it back to your hands without a stain on its honour, flourishing and prosperous, inexhaustible in its resources, high-spirited in the development of its forces, the envy and admiration of the whole world. The future will demonstrate what you will do with it; but no future will be able to tarnish our glory, or diminish your responsibility."

As long as the South prevailed in the councils of the nation, certain persons belonging to the radical party in the North were simply deprived of places, and did not attain to power. But from the day when the North, acting not only as a political party, but also as a people united for an end, supplanted the South, the latter was exposed to something much more serious than a passing evil or antagonistic ambition—it was the accession at Washington of a despotism of a section which threatened the institutions, fortune, and life of the entire people of the Southern States. The South, armed with central power, only injured a certain political party in the North, the abolitionists; the North, master at Washington, held in its hands the repose and prosperity of every individual in the South. It was, therefore, very natural for the latter to withdraw from an association where the stake was so unequal, and where its loss must inevitably lead to its ruin.

Without carrying our retrospective researches further, we think enough has been said to demonstrate clearly how profound and legitimate was the antagonism between North and South, from the times which preceded the definitive establishment of the Federal Constitution, and how, in these latter years, this state of things has only grown worse.

The belief, therefore, must not be permitted that slavery was the real subject of the strife. This, to-day, would be a proof of marvellous ignorance, or of an unpardonable bias. A question so complex could not be reduced to terms so simple. What rules everything in this great fratricidal war, and in the parliamentary

storms which preceded it, is the struggle of federalism against centralization, the desperate resistance of states feeling themselves menaced in their right of self-government, and on the eve of being absorbed into a Unitarian power. The duel becoming envenomed, everything coming to hand was converted into a weapon. The question of slavery, which should have had, and would have had, a happy termination, with the aid of time and mutual concessions, offered to the fanatic partisans of abolition in America and elsewhere too tempting an opportunity for them to neglect making use of it.

To seek to establish a strong centralization in the United States was less excusable than in any other country whatever. There were no dangerous neighbours; nothing in local institutions shackled individual liberty; military, civil, and commercial liberty, in fact, existed everywhere. Only the thirst to exclude their adversaries from power, stained with the name of slave-traders, but whose true wrong was that of being sincere conservatives, little disposed to allow themselves to be invaded by the radical ideas so much in favour in the North, set fire to the train.

Slavery was to disappear; but it is to be regretted that, by enveloping in the same ruin all that the South contained of conservative and respectable elements, that half of the Union was devoted to destruction, which was a counterpoise to the political fanaticism, financial corruption, and impassioned love of change so developed in the North. This country of the Washingtons, Jeffersons, Lees, Munroes, Madisons—this nursery of statesmen, where the social life allowed men to prepare themselves to guide their fellow-creatures—is to-day represented in congress by illiterate negroes—a crying anomaly which the North would not permit as regards itself, but which it has imposed on the conquered South!

In spite of all the faults with which it can be reproached, the work of bygone generations which obeyed the Washingtons, Adamses, and Hamiltons, has left grand and beautiful traces. It

knew how to ally a wise love of liberty with respect for the past. It remains to be seen whether the actual régime, where only mediocrities and characters often wanting in honour predominate, will leave to future generations a testimony which shall cause them to forget, in spite of the deficiences which have had such sad consequences, the Act of Independence, and the wise institutions which emanated from the founders of the American Union.

CHAPTER II.

ORIGIN OF THE LEE FAMILY.—GENERAL LEE'S EARLY CAMPAIGNS.—HIS RETIREMENT FROM THE FEDERAL ARMY.

THE character of a man is always best explained and understood when one knows something of his origin. He often resumes and accumulates in his person the most remarkable qualities of his ancestors. In General Lee we shall discover more than one trait of the members of his family. The Lees of Virginia spring from an old English family, whose patrimonial estates were situated in Essex. In 1192, we find a Lionel Lee at the head of a company of gentlemen, accompanying Richard Cœur de Lion in the third crusade. He so distinguished himself at the Siege of Saint Jean d'Acre, that, on his return, King Richard created him Earl of Lichfield, and gave him the property of *Ditchley*, a name which subsequently was borne by one of the Lees' estates in Virginia. The armour which Lionel wore in the Holy Land can still be seen in the Tower of London.

In 1542, Richard Lee entered Scotland with the Earl of Surrey. Two members of the family were at that time Knights of the Garter, and their banners, with the Lees' arms above, are suspended in St. George's Chapel at Windsor.

Under Elizabeth, Sir Henry Lee was a Knight of the Garter. The title of Earl of Lichfield was still in the Lee family in 1674.

Richard Lee, the seventh son of Sir Robert Lee, of Hullcott, and younger brother of Sir Henry Lee, of Ditchley, came to Virginia in the reign of Charles I. as secretary to the colony.

After an absence in England, he returned to settle for good in the country. Altogether royalist, like all his family, he did not wait for the end of the English Commonwealth to proclaim Charles II. The rest of his days were given up to the care of his vast estates, and the direction of the affairs of the colony.

Thomas Lee, grandson of Richard, was President of the Colonial Council, and Governor of Virginia, the first man of American birth named to this post by the English Government. Three of his sons played a remarkable part in the War of Independence: Richard Henry Lee, one of the best orators and debaters in the United States Congress; Francis Lightfoot Lee, one of the signatories to the Act of Independence; and Arthur Lee, who represented, in France and elsewhere, the colonial insurgents.

General Henry Lee, the contemporary and friend of Washington, father of General R. E. Lee, was grandson of a brother of President Lee. He took service in 1776. After having valiantly and brilliantly fought under the eyes of Washington, he went, in 1781, with his regiment of light cavalry, become celebrated by its exploits, to join General Green's corps in the Carolinas.

There he rendered great service in the series of operations which led to the surrender of the English army under Lord Cornwallis. The memoirs left by him on his campaign are remarkable. He was a man of well-cultivated mind, as is proved by some admirable letters addressed to one of his sons, very energetic, brilliant in conversation, having in a very high degree the *mens æqua in arduis*. Become Governor of Virginia and member of congress, he pronounced the funeral oration of Washington. He died himself in 1818.

It was at Stratford, in the county of Westmoreland (Virginia), that Robert Edward Lee, the third son of the preceding, was born. Before passing to the accidental events of Robert Lee's public life, let us stop a moment to contemplate the old dwelling where he first saw the light, on January 19th, 1807. Those old walls,

mute and sad witnesses of the past, attract us, not only because they saw the birth of an illustrious man, but also because they recall to us a state of society which exists no longer, and of which they are one of the last remaining monuments.

Stratford House was originally built by Richard Lee, the first of the name who came to America. It was destroyed by a fire in the beginning of the eighteenth century, in the time of Thomas Lee. A member of the council-royal, Thomas Lee was much beloved; as soon as the disaster was known, contributions flowed in on all sides from persons desirous to testify to him their esteem. Queen Caroline herself wished to contribute, and wrote Lee an autograph letter. The mansion rapidly rose again; the bricks of which it was built, the wainscoting, and furniture all came from England. Goodly dwellings like this had at that time their reasonable purpose. Lost in the depths of the country, they served as a refuge and place of assembly for all the members of the family.

The eldest son succeeded the father, and the representative of the family continued to reside there from generation to generation. These times exist no longer; and the love of the hearth and family recollections have disappeared with them.

Lee was deeply imbued with these sentiments of former times; he loved the old country-houses of old Virginian families, simple-minded and honourable folks, attached, like himself, to the soil of Virginia.

Stratford, the old home of the Lees, situated on a hillock which rises on the left bank of the Potomac, is a building sufficiently large. The estate is well wooded. Oaks, cedars, and maple-trees abound there. In the interior, the distribution of the rooms, the style of the wainscot and mouldings, the appearance of the halls and corridors, all remind us of the times of powdered perriwigs and silk stockings. It was here that, after the War of Independence, General Henry Lee retired to live. Three generations of Lees had lived here, leading a large-hearted and hospitable existence.

In each generation more than one distinguished man had attracted there the élite of colonial society; those ancient walls had resounded with the noise of fêtes; the great gate had never been closed, everybody was welcome, and the type of a life there existed which one looks for now in vain, but which had at least the merit of being cordial, generous, and engaging. Henry Lee, the brilliant warrior, was, like all his race, given to expense; with him the cover was ever laid, all who came were well received; whence it happened that his latter years were straitened.

It was in this abode, become silent and solitary, in the same room where several of his distinguished ancestors were born, that Robert Edward Lee first saw the day.

The first looks of his infancy were directed to those old rooms, those large paternal fields and familiar rural occupations, those oaks and poplars over which the wind brought him the murmurs of the Potomac. It was thus that there became gradually impressed on his young heart a love for the soil, for country life, for his fatherland, for his family.

Surrounded as he was by portraits, parchments, and other tokens, which recalled the already ancient origin and position of his forefathers, the child saw, in one of the rooms of the manor house, his father, sick and grey-headed, not long since the friend of Washington and Greene, writing an account of the battles in which he had drawn the sword for the defence of his country.

It was amidst such surroundings that young R. E. Lee grew up. His character was deeply affected by them, for he was at an age when the mind receives each new impression; thus to his last day he remained simple-minded, true, worthy, courteous, the type of a Virginian country gentleman. He rejoiced in a view of the fields; he loved horses, and rode admirably; rural occupations and the murmur of streams had for him many more charms than cities and crowds. In the year of his death he wrote to a friend: "My visits to Florida and the White Sulphur (mineral springs in Virginia) have not benefited me much; but it did me good to go

to the White House (an estate belonging to one of his sons), and see the *mules walking round, and the corn growing.*"

A last and inestimable advantage which he owed to this simple and manly country life, was the robust and vigorous health which resisted all the trials of war. Strong as a forest oak, he appeared equally insensible to want of sleep, hunger, thirst, cold, and heat.

"Robert was always good," wrote his father. All his youth, all his life proved this. In 1811, his family removed to live in Alexandria, a small town situated nearly opposite Washington, which offered more conveniences for the education of the children. Robert remained there with his mother and sisters till, having decided on a military career, he was sent, at the age of eighteen, to the military school of West Point, where Virginia paid the expenses of his education. This school, situated in the village of the same name, on the Hudson River, in the state of New York, was founded in 1802, on the model of St. Cyr, and its studies were very severe. Lee left in 1829, the second in his class. He had been remarked for his studious habits and exemplary conduct. From this time his living was temperate; he drank only water, and did not smoke. Nominated as a lieutenant of engineers, he was for several years employed in fortifying the United States' boundaries. In 1832, he married Mary, daughter of George Washington Parke Custis, grandson of Washington's wife, and adopted son of Washington himself, who, having no children, had adopted two of his wife's grandchildren.

Miss Custis brought the young officer a large landed fortune, of which later events in part deprived him. This marriage, in the eyes of the world, made Robert Lee the representative of the family of the founder of American liberty. In estimating his conduct at the beginning of the Civil War, it is necessary not to lose sight of this fact.

The war which broke out in 1847, between the United States and Mexico, found Robert Lee arrived at the rank of captain. He

commanded the engineers during the whole campaign. At the siege of Vera Cruz he rendered signal service. Pursued by the American army into the interior, the Mexican troops halted on the heights of Cerro Gordo, and there gave battle, which was well contended for. Captain Lee had, at the head of his pioneers, to make several dangerous reconnoitrings. In three days he constructed a road, by which, unknown to the enemy, he brought up some light batteries. The extreme left of the Mexicans was turned, and the whole army obliged to surrender. General Santa Anna confessed that he did not think a goat would have been able to climb on that side. It was not an easy thing to construct a road all along steep declivities, over deep fissures, and lastly, under the Mexican fire. To protect the workmen it was necessary to fight. Captain Lee was nobly seconded by Lieutenant Beauregard of the Engineers. Already we find these two names associated.

In all the other affairs, and especially in the last, the battle of Chapultepec, which caused the capital to fall into the hands of General Scott, Lee was continually remarked for his military talents, conducting works for attack, directing columns, advising his general-in-chief, and often taking part in the most sanguinary combats. He was wounded at Chapultepec, and obliged to leave the field of battle. In the official report, General Scott did justice to the gallant conduct of his chief of engineers, and passed great encomiums on him. From that day the old soldier felt himself attracted in a peculiar manner towards the young officer. In 1847, Lee was promoted to the rank of major, for his services at Cerro Gordo, and later he received his brevet as lieutenant-colonel, after the battles of Contreras and Cherubusco.

He was entrusted, in 1852, with the place of Superintendent of the Military School, twenty-three years after having quitted it a lieutenant. In 1855, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, he passed into one of the new cavalry regiments. This regiment (the second) was, for several years, stationed on the Texas frontier, where it had to struggle continually against the Indians of that region. A

great number of officers, who later became distinguished in the Civil War, were at that time in the squadrons of the second regiment of cavalry. Thus, Colonel Albert Sidney Johnston, Lieutenant-Colonel R. E. Lee, First Major Hardee, Second Major Thomas, Captains Van Dorm and Kirby Smith, Lieutenants Hood, Crosby, Fitzhugh Lee, Johnston and Stoneman, attained the rank of general in one or the other army. It is rare to see a single regiment furnish so many remarkable names.

The subjoined fragment of a letter (addressed about this time by Lee to his wife) will show the sentiments the young colonel already had on the political affairs of his country:

"Fort Brown, Texas, 27th Dec. 1856.

". . . . . I was much pleased with the President's Message. His views of the systematic and progressive efforts of certain people at the North to interfere with and change the domestic institutions of the South, are truthfully and faithfully expressed. The consequences of their plans and purposes are also clearly set forth. These people must be aware that their object is both unlawful and foreign to them and to their duty, and that this institution (*i.e.* slavery) for which they are irresponsible and unaccountable, can only be changed by *them* through the agency of a civil and servile war. There are few, I believe, in this enlightened age, who will not acknowledge that slavery, as an institution, is a moral and political evil in any country. It is useless to expatiate on its disadvantages. I think it a greater evil to the white than to the black race. While my feelings are strongly enlisted in behalf of the latter, my sympathies are more strong for the former. The blacks are immeasurably better off here than in Africa, morally, physically, and socially. The painful discipline they are undergoing is necessary for their further instruction as a race, and, I hope, will prepare them for better things. How long their servitude may be necessary is known and ordered by a merciful Providence. Their emancipation will

sooner result from the mild and melting influence of Christianity, than from the storms and tempests of fiery controversy. This influence, though slow, is sure. The doctrines and miracles of our Saviour have required nearly 2000 years to convert but a small portion of the human race, and even among Christian nations what gross errors still exist! While we see the course of the *final* abolition of human slavery is still onward, and give it the aid of our prayers, and of all justifiable means in our power, we must leave the progress, as well as the result, in His hands who sees the end; who chooses to work by slow influences; with whom 2000 years are but as a single day. Although the abolitionist must know this, must know that he has neither the right nor the power of operating, except by moral means, and that, to benefit the slave, he must incite angry feelings in the master; that although he may not approve the mode by which Providence accomplishes its purpose, the result will still be the same; that the reasons he gives for interference in what he has no concern with, hold good with every kind of interference with our neighbour; still I fear he will persevere in his evil course.

". . . . Is it not strange that the descendants of those Pilgrim Fathers who crossed the Atlantic to preserve their own freedom of opinion, have always proved themselves most intolerant of the spiritual liberty of others?"

Profiting by a leave of absence, in 1859, he went home to his family at Arlington. This was a very large estate which had belonged to General Washington. At his death his adopted son, Mrs. Lee's father, had inherited it. Arlington has since been confiscated and made into a public cemetery. During these events the rising of John Brown took place, a prelude, in some sort, to the Civil War. This fanatic, urged on by the abolitionists, got possession, one fine morning, of the Federal Government Arsenal at Harper's Ferry, a small town on the Potomac, above Washington. He and his companions, after having pillaged this establishment, where they found several thousands of rifles, spread

themselves in the environs, calling the slaves to arms, and seizing all the white proprietors whom they could get possession of. The next day, when recovered from their surprise, the militia of the neighbouring counties assembled to stifle the revolt.

The telegraph carried the news to Washington, grossly exaggerating it. In the absence of General Scott, President Buchanan, on the advice of his Secretary of War, summoned Colonel Lee, and confided to him the care of the operations against Harper's Ferry. Hastily gathering some troops, Lee arrived on the scene of the insurrection. The insurgents had barricaded themselves inside the arsenal, and kept prisoners there Colonel Washington and various other citizens, as hostages, hoping the troops would not dare to fire on them for fear of killing the prisoners. After some parleying, as Brown refused to surrender, Lee made an assault, and obtained possession of all the insurgents, several of whom were either killed or wounded. When once the prisoners were in the hands of civil justice, Lee returned to the capital, and shortly after, his leave having expired, he rejoined his regiment at San Antonio, in Texas, where he commanded in chief.

The election of Mr. Lincoln, in 1861, to the presidency of the United States, caused the liveliest agitation throughout the country. What everybody feared, without believing it possible, actually happened. The Southern States withdrew from the Union, and formed a new confederation, composed exclusively of slave states, under the name of the Confederate States of America.

We have already spoken of the causes which led to this result; they were numerous. Several, indeed, were inherent in the very essence of the Union, and would, in a given time, have worked its downfall. The authors of the Federal agreement had unhappily regulated the constitution in such a manner that this result was inevitable. As long as this constitution remained in vigour, neither the Federal Government nor the Northern States had the least *right* to force any state to remain in the Union in spite of itself. Whatever change the war has brought about in

the United States' system of government, there is no doubt that the Southern States, in withdrawing from the Union, availed themselves of an incontestable right.

Virginia was the last state to quit the Union. This "mother of presidents," as it was called—six of the thirteen presidents (before 1861) having been Virginians by birth—feeling that its past glory was intimately allied to that of the United States, and that by its geographical position it would be called upon to be the theatre of the war, had remained in the Union to the last moment, without wishing to leave it as long as there was any chance of remaining in it on honourable conditions. The Virginian Legislative Assembly suggested the Peace Conference which assembled at Washington in February, 1861. Its representatives to Congress sought by all means to arrive at an amicable arrangement. Finally, the convention assembled at Richmond sent delegates to Mr. Lincoln to persuade him to pursue a more peaceable policy.

But the conduct of the Federal Government in bringing about the capture of Fort Sumter, and President Lincoln's proclamation demanding 75,000 men to restrain the separated states by force, left Virginia no other alternative than that of uniting its destiny with that of its Southern sisters, or of joining the North to oppress them. Her choice could not be doubtful. She had laboured to bring about a pacific agreement, and all her labours had been useless. She, therefore, was compelled to prepare herself to repulse the attack with which she would be threatened.

Colonel Lee, camped among the Indians, several days' march from every great town, was outside the great movement agitating the country. Nevertheless, he followed the march of events with disquiet, as these lines of a letter, dated from Fort Mason, prove.

"Texas, 23rd January, 1861.

"I have received Everett's *Life of Washington*. How his spirit would be grieved could he see the wreck of his mighty labours!

I will not, however, permit myself to believe, until all the ground for hope is gone, that the fruit of his noble deeds will be destroyed, and that his precious advice and virtuous example will so soon be forgotten by his countrymen. As far as I can judge by the papers, we are between a state of anarchy and civil war. May God avert both of these evils from us! I fear that mankind for years will not be sufficiently Christianized to bear the absence of restraint and force. I see that four states have declared themselves out of the Union; four more will apparently follow their example. Then, if the border states are brought into the gulf of revolution, one half of the country will be arrayed against the other. I must try and be patient, and await the end, for I can do nothing to hasten or retard it. . . . ."

General Scott, perceiving the gravity of what was brewing, and wishing to have at hand a man of whom he might be sure, recalled Lee immediately. Scarcely had he returned to Arlington before he was summoned to Washington. President Lincoln offered him the effective command of the Federal army, old General Scott being too infirm to take the field in person. The latter also conjured him, in the name of their old friendship, not to quit the army, seeking by all possible arguments to shake Lee's already settled resolution.

This magnificent offer was, in effect, one of those temptations which but few officers would have been able to resist. But Lee did not hesitate to oppose a formal and immediate refusal to all the propositions made to him. One must be a soldier to understand all that he had to experience. On the one hand, his education at West Point, his habits of discipline, his life passed entirely under the flags of the Union, retained him in the service of the United States; on the other, his love for Virginia called to him to abandon all for her. He felt also that the crisis had been hastened by political leaders, whose ideas he was far from sharing. He knew too well, from a military point of view, the resources of the different regions of the Union, not to be able to measure,

without illusion, all the dangers which the South was about to run. For a quarter of a century Lee had served in the United States army with distinction. He actually held in the eyes of the army and country the first place after the veteran Scott, public opinion designating him beforehand as his successor in the command-in-chief. If he remained in the service of the North, there were no honours to which he might not aspire. The official offer just made to him was a guarantee of this, and no efforts were wanting to induce him to accept it. On the contrary, he knew that, if he associated his destiny with that of Virginia, miseries and trials without number were awaiting him; he and his ran the risk of being ruined; he would be proclaimed a traitor in the face of the world by the very government he had loved so much and served so honourably. The trial was terrible, and if he had obeyed convictions less pure, or a sentiment less elevated, ambition would have gained the day.

But his conduct appeared ready sketched for him. He was convinced that Virginia had the right to act as she intended, although, with his sound practical sense, he foresaw the cruel sufferings which must result from it. A Virginian by birth, he thought his state had the first right to his services, that it was his duty to obey the call of Virginia without hesitation or discussion. He therefore espoused the cause of his province. His resolution had been dictated by an inward conviction of his conscience, after mature reflection. To seek his duty, and, having found it, to do it, such was ever the principle of his actions.

"My husband has wept tears of blood," Mrs. Lee wrote to a friend, "over this terrible war; but he must, as a man and a Virginian, share the destiny of his state, which has solemnly pronounced for independence."

The two following letters will show what Lee experienced in leaving the United States army. The first is that in which he sent in his resignation; it is addressed to General Scott.

"Arlington, Virginia, April 20th, 1861.

"GENERAL,

"Since my interview with you on the 18th inst., I have felt that I ought not to retain my commission in the army. I therefore tender my resignation, which I trust you will recommend for acceptance. It would have been presented at once but for the struggle it has cost me to separate myself from a service to which I have devoted all the best years of my life, and all the ability I possessed.

"During the whole of that time, more than a quarter of a century, I have experienced nothing but kindness from my superiors, and the most cordial friendship from my comrades. To no one, General, have I been so much indebted as to yourself for uniform kindness and consideration; and it has always been my ardent desire to merit your approbation. I shall carry to the grave the most grateful recollections of your kindness and consideration; and your name and fame will always be dear to me.

"Save in defence of my native state, I never desire again to draw my sword. Be pleased to accept my most earnest wishes for the continuance of your happiness and prosperity, and believe me most truly yours,

"R. E. LEE.

"Lieutenant-General Wingfield Scott,
"Commanding United States Army."

The next is addressed to his eldest sister, whose husband had very pronounced opinions in favour of the North.

"MY DEAR SISTER,

"I am grieved at my inability to see you. . . . I have been waiting for a *more convenient season*, which has brought to many before me deep and lasting regret. Now we are in a state of war which will yield to nothing. The whole South is in a state of revolution, into which Virginia, after a long struggle, has been drawn; and though I recognise no necessity for this state of

things, and would have forborne and pleaded to the end for redress of grievances, real or supposed, yet, in my own person, I had to meet the question whether I should take part against my native state.

"With all my devotion to the Union, and the feeling of loyalty and duty of an American citizen, I have not been able to make up my mind to raise my hand against my relatives, my children, my home; I have, therefore, resigned my commission in the army, and, save in defence of my native state, with the sincere hope that my poor services may never be needed, I hope I may never be called on to draw my sword. I know you will blame me; but you must think as kindly of me as you can, and believe I have endeavoured to do what I thought right. . . . That God may guard and protect you and yours, and shower upon you everlasting blessings, is the prayer of your devoted brother,

"R. E. LEE."

Colonel Lee's resignation having been accepted on the 20th of April, he immediately went to Richmond, leaving behind the beautiful dwelling in which he had passed the best years of his life, and which soon was no longer to belong to him.*

Lee, having ceased to be a member of the United States army, was presently offered the place of commander-in-chief of the Virginian forces. Although he would not have sought this honour, he did not feel at liberty to refuse it. In answer to the President of the Convention assembled at Richmond, Lee thus expresses himself:

"Mr. President, and gentlemen of the Convention. Profoundly impressed with the solemnity of the occasion, for which I must say

* Arlington House was pillaged shortly after by the Federals. The beautiful Sèvres service given by Lafayette to Mrs. Washington, all the relics of Washington, the plate, family portraits, library, everything in fact, was taken. The family, persistently believing there would be no serious war, had carried away scarcely anything. Nothing has been restored since, and the soil has become Federal property.

I was not prepared, I accept the position assigned me by your partiality. I would have much preferred your choice had fallen upon an abler man. Trusting in Almighty God, an approving conscience, and the aid of my fellow citizens, I devote myself to the service of my native state, in whose behalf alone will I ever again draw my sword."

There was not a word of blame or reproach in this address for the adversaries of Virginia. This constant moderation, this absence of rancour, did not fall off in any of his actions or words during the continuance of the whole war. His heart bled, his soul was saddened, his deep patriotic grief left no place for bitterness or anger.

Installed, at the end of April, in his new office, General Lee lost not a moment in putting Virginia in a state of defence. His head-quarters were in the buildings of the Richmond Custom House; immense activity prevailed there. From the first, every one understood that Virginia, facing, as it did, the Federal capital, and constituting the extreme frontier of the new Confederacy, would necessarily be the theatre of the war. Its greatness, richness, and importance, as the chief of the Southern States, made it the principal object of Federal hostility. From all points of the Confederacy, therefore,—from Texas, Florida, the Carolinas, and Alabama,—convoys of provisions, war-ammunition, aids of all kinds, and thousands of men, were directed to Richmond. It was for Lee to give form to this confused mass, and the task was Herculean. Everything was wanted at once,—arms, cannon, powder, drill-instructors. Everything had to be organized: the commissariat, the service of provisions, the artillery, the staff. The volunteers who daily arrived in great numbers, thus responding to the appeal of the Confederate Government, brought devoted hearts and strong arms, but were without organization, discipline, or arms. To remedy what was lacking, and make these peaceable citizens into an effective army, would be the first duty of the new commander. He succeeded much more rapidly than could have

been believed. The troops were organized and equipped, all the strategic positions in the territory were occupied and fortified, and an unheard of life and activity were impressed on all the military services. Attention was also given to turning three steamers into ships of war.

On the 16th of May, Virginia formally entered the Southern Confederacy, and the Virginian soldiers were incorporated with the Confederate army. Lee passed as general into the service of the Confederacy, the third on the list, taking rank after Generals Cooper and Sidney Johnston. Generals Joseph E. Johnston and Beauregard completed the list of division generals. With that extreme modesty which was one of the most notable features of his character, Lee never sought opportunities to push himself forward, and however trifling the task assigned him, he was always happy to obey. Later, during the war, he well expressed his guiding sentiment when he said: "I will accept every position to which the country appoints me, and I will do my best in it." Here is the secret of all his success. He always did his best, never thinking, however trifling might be the thing he undertook, that it was too little to be done conscientiously.

In May, 1861, General Lee was fifty-four years old. All his faculties had arrived at their complete development. Of tall figure, he had still at that time a carriage somewhat stiff, owing to his military education; but gradually his appearance changed, and gave place to a grave and reflective air, the result of his heavy responsibility as commander-in-chief. The rude trials of the Civil War had not yet whitened his hair. His moustache was black, the rest of his beard close-shaved. His fine clear blue eyes, full of sweetness and benevolence, shone beneath his black eyebrows. One could not meet his look without loving him. His temperance was nearly absolute; he seldom drank anything but water, and was completely indifferent as to what he ate. Excess had never enfeebled his robust vigour. Grave, silent, shut up in himself, he impressed those who saw him for the

first time with the idea that he was a man endued with little sensibility. His sincerity, his frankness at all times, his great and generous heart, full of honour and candid simplicity, could only become known during the war.

The following letter, addressed to his eldest son, G. W. Custis Lee, a little while before the events narrated above, will show the degree to which his frankness and freedom from all subterfuge was carried:

"You must study to be frank with the world; frankness is the child of honesty and courage. Say just what you mean to do on every occasion, and take it for granted you mean to do right. If a friend asks a favour, you should grant it, if it is reasonable; if not, tell him plainly why you cannot; you will wrong him and wrong yourself by equivocation of any kind. Never do a wrong thing to make a friend or keep one; the man who requires you to do so, is dearly purchased at a sacrifice. Deal kindly, but firmly, with all your classmates; you will find it the policy which wears best. Above all, do not appear to others what you are not. If you have any fault to find with any one, tell him, not others, of what you complain; there is no more dangerous experiment than that of undertaking to be one thing before a man's face and another behind his back. We should live, act, and say nothing to the injury of any one. It is not only best as a matter of principle, but it is the path to peace and honour.

"In regard to duty, let me, in conclusion of this hasty letter, inform you that, nearly a hundred years ago, there was a day of remarkable gloom and darkness—still known as "the dark day"—a day when the light of the sun was slowly extinguished, as if by an eclipse. The legislature of Connecticut was in session, and as its members saw the unexpected and unaccountable darkness coming on, they shared in the general awe and terror. It was supposed by many that the last day—the day of judgment—had come. Some one, in the consternation of the hour, moved an adjournment. Then there arose an old Puritan legislator,

Davenport of Stamford, and said that, if the last day had come, he desired to be found at his place, doing his duty, and, therefore, moved that candles be brought in, so that the House could proceed with its duty. There was quietness in that man's mind, the quietness of heavenly wisdom and inflexible willingness to obey present duty. 'Duty, then, is the sublimest word in our language. Do your duty in all things, like the old Puritan. You cannot do more, you should never wish to do less. Never let me and your mother wear one grey hair for any lack of duty on your part."

Lee's greatest glory consisted in this, that he never failed in any of these precepts, that he always allowed himself to be guided by these wise maxims in the most terrible storms of a troubled life, and the most gloomy moments of the civil strife. His military glory, however great it may be, yields to that of his having had continually before his eyes the accomplishment of his duty as the supreme end of his life. He tendered his resignation from a sentiment of what was owing to the state in which he was born; at every step in his career this sentiment was his only guide, and when the grand collapse came, and the cause for which he fought was crushed, the inward conviction of having done his best took away from him the bitterness of defeat, and gave him that fearless calm which cannot be contemplated without admiration. "*Human virtues ought, in case of need, to equal human calamities*," were his words when all was lost, when all the minds around him bent under the accumulated weight of so much anguish and so many disasters. These words could only be uttered by a man who had made duty the first object of his life, and who had found the only glory worthy of the name in the accomplishment of it.

There are some persons who think that Lee was mistaken in embracing the cause of the South. This objection takes nothing from his greatness. What he did he at least regarded as right. The old Puritan whom he so much admired was neither calmer nor more resolute than he, when the last day of the cause for

which he struggled came. In the spring of 1865, it was manifest to all those who beheld him unshaken in the midst of the universal downfall, that his only ambition was "that he might be found at his post doing his duty."

It has been said that he sought to influence other officers of the United States army, natives of the South like himself, and so cause them to send in their resignation. Nothing can be less true. One of his old companions in arms testifies to the contrary in the following letter:

"Immediately after Mr. Lincoln's election, I wrote to him (i. e. General Lee) in the effusion of our old friendship, asking his advice, and seeking to know what he intended to do. My letter was not answered. We could not help being struck with this fact, that the scrupulous reserve which he always maintained in the discussion of political affairs, or the rigid exactness which he showed in fulfilling his military duties, had never been greater than in this moment of solemn crisis."

CHAPTER III.

THE COMPARATIVE RESOURCES AND FORCES OF THE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN STATES.

BEFORE pursuing this recital further, let us say a few words on the relative forces of the two adversaries in the great Civil War of 1861. According to the official census of 1860, the states and territories of the North contained a population of 22,877,000, in which were included some hundreds of thousands of negroes.

According to the same census, the population of the Confederate States was only 8,733,000, of whom 3,664,000 were negroes, so that, after deducting these from both sides, there remain in round figures 5,000,000 whites to uphold the struggle against 22,000,000. In these calculations we have taken no account of Kentucky and Missouri as Confederate States, inasmuch as the North occupied their territories, and made use of their resources, during the whole war. To be exact, we must remember that, after the month of May, 1862, the Northern armies were masters of the centre and west of Tennessee, nearly all Louisiana, part of Florida, the coasts of North and South Carolina, and the east and north of Virginia. The number of the inhabitants of the South who, for this reason, could not contribute to the support of the Confederate cause, may be estimated at 1,200,000. The South, therefore, during the greater part of the war, had only 3,800,000 whites to contend against 22,000,000 of the North. The neighbouring territories, beyond the frontiers of the Confederacy, furnished, it is true, some combatants to the

Southern cause, over and above the number already mentioned; but there was no reliance for material resources to be placed on districts in the power of the enemy. Indeed, material resources were still more disproportionate than population. The region which formed the Confederate States may be styled a country of plantations, producing cotton, tobacco, and rice, rather than an agricultural country, properly so called, producing corn, cattle, wool, horses, and everything which contributes to the maintenance of large armies, as in the North. The Northern part of the United States had the advantage also in the extent of its commerce, and the development of its manufactures. Everything which formerly had been in common, the army, the navy, the arsenals, the taxes,—in a word, the government,—remained with the North. The South had, therefore, while it fought, to create everything *ab ovo*.

There is an error to be rectified which consists in believing that a people, inhabiting a large country, finds in the forests, rivers, mountains, and especially in the vast spaces which hostile armies have to traverse, advantages against an invader—advantages which compensate for every other inferiority. This argument, as far as regards the Confederates, is utterly inapplicable. These apparent advantages were completely neutralised by the circumstances under which the war was carried on, and the geographical configuration of the country. At the commencement the invader had at his disposal numerous railways, drawing distant places nearer together, and facilitating the transport of provisions and war-material, no matter of what weight or bulk. Whatever might be done to destroy the iron ways, or render them useless to the Federals, they, having under their command a multitude of workmen, skilful engineers, machines and materials without limit, repaired the damage without delay. So that an invading army, as it advanced, repaired the railways, and made use of them to bring its base of operations, so to speak, quite to its rearguard. The cause of the greatest embarrassments

to an army which invades a hostile country was thus, in this case, wanting.

But what contributed most to snatch from the South the advantages which its vast territory would have been able to give, was the superiority which the North enjoyed at sea. All the navy remained to it. The South, a district of planters, had not the same resources as the North, a district of manufacturers and sailors. Hence the extreme facility with which the latter multiplied its ships and means of attack by water. It was not difficult for it to establish a blockade more and more effective, which deprived the Confederates of all succour from the foreigner. The Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico, forming two of the Southern boundaries, constituted a part, one might say, of the Northern territory, and furnished the Federals every facility for assailing the Confederacy. Let the reader imagine Bavaria attacked simultaneously on its four sides by Austria, Switzerland, and the other German States, all obeying the same will, and he will have some idea of the position of the Confederate States, with a population less than that of Bavaria, but with a territory infinitely more vast to defend, invaded by an enemy having two double bases of operation, at right angles to one another; whence the result, that whatever point of support a Confederate army might have, in defending one of its frontiers, its line of operations must necessarily be exposed to a flank attack from a Federal force coming to surprise it.

Add to this that the Confederate territory was intersected by rivers, often navigable for large ships, some flowing into the sea, which was in the power of the Federals, others communicating directly with the territory of the North, a resource which freed the invasion from all ordinary difficulties in other places and circumstances, especially when it was proved that the land-batteries could no longer close the passage of the rivers to iron-clad steamers. Thus the Federal steamers were able to pass in front of the forts constructed on the Mississippi with a view to the

defence of New Orleans, Memphis, and Vicksburg, sustaining their fire, it is true, but without any great damage. These towns, therefore, were at the mercy of the invader. Not only did the districts bordering on these rivers, and the towns on their banks, become the prey of the enemy, but the rivers themselves served as bases of operation. No Confederate army was thenceforward sure that it would not see the Federals masters of one of these rivers, and consequently at a new and unforeseen point of attack.

It is thus explained why, the South being on the defensive, most of the Confederate successes had no permanent results. Even before the fiercest part of the struggle, after the month of May, 1862, all the rivers (except a small portion of the Mississippi between Vicksburg and Port Hudson), were in the power of the Federals, and all the advantages resulting from extent of territory or vast distances to be traversed had, as regards the South, become illusory.

Lastly, let us compare the number of soldiers whom the two belligerent powers were able to bring into the field. The report of the Adjutant-General of the United States proves that the North, during the war, employed by land 2,530,000 combatants. General Shanks, who has compiled a statistical work on this war, estimates the number only at 2,335,951 men, of whom 83,944 were officers (nine of these were negroes), 2,073,112 white soldiers, and 178,895 negroes; 9,314 officers, 251,722 white soldiers, and 33,379 negroes fell on the Federal side.

In the North, all the able-bodied population fit to serve, but not under arms, had been enrolled, and the number of these enrolments was 2,784,000.

A curious fact to be noticed, whence arose the large number of mercenaries who served in the Federal ranks, is, that if the North had not had foreigners in her armies, nearly half of the whole population fit for service (2,530,000 as against 2,784,000,) would have been under her standards.

The number of volunteers disbanded at the end of the war, according to a table compiled with the greatest care, amounted to 1,034,000. The greatest number of combatants that the Federal government had in its service at a given moment was 1,072,500.

Five hundred horses or mules perished per day; 1,080 steamers, on the sea or by the rivers, served for the conveyance of the Northern armies, at a cost of 120,000 dollars per day; 8,000 cannons and 12,000,000 rifles were distributed among the Federals during the war.

To these figures, already formidable, must be added the regular navy of the United States; 126,553 sailors or marines served on the water, without counting the workmen and others employed in the dockyards and arsenals. On the 5th of December, 1864, the number of the United States ships of war was 559 steamers (of which 71 were iron-clads) and 112 sailing-vessels: total, 671.

Now let us glance at the Confederate armies. All the levies made by the South throughout the whole duration of the war only amounted to 660,000 men—a number very inferior to that of the combatants present under the Northern flags at any given moment. The total of the Southern levies, therefore, never reached above a quarter of those of the North, which would give us an average of 165,000 soldiers under arms at any one time.

If we take into account the fact, that a large number of Confederate recruits came from districts permanently occupied by the enemy, where runaways and deserters could not be pursued, we shall be justified in concluding that the number of Confederate forces present under arms at a given moment was necessarily inferior to that of the levies; but thanks to the patriotism of the Southerners, there was little of this, and in May, 1864, the South could put in line 264,000 combatants against the 970,000 whom, at that date, Mr. Lincoln opposed to them. She could not, however, possibly mobilize such a great number of men so easily

as the North. Her frontier was as extended; it must be protected; regard being had to their relative forces, the South was obliged to reserve a greater proportion for garrisons: whence the result, that General Grant could put in the field 620,000 men in May, 1864, while Mr. Davis had only 125,000 men to oppose him, counting all the different armies.

This disproportion of the forces will be still more strikingly realized, by comparing the number of combatants present on both sides, in the different principal battles. The official reports of Generals MacDowell and Beauregard showed, that at the first battle of Manassas, the final effort which decided the victory was attempted by 6,500 Confederates against 20,000 Federals, among whom were several regiments of regular troops. At Sharpsburg, in 1862, Lee's 33,000 Confederates repulsed 80,000 Federals.

At Chancellorsville, Lee and his 50,000 soldiers defeated General Hooker at the head of 108,000 men. In the "Wilderness," General Lee had only 50,000 Confederates to oppose 140,000 men under General Grant, and, without receiving any reinforcement, he continued to hold his own against the Federal army, increased, the losses which the Confederate fire made it undergo only excepted, by 60,000 new troops. At the battle of Winchester, in the autumn of 1864, Sheridan gained a dearly-bought success over General Early only by crushing 12,000 Confederates under the weight of his own 50,000 soldiers. In the final struggle, Lee's 33,000 soldiers were not dislodged from Petersburg and Richmond till after their adversaries had been successively increased to 180,000 men, and the remnant of Lee's truly heroic army did not finally surrender to this multitude till after it had been reduced to less than 8,000 bayonets. The number of 27,500 soldiers made prisoners at Appomatox came from this, that 20,000 famished stragglers and others on detached service profited by what they believed to be a definitive peace, to surrender themselves to the conquerors.

Thus the blockade cruelly paralyzed the South. For Mr. Davis would have been able to negotiate loans in Europe, by the aid of the abundant harvest of cotton and tobacco of 1861, as well as those of 1862 and 1863, diminished in bulk but increased in value, and to obtain also, perhaps, the recognition of the South by foreign powers. But in 1864, the cultivation of cotton was obliged to yield to that of cereals, in order that the inhabitants might have something to eat. Besides, the blockade, in the end, had become so effective, that the feebler of the two adversaries in this unequal strife was, so to speak, without arms and without nourishment, as if all its other disadvantages had not already been enough.

One last remark, which has also its importance. The Confederacy never had under its standards a good, solid, and well-organized army. Time failed it, and officers endued with knowledge were necessarily wanting. The Southerners, certainly very brave, had no experience in war. Since that of 1812, two generations had passed away amid the profoundest peace. Few men are born soldiers. For the greater number, that incessant self-denial, that cultivation of duty, that acquaintance with details, that care, that self-control, that faculty of commanding, that understanding of the art of attack and defence, which, joined to personal courage, constitute a good officer, all are acquired in a rude school. Experience in war alone can give these great military virtues. The Confederacy had, in a very short space of time, to organize and discipline a number of men greater, in proportion to its population, than any other nation of modern times.

It was necessary to employ thousands of officers, very few of whom had previously seen service. Throughout the whole of the country, not the tenth part of the knowledge wanted for the instruction and organization of armies was to be found. The results obtained argue much in favour of the military aptitude of the Southern people. For want of instruction, and of officers capable of giving it, the Confederate regiments seldom preserved their

line in a charge. On the contrary, they suffered from the fire of their own men.

The officers were never sufficiently masters of their soldiers to prevent them, when bullets were whistling past, from immediately answering the enemy's fire. In the best Confederate regiments, in the midst of a conflict, the ardent and burning inclination of the soldiers was obeyed rather than the commands of the officers.

This imperfect discipline corresponded also with the critical position of public affairs. New recruits were often obliged to join their regiments under pressing urgency, before they had even learnt their drill. Scattered about in different corps, these young soldiers, wholly given up to the duties of an active camp-life, getting supplies for long marches, mounting guard in the outposts, or crossing bayonets on the field of battle, could no longer find leisure to learn it. They did not even go into winter quarters, for campaigns lasted winter and summer. Want of discipline and the ignorance of the soldiers were the cause of the officers being exposed beyond measure, so that, in time, the best of them were captured or slain. The principle of election of the officers was the origin of the evil—the source of a relaxation of discipline.

This is why the Confederate armies, in spite of the heroic bravery of which they gave so many proofs, could scarcely, from their want of discipline and instruction, pretend to the name of regular armies.

General Lee, speaking of the great advantages which military instruction and the unity of action resulting from it give to soldiers, made apparent, in connection with the two armies then in presence of each other, the superiority which the Confederates would have over their adversaries, in spite of their small relative number, if their organization and discipline were what they ought to be: "But," added he, after a moment's silence, with a sadness very easy to understand, "I cannot give this instruction to my army, for the enemy detains my officers in his prisons."

The Federals had none of these difficulties to overcome. The

old army of the United States served them as a nucleus for the organization of their troops, most of the officers remaining in their service. Besides, they could legally draw from Europe mercenaries without number. As the aggressors, they could wait till their new recruits were sufficiently drilled, and choose, for attacking the South, the moment which most suited them; while the Confederates, not having the same freedom, must go to the encounter whether ready or not. Further, the invaders, having at their disposal a much more numerous population, as well as the whole world to recruit from, were always sure of having enough men under their flags, since their conflict was with an adversary whose forces only amounted to a quarter of their own.

It is a singular fact to be remarked, that the South furnished the North with legions of negroes nearly as numerous as the entire total of the Confederate armies.

The Minister of War (Federal) acknowledges in his official report having disbanded, at the end of the war, 170,000 negroes, who were mostly old Southern slaves. In justification of the different statements which have been made, we shall not be charged with exaggeration, if we fix at 500,000 the number of soldiers of foreign origin who served in the Federal armies. In the Confederate prisons half the captives were foreigners. Some brigades, like that of General Meagher, were composed of Irishmen, and whole divisions (that of Blenker, for instance) of Germans. Thus, then, to struggle against the 3,800,000 Southerners (men, women, and children), 200,000 negroes and 500,000 foreign mercenaries must be added to the 22,000,000 Northerners.

As this work is not written with the intention of recriminating against the North, and as it has not for its end to re-open old wounds, we shall say nothing of the systematic manner in which certain Northern generals undertook to devastate entire districts in the South, in order to starve out those who were so hard to conquer. It was an odd way of making their brothers love the Union yoke.

War is a cruel thing. Apparently there are but two ways of carrying it on. At all times there have been burning, sack, and pillage. Let us hope that the intention of the Federal Government, in authorizing such devastations, was to have done more promptly with the horrors of war, and that the chiefs who accepted such a mission reluctantly fulfilled it.

CHAPTER IV.

PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS.—CONFEDERATE VICTORY AT BULL'S RUN.

THE time of hesitation, skirmishing, uncertainty, had passed: it was for the cannon to speak. On the 17th of April, 1861, the feeble detachments of Federal troops stationed to guard the different arsenals and forts on the Virginian territory retired. The military arsenal of Norfolk, at the mouth of the James River, (so called in honour of King James I.), was given to the flames. Nevertheless, the Virginians arrived in time to save a great amount of war-material, as well as a great many ships and munitions, and a considerable quantity of artillery. Fortress Monroe, situated on a small island at some distance from the coast, alone remained in the power of the Federals. This fortress commanded the entrance of the James River. On the other hand, divers corps of Virginian troops were placed in such a manner as to cover the points which the Northern forces had power to menace.

This country, over which for four years all the horrors of war were about to be unchained, was, in 1861, a charming district, peopled by a race of generous and hospitable men. Peace and prosperity, joined to upright and patriarchal manners, somewhat behindhand if you like, had made it a corner of the world where the white race and the black race lived peaceably together, needful to each other, and insensibly bringing about the gradual emancipation of slaves by those thousands of daily relationships which blot out prejudices and engender sympathy.

In 1861, Virginia, which Sir Walter Raleigh had so named, in

1584, in honour of Queen Elizabeth, included an area of 55,958 square miles, a little more than one-fourth the surface of France. From east to west its extreme length was 326 miles, and from north to south the average distance was 193 miles.

On looking at a map of Virginia, one is struck with all that nature has done to render it rich and prosperous. Very easy of access, it presents a vast plain, little broken except near the mountains. Numerous rivers, with their affluents, offer so many means for penetrating to the heart of the country. The Potomac, with a course of 367 miles, serves as a boundary to the north, through two-thirds of its extent, between Maryland and Virginia. The James has a length of 280 miles. The York, Rappahannock, Pamunkey, and Rapidan are deep rivers, which, rising to the west, in the Alleghanies, all flow towards the east, not very far apart, and fall into the Atlantic by large mouths.

The neighbouring zone of sea-board resembles the rest of the southern coasts of the United States. The Atlantic coasts are low and sandy; marshes where the pitch-pine abounds and engenders pestilential fevers. There are bays and creeks innumerable, but life is wanting: there is but one harbour worthy of the name—Norfolk—and very little commerce; for the rest, the coast is of small extent, compared with the area of the Virginian territory. This narrow belt once passed the country becomes very healthy.

The soil is fertile, although dusty, (i.e. *light*,) and even stony where the first undulations of the Alleghanies appear; but, on the other hand, along the rivers there are tracts of alluvial soil of great fertility, where cotton, maize, and tobacco grow to perfection. The inhabitants are occupied in breeding cattle, felling timber in the widely extending woods, and agriculture on a very grand scale. At Richmond there were already a large number of arts and manufactures; coal and iron abound in Upper Virginia, and several blast-furnaces were established there.

About 185 miles from the sea the vapour-clad outline of the

Blue Ridge, a long line of mountains, is seen. The Alleghany Mountains, divided into two principal parallel chains from north to south, one the Blue Ridge, the other, more to the west, preserving the name of Alleghanies, cut Virginia into two equal parts, called, one the Eastern district, that which extends from the Atlantic to the mountains, the other the Western district, which extends from the mountains to Ohio and the borders of Kentucky.

Between these two ranges, parallel to the mountains, run long valleys, often very wide. The soil here is richer than in any other part of the state. It is the region known as the Valley of Virginia. It extends northwards to the Potomac. This spot, besides being one of the most fertile, is also one of the most picturesque of North America. The eye, wearied with the monotony of unbroken plains, rests with pleasure on the varied outline of the Blue Ridge or Alleghanies in the distance, rising to the sky. With change of place and level there is also a change of aspect. Far away extend these laughing valleys, which, more than any other American scene, remind one of the landscapes of old Europe.

The population of this part of Virginia is purely English, intermingled here and there with Scottish blood, settled in the country in the early days of the colony. These men, honourable and frank, devoted to agriculture, always in the saddle, inured to fatigue, tall, strong, simple in their habits, wearing wide-brimmed felt sombreros, riding-boots, and gloves with beaver-skin backs, like the cavaliers of the time of Charles I.; these men, Virginians above all things, furnished Jackson and Lee their most valiant soldiers.

The belt beyond the Alleghanies, stretching towards the Ohio, belongs to the Mississippi basin. It is quite another country, higher and colder than Eastern Virginia. It produces cereals, is rich in ore, and covered with thick timber.

Winter rains cover the plains of Eastern Virginia with deep reddish sticky mud; the roads become impassable. When the heat comes, deep cracks and bottomless ruts replace the

liquid mud, and render the maintenance of the roads very onerous.

The climate, very warm in summer, becomes, in winter, rainy, and, in the part near the mountains, it is as cold as in the north of France. Snow falls everywhere in the Alleghanies after the month of November.

The state was divided into 119 counties or communes. The number of inhabitants amounted, in 1861, to 1,569,083 souls, of whom 490,887 were negroes, and of them 54,333 were free. There remained, therefore, 1,078,196 whites. It was with such a feeble population that Virginia prepared herself for the struggle *pro aris et focis.*

Harper's Ferry, at the entrance of the Shenandoah Valley, the beginning of the great Valley of Virginia, was guarded by General Joseph Johnston, an officer of the old United States army. General Beauregard, a Frenchman of Louisiana, was stationed at Manassas Junction, the meeting-place of three railways, coming from the north, south, and west,—that is to say, from Washington, Richmond, and the Virginian Valley. This most important place was in the plain, and permitted any one who was master of it, either to block the Richmond road, or march on Washington, only 35 miles off, or, in the face of superior forces, to retire to the west, through the Manassas Pass, into the valley. General Huger, a descendant of the refugee Huguenots, also belonging to the old army, held the command at Norfolk. All the approaches to this town, and all the important points at the entrance of the James River, were carefully fortified. The Confederate Government was transported to Richmond, which thus became the capital of the new republic. Volunteers poured in from the other states, and presently the number of troops gathered in Virginia was considerable. In West Virginia, the command was entrusted to General Garnett, who had just displayed great activity as adjutant to General Lee. It was for him to assemble and drill the volunteers

On its side, the Federal Government did not deceive itself as to the gravity of the struggle which was impending. General Scott, who had the chief control in military affairs, was too old a soldier to commit the notable blunder of despising his enemy, especially as the Southern armies had for their guide the man whose talents he had for so long a time appreciated.

On May 3rd, President Lincoln made a new appeal for 40,000 volunteers, ten supplementary regiments for the regular army, and 18,000 sailors. These forces, added to those already in existence, placed at the disposal of the Government 150,000 men. The country promptly answered this appeal. The Federal Government plan was to send a strong body of troops into the Mississippi Valley and occupy it. A second army was to take up a position in Kentucky, and there stop all Southern proclivities, while a third would march straight on Richmond. These measures, supplemented by an effective blockade, would not be long, it was thought, in crushing the rebellion. In Virginia an attack was to be made on four sides simultaneously; in the east, relying on Fortress Monroe, an ascent of the Peninsula would be made to the capital (all the country situated between the rivers James and York, comprising five or six counties, is called the Peninsula). On the north-east a start was to take place from Alexandria, opposite Washington, passing through Manassas; on the north, one ascending the Shenandoah Valley from the Potomac; and lastly, on the north-west, it was intended to defile at Staunton, into the great Virginian Valley.

These four movements were to be made simultaneously. Richmond was the point of re-union. This town once taken, the assembled forces would have nothing more to do but co-operate with those occupying Kentucky and the Mississippi Valley, in order to insure the definitive triumph of the Federal arms. Such was the magnificent programme which was to counteract and valorously upset the lieutenants of the Southern commander-in-chief.

Some skirmishes had taken place in the month of June, 1861. On the 3rd, Colonel Porterfield, sent into the west of the state to assemble volunteers, had been defeated at Philippi by a Federal corps. But the first combat of any importance was at Great Bethel on June 10th. Five thousand Federals ascended the Peninsula, starting from Fortress Monroe. They assaulted an entrenched camp not far from Yorktown, where 1800 Confederates, with 6 pieces of artillery, awaited them. The Federals were obliged to turn back. This affair, insignificant in itself, acquires importance when we remember that it was the first combat in which both parties had been able to measure their strength, and that, if Colonel Magruder had been beaten, the safety of Richmond would have been compromised. Bethel was soon followed by other feats of arms in the Valley of Virginia, between the Confederate Johnston and the Federal Patterson, the defeat of the Confederate Colonel Pegram at Richmountain in the west of the state, and the death of General Garnett, during his retreat after the battle of Laurel Bridge, also in the west of Virginia.

On July 16th, the principal Northern army, consisting of 55,000 infantry, 9 regiments of cavalry, and 49 pieces of artillery, issued from Alexandria, and advanced some hours' march, to a water-course named Bull's Run, behind which the Confederate army, under the command of Beauregard, was posted. Johnston, warned of this movement, succeeded in stealing away from his adversary Patterson, marched night and day, and joined his colleague on July 20th. All the Southern army, on the morning of the 21st of July, only amounted to 31,431 men, and 55 cannons. That same day the Federal army attempted to force the passage of Bull's Run, but disorder spreading in its ranks, it was obliged to fall back on Washington. Its retreat was soon changed into a defeat. General Johnston came and camped in sight of the United States capital.

Let us return for a moment to the campaign in West Virginia.

Colonel Porterfield, who had been sent there by General Lee to raise recruits and organise a centre of resistance against the Federals, soon became aware of the little haste manifested by the inhabitants in responding to his appeal, and that that part of the state where the Northern element, introduced from the neighbouring States of Ohio and Pennsylvania, prevailed, would readily be gained over to the Federal cause unless reinforcements were received.

The surprise of his camp at Philippi soon after, hastened the despatch of a reinforcement of 5000 men, under the orders of General Garnett. Hardly had the latter had time to post himself at Laurel Hill, a position which commanded the high road of communication between the west and the remaining portion of Virginia, when General MacClellan, charged by the Federal Government with the military command of Ohio, resolved to drive back Garnett beyond the Alleghanies, towards Virginia proper. On the 11th of July, General Rosencranz surprised and defeated a Confederate corps, ordered by Garnett to protect his line of retreat. The latter was obliged to abandon his artillery, and leave the beaten roads, in order to march across the mountains. Vigorously pursued, he lost many prisoners, and perished himself. This initiative of MacClellan decided the lot of West Virginia. Although the *débris* of General Garnett's column might have been able to rally to the east of the mountains, and there join reinforcements come from Richmond, the Federals never slackened their hold, and the district beyond the hills remained in their power.

The Confederate General Wise alone, with a small corps, still held out in this region. He also retired presently before the victorious MacClellan to Lewisburg, where General Floyd, with 2000 or 3000 men, joined him; but a want of understanding between the two Confederate officers rendered all their operations useless.

After Garnett's death, Lee was sent to the western frontier. He there assembled 10,000 men, including what remained of

Garnett's column, badly armed, poorly clad, and many of them without shoes. The roads were in a deplorable state; rain fell incessantly; they sunk up to their knees in a thick mud; the means of transport were wanting, as well as victuals and forage.

During the months of August and September there were only some unimportant skirmishes. The Federals were strongly posted at Cheat Mountain, awaiting an attack. After having in vain attempted to turn the position, Lee, who always tried as much as possible to husband the blood of his soldiers, retired. Under the circumstances, he judged, with much reason, from a practical point of view, that if the Federals continued to occupy their impregnable position in the mountain, he would gain nothing by obtaining a barren success, dearly achieved, probably, by the sacrifice of many of his own men. The result of the campaign, however, was to arrest the enemy's march so completely, that from that moment for a year no further progress was made in the north-west.

Meanwhile Lee, warned of the dangerous position of Floyd and Wise, against whom the combined forces of Rosencranz and Cox were advancing, resolved to march on Lewisburg, and give battle to the Federals before the autumn rains made the roads impracticable. He rallied the troops of Wise and Floyd on the 22nd of September, and posted himself strongly at Sewell Mountain. The two adversaries had under them equal forces, nearly 15,000 men.

It seemed that at length a serious engagement was about to end this barren and indecisive campaign. The outposts were in sight of each other, and not a day passed without some affair or skirmish. Waiting to be attacked, Lee held himself on the defensive, and thus the two generals remained in each other's presence for a fortnight. Suddenly, on the 6th of October, Rosencranz decamped during the night, and retired towards the west. The state of the roads and rivers rendered all pursuit impossible. Winter came rapidly, and it was decided to abandon

this part of the country, and transport the Confederate forces to a more important scene of action.

General Lee returned to Richmond in November, and the trifling success of this campaign drew down upon him some severe criticisms on the part of his fellow citizens, too impatient to have much hope in him. Like Washington before Boston in 1776, he might have said: "I know the sad position which I occupy; I know I am expected to do great things." But, like Washington, he was ready to sacrifice his reputation rather than squander away men's lives in a useless attempt to keep a hostile district. When one reflects on the obstacles of every kind with which he had to contend, the sympathy of the inhabitants with the Northern cause, who betrayed, for the benefit of the enemy, all his movements, the difficulties of transport in so primitive a country, it is easy to comprehend his want of success. A little after his arrival Lee had reported that it was not for him to take the offensive. The district was not favourably disposed to the Southern cause. It was difficult to find provisions, the enemy being master of the railway from Baltimore to Ohio, and of the river of this name; both served as safe bases of operation. The Confederates, on their side, had only impassable roads, no railway, and no river which could be useful to them.

"He came back," said ex-President Davies, "carrying the heavy weight of defeat, and unappreciated by the people whom he served; for they could not know, as I knew, that if his plans and orders had been carried out, the result would have been victory rather than retreat. They did not know it; for I would not have known it, if he had not breathed it in my ear, only at my earnest request, and begging that nothing be said about it. The clamour which then arose followed him when he went to South Carolina, so that it became necessary to write a letter to the governor of that state, telling him what manner of man he was. Yet through all this, with a magnanimity rarely equalled, he stood in silence, without defending himself, or allowing others to defend

him; for he was unwilling to offend any one who was wearing a sword, and striking blows for the Confederacy."

The Richmond Government confided to Lee, on his return, the care of fortifying Charleston, the capital of South Carolina, situated on the sea, and offering an opportunity of attack, some day or other, to the Federal ships. He passed the winter in raising redoubts at the most exposed points of the coast, and this work was executed with so much judgment and ability, that it was principally because of these redoubts that the enemy's efforts in this locality subsequently gained so little success.

It was from Charleston that he wrote, on the 1st of January, 1862, the following letter to one of his daughters:—

"My dear Daughter,

"Having distributed such poor Christmas gifts as I had to those around me, I have been looking for something for you. Trifles even are hard to get these war-times, and you must not, therefore, expect more. . . . I send you also some sweet violets that I gathered for you this morning while covered with dense white frost, whose crystals glittered in bright sun-like diamonds, and formed a brooch of rare beauty and sweetness, which could not be fabricated by the expenditure of a world of money. Yet how little will it purchase. But see how God provides for our pleasure in every way. May He guard and preserve you for me, my dear daughter. Among the calamities of war, the hardest to bear, perhaps, is the separation of families and friends. Yet all must be endured to accomplish our independence, and maintain our self-government. In my absence from you, I have thought of you very often, and regretted I could do nothing for your comfort. Your old home, if not destroyed by our enemies, has been so desecrated that I cannot bear to think of it. I should have preferred it to have been wiped from the earth, its beautiful hill sunk, and its sacred trees buried, rather than to have been degraded by the presence of those who revel in the ill they do for

their own selfish purposes. You see what a poor sinner I am, and how unworthy to possess what was given me ; for that reason it has been taken away. I pray for a better spirit, and that the hearts of our enemies may be changed. In your houseless condition, I hope you will make yourself contented and useful. Occupy yourself in aiding those more helpless than yourself. . . . . Think always of your father,

"R. E. LEE."

In the spring of 1862, the reverses which the Confederate cause had sustained made the urgency of centralizing the military power apparent. Congress passed a bill creating the rank of general commanding-in-chief. But the attributes of this new generalissimo were utterly failing in clearness, as may be seen in the following order of the day which summoned Lee to Richmond. It was on him that, in spite of the opposition of some prejudiced or timid minds, the choice of President Davis fell.

"War Department, Richmond, March 13th, 1862.

"General Orders, No. 14.

"General Robert E. Lee is assigned to duty at the seat of government, and, under the direction of the President, is charged with the conduct of military operations in the armies of the Confederacy.

"By command of the Secretary of War,

"S. COOPER,

"Adjutant and Inspector-General."

This is the proper place to protest against the systematic disparagement of which the ex-President of the Confederate States has been the object. He has been accused of jealousy of General Lee. On the contrary, it was Mr. Davis who warmly undertook Lee's defence at this time, when he was in disfavour, and who contributed more than any one to call him to the high position in which he rendered such signal services.

Hardly had the new commander-in-chief assumed his office before a change began to be felt. A new life was communicated to the Government, and from the moment when his firm will presided over the march of affairs, the military situation began to wear a less dismal aspect. If his counsel had been always listened to, we should, perhaps, have been able to trace a very different account to that which will be unfolded before our eyes.

In his new position, before even he had had time to act, his popularity returned, owing chiefly to the kindness and courtesy with which he received all demands preferred to him. He could not, however, long preserve this situation. Important events called him elsewhere into a more active sphere. His new duties in it became so absorbing, that he was soon obliged to beg the President to relieve him of the functions of commander-in-chief of all the Confederate forces, his military occupations in Virginia taking up all his time.

Beauregard's victory at Manassas had inspired the Confederates with such confidence, that they did not doubt for a single instant but that the North had received a mortal blow. The newspapers ridiculously exaggerated the importance of the Federal check. Many people took no pains to reflect that the success at Bull's Run was only temporary, that the army which was there beaten was composed of raw recruits, entirely inexperienced, under incapable officers, and they persisted in ignoring the extraordinary efforts the North was making to repair its losses. Opportunities to be better informed on these points were not, however, wanting. Northern newspapers, full of facts, recitals, details, all relative to the preparations going on on a grand scale, easily found way into the country, and the Southern newspapers hastened to copy them. All persons who came from the North confirmed this impression. Nevertheless but a few men, such as Lee, Johnston, and others, alone recognised the vital importance of the struggle in which they were engaged, and they ceased not to warn the Southern people against their foolish imprudence.

President Davis, under the late President of the United States, had been Minister of War at Washington. His antecedents and character do not permit us to believe that he also could be deceived as to the situation. In the South, as in the North, there was a horror at the idea of conscription. It was only, therefore, in the last extremity that the Government decided to have recourse to it. This arbitrary measure was so little in harmony with all the traditions of the English race, that such a hesitation on the part of the President, Ministers, and Congress, may be well conceived. Nothing is more natural than that Lee and his lieutenants should, from the first, have counselled it. Their point of view was different. Their experience was one of camp life, of the little confidence which can be placed in volunteers, badly paid and badly fed, who have obeyed a patriotic impulse, but are restrained neither by *esprit de corps*, nor discipline, nor hard necessity.

Thus what they had foreseen happened. The first moment of enthusiasm past, when reverses, inevitable in a war which extended over so vast an area, came in their turn, volunteers ceased to appear. Prizes the most elevated ceased to attract them.

Another error to be remarked is the immense development given to the line of defence. In the spring of 1862, the Federals had touched the border of Kentucky. The Confederate army of the West was thrown back behind the river Tennessee, and on the Atlantic coast the Northern troops had got possession of the very important positions of Port Royal, and Roanoke Island, in the Carolinas. Everywhere, except in North Virginia, where no encounter had taken place since the last campaign, victory attended the standards of the North.

We can imagine, while blaming, the hesitation of the Richmond Government. To concentrate all civil and military powers in the hands of a dictator would have been much the most practical and effective step, but in its own opinion this would have been the negation of its own existence. It considered it, on the contrary, to be due to honour, whilst accomplishing the deliverance of the

country, to allow the continuance of self-government, by means of a Congress regularly elected, thus changing nothing in parliamentary manners. Hence troubles and numberless difficulties,—results of an ill-defined position.

Instead of finishing the war, and then thinking how to establish a stable and definitive government, the Confederate statesmen wished to do both at once. Besides, the Richmond Government took very great pains not to wound the susceptibilities of the different governments of the Confederate States. This is why, in order not to abandon the most exposed states to Federal attacks, it was compelled to disseminate its troops over an immense area, remaining on the defensive, when it would have been able, by concentrating them under one direction and in one army, to strike a decisive blow.

However this may be, very few remarkable men showed themselves in the Civil Government, or in the Congress of the South. Neither of these bodies rose to the height of the circumstances. The want of initiative, the narrowness of political views of which the Congress gave proof, the obstinacy with which it opposed the enfranchisement of slaves till the last moment, contributed not a little to bring about the final catastrophe. It is in the army, among its chiefs, that search must be made for examples of rare self-denial, patriotic devotion, moral greatness, and talents of the first order.

President Davis could not, therefore, in consequence of the opposing influences which surrounded him, decide on following the advice which Lee and Johnston ceased not to give him. These generals were of opinion that the proper course was to abandon the most remote frontiers, and to concentrate the forces of the Confederacy on a spot where they would be useful and available at any moment.

Scattered at a distance, not supporting each other, they were exposed to the assaults of the Federals, who could attack them successively one after the other. The system adopted by the

Government was the more full of risk, because the South was so thinly peopled—far more thinly than the North—and it could not therefore repair its losses of men. To these arguments the partisans of the Government replied, that if the states of the West were abandoned, not only would the *prestige* of the new republic suffer in America and Europe (which was an important matter from the point of view of hoped-for intervention), but that entire provinces would be lost, whence were drawn corn, cattle, and soldiers without number; that support and protection were owing to the many secessionists of those states; and, finally, that the situation was not so serious as was supposed. These counsellors were not without authority, and many of them were much interested in upholding the prevailing system, since their estates and families were in the provinces it was proposed to abandon, and would become the prey of the Federals. The majority in Congress shared these sentiments. Consequently the question was decided by civil and political considerations against the opinion of the generals.

The fear of encroaching on the individual rights of the states for a long time retarded the adoption of a general law of enlistment. It was not till the Federal troops menaced the capital itself that a law of enlistment was passed, in May, 1862. This was very imperfect, and stirred up such discontent, that all the warm patriotism of the Southern population was necessary to support its burden. It would have been better to adopt the plan followed later by the Federal Government; fix the contingent, assign each state its quota, and render it responsible for furnishing the proportion so assigned. Thus all the odium of the measure would fall on the local authorities.

After the battle of Manassas, or Bull's Run, (July 1861), gained by 31,000 Confederates over 55,000 Federals, General Johnston assumed the supreme command of the Confederate army of the Potomac. The task which he had before him was not easy. Undisciplined recruits, whom the easy victory of Manassas had

demoralized, did not offer very encouraging elements for the reorganization of his army. Discipline was not easy to establish, the natural explanation of which is that all the officers below the rank of brigadier-general were elective. The candidates in favour with their comrades too often won votes by closing their eyes to infractions of military regulations, which are as necessary to an army as air to a human organism. This evil existed during the whole war, and exercised immense influence in all the insurmountable obstacles which fettered the operations of the Southern chiefs.

Nevertheless, in the month of October, 1861, General Johnston had succeeded in giving to this confused mass a certain amount of organization. All the troops in the neighbourhood of the Potomac arriving, whether from the Shenandoah Valley army, which Johnston had commanded, or from the army of the Potomac, under the orders of Beauregard, were formed into a single army, and took the name of the Northern Virginian army. General Johnston had the command-in-chief. It occupied a strong position on the heights of Centreville. Various corps were detached to the banks of the Potomac, where, by the aid of batteries, whose fire swept the river, they intercepted all navigation and effectively blockaded the Federal capital.

A division of this army, commanded by General T. J. Jackson* was stationed in the Valley of Virginia, which he held against the enemy. Another division, under General Holmes, guarded the line of the Rappahannock, and formed the rear-guard of the whole army.

During the autumn and winter the soldiers had to suffer much, chiefly from the dearth of provisions. To other privations was

* This distinguished officer, whose career was so short and brilliant, was a Virginian. A pupil of the Military School at West Point, he served a campaign in Mexico in 1846 and 1847. Shortly after he left the army. When the Civil War broke out he was a simple professor at the Virginian Military School, at Lexington. His offer of services having been accepted by the Confederate Government, he soon had an opportunity of displaying military talents of the first order.

added a want of clothing and shoes. Johnston consequently had been obliged to content himself with remaining on the defensive, while yet foreseeing grave inconveniences. His lines of communication with Richmond were reduced to a single railway, one road only, which the enemy might at any moment intercept. Further, all his provisions and war-material had to be carried by a most detestable route from Manassas to Centreville.

It is astonishing, perhaps, that so enterprising a people as the Americans did not think of connecting the principal line and head-quarters by a temporary railway, as the Allies did in the Crimea. But the truth is that iron and rails for a railway were precisely what were wanting in the South. In the long run, even the repair of the roads had to be neglected, whence it happened that all service was performed badly and very slowly, causing great delay in the transport of provisions, and intolerable sufferings to the unfortunate wounded.

All the branches of the army were very inadequately furnished with capable men, the corps of engineers in particular. An appeal had to be made to civil engineers generally in order to fill the ranks. The enormous and sudden development which the army had taken rendered it necessary here, as elsewhere, to employ men who had neither the requisite aptitude nor experience. The staff also left much to be desired. The officers of the old United States army, who, having been born in the South, and having embraced its cause, ought to have served on the staff, were called to other duties in consequence of the extreme scarcity of officers possessing any education and knowledge. It was necessary, therefore, to improvise aides-de-camp with what was presented, and during the whole war, Lee, Johnston, and other generals had at their disposal only a very insufficient number of aides-de-camp, which was an immense disadvantage.

The arms furnished to the soldiers were not always good; but, for the moment, no remedy could be adopted. Those which they had could only be procured with great difficulty, and it was not

till later, in consequence of important captures, and of deliveries of European arms, as well as of the factories and foundries of cannon created amid great difficulty by the Confederate Government, that the army was, in the end, better provided in this respect.

In spite of all these obstacles, the Northern Virginian army, in the campaign which opened shortly after, occupied from the outset, from the very first blow struck, the place which history will always assign it in the account of this memorable contest.

Few armies more than it, have had the right to be proud of themselves! All the youth of the South entered its ranks, and for four years it was the chief support of the Confederate cause.

In the days of discouragement, its heroic soldiers alone never doubted, and, victors or vanquished, their devotion to the South did not for a single instant give way. Starving, half-naked, shoeless, their feet lacerated by long marches, struggling against a powerful enemy superior to them in everything—courage excepted—these brave fellows remained faithful to the cause they had embraced to the last moment. As long as honour speaks to the heart of man, the remembrance of their acts will remain imperishable. The finest encomium that can be bestowed upon them has issued from the mouth of an adversary.

"Who can forget, that once looked upon it," says Swinton, the Northern military critic, "that array of tattered uniforms and bright muskets, that body of incomparable infantry, the army of Northern Virginia, which, for four years, carried the revolt on its bayonets, opposing a constant front to the mighty concentration of power brought against it, which, receiving terrible blows, did not fail to give the like, and which, vital in all its parts, died only with its annihilation."

On the 1st of March, 1862, this army extended its lines along the Potomac, from the Valley of Virginia to the environs of

Fredericksburg. The rolls numbered 84,225 names, but there were only 47,617 able-bodied men present under arms.

In the list of division-generals were Jackson, Longstreet, Hill, Ewell, and among others less known, many who distinguished themselves later. Stewart, that magnificent Hotspur, commanded the cavalry, and Pendleton had the direction of the artillery.

CHAPTER V.

MACCLELLAN LANDS IN THE PENINSULA OF VIRGINIA.—BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES.

MACDOWELL'S disaster at Manassas was the greatest piece of good fortune that could have happened for the Federal Government. It caused it to understand how serious was the enterprise on which it had embarked, and that its projects for reconquering the South bristled with difficulties. The Federal authorities were obliged to confess that their armies were nothing but masses of men without discipline. The defeat of Manassas, fatal to the self-love of the North, yet rendered it better service than to the conquerors of the day. Everybody in the North began to work bravely to raise new armies and equip the fleet. The government negotiated some loans, decreed new levies of men, bought and built ships. It would be difficult truly to approve all that was done in the North at this time. A great number of the measures taken were despotic and arbitrary, and would have been thought disgraceful by all honourable men. But it is not the less certain that the Federal Government acted with decision and energy.

From the breaking out of hostilities, it was clear that the decisive struggle would take place in Virginia. After MacDowell's retreat, the Federal Government hastened to assemble another army under the walls of Washington. Major-General George B. MacClellan was placed at its head, whose name had already appeared in the campaign of Western Virginia. The new commander was one of those men about whom it is difficult to form

a just idea. When nominated by the president, the country had in him the greatest hopes, because of the campaign of the preceding summer. If he did not justify them, it must be recollected that many influential people in the North offered him a lively opposition, and that Mr. Lincoln's Government fettered him continually. However this may be, he passes for having been the best general the North had. More brilliant in the council than on the battle-field, he understood better how to map out a plan for a campaign than how to execute it. His military operations seldom succeeded, in consequence of his hesitancy and want of vigour. The immense superiority of his army over that of his adversary rendered still more surprising the trifling results of his Virginian campaign. Nevertheless the affection of his troops for him, and the enthusiasm which he knew well how to awaken in them, are proofs that he had military qualities of the first order.

At first he was entirely occupied in reorganizing his army. On July 27th, 1861, he assumed the command of it. It comprised only 51,000 men; all appearance of military organization had disappeared, and every day the number of deserters increased. He lost not a moment in stopping this evil, and obtained from Congress a law which permitted him to dismiss incompetent officers. Thanks to this law, he was able, during the autumn, to get rid of several hundreds of them. The new recruits were rapidly organized, and subjected to a strict discipline. Thus, when the army of the Potomac commenced the campaign of 1862, it comprised 221,987 men of all arms, including 25 regiments of cavalry, and was provided with 92 batteries of 521 cannon, a corps of engineers, all manner of conveyances and supplies, pontoon bridges, and so forth, all in a high state of perfection. Never was the army of the South, that medley of rags and heroism, provided in this way, and yet what marvels did it accomplish!

It would be unjust to deny that General MacClellan, in this matter, gave proof of great talent as an organizer. To him especially it is due that the Northern army was able to preserve

its discipline intact under the most overwhelming reverses. But the resources placed at his disposal were inexhaustible, when compared with those of the South, and it was especially in this that the superiority of the North made itself so cruelly felt.

In the month of October, 1861, the Federal army was ready, and public opinion in the North showed itself impatient of prolonged inaction. The Confederate army was encamped at Centreville, its outposts being stationed on certain elevations named Mason, Munson, and Upton's Hills, over which the inhabitants of Washington saw the Southern flags floating, and whence came to them the noise of the enemy's drums. The Northern humiliation at this was great; it became still greater when, some time after, the Potomac was blocked. Loud demands were made to force MacClellan to a decided course of action before the winter rendered all military operations impossible.

For a moment he seemed to think seriously of threatening Manassas. Had he even left half of his effective force at Washington and along the Potomac, there still remained an army at his disposal of 75,000 men, 30,000 more than could be opposed to him by the Confederates. The time was singularly favourable; for many years the roads had not been so good at this season. It would at least have been a gain to thrust back Johnston from the line of the upper Potomac upon the line of the Rapidan, and the moral effect in the North would have been immense, without reckoning that in the following spring he would commence his campaign with just as much *prestige* as his slowness made him lose.

The plan remained a mere project, and autumn and winter passed in an inaction of which the South profited to develop its resources as much as possible by establishing ammunition factories and cannon foundries, by buying all it wanted of the foreigner, and summoning to its standard all the able-bodied men.

This was still the state of things when, on the 8th of March, General Jackson had evacuated the line of Manassas, and retired

southwards. In spite of the advantages which the South drew from MacClellan's inaction, Johnston and Beauregard, to their great regret, had been obliged to leave the Federal general leisure to reorganize his troops. They felt all the value of the time lost. Their true interest would have been to force MacClellan to accept battle before he had finished his preparations, to trammel and paralyze the reorganization of his army as much as possible. But the deplorable state of the commissariat of the South at that period, and the fear of exposing, by a concentration of all the disposable forces of the Confederacy, different points on the coast, and especially the capital, to the attack of an enemy commanding more numerous forces, compelled them to be prudent.

It is easy, indeed, to understand that, because of its numerical inferiority, the South was obliged to remain on the defensive, especially at the beginning of the struggle, when its soldiers had not yet learned their trade, and the brilliant successes of the campaign of 1862 had not yet given them that confidence which afterwards twice victoriously carried them beyond the Potomac.

The army at Centreville, therefore, also remained on the defensive during the winter. But in the month of February, 1862, Johnston resolved to abandon Manassas and fall back on the line of the Rappahannock. This movement brought the Southern army nearer its base of operations, and afforded better shelter from marauding foes to the convoys of provisions which were arriving.

He dismounted guns of heavy calibre from the lines at Bull's Run and the Potomac, and moved them to the rear of the Rappahannock. The army numbered 50,000 men. Of these Jackson had 6,000 with him in the Valley of Virginia, so that 44,000 men remained under the immediate orders of Johnston. The outposts were recalled from Leesburg and Evansport, and, on March 8th, 1862, the entire army retreated behind the Rappahannock, destroying all the bridges on its way.

The smoke of the barracks, to which the Confederates had set fire,

revealed next morning to the Federals the retrograde movement of their enemy. MacClellan made no attempt to pursue him, convinced that his adversary had too much start for him to overtake him. He was contented to occupy the forsaken lines, and send out a strong reconnoitring party to the Rappahannock. Soon after, Johnston, having assured himself that the line of the Rapidan offered a better defensive position than that of the Rappahannock, retired behind that stream.

MacClellan then, renouncing the movement on Manassas, thought of changing his base of operation, and carrying his troops into the Peninsula of Virginia. His plan of campaign was very simple. The principal army under MacClellan, to the number of 120,000 men, was to embark at Washington and Alexandria, and occupy the Peninsula, making use of Fortress Monroe as a base of operations in an advance upon Richmond. MacDowell's corps, 40,000 strong, was to follow MacClellan as soon as possible, and he would have for his mission to act against the Confederate flank, if they persisted in defending the Peninsula. General Banks was ordered to occupy Manassas, and cover Washington with 40,000 men; Fremont commanded in Western Virginia, having 30,000 men under him. He was to descend the mountains and march on the Southern capital. All these troops combined could not fail to lead to the forcible capture of Richmond in less than a month.

From February 27th to March 16th, 400 steamers and sailing-vessels assembled at Washington and Alexandria. There were shipped 121,500 men, 14,592 horses and mules, 44 batteries, waggons, ammunition-vans, ambulances, train-service, telegraphic materials, supplies, and all the baggage required for so great an army. On the 17th of March the embarkation began, and was completed without hindrance. The transports had only to descend the Potomac, a large and deep river, whose two banks were in the power of the Federals, then navigate a few hours along the coast into the Bay of Chesapeake, a small inland sea

separated from the Atlantic by tongues of land which shelter it against storms, and so they were conducted without danger to the mouth of the York River.

General MacClellan, in adopting definitively a plan which he had declared should only be followed in the last extremity, committed a grave error. Napoleon said that every general who puts into execution a plan which he considers bad, is culpable in the highest degree. Otherwise, the plan was not bad in itself, but it should have been executed with more boldness and decision.

On April 1st, MacClellan disembarked at Fortress Monroe. Johnston, during this time, had contented himself with drawing his forces little by little nearer Richmond. The Confederate Government having signified its wish to him that he should take up a position in, and defend, the Peninsula, the Southern general put his army in motion towards the lines of Yorktown. It began to defile through the streets of Richmond on the morning of April 5th, and on the 7th the advanced guard rejoined General Magruder's corps.

To the south-east of Richmond, between that town and Chesapeake Bay, there stretches a tongue of land, bounded on the north by the York River, on the south by the James, and known under the name of the Peninsula. Properly speaking, it is terminated at West Point, where the York River begins; but, since 1862, this name has been given to all the country between Richmond and the bay, bounded by the rivers Pamunkey, York, and James. A railway connects Richmond with West Point, whence vessels of the largest draught ascend the York. Several good coach roads start from the town toward various points in the Peninsula, which is terminated at Fortress Monroe.

At the opening of hostilities the Confederate Government was persuaded that the enemy would attempt to push through on that side to the capital, and in the month of May, 1861, Colonel (afterwards General) Macgruder had been stationed at Yorktown

for the protection of that neighbourhood. Although at first he had but 3000 men at his disposal, gradually increased to 15,000, he succeeded after the battle of Bethel, of which mention has been already made, in keeping the Federals shut up in their entrenched camps at New-Port-News and Hampton.

Deceiving MacClellan as to the number of forces under him, he stopped the Federal army before some earth-works, rapidly thrown up and armed, till Johnston, at the head of 53,000 men, was able to join him. The Northern army was double that of the others. Nevertheless, Johnston was able to maintain himself in the lines of Yorktown till they became no longer tenable, in consequence of the disembarkation of Federal troops in his rear. After a sanguinary engagement at Williamsburg, he slowly retired, presenting an undaunted front to the enemy, and finally halted on the banks of the Chickahominy. For some days the weather was abominable, rendering military operations very difficult, the rivers and marshes overflowing on all sides. A Federal corps, commanded by General Franklin, having landed at West Point on the York River, marching to place itself between Johnston and Richmond, was thrown back, after a sharp encounter, towards the York, and obliged to seek refuge under the fire of the Northern batteries.

Thus, at Williamsburg, the Federal pursuit had been arrested, and Franklin's plan at Eltham's Landing had been baffled.

But, on the contrary, the evacuation of Norfolk, and the destruction of the Confederate iron-clad, the *Merrimac*, permitted the Federals to ascend the James River to within a short distance of Richmond. Great was there the consternation. Happily, the defences raised at Drury's Bluff (a height commanding the river), considerably augmented, sufficed to shelter the town on that side.

This did not make the Southern situation less gloomy. The army, exhausted by its retreat, reckoned only 47,000 men. The country was alarmed, and many people left Richmond to take refuge in the interior. The Federal army, numbering twice its

opponents, encamped at the gates of Richmond. MacClellan, in his report, estimated it at 156,838, of whom 115,102 were efficients, that is to say, present on the field of battle. Provisions and war-material came to it direct, and without hindrance, from the White House, on the Federal rear, MacClellan's head-quarters, situated on the York River, and connected with the Federal camp by a railway. Hundreds of steam-boats brought daily from Washington and New York all that the Federal commissariat or the general had need of.

The Northern army occupied an excellent position. Its left was protected by the White Oak Swamp, nearly impassable; all approaches in the direction of Richmond had been rendered inaccessible by the natural difficulties of the soil; these had been further defended by means of felled trees and earth-works. Unless the Confederates could succeed in turning MacClellan's right, his communication with his base at the White House, and his army's safety ran no risk. As regards this contingency, precautions had been taken.

Other Federal corps were advancing into Virginia to co-operate with the principal army. MacDowell was at Fredericksburg with a strong division of 40,000 men, and was to descend in all haste towards the South, and form on the extreme right of MacClellan. Fremont was ordered to defile into the Valley of Virginia, to crush Jackson's feeble corps, and give a helping hand to General Banks, who was directed to leave Winchester, and post himself along the railway to Manassas. Both were to watch the approaches to Washington, and replace MacDowell before that city. Thus Richmond would be half surrounded by the Federal armies. At the head of 200,000 men it seemed certain that, before the summer, MacClellan must make himself master of the Confederate capital, which had for its defence but 100,000 men at the most. It is plain now that it was only the ability of such men as Johnston, Lee, and Jackson, which succeeded in saving Richmond from this imminent danger.

Taking in at a glance the general position of Virginia, and penetrating the enemy's scheme, Johnston ordered Jackson, who commanded in the Valley, to take the offensive, and, by disquieting the Northern generals about the safety of their capital, to stop the continual influx of troops into the Peninsula. Jackson immediately precipitated himself on General Banks, who was executing his movement from Winchester by the Blue Ridge towards Washington. Repulsed at first at Kernstown, Jackson made a second attempt at Strasburg, overthrew Banks, and pursued him closely beyond the Potomac. The fright caused by the news of this at Washington was such that President Lincoln ordered MacDowell, who was still at Fredericksburg, to detach 20,000 men to bar Jackson's passage. The Federal plan was thus entirely deranged. Banks being vanquished, and MacDowell detained by order of the President, MacClellan was obliged to remain inactive, always awaiting MacDowell. The Northern army was half on one side and half on the other, of the Chickahominy, and its chief felt little disposed to give battle under these circumstances.

Johnston ended this indecision. Perceiving that the Federal forces opposed to him near Seven Pines, on the south bank of the Chickahominy, were only a portion of the enemy's army, the Confederate general, profiting by a sudden rise of the water, resolved to attack. MacClellan the same day, the 30th of May, at length decided, it would appear, to attack the lines of Richmond, when the Confederate columns came out to assail him. The battle which followed is known as that of the Seven Pines. It was one of the most furious and sanguinary of the whole war. On both sides they struggled frantically, and neither gained a decisive advantage. On the Confederate right, near the Seven Pines, the Federal lines were thrust to the rear; but on the left, at the station of Fair Oaks, the Confederates, in their turn, were repulsed. Night put an end to this indecisive contest. The onward march of the Federals had just been rudely checked,

but, on the Southern side, General Johnston had received a severe wound, and had to be carried to Richmond.

For some time Lee had returned from Carolina. When the calamity which had fallen on Johnston was known, all thoughts turned towards Lee. Till now no opportunity worthy of his talent had been given him. The only command, if one may give it the name, which he had held was in that part of Virginia beyond the Alleghanies; it was rather in remembrance of his services in the old United States army, than of those hitherto rendered to the Confederacy, that he was to be nominated to the command of the principal Southern army. His nomination was dated the 3rd of June. Thus the Virginians, assembled for the defence of their capital, found themselves under the orders of the most illustrious of their fellow-citizens.

The critical position of affairs decided President Davis to put Lee at the head of the army of Northern Virginia. While retaining his rank of commander-in-chief of all the Confederate forces, he held besides the command which had just been entrusted to him. While at Richmond he had sent all the reinforcements that could be spared to Johnston's army. The conscription began to bring many soldiers to the Southern standard. On the 20th of June the army of Northern Virginia numbered 70,000 fighting men. Like his predecessor, Lee did not wish to allow the Federals to come close under the walls of the Confederate capital. He spent some days following his appointment in studying the position of the two armies.

Meanwhile President Lincoln at length consented to MacDowell's division rejoining the principal army under MacClellan, provided it made its march by land, so as not to expose Washington. The Federal general-in-chief extended his right wing to Hanover Court House,* in order to render assistance to Mac-

* A court house in its origin was frequently but a house, situated generally in the centre of the county whence it took its name; a place where, at certain times, the authorities and judges of the county met, and serving both for

Dowell's advanced guard. It was a critical moment for the Southern cause. This new reinforcement of 40,000 men, coming to swell 120,000 Federals already in line, would probably necessitate the abandonment of Richmond, the moral effect of which would have been great. MacClellan, with ear extended towards the North with feverish impatience, thought he already heard MacDowell's cannon. But this movement was never to be executed.

General Jackson, charged with neutralizing the three columns of Banks, Fremont, and MacDowell, and so hindering them from helping MacClellan, rose to the height of his difficult mission. The conqueror of Banks, who had been ordered to replace MacDowell at Manassas, this indefatigable Jackson succeeded in beating separately Fremont, who, according to the preconcerted plan, was advancing from the west on Richmond, as well as Shields's division, detached by MacDowell to intercept his passage. Free, then, in his movements, Jackson could join Lee for a decisive attack on MacClellan's army. Lee, on his side, had decided not to lose an instant, and an immediate attack was resolved on.

On the receipt of these disastrous tidings from the Valley, President Lincoln absolutely opposed the departure of MacDowell. MacClellan, thoroughly disheartened by this new delay, perceived that he would be compelled to change all his combinations, and must rely only on himself. The left of the Federal army was, to the south of the Chickahominy, protected by a system of formidable works, whose approaches were rendered inaccessible by the felling of huge trees; the whole being commanded by numerous batteries. The centre was supported on the stream itself, near New Bridge. The right extended to Meadow Bridge, beyond Mechanicsville, strongly intrenched in a country admirably

town-hall and sessions-house. In this district, the population of which is scattered, there are not many villages; the inhabitants are disseminated in *plantations*, and the farms isolated.

adapted for defensive operations. This line, fifteen miles in length, was in shape a crescent. At Meadow Bridge, where the outposts of the right wing were, the river is only six miles from the capital. At New Bridge, in the centre of the Federal position, the distance from Richmond is nine miles. York River railroad connected the camp with the Pamunkey in a straight line, a river navigable to this point for the largest steamers, and kept the army in communication with all the North. It was thus most easily provided with everything it needed.

The Chickahominy, which thus cut the Federal position at right angles, is a narrow watercourse, without any perceptible current. Its banks are boggy; trees and brushwood descend to the water, and form there an impenetrable mass, rendering its passage, except where there are bridges, difficult and dangerous. The Confederate army covered Richmond, extending from the James River, where its extreme right commenced, to the Chickahominy, beyond Meadow Bridge, on which its extreme left abutted. General Huger commanded the right, General Magruder the centre, General A. P. Hill the left. The divisions of Longstreet and D. H. Hill, drawn up behind and beyond the left, were to support, at a fitting moment, the turning movement of Jackson.

In order to get an account of the positions occupied by his foe, General Lee directed General Stuart, the commander-in-chief of the cavalry, to reconnoitre in force. This feat of arms, one of the most daring the war saw, succeeded perfectly. MacClellan's vulnerable point seemed to be his extreme right. To this side, therefore, the Confederate new commander-in-chief gave his attention.

General James E. B. Stuart, who here appears for the first time, was a Virginian by birth, and, as yet, only thirty years old. A cavalry lieutenant who had resigned, he served under Johnston in the Valley in the early engagements. At Manassas, in the skirmishes which followed Johnston's retreat behind the Rappahannock, and in the combats of the Peninsula, he was always

remarked for his courage and skill. Of medium height, square shoulders and large chest, he wore a long beard and moustache, turned up at the ends, in the manner of Charles I. The glance of an eagle flashed from his clear blue eyes. A lover of noise, movement, adventure, brilliant colours, Stuart had engaged in the strife with the ardour and passion which the hunter experiences in the pursuit of game. Young, ambitious, brave as his sword, joyous, laughing, and for ever joking, continually followed by a negro banjo player, hurling himself on the enemy while singing a lively refrain, Stuart was the *beau-idéal* of a cavalier, and was adored by his soldiers. It was with joyful alacrity he answered the appeal of his chief.

He assembled 1200 men, composed of the 1st, 4th, and 9th regiments of Virginian cavalry, under Colonels W. H. Fitzhugh Lee and Fitz Lee, the son and nephew of the general-in-chief, (both subsequently became generals), two squadrons of Davis's legion, and two pieces of horse artillery. The column left Richmond on the 12th of June, and moving northwards, encamped for the night near Hanover Court House, not far from the bridge over the South Anna. Stuart had taken this direction in order to make the enemy believe that he was moving from General Jackson's side. He was twenty-two miles from the town, and could from thence bear down directly on the rear of the Federal army. During the night Stuart sent up some rockets, to let them know at Richmond where he was. An answer was made to these signals from the city. Sentries posted on all sides watched against surprise. On June 13th, at dawn, after a short meal, everybody was in the saddle. The most profound silence reigned in the ranks. Up to this moment nobody asked a question about the object of the expedition. Once in the enemy's lines, Stuart confided to his officers his orders and plans. Scouts brought back word that the Oldchurch road was open. This point is equidistant from New Bridge on the Chickahominy, and the Pamunkey, a river serving as the base of Federal operations. He thus found himself on the road leading

straight to MacClellan's centre. The column rapidly advanced in that direction.

At Hanover Court House, 150 Federal cavalry took flight towards Mechanicsville. They were not pursued; Stuart was in too great a hurry for that. At Hawe's Shop several of the enemy's sentries were seized. A little further on a whole regiment of cavalry (the 2nd Federal, General Lee's old regiment,) precipitately retired before Stuart's column. The pursuit continued to a little watercourse named Tottapotomy. A little further on, the Federals having been reinforced, halted at Oldchurch. There was no time to hesitate. Stuart threw on them a squadron in close column, occupying the width of the road. Captain Latané, who commanded it, was slain, but the Federal cavalry made no stand, and the 1st regiment of Virginian cavalry, under Colonel Fitz Lee, put it to the rout, capturing several prisoners and horses. The tents, waggons, and provisions were burnt.

Stuart had to choose whether he would return by the way he came, or, making a complete circuit of the hostile army, cross the Chickahominy lower down. His instructions left him free to act as he thought best. The railroad of the York River once crossed, he made sure of arriving at the Chickahominy, hazarding, if he met with infantry, his leaving it behind him, or if cavalry, his defeating it. He therefore decided for the hardiest plan, but in truth, the least dangerous, for it was probable that the enemy was watching with superior forces all the country he had just traversed, thus rendering his return very problematical. He started, therefore, in the direction of Tunstall's Station. On the road, his soldiers burnt everything that belonged to the Federal army—tents, waggons, supplies. Everywhere the inhabitants welcomed them with shouts of joy. At the sight of their grey jackets many an eye was filled with tears, and more than one old man counselled them to be prudent, "for the enemy," it was added, "surrounded them on all sides."

On the edge of New Kent County the squadron of the advanced

guard fell on a canteen establishment, well furnished with provisions. The famished horsemen halted and ordered a meal. When the canteen-keeper wished to be paid, great was his consternation at learning that he was a prisoner, and so it was with some Federal soldiers who were in the public-house. The rest of the column arriving, finished off the remaining victuals; a little further on Stuart reached the Pamunkey, and there set fire to two ships, loaded with provisions, moored to the bank. Here the column turned off on the railway. Some chosen men went on in advance and surprised the Tunstall station, cutting the telegraph wires, making prisoners twenty men on guard, and obstructing the line. Hardly had this blow been struck before a long convoy of provisions was observed approaching by the road, on its way to the Federal army, under the escort of five squadrons of cavalry. To put these to flight, and obtain possession of the booty, was but the affair of a moment. Shortly after a train was heard coming from the Richmond side, bound for the White House on the Pamunkey. The Confederates stationed sharpshooters along the way, but the train passed very swiftly, without being stopped by the obstacles. Presently Stuart's soldiers rained down a perfect hailstorm of bullets on some open waggons full of Federal soldiers. Some were killed or wounded; others, terror-stricken, leaped from the train, and were made prisoners.

It was night, and time was becoming precious. The convoy they had taken was burnt, as well as the railway bridge at Black Creek, thus intercepting the highway of communication between the Federal army and the Pamunkey. These precautions taken, it was necessary to set out again. The burning waggons gave light to the departing of the hardy Confederates. The roads were abominable; they had all the difficulty in the world to drag their cannon through the mud. Some of the men wandered on the road. A delay of three hours and a half was therefore necessitated at Talleysville, in order to rally the stragglers. A Federal hospital, with 159 sick men in it, fell into the hands of the

Southerners, but suffered no damage. At midnight the march was resumed, and on the morning of the 14th the column reached the Chickahominy at Forge Bridge, where Stuart hoped to find a ford. But Colonel Fitzhugh Lee, having tried to cross, found the river there very deep and the current very rapid. The situation became critical. The Federal sentries were so near that one could almost hear them, and numerous columns of Federal cavalry scoured the country in all directions to cut off the retreat of Stuart's troopers, whose audacious exploits had awakened all the energy of General MacClellan. Before them flowed an impassable river; on all sides they were beset by a swarm of enemies bent on their destruction. It seemed impossible that, on the return of day, they would not be made prisoners. Over and over again men threw themselves into the water, seeking a ford, but in vain. The only resource was to construct a bridge. Happily, at this moment, the ruins of an old bridge were discovered, destroyed by the Confederates some weeks previously. These they could make use of. With the aid of some boards found in a house, and some trees felled on the banks of the river, they succeeded in repairing the bridge, and before day all the column had crossed the Chickahominy and re-entered the Southern lines.

Without speaking of the intelligence, precious and precise, which had been gained relative to the position and strength of the Federal army, General Stuart led back 165 prisoners, 260 horses and mules with their accoutrements, and a considerable quantity of arms. He had likewise destroyed provisions and war-materials valued at several million dollars. This magnificent result had cost the life of only a single man, the brave Captain Latané. The soldiers' conduct was worthy of all praise. Except a very short halt on Thursday evening, they had not left their saddles from Thursday morning till Saturday night, stopping neither to rest nor eat, and amid a thousand dangers accomplishing with success one of the most brilliant feats of arms that have ever rendered the cavalry of a country illustrious.

Thanks to the intelligence which Stuart brought back, General Lee saw that the Federal right could be easily turned, for, so to speak, it was unguarded. He resolved to profit by this circumstance. His first care, on assuming the command, had been to construct along his lines works of defence sufficiently strong for a part of his army to hold them against all the Federal army, leaving the rest of the Confederate troops free to take the offensive. The time was favourable. Jackson, the conqueror of Shields and Fremont, was in a situation to join his soldiers with the Confederate army under Richmond. He was, therefore, recalled, with the recommendation to operate this movement as secretly as possible, so that the enemy might not know he had left the Valley.

To this end recourse was had to a stratagem. On the 11th of June, Whiting's division of Lee's army were loaded in several trains at the terminus of the Danville railroad at Richmond. They were made to cross the river at a point near Belleisle, where there were, at that moment, a considerable number of Federal prisoners, about to be released and sent down the James River. The trains loitered a long time, and the prisoners were able to convince themselves that all these Confederate soldiers were sent by Lee to reinforce Jackson, who was only waiting for them to march on Washington. MacClellan, in effect, believed this report of the liberated prisoners. The trains set out in the direction indicated, but returned the same night. Jackson, on his part, by a clever combination of marches and countermarches, made believe that he was descending the Valley towards the upper Potomac, and disappeared suddenly. Even his soldiers were ignorant whither he was leading them. They had received orders not to ask the names of the villages they passed through, and to reply to all questions: "I don't know." So well, that Jackson, having surprised a soldier stealing cherries, and asking him his name and regiment, could get him to say nothing else but "I don't know."

On the 15th of June, Jackson's division arrived at Ashland, fifteen miles north of Richmond. Here he left his tired soldiers, and rapidly betook himself to the city. Crossing the streets at night, he arrived, without being recognised, at the house which served Lee for head-quarters, near Fair Oaks Station. There took place the first interview, since the commencement of the war, between these two remarkable men.

Lee's plan was to take the Federal's right wing in front and rear, throw it back on the centre, and thus force MacClellan to issue from his intrenchments and deliver battle in order to maintain his communications with the Pamunkey. Consequently Jackson was to direct his march on Pole Green Church, nearly in the direction of Stuart's reconnoitring expedition. This latter, with a large part of the cavalry, was stationed at Jackson's extreme left, to surround the Federals more surely. General Branch was to defile by Meadow Bridge on Mechanicsville, while General A. P. Hill would bear directly on Mechanicsville, supported by the concentrated fire of all the Confederate batteries raised along the Chickahominy. The position of Mechanicsville once carried, General D. H. Hill would support Jackson's operations, who was charged to attack on the rear, and squeeze everything that came in his way as in a vice, all the while pressing on the Federal centre. Longstreet was to support General A. P. Hill, and the two corps united had for their mission to occupy the enemy's lines at New Bridge. Generals Huger and Magruder were meanwhile to defend the works before Richmond, making demonstrations against the centre, and to advance if the enemy retreated, pursuing him vigorously. On the roads abutting on the capital were posted sentries and detachments of cavalry, to watch the movements of the enemy. Reserves of infantry were ready to support them in case of an unforeseen attack. The soldiers were ordered to carry provisions for three days. As the Confederates occupied the inner, that is, the shorter line, it was easy for them, if needed, to concentrate themselves rapidly, either for attack or defence.

MacClellan, on his side, since the battle of Seven Pines, had been content to fortify his position, seeking to divine the schemes of his adversary. He had quietly given up the offensive part to Lee, and during the rest of this campaign the Federal forces offered the strange spectacle of an army invading a country, and, although very superior in number and resources, awaiting the attack, instead of pressing forward and engaging itself in conflict. MacClellan had also committed the remarkable blunder of so disposing his army that the Chickahominy flowed between its two wings, thus cutting its centre at right angles. The wings could only communicate with each other by means of bridges and roads, always very bad, because of the marshy nature of the ground bordering the river. Sudden overflows might at any moment carry away the bridges, in which case the two halves of his army could not possibly succour each other. Having established his base of operations on the Pamunkey, which was unnecessary, he was compelled to keep his right wing between that river and Richmond, to protect his communications. Had he chosen the James, all need of remaining north of the Chickahominy would have disappeared, and this dangerous position, the holding of both banks of a stream which could play him a bad turn, would have no further shade of excuse or reason for its continuance.

For the rest, he felt the peril of his position so much, that he was thinking of changing his base of operations, when a deserter from Jackson's division arrived on the 24th of June, and informed him that that general was preparing to march on his right flank.

CHAPTER VI.

THE BATTLE OF THE CHICKAHOMINY OR COLD HARBOUR, JUNE 27TH, 1862.

Now commences that series of combats from June 26th to July 1st, known by the name of "The seven days under Richmond," terminating in the defeat and final retreat of MacClellan. The Chickahominy, whose borders were about to be the scene of an eager and decisive struggle between the two hostile armies, is a river with small current, winding much, which takes its rise above Richmond, running north and east of the city, and falling into the James to the south, far below Richmond. Its borders are marshy, and covered with trees and brushwood. The banks are low, and at the least overflow of the water, the stream, generally narrow and insignificant, becomes a lake, covering all the plain to the woody hills which rise at a certain distance on both sides. Several bridges cross it; that of Mechanicsville, four miles from Richmond, and that of New Bridge, eight miles, are very important points.

MacClellan's position has been already described. One part of his army had crossed the southern bank and was about five miles from the city. The rest of his troops remained on the north bank of the Chickahominy, and extended in the form of a crescent to the neighbourhood of Mechanicsville, where it had been agreed that General MacDowell should post himself, thus covering the Federal right flank, and protecting its communications with the Federal base at the White House. In the presence of such foes as Johnston and Lee this disposition of the troops was a grave

blunder. But here MacClellan was the victim of the feeble and changing policy at Washington. If MacDowell's 40,000 men had marched to join his standard, his position would have been sheltered from all surprise. It was precisely this right flank, left defenceless, because too much reliance was placed on MacDowell, which became the point of the Confederate attack.

The army Lee was preparing to hurl against the enemy was composed of the *élite* of the Southern population. Among the common soldiers were many men of good education and high social position. This explains the character which the contest had taken. The war was one of invasion on the part of the North. Thus all the Southern youth, naturally impatient and ardent, had thrown body and soul into it with enthusiasm. The feeling that everybody ought to become a soldier for his native soil, and a legitimate indignation at the thought that a fraction of the country had sent an army to reduce them to obedience, attracted to the Confederate ranks the flower of the youth, and all that was most vigorous in the district. Restive under discipline, and hard to manage, these men still gave proof of precious military qualities. They could especially be counted on when the enterprise was perilous. Among the generals, it is enough to mention A. P. Hill, whose dash was irresistible; Longstreet, remarkable on the contrary for his quiet and obstinacy; the already celebrated Jackson, nicknamed "Stonewall," and others who made a name afterwards.

Till now, General Lee had passed for being a man of exaggerated prudence, but his plan of attack against MacClellan indicated a hardiness which, on the contrary, bordered upon rashness. Informing himself accurately as to the positions occupied by the enemy and his forces, knowing also that a great part of the Federal army had crossed the Chickahominy and were in his ront, Lee had decided to cross to the north bank with the major portion of his troops, leaving only 25,000 men for the protection of the city, and risk all on the chances of the battle he was about

to deliver. It was, perhaps, very inconsiderate, but, like his later flank movement at Chancellorsville, and his entry, in 1864, into Pennsylvania under the very eyes of General Hooker, this hardiness had its source in a true military inspiration, revealing the qualifications of a great captain.

On June 26th, 1862, General Jackson put his troops in motion about 10 o'clock, a.m. In consequence of the rapidity with which he had descended some mountains in Western Virginia, the bulk of his train had only rejoined very late in the night; by this his departure in the morning was delayed. General Branch, of A. P. Hill's division, immediately crossed the marshes with his brigade and marched on Meadow Bridge. But the obstacles met with made his progress very slow. General A. P. Hill waited a long time without receiving any news of Jackson or Branch. He well knew the engagement had begun, but the enemy's forces in his front gave no signs of trouble. At 3 o'clock, p.m., feeling that if he delayed longer, the success of the whole combination would be compromised, he gave orders to commence the attack. Field's brigade precipitated itself on the bridge and took it. The whole division followed, and, turning to the right, marched on Mechanicsville. Received by a sharp fire of artillery it still pressed on, and routed the Federals at Mechanicsville. But this was only an affair with the outposts. The true line of defence chosen by the enemy was rather more than a mile in the rear, on the left bank of a watercourse, Beaver Dam Creek; this bank, higher than the right bank, commands the latter. The Federal left was supported on the Chickahominy, the centre was stationed at Beaver Dam Creek, and the right leaned on some thick woods which bordered the road from Mechanicsville to Cold Harbour. A road crossed the watercourse and ascended towards Ellison's Mill. This was the only way by which Confederate artillery could attack the Federal position, and the fire of the Federal cannon had an entire sweep of it. To the south of this creek there was also a small valley, but so marshy that infantry could

not manœuvre there. Besides, it had been strewn with trunks of trees thrown across it. The Federal position, naturally so strong, had been chosen with extreme care; several lines of infantry and artillery possessed the heights, and rifle pits extended from the base to the top of the hill. General Fitz-John Porter, the most able of the Northern divisionary generals, commanded at this point. It was here that the Federal troops, crowded back from Mechanicsville, sought a refuge. General Hill's soldiers pursuing the enemy were soon under the fire of the Beaver Dam Creek batteries. Perceiving that the position was too strong to be carried by assault, and hoping every moment to hear Jackson's cannon, on the enemy's rear, General Hill halted. To his right, however, he twice attempted to cross the Beaver Dam Creek stream at Ellison's Mill, but without being able to touch General Porter's left. At 9 o'clock, p.m., the combat ceased. The Federals had been dislodged at Mechanicsville, but held their own at Beaver Dam Creek. The Confederates passed the night on the ground they had conquered. They had lost between three and four thousand men; the Federals much less.

At 6 o'clock, p.m., General A. P. Hill's offensive movement having laid open the Mechanicsville Bridge, the divisions of D. H. Hill and Longstreet were able to cross the Chickahominy, the former taking the direction of Cold Harbour to co-operate with Jackson, the latter going to the help of A. P. Hill, in order, on the following morning, to be in line.

Up to this time, in spite of some delays caused by the difficult nature of this woody and marshy country, Lee's plan had perfectly succeeded. The four divisions of Jackson, A. P. Hill, D. H. Hill, and Longstreet had crossed the Chickahominy, and although the Federals still held out at Beaver Dam Creek, there was no doubt that when Jackson fell on their flank, they would be obliged to abandon this position. Indeed, this calculation was verified by the event. General MacClellan, at the news of Jackson's approach, gave orders to General Porter to retire on New Bridge.

In the night of the 26th of June, Porter sent the greater part of his cannon and waggons to the south bank of the river; and a little before day, the Federal troops withdrew, burning all they could not carry off. General Jackson had arrived on the borders of Tottapotamy Creek, a marshy watercourse, with steep banks covered with thick wood. He found the bridge in flames, and heard the enemy on the other side cutting timber in the forest to bar his road. The Texas Brigade, commanded by Wood, was sent on in advance as scouts. An opportune fire of some howitzers into the woods made the enemy take flight, and the Confederates promptly repaired the bridge and crossed. Continually pushing the Federal rear-guard before him, Jackson passed the night at Hundley's Corner; and the next day, June 27th, at dawn, resumed his march on Cold Harbour. D. H. Hill, during the morning, rejoined him with his division, and from that time formed the advanced guard of the Confederate left.

On the morning of the 27th, Longstreet in the centre drove Porter's troops before him, and A. P. Hill went further to the left to Gaines Mill, more than a mile from Cold Harbour, in order to give a helping hand to D. H. Hill and Jackson. Thus, therefore, on the morning of June 27th, at ten o'clock, MacClellan withdrew his right wing, to find a place where he could deliver a last battle to the north of the Chickahominy, the four Confederate divisions pressing him smartly with their united forces. Up to this point everything had succeeded to General Lee's satisfaction. The Federal general-in-chief felt that his plan of campaign had failed, and that there was only left to him the choice of two alternatives, equally dangerous. He could no longer think of preserving his communications with the White House* on the Pamunkey; Jackson was already master of it. Should MacClellan risk a battle in its aid, and victory not declare for him, his line of retreat towards the James River would be lost. His only choice was

* This property belonged to Lee, and came from General Washington. The latter was married here. The Federals did not leave it a blade of grass.

between an abandonment of the position he occupied, and a retreat, or the rapid concentration of his forces south of the Chickahominy, followed by an assault on the lines at Richmond. The latter would have been the most daring, inasmuch as it would have presented his flank to the enemy; but, perhaps, his great numerical superiority might have allowed him to crush Magruder and Huger's 25,000 men before Lee could fly to their succour. However this may be, MacClellan decided on retreat. As Jackson, at the head of the Confederate left wing, barred his road to the Pamunkey, where, up to the present, his base of operations had been, there remained to him only two lines of retreat; the first, that which the Confederates had followed in May, coming from Yorktown; this was much the longest, and exposed him to the daily attacks of the victorious Confederates, which might lead to the entire destruction of his army; the second carried him through the White Oak Swamp to the James River, and was hardly more than thirty miles long. The nature of the country traversed would permit him to conceal his movements, and arrest the enemy's pursuit at critical points. He chose this latter route. He hoped thus to accomplish a change in his base of operations, which he had long desired, in order to begin a new campaign against Richmond, with this difference, indeed, between the movement he wished for and that he was compelled to take, that in the former case he would not have had to experience the frightful losses in men and treasure which were about to attend its actual execution, and that what would have been an offensive movement became an obligatory flight before a conquering enemy.

Having then decided on the White Oak Swamp, MacClellan saw that, in order to give time to the bulk of his army to defile, the right wing under General Porter must be sacrificed to cover the Federal retreat. Porter, therefore, withdrew from Beaver Dam Creek, and occupied a very strong position at Cold Harbour, where MacClellan had ordered some formidable works to be

constructed, which extended over a series of heights from the Chickahominy to Cold Harbour. A boggy watercourse, Powhite Creek, traversing a very woody country, flowed at the foot of these heights. The left occupied an elevated ground covered with trees, very precipitous, and overlooking a ravine which descended to the Chickahominy; the right, a sheltered position in the woods behind Cold Harbour. The tufted brushwood of this ravine hid thousands of sharpshooters; half-way up the height there extended a line of infantry, and behind, a second line, protected by parapets formed of the trunks of trees; a third line crowned the summit, which likewise bristled with artillery. At the foot of this really impregnable position, a plain, somewhat more than 500 yards wide, stretched, overlooked by the fire of this triple line of defence, and swept by the huge Federal batteries south of the Chickahominy. The watercourse already mentioned rendered all approach in front, over the soft ground, very difficult. On all sides, in the plain, trees had been cut down, for the double purpose of laying open the Confederates, and, the trunks being strewn all about on the ground, of keeping the enemy longer exposed to the shower of grape-shot all around them. This line of battle covered the approaches of the bridges which connected the two wings of the Federals.

General Lee had fixed his head-quarters in a house on Hogan's plantation, and there quietly awaited the moment when he should give the signal to engage. Hill and Longstreet's columns had halted on the plain, till the arrival of Jackson's right at Cold Harbour should be signalled. Lee, calm and collected, was seated beneath a verandah in the rear of the house. A crowd of officers were on the walks and greensward. They conversed in whispers, while their chief, aside and alone, seemed buried in his own thoughts, his fine countenance impressed with a serious air, but without a shade of inquietude or irresolution. Presently a courier arrives full gallop, on a horse white with foam, and presents a letter to the general. After having thrown his eyes

over the paper, Lee mounts his horse without losing a moment, and a report spreads that Jackson is approaching, and the battle going to commence.

Longstreet's division, coming from Beaver Dam Creek, had, in an hour, arrived at a place near the Chickahominy, opposite the new Federal position. It was there that Lee rejoined it. He wore his simple uniform of grey cloth with brass buttons, three gold stars on the collar alone indicating his rank; on his head was a grey felt hat with broad brims; riding boots, and leather gloves, with large gauntlets, completed his costume. His confident look, fine figure, and ease on horseback made him an accomplished cavalier. Such he appeared to his soldiers, many of whom saw him now for the first time.

At the same moment A. P. Hill, whose division had suffered so much the evening before at Mechanicsville, and which reckoned now only 11,000 bayonets, precipitated four of his brigades on the enemy's left at Cold Harbour. But although Hill kept on supporting them with all the soldiers he had left, in spite of repeated efforts, the Federals retained their positions. It was their turn to charge the exhausted troops of Hill. Lee counted on Jackson's arrival to turn the hostile lines, but he saw that while waiting Hill would be crushed; he therefore ordered Longstreet to feign an attack on the Federal left and centre. The latter instantly advanced, but taking notice of the immense strength of the enemy's works, he felt that his feigned attack must be changed into a real one, if he wished to afford Hill any real help. Five brigades rushed to the assault in double quick time, but were received by a fire so terrible that they recoiled cowed.

Night was approaching, and none of the attacks had finished. Happily at this moment the noise of the firing increases towards the Confederate left, and re-echoes loudly in the distance. A cry of joy and enthusiasm rises in the Southern ranks. "It is Jackson! it is Jackson!" the soldiers repeat to one another.

It was indeed he. He had marched all day, guided by the cannon which he heard thundering in the direction of the Chickahominy, and fearing to arrive too late, so much was his march delayed by unforeseen obstacles, watercourses, marshes, felled trees, abominable roads. He reached Cold Harbour at half-past five, when Longstreet was just assaulting the left of the enemy's position. He immediately ordered D. H. Hill's division to charge. Hardly was the order received before the latter rushed through everything, the marsh, the river, the brushwood, and the obstacles raised to guard the extreme right of MacClellan, thrusting everything he met before him, and at nightfall, by a last charge, he put the Federals to rout. General Ewell, however, had still to strive for four hours before he could render himself definitively master of the ground. It was not till ten o'clock at night that all the Federal position was abandoned.

Whiting's division arrived to succour Longstreet just when the latter had been arrested by the crushing fire of the Federal batteries. Hood and his Texas brigade were charged to snatch a victory from the enemy on that side. Already three of the four regiments which composed it had been cut down by the Federal fire, when Hood came and found the fourth regiment acting as a reserve, the men lying flat on their stomachs. He made it advance by the right flank to an orchard. "The ground," says an eye-witness, "was covered with the dead and dying. Every instant the ranks opened for panic-stricken fugitives to pass through. In front of us was the *old 3rd Brigade* who, but a few minutes before, had started with cheers to storm the fatal palisade. But the storm of iron and lead was too severe; they wavered for a moment; half of the column lay writhing on the ground, the remainder, throwing down their arms, sought refuge in flight. At this instant, General Hood, who had in person taken command of our regiment, commanded in his clear ringing voice: '*Forward, quick march!*' We were but 500. We had as supports behind us

two regiments, one from Texas and one from Georgia. Hardly had we gone ten steps when our colonel fell dead. Volleys of musketry, and showers of grape, canister, and shell ploughed through us, but were only answered by the stern '*Close up—close up to the colours!*' And onward we rushed over the dead and dying without a pause, until within about one hundred yards of the breastworks. We had reached the apex of the hill, and some of the men, seeing the enemy just before them, commenced to discharge their pieces. It was at this point that preceding brigades had halted, and beyond which no one had gone, in consequence of the terrible concentrated fire of the concealed enemy. At this critical juncture the voice of General Hood was heard above the din of battle: '*Forward, down on them with the bayonet!*' We made one grand rush for the fort, down the hill, across the creek and fallen timber, and the next minute saw our battle-flag planted upon the captured breastwork. The enemy, frightened at the rapid approach of pointed steel, rose up from behind his defences, and started for his second line at full speed. One volley was poured into their backs, and it seemed that every ball found a victim, so great was the slaughter. Their works were ours, and as our flag moved from the first to the second tier of defences, a shout arose from the shattered remnants of the 4th Texas. . . Right and left it was taken up, and rang along the line for miles, long after many of those who started it were in eternity."

Supported by the reinforcements continually sent him, Hood pursued the enemy, took fourteen cannon, an entire Federal regiment, and rendered himself complete master of their works. This charge cost the Confederates 1,000 men. Once sure that the key of the Federal position was in his hands, Lee advanced his whole army and energetically crowded back the Northern troops toward the Chickahominy, crushing everything in his way. But during this time the darkness had become profound; the Southern army itself lost its alignment, and the country was

ill-adapted for a night pursuit. An order was therefore given to camp on the battle-field.

The Federals retired in disorder towards the bridges, a large number of them being a prey to unspeakable terror. Riderless horses ran about affrighted in all directions; balls whistled; here and there fell an unfortunate, hit unawares; upset waggons, ambulances, cannons blocked the way; the poor wounded, limping, groaning, losing all their blood, dragged themselves into the midst of the affray; the officers in vain addressed their soldiers to restrain them, seeking to reason with them, supplicating them, and, in spite of themselves, carried away by the torrent of fugitives,—above all, the growling of the cannon, clouds of smoke rising over the field of battle, the red disc of the sun settling below the horizon,—formed a spectacle impossible to forget.

Order was partly restored at the bridges; during the night most of the troops crossed the river; at 6 o'clock, a.m., the soldiers of the regular army were the last to go over, after which the bridge was set on fire.

This contest at Cold Harbour was one of the most seriously disputed of the whole war. The Confederate victory determined the campaign. The losses of the two armies were great; from 7000 to 8000 on the Confederate side, from 6000 to 7000 on that of the Federals.

General Lee the same night despatched to Richmond the following letter:—

"Head-quarters, June 27th, 1862.

"His Excellency President Davis.

"Mr. President,—Profoundly grateful to Almighty God for the signal victory granted to us, it is my pleasing task to announce to you the success achieved by this army to-day.

"The enemy was this morning driven from his strong position behind Beaver Dam Creek, and pursued to that behind Powhite Creek, and finally, after a severe contest of five hours, entirely repulsed from the field

"Night put an end to the contest. I grieve to state that our loss in officers and men is great.

"We sleep on the field, and shall renew the contest in the morning.

"I have the honour to be,

"Very respectfully,

"R. E. LEE, (General)."

CHAPTER VII.

MACCLELLAN'S RETREAT.

THE battle of the Chickahominy or Cold Harbour was a decisive battle, whatever certain Northern writers may say, who pretend that it was only the first in a series of engagements, all nearly of equal importance, mere incidents in General MacClellan's change of front from the banks of the York to those of the James. This theory is difficult to support. Had this first encounter been a Federal victory General MacClellan would have marched straight on Richmond, without dreaming of losing time in a change of his base of operations, and the result would have been the taking of the city. The proof that it was a Federal defeat is precisely the necessity MacClellan was under of bearing towards the James, since his communications with the North by the White House were cut off. Far from being able to think of attacking Richmond, all he could do was to save his army. It is true he had an idea of changing his base of operations before the battle; but, having lost it, he had no further choice. It was no longer an army full of spirits and hope which he was directing towards a stronger position than the one he left, but a tired and discouraged mob whom he drew after him, hastening to gain the River James, there to take refuge under the fire of his batteries, and so escape from the pursuit of an enemy bent on his destruction. This result, deciding the whole campaign, was brought about by the battle of the Chickahominy. To wish, therefore, to

give no more prominence to this engagement than to those which followed it is to falsify history.

However this may be, MacClellan at least was too good a soldier not to know that the battle of the 27th had been decisive, and his resolution to beat a retreat was attested the night of the battle in an assembly at head-quarters, where he unfolded to his generals his plan and the motives which had dictated it.

On the morning of the 28th of June, nearly all his army was concentrated on the southern side of the Chickahominy. MacClellan gave proof, in the retreat which followed, of a rare skill and much vigour, surrounded as he was by dangers of all kinds. The advantages he was able to possess over his foe ought in no-wise to detract from the admiration due to the Federal general-in-chief.

One of these advantages was the uncertainty in which Lee was placed as to what his adversary was going to do. The latter could give battle to reconquer the railway from York River, or retire into the Peninsula, or towards the James. Lee found himself compelled to await his enemy's movements. It was very unfortunate, but there was nothing to be done. Meanwhile Ewell took the railway from York River, the Federals retiring before him to the other side of the Chickahominy, burning the bridge and destroying the road. The clouds of dust coming from the Federal lines south of the river manifestly indicated that something was preparing. The Federals had just abandoned for good the York River railway; but on the side of the James the Confederates could not detect any sign of movement towards this river. It became, therefore, more and more probable that it was to the Peninsula that MacClellan was directing his army. Ewell advanced, following the north bank of the Chickahominy, in the direction of the different fords leading to Williamsburg, but without discovering anything. General Stuart likewise made a sudden push towards the White House, taking, on his way, some convoys of provender and war material, capturing or putting to flight some

scouts and squadrons of artillery. Towards night the blaze in the sky and the explosion of howitzers in the direction of the White House, showed that the enemy was destroying there all they could not carry off. At daybreak Stuart resumed his march, and arrived in sight of a Federal battery, with which he exchanged cannon shots. Stuart took at the White House considerable booty. Nine large barges, loaded with provisions, were burning as the Southern cavalry arrived; the fire likewise devoured an immense number of tents, waggons, railway trucks loaded, five locomotives, buildings of all sorts, ammunition, and an immense amount of material, representing a total of several million dollars: all was destroyed.

Hence, turning to the south, the cavalry went, according to Lee's orders, and surveyed the bridges and fords over the Chickahominy, leading towards the Peninsula. At New Market, a group of houses near the James, between Richmond and the Federal lines, 6000 men under General Holmes were posted, to hinder the enemy from approaching the river, and to advertise head-quarters of the first indication of a Federal movement. The 28th, therefore, was passed in watching the enemy, completely hidden by the woody nature of the country, and the lines of defence which sheltered him. All the Confederate army received orders to rest under arms all night between the 28th and 29th of June, in order to advance without losing a moment directly it was known in what direction MacClellan would retire. All the tokens which came to him confirmed General Lee in his idea that the Northern army was preparing for a general movement, and as nothing indicated that it would be towards the Peninsula, it could only be in the direction of the James.

Lee was right. During daytime on the 28th, MacClellan occupied all the defensive points which could protect the passage of his army across that series of bogs known under the general name of the White Oak Swamp. 5000 ambulances, waggons, tumbrils, and 2500 bullocks, were driven by the single and only road which traversed this district. During the night of the 28th,

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Porter's division also retired by the same way. The corps of Sumner, Heintzelman, and Smith received orders to remain north of the swamp, on the side of Richmond, during the whole day on the 29th, till all the conveyances and supplies were out of danger. Although Lee had no doubt about what was occurring, everything was done with such order, that he was not assured of the Federal retreat till discovering at sunrise on the 29th that their lines were abandoned.

Presently Longstreet and A. P. Hill recrossed the Chickahominy at New Bridge, and took the road which goes from Derbytown to Long Bridge. Huger quitted his intrenchments, and his columns defiled by the Charles City Road to fall on the Federal flank. Magruder, following the route to Williamsburg, was to attack their rear; and Jackson, recrossing the river at Grape-vine Bridge, and then passing Savage Station, was to rejoin Magruder. Lee hoped thus to cut off the enemy's retreat, and capture or destroy the greater part of his army. All the Confederate columns were early on the march; on the 29th Jackson alone, who was obliged to repair the bridge at Grape-vine, could not cross the Chickahominy till the evening.

Lee's arrangements were excellent, but MacClellan had twenty-four hours' advance, which, joined to the nature of the country the two armies had to travel, gave him advantages that no pursuit could deprive him of, however vigorous and well-combined.

Magruder, going through the fortified outposts and positions just abandoned, and passing enormous quantities of war material, chiefly in good condition, arrived at Savage Station towards evening. There the Federal General Sumner's corps was awaiting him. A sanguinary conflict ensued, to which the darkness of night alone put an end. During the night Sumner retreated across the White Oak Swamp, destroying all the bridges in his rear, and all the war-material he could at Savage Station. The Confederates took several hundred prisoners, and found a large number of men killed and wounded in the recent engagement,

and likewise a hospital of 2500 invalids. Unfortunately, already the Confederates were ill-provided with medicines for the wounded, and the Federals left but few behind them.

It will not, perhaps, here be uninteresting to recount, following a Northern narrative, some of the scenes which took place during the retreat of the Northern army across this labyrinth of marshes and soft ground, rendered still more inauspicious by drenching rains, and by the thick wood covering their surface:

"The line of retreat was straight through the middle of White Oak Swamp. Under one's eyes was the sad spectacle of thousands of wounded dragging themselves along as best they could, in an extended file. All the ambulances which could be got together were laden with such of the unfortunate wounded as could bear the journey. Many who could not be so carried fell into the hands of the enemy. In the distance shone the fires of the Confederate outposts. The night was very dark, and the clouds seemed to forebode a tempest, but, no matter how exhausted the soldiers were, they could not stop, they must march all night.

"Savage Station is about six miles from the White Oak Swamp Bridge. Over this extent a confused multitude of horses, waggons, cannons, ambulances, pontoons, and all the material of a vast army, was hastening. Sometimes a stoppage occurred; it is impossible to describe the confusion then resulting. The waggons, twenty abreast, blocked the road. The officers made unheard-of efforts to extricate them; the drivers swore, the horses plunged, and accidents to the carriages added to the general disorder. That day there was but little fighting, as the enemy was ignorant of our movements. The sun rose on the 29th of June over this scene of tumult and consternation. The heat of the day was oppressive; not a breath of air was felt. Behind us the incessant noise of musketry and growling of artillery were heard. At every footstep set we left all along the road some dead, as well as those too seriously wounded to allow of their transport. Many of our men threw away their knapsacks and other

incumbrances, retaining only their arms. Others, being affected with sun-stroke, fell down, foaming at the mouth, a prey to delirium. Cannon-balls, shells, from time to time burst over us, as a warning that the enemy was not far off. Occasionally our rear-guard halted, and then the battle was furiously renewed.

"Black clouds brought early darkness, and torrents of rain began to fall. Our rear hastened its march through the darkness and tempest. The forest was illumined by incessant lightning; the thunder was, every minute, growling above our heads. Pell-mell on the narrow road, horse-soldiers, foot-soldiers, artillerymen, all confused and intermingled with guns, waggons, columns of infantry, and squadrons of cavalry, we rolled onwards like a gloomy torrent, except when the lightning whitened our bayonets, and made the frightful scene still more hideous: on the right and left of the road, where the ground presented a firmer bottom, the multitude of fugitives hurried along. Shattered carts, forsaken ammunition-waggons, débris of all kinds, marked the line which the routed army was following. We spoke in whispers. Every sort of noise was avoided, such was the haste to get out of this horrible marsh before daylight. Sometimes a poor soldier would throw himself on the ground for a few moments' sleep; then, awaking with a start, pale with fright at the idea of falling into the hands of the enemy, he would continue his way half asleep."

It was, indeed, a terrible march. General Jackson arrived at the bridge over the White Oak Swamp on the morning of June 30th. His vanguard had taken above a thousand prisoners, and so many arms were scattered on the ground, that it was necessary to detach two Northern Carolina regiments to gather them and carry them to the rear. The bridge was destroyed, and the enemy in force on the other side disputed the passage. Twenty-eight guns soon swept the opposite bank, and the Confederate skirmishers passed the water-course, but could not maintain themselves on the other side. The enemy disputed the ground so

vigorously till night, that Jackson could not advance, although the cannonade at the other extremity of the marshes indicated to him sufficiently clearly that the struggle in which Longstreet was engaged was becoming warmer and warmer. But it was totally impossible to force the passage; there was only a very narrow ford, completely commanded by the enemy's fire. It would have been madness to attempt to cross.

While Jackson was champing his bit, Longstreet, the same afternoon, had arrived very near Quaker Road, which the Federal army travelled in its precipitate course towards the James. Long Bridge Road, by which Longstreet was approaching, intersected Quaker Road at right angles, very near the place where the latter enters the White Oak Swamp. A little further on, Charles City Road also joins Quaker Road. Huger came by the Charles City Road, while Jackson pursued the Federal rear by Quaker Road. Should these three columns succeed in helping each other, and fall on MacClellan at the same time, Lee would have all his army united, and it would be all over with the Federals. It was, therefore, of the last importance to hinder this concentration, and so secure to the Federal general-in-chief time to draw his army from the dangerous position into which it had fallen, and concentrate it in the plains within reach of the James, where it would have nothing further to fear. For this, three things were necessary: to hinder Jackson from penetrating the White Oak Swamp, which had already taken place; to hold the cross roads between Long Bridge Road and Quaker Road against Longstreet till the Federal army had defiled in safety; and lastly, to prevent Huger's column joining that of Longstreet. Huger, whose movements were a little slow, could not issue from the Charles City Road till the morning of July 1st.

To resist Longstreet, who arrived on the ground at one o'clock, p.m., on the 29th, MacClellan posted the Pennsylvanian reserves, under General MacCall, parallel to the Quaker Road, extending to the New Market Road, and supported by three Federal

divisions. General Holmes, on the extreme Confederate right, opened a smart fire on the Federal positions at Malvern Hill, but without result, the gun-boats on the James having been put into use on the other side.

Although Huger had sent word in the morning that his march was slackened because of the obstacles he met with, Lee's need of him was so great, that, in consequence of the pressing orders transmitted to him, he was in line in the afternoon. When, therefore, Longstreet disposed his forces in order of battle at Frazier's Farm, Lee, who was with that part of the army, believed he could fully count on Huger and Jackson's corps in his general attack on the Federal lines, completely ignorant that Jackson had been unable to cross the White Oak Swamp.

About four o'clock, the noise of cannon sounded from the side of the Charles City Road. Believing it was General Huger, Longstreet opened fire with one battery only, to show where he was, but Huger did not come, and the enemy answering by a furious cannonade, the combat began. Longstreet hurled his cavalry against MacCall;—the struggle became intense;—the ground would not allow of an attack by the whole body of troops. Nevertheless, in spite of the enemy's superior number, and their admirably directed artillery fire, the Confederates kept advancing. General A. P. Hill received orders to support Longstreet with all his division. A determined charge met with full success; several batteries were taken at the point of the bayonet, and the guns afterwards being turned upon the enemy, they were driven from their positions. General MacCall was taken prisoner. The battle lasted till nine o'clock, p.m. The Federals had given way throughout their whole line, except on the right, where they maintained themselves most desperately. The ground was disputed inch by inch, but the battle-field, again excepting the right, remained with the Confederates, who thus obtained the dead and wounded of the Federal army, 14 cannons, and many prisoners. If General Huger could have arrived in time to attack the right,

as Lee intended, the Northern army would have suffered a great disaster.

Thanks to the delay forced on Jackson and the non-arrival of Huger, MacClellan was able to thread the dangerous passages of the White Oak Swamp with the rest of his army, whilst his rear-guard kept Jackson in play, and his left wing resisted Longstreet. General Franklin having retired from the Swamp during the night with the Federal rearguard, Jackson was able to pursue his route, and the next morning rejoin the Confederate army on the battle-field of the previous evening. The Federal army was concentrated at Malvern Hill. All the dangers threatening it had passed away with the combat at Frazier's Farm. The Confederates could no longer hope to cut off its retreat towards the James, for on the 30th of June, that is, the preceding night, its van had reached this river, while its artillery and waggons were parked behind Malvern Hill, and MacClellan was in communication with the Federal batteries.

Lee's only course now was to force a battle. He knew well that, if successful, the Northern army would be at his mercy; if the affair was not decisively in his favour, the worst that could happen was that the enemy would be able to traverse the few remaining miles separating him from the river. Jackson, therefore, following the Willis Church Road, hastened to get in front of the Federal position at Malvern Hill, a position, by the way, remarkably well-chosen. It was an elevated plain nearly two miles long, and somewhat more than half a mile broad. Masses of infantry, deep and dense, lined this table-land, crowned by 60 huge pieces of ordnance. The Northern army formed a semi-circle, of which Malvern Hill formed the left and a part of the centre, while the right inclined towards the river, through woods and ravines. It rested thus on the James, ready, in case of need, to take shelter under the fire of its gunboats. At the foot of Malvern Hill the country was without trees, but marshy and uneven; the fire of the batteries and gunboats swept it in all directions. Lee had given

orders to bring all available artillery into line, in order, as a preliminary step, to reduce the Federal batteries to silence, and throw disorder among the columns of infantry ranged for the contest. But the difficulties of the ground were such, that the Confederates could never get their cannon up in time, and to oppose the magnificent Federal batteries they had but 8 or 10 pieces, which were speedily put out of the combat. About six o'clock, General D. H. Hill, deceived by what he thought was the signal for attack, charged with all his division, but, finding himself unsupported, although Jackson might have hastened to his aid, he was obliged to retire with great loss. Jackson's artillery continued to fire on the Federal position, but his infantry did not stir.

Magruder also, on the Confederate right, made an attempt, which ended like Hill's. The flux and reflux of the rival armies lasted till night. Without being able to capture the Federal batteries, through the impossibility of keeping up a convergent fire from all their cannon, the Confederates, nevertheless, inflicted serious losses on the Northern infantry, and camped on the battle-field.

MacClellan profited by the night to withdraw his forces, and lead them towards Harrison's Landing and Westover. Although he had succeeded in repulsing the late Confederate assaults, yet his army had sustained frightful damage. It became absolutely necessary to seek shelter under the fire of the gunboats. The attacks of the enemy had been so vigorous and persevering, making such great gaps in the Northern ranks, that MacClellan's army, already much tried by this long six days' retreat, and these sanguinary conflicts, had become completely demoralized. At this critical moment the Federal general-in-chief was afraid to risk another battle, even in the strong position occupied by him. Many killed and wounded were found in the abandoned works, as well as two pieces of cannon, a large number of carriages, tumbrils, and ambulances, and quantities of war-material which had belonged to the commissariat, the medical service, and the engineers.

Enormous quantities of munitions had been thrown into the ravines, and on all sides appeared signs of a precipitate retreat.

General Lee's troops, for that matter, were hardly less fatigued than the army flying towards the James. They, also, had fought for six days, had marched a very difficult road day and night, had suffered cruel losses. No consequence, however; for the next day, July the 2nd, in spite of a drenching rain which fell continually, Stuart's cavalry pressed the Federal rear with vigour, making prisoners, and leaving it no rest. Towards evening, Longstreet arrived to support him. But the enemy had raised intrenchments on a plateau, Evelington's Heights, which they fortified during the night. The whole Federal army was encamped along the river—the plateau was strongly fortified—two creeks covered the two flanks, which were likewise defended by intrenchments and gun-boats. It was therefore decided not to risk an assault against so strong a position—an assault which must have cost an enormous sacrifice of human life.

Under these circumstances Lee resolved to draw his army nearer Richmond, to give his harassed men some days' rest, till MacClellan's movements were more clearly defined.

The critics who blame Lee for not having, on the day after the battle of Malvern Hill, pursued his foe vigorously, and crushed him, forget the state in which his army was. It was not without prolonged and heroic efforts that it had successively taken intrenched positions, chosen with the greatest care, and defended with the greatest valour; that it had, for twenty-five miles from the first field of battle, driven before it an enemy having the disposal of much more numerous forces, much better equipped, and with much better tools. The Federal artillery in particular was excellent, formed on the most recent models, while that of the Confederates was quite as inferior. The country in which this struggle took place was naturally favourable for defence, and it cannot be denied that MacClellan had reaped great advantage from it. He displayed talents of the first order

during this retreat; and an army which was able, in the midst of so many trials and disasters, to continue fighting all day and marching all night, enduring its defeats bravely and without flinching, deserves the respect and admiration of both friends and foes. Still MacClellan was wrong, on July 4th, to publish an order of the day but little suitable to the part of a conquered general.

Lee's army was too much exhausted for him to think of pushing his advantages further. He had compelled his adversary to abandon the line of the Chickahominy. The people of the South were very thankful to him for this great boon. Lee was always sparing of the life of his soldiers, first by temperament, and secondly because he knew that if misfortune happened to this army, the South had not another to replace it. Consequently it is but natural that the Southern generalissimo, satisfied with the brilliant successes he had gained, preferred to reserve it for the future, where so many trials still awaited it.

The total loss of the Confederates during this campaign amounted to 19,533 killed, wounded, and disappeared. Among them were many officers of high rank, and several generals.

The Federals left in the hands of the Confederates more than 10,000 prisoners, and, at the lowest, their losses were upwards of 25,000 men, among whom were many officers and generals; 52 cannons and 35,000 rifles, as well as vast quantities of war-material, became the property of the conquerors. But this was little, compared with what the Federals themselves destroyed during the retreat.

On the 7th of July, while still in the presence of the Federal army on the James River, General Lee addressed to his soldiers an order of the day, in which, after having humbly thanked "Him from whom all victories come," he congratulated his troops on their valour, and the brilliant results of this short campaign.

Lee had thus saved the Southern capital at the moment when he first took command of the Confederate army, by a blow struck at his adversary, a blow as sudden as irresistible. The dissatisfied, of whom there are always some, discovered that he had not done

enough, that he ought to have annihilated the Federal army; but the great mass of people welcomed him with joy on his return to Richmond, and received him as its saviour. He took these demonstrations of public favour with that quiet dignity which never left him, whether in the hour of triumph or that of defeat. He saw perfectly, on the 2nd of July, that the Confederate States were as far as ever from having obtained the object of the war. MacClellan had been beaten, but the inexhaustible resources of the Government of the United States, Lee well knew, would allow it to raise and equip other and still greater armies.

From the strictly military point of view, MacClellan was far more threatening on the James than if he had remained on the Chickahominy. He had no longer anything to fear, now that his left wing was supported on a river where he possessed a whole flotilla of gunboats. His position was such that the Confederates could not drive him from it. Besides, he could at leisure cross the James and assault Petersburg, the capture of which would probably lead to the abandonment of Richmond, for this little town was situated in the direct line of all the communications of the Confederate capital with the rest of the South. With MacClellan to the south of Richmond, the Confederate government would not be able to dream of detaching a single man towards the North. The Federal general had still 85,000 men and 150 cannons; he could render services to his government of much greater import here than elsewhere. Further, the North would have been able to double the forces of MacClellan's army; but, in spite of his protestations, justice was not done to his demands, and other events turned away public attention from the banks of the James.

General Lee was not ignorant of any of the dangers which the presence of his adversary on the James made him run, if the latter felt himself sufficiently strong to give effect to his projects. To disquiet him, and, if possible, force him to retire, D. H. Hill was sent to the southern bank of the river. From Cozzin's Point, opposite the Federal encampment, a battery of forty-three guns,

on the night of the 31st of July, opened a very lively fire on the enemy's hundreds of ships, and on the hostile camp. The vessels were nearly a mile off, and numerous lights, both on land and water, offered to the gunners capital marks. The army and fleet were sleeping in profound peace, little dreaming of the danger threatening them. Shortly after midnight, the Confederate guns simultaneously opened their fire, and for an hour the roar of the cannons mingled with the confused cries of soldiers and sailors. The gunboats presently responded, but without much effect. Little by little the firing ceased. Next day, the Confederates having retired, MacClellan occupied Cozzin's point.

North of Richmond, General Jackson, followed soon by other troops, occupied Gordonsville, there to hold in check the Federal army commanded by General Pope. General Stuart, on the 5th of August, routed two brigades of Northern cavalry, and pursued them towards Fredericksburg.

Some movements of MacClellan's army decided Lee to get near his adversary. Advancing in order of battle, the Confederate general, on the 5th of August, found the enemy in force at Malvern Hill, behind his old intrenchments. After some evolutions, which led to no result, MacClellan retired to Westover, and Lee re-entered his lines. This was the last demonstration made by MacClellan before quitting the Peninsula. The evacuation began on the 16th of August. A part of the army and baggage went by water; the rest took the land road, passing by Yorktown to Fortress Monroe. On the 18th of August, the rear-guard crossed the Chickahominy. As soon as General Lee was sure that MacClellan was finally quitting the James River, he led his army towards the position occupied on the Rapidan by Jackson, whom he rejoined on the 15th of August.

Let us return for an instant to speak of an address sent by General MacClellan to President Lincoln. This important writing belongs to history. It not only throws a new light on the character and views of the most worthy foe whom Lee encountered,

but, with admirable clearness, expresses the feelings of a great portion of the Northern people at that moment. The President had asked of General MacClellan a statement of his opinion on the conduct of the war, and, on the 7th of July, amid those disastrous scenes at Harrison's Landing, the General wrote these truly remarkable words:—

"This rebellion has assumed the character of a war; as such it would be regarded, and it should be conducted upon the highest principles known to Christian civilization. It should not be a war looking to the subjection of any state in any event. It should not be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces and political organization. Neither confiscation of property, political executions, territorial organizations of states, nor forcible abolition of slavery, should be contemplated for a moment. In prosecuting the war, all private property and unarmed persons should be strictly protected, subject only to the necessity of military operations. All private property taken for military uses should be paid or receipted for; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes; all unnecessary trespass sternly prohibited; and offensive demeanour by the military towards citizens promptly rebuked. Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities exist; and oaths, not required by enactments constitutionally made, should be neither demanded nor received. Military government should be confined to the preservation of public order and the protection of political right. Military power should not be allowed to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by supporting or impairing the authority of the master, except for repressing disorder. . . Slaves, contraband under the act of Congress, seeking military protection should receive it. The right of government to appropriate permanently to its own service claims to slave labour should be asserted, and the right of the owner to compensation, therefore, should be recognised. . . .

". . . . A system of policy thus constituted, and pervaded by the

influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favour of the Almighty.

"Unless the principles governing the future conduct of our struggle shall be made known and approved, the effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration of radical views, especially on slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies.

"The policy of the government must be supported by concentrations of military power. The national forces should not be dispersed in expeditions, posts of occupation, and numerous armies; but should be mainly collected into masses, and brought to bear upon the armies of the Confederate States. These armies thoroughly defeated, the political structure which they support would soon cease to exist.

"In carrying out any system of policy which you may form, you will require a commander-in-chief of the army,—one who possesses your confidence, understands your views, and who is competent to execute your orders, by directing the military forces of the nation to the accomplishment of the objects by you proposed. I do not ask that place for myself. I am willing to serve you in such positions as you may assign me, and I will do so as faithfully as ever subordinate served superior. I may be on the brink of eternity, and, as I hope forgiveness from my Maker, I have written this letter with sincerity towards you, and from love for my country."

This noble and warm statement of his views does the greatest honour to General MacClellan, especially when it is remembered that he wrote it on July 7th, smarting under the blow of the sanguinary check he had just experienced. His self-esteem had been wounded by it, his spirit exasperated; but in this report no traces of such feeling are allowed to be seen, and yet, it must be said, it seems that the man who could be sincere in writing these

lines ought never to have consented to take part in a war evidently so contrary to his inward convictions.

This fine epistle was doomed to have no effect at Washington, as is proved to conviction by the fashion in which this inauspicious war was carried on afterwards.

In consequence, it is said, of the opinions expressed above by MacClellan, altogether contrary to those of the party then in power, it was thought necessary to dismiss him from his duties. He had an especially determined enemy in General Halleck, the Federal War Minister. MacClellan wished to cross the James, attack Petersburg, and so cut off all communications between Richmond and the rest of the South. This plan, which succeeded later, in 1865, with General Grant, was not approved by General Halleck and the President, in 1862, probably because they had decided on dismissing MacClellan.

General Lee, on this matter, shared the view of General MacClellan. To those in his confidence he explained how much more vulnerable Richmond was on the southern side. The course of events proved it.

CHAPTER VIII.

AUGUST 1862.—POPE ADVANCES INTO VIRGINIA.—JACKSON STOPS HIM AT CEDAR RUN.—SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS.—POPE TAKES REFUGE UNDER WASHINGTON.

ALTHOUGH the presence of Jackson's corps at the battle of Cold Harbour might have been ascertained, so great was the fright which his unforeseen movements had caused in the councils of President Lincoln, that it was decided a Federal army should remain between Washington and the Rappahannock to cover the capital. Fremont and Banks received orders to cross the mountains and join MacDowell's corps, and thus to constitute an army of 60,000 men. The whole were put under the orders of Major-General Pope, who had signalised himself in the West by some successes more imaginary than real—so said slander. This army was called the army of Virginia. Pope was full of energy, and might probably have distinguished himself as a division-general under a skilful leader, but he was entirely unfit for the command-in-chief. Although the principal mission of the new general-in-chief was to cover Washington, it was well understood that his ultimate object was Richmond.

The defeat of the army of the Potomac spread consternation in the North. MacClellan's enemies, at whose head were General Halleck, who had succeeded General Scott as generalissimo, and the War Minister, Staunton, profited by it to ruin him. Without taking account of the skill and energy he had shown, and which, indeed, had saved the army of the Potomac, Mr. Lincoln,

on the 5th of August, transmitted MacClellan an order to retire from the Peninsula, and join his forces with those of General Pope in the neighbourhood of Acquia Creek, on the Potomac. If Mr. Lincoln could have known that in recalling MacClellan he was doing precisely what Lee most desired, perhaps he would have altered his mind.

Otherwise, the Federal Government acted with vigour, and military operations, except in Virginia, were conducted with success. In the west and south, the entire course of the Mississippi, except at Vicksburg, was in its hands. New Orleans and Memphis belonged to it, and the Confederate army of the west had retired from Corinth to Tupelo. But MacClellan's defeat paled all these triumphs. Without losing heart, President Lincoln made another appeal for 300,000 soldiers. Congress enacted several important laws; one confiscating the slaves of all who supported the Southern cause; another authorizing the levy of negro troops; a third enjoining on Federal officers to seize and make use of, for their convenience, all property belonging to the Southerners, landed or moveable, without at all indemnifying the persons so despoiled. Thus, the Southern States were thrust beyond the pale of the law, and the Draconian programme of the radicals had it all its own way.

The arrival of General Pope's army in Northern Virginia was signalised by several orders of the day remarkable for their brutality, and for the iniquitous system so inaugurated of making war contrary to the usages of civilized nations.

Every time damage was done to a railway, high-road, or telegraph, all the inhabitants for two miles round were obliged to repair it at their own expense. If a shot were fired from a house on a Federal soldier or other servant, that house was rased to the ground, and those who lived in it sent to prison. Everybody taken in the act was shot on the spot.

One of Pope's subordinates, Brigadier-General Steinwehr, hastened to put these orders into execution. He arrested five

of the most notable citizens of Luray, in Page County, Virginia, and kept them as hostages. They were admitted to his table and decently treated, but for every soldier who fell under the bullets of guerillas, numerous in those parts, and, indeed, at all times of disorder, one of these hostages was to be shot. The order of the day added that guerillas could not maintain their stand were they not encouraged by the citizens of the country. If the pretext urged by Pope had been true, perhaps these measures might have been excusable; but the damage done to railways was the work of Confederate soldiers acting under the orders of their government. It was in cases of legitimate defence that Federal soldiers were slain. The true end of these orders of the day, inspired by the radicals, was to strike terror into the Virginians. The honourable spirit of MacClellan would never have lent itself to such manœuvres.

But Pope dared still more. He published a new order of the day, directing officers under his command to arrest *all the inhabitants* of localities occupied by Federal troops. Those of them who consented to pay fealty and homage to the United States, giving sufficient guarantees, would be authorized to remain in their houses. Those, on the contrary, who refused to take the oath demanded would be conducted to the Confederate outposts. They were cautioned that if they reappeared in the neighbourhood of their old dwellings they would be treated as spies, and shot without mercy. Whoever violated the oath taken was likewise shot, and all his goods confiscated. Whoever had the least connection with persons within the enemy's lines, whoever was surprised carrying letters or any other communication whatever, was to be treated as a spy.

These measures scattered consternation. To take an oath to the Federal Government filled everybody with horror: exile was complete ruin. Despite all representations made to General Pope, he persisted in his orders. Authorized to live at the expense of the Confederate country, the Northern troops did not

delay to assume habits of pillage much to be regretted. Nothing escaped them. Nothing was left to the unfortunate inhabitants. The greatest trickery the Federal soldiers conceived was to palm off in the district false Confederate bank notes, which the Virginians, unsuspicious of the deceit, eagerly accepted. In order the more effectually to deliver up the conquered country to the brutal appetites of his soldiers, General Pope, by a new order of the day, forbade the placing of sentinels to protect certain estates, which some of the officers had had the delicacy to do.

At length the Confederate Government was obliged to interfere. A proclamation of President Davis, bearing date August 1st, 1862, after having recited all the measures adopted by General Pope, the result of which was to cause a war, hitherto an enterprise against regular troops, to degenerate into an expedition of maurauders, pillagers, and brigands, against peaceable and unarmed citizens occupied in field labours; added that the Confederate Government, influenced by a sentiment of justice and humanity, did not wish to make use of reprisals towards mere Federal soldiers happening to be prisoners, who could only be the involuntary instruments of such cruelties, but that formal orders had been given that Generals Pope and Steinwehr, as well as all the officers serving under these two generals, should no longer be treated as soldiers and exchanged on parole; and, further, that all Federal officers taken after the day of the proclamation should be imprisoned securely, and that in every case where a citizen of the Confederate States was assassinated under any pretext whatever, a Federal officer should be hung for each Confederate shot.

This proclamation produced its effect. On the 15th of August the Federal Government modified its instructions so as to satisfy the legitimate demands of the Confederates. General Pope, indeed, pretended that his orders had been misinterpreted. Be that as it may, the evil was cut at its root. All motives for reprisal having ceased, on the 24th of September, 97 officers

of Pope's army, retained as hostages, were exchanged. But this general had none the less profited by the few days he had had. When his soldiers invaded the Rappahannock district it was full of life and prosperity. On their departure it was nearly a desert, and the inhabitants were reduced to beggary.

As soon as Pope had assembled his 60,000 men, he conducted them, on July 1st, by the Orange and Alexandria Railway, to the Rappahannock, thus menacing Gordonsville and Charlottesville. If he succeeded in occupying these two points, he hoped to intercept Lee's communications with the south-west of Virginia. He established himself at Culpepper, his right extending towards the Blue Ridge, and his left to the Rapidan.

The Washington Government manifestly sought to mystify General Lee, and leave him in doubt as to the ulterior operations of the Federals. Would MacClellan recommence his attack on Richmond from the James River side, or was the real movement to be made from the north? Without troubling about this matter, the Southern general remained with the bulk of his army under Richmond, contenting himself with sending Jackson, on the 13th of July, with two divisions, in the direction of Gordonsville. Lee prudently observed all that was passing, both on the James and on the Upper Rappahannock. Pope's movement could only be a feint, but on the 27th of July, MacClellan still giving no signs of life, A. P. Hill's division was detached to support Jackson, while General D. H. Hill, on the south bank of the James, disturbed General MacClellan's communications both by his evolutions and the fire of his artillery.

But the time was approaching when it would be necessary for the Federals to unmask their real design. On the 2nd of August, Jackson took the offensive by attacking the enemy at Orange Court House. On August 5th, MacClellan made a vigorous demonstration against the Confederate lines to hinder Lee from sending new reinforcements to his lieutenant. The Federals were massed in close column on Malvern Hill, where they drew up in

order of battle, as if MacClellan's intention were to renew his march on Richmond. Lee immediately accepted the challenge, and a trifling engagement took place at Curl's Neck. The next morning the Federal army had disappeared, and it became plain that all this show of force had been but a feint.

This situation lasted till the middle of August, when Lee learnt most positively that the fleet bringing General Burnside and his troops, who were returning from the coasts of Carolina, were directed towards the Rappahannock to reinforce Pope. Henceforward it was clear that the true movement was to be on this side.

Jackson had just struck the enemy a formidable blow, energetically co-operating, as was his wont, in the general plan. MacClellan had endeavoured to retain Lee before Richmond; Jackson, on the other hand, hastened the recall of MacClellan's army by a vigorous combat which he had with the Federals. He crossed the Rapidan at the head of his three divisions, and, on August the 9th, attacked Pope's van at Cedar Run. The contest was obstinate. At one period Jackson's left suffered much, but at night the action was terminated by the retreat of the Federals, and the Confederate General remained master of the battle-field. He had, however, but few forces to maintain himself against the bulk of the hostile army which was advancing; there was nothing for him, therefore, but to retire behind the Rapidan, into the vicinity of Gordonsville, where General Lee soon rejoined him with the greater part of the Confederate army.

Jackson's vigorous demonstration seriously disturbed the Federal staff. General Halleck immediately recalled General MacClellan, and ordered him to join General Pope as soon as possible. Thus the combat at Cedar Run had at one and the same time stopped Pope's march and delivered Richmond from the presence of MacClellan.

The theatre of war was about to change. We must turn our look to other districts in order to appreciate the magnificent

campaigns of the summer and autumn of 1862, in Southern Virginia and Maryland.

Lee had, as we know, conducted all his military operations with the greatest prudence, determined to allow his opponents to take no advantage, and to remain firm under the walls of the Confederate capital till all danger had passed. The junction of Burnside and Pope relieved him for the future from taking so many precautions. Besides, the numerous reinforcements sent by MacClellan to Pope's army indicated very clearly the plans of the Washington Cabinet. "It appeared evident," said General Lee, "that all movements on the James had been abandoned." Whence he sagaciously concluded that the surest means of succouring Richmond was to augment Jackson's troops, and force Pope back beyond the Rappahannock. Lee in this gave proof of military talents of a superior order. He took in at a glance—and this constitutes clear foresight—what was to be done, and displayed that resolution which executes without hesitation.

He gave orders to Longstreet's division, and the two brigades under General Hood, to leave Richmond on the 13th, and march to Gordonsville. Stuart was to leave at Fredericksburg a corps of cavalry sufficient to watch the enemy and guard the central railway, and to put the rest of his cavalry at General Jackson's disposal. The two divisions of D. H. Hill and MacLaws, two brigades under General Walker, and the cavalry brigade under General Hampton, remained on the James to watch the Federals.

Longstreet reached Gordonsville on the 15th of August. Lee closely followed him. On the 16th the Federal army approached the Rapidan. The Confederate general-in-chief lost not an instant in disposing his forces so as to turn it. Stuart was ordered to cross the river on the extreme Federal right, to burn the railway bridge of the Rappahannock on the line of communication between Pope and Washington, to destroy the permanent way and telegraph, and take his course towards Culpepper Court House in the rear of the Federal army. Longstreet, with the Confederate right wing,

was to cross the Rapidan at Racoon Ford, and march straight on Culpepper. Jackson was to ford the same river at Somerville Ford, keeping to the left of Longstreet. R. H. Anderson would follow with the reserves. In this way Lee would be on Pope's left flank, and the latter would run the risk of being annihilated. But the Federal general had wind of what was preparing, and retired in hot haste, on the 18th and 19th, to the rear of the Rappahannock.

On the 20th, the whole Confederate army were on its banks, having crossed the Rapidan without hindrance, a few cavalry skirmishes only excepted. Lee, seeing all the fords of the Rappahannock strongly guarded, resolved to repeat his previous manœuvre, and disposed the bulk of his army so as to mask the flank movement entrusted to Jackson. The latter stole away on the 22nd, and reached Warrenton Springs in the evening, on the old road from Warrenton to Culpepper Court House. Finding the bridge at this place broken, he defeated the few Federal troops stationed there, and became master of the passage. A terrible storm bursting out at this moment made the waters rise, and interrupted military operations. The two armies exchanged gunshots; but Longstreet soon joined Jackson at Jefferstonton, and the 24th passed quietly. Just then General Stuart brought Lee important news which hastened his resolution to act promptly.

Stuart had been directed by his chief to reconnoitre in force to the rear of the enemy. Starting on the 22nd from Freeman's Ford on the Rappahannock with 1500 cavalry and two pieces of artillery, he arrived in the evening at Warrenton. Thence, learning that the roads were open, he proceeded to Catlett's Station, on the railway, to destroy the bridge, but the storm broke over the little column. Still advancing, at night he reached the little village of Auburn. The Federal sentries were surprised and taken. Presently Stuart perceived he was in the midst of the hostile camp. The night was black, and rain fell in torrents; it was nearly impossible to see anything. Happily, at that moment, a trooper

seized a negro and brought him to Stuart. This negro had known the general before the war, and informed him he was close to the head-quarters, offering to lead him there. Stuart accepted. Some minutes later, Fitzhugh Lee's regiment rushed into the midst of the tents of Pope's staff. The surprise was complete. The Federal chief escaped with difficulty. A large number of prisoners was taken, nearly all officers, without reckoning their personal effects and General Pope's horses; but the most precious prize was the Federal general's despatch-book, containing copies of all his official correspondence with his government.

The Federals, recovered from their surprise, began to reassemble in force. Prudence counselled to Stuart a quick retreat. After a useless attempt to destroy the railway bridge, too much sodden by the rain to take fire, Stuart, knowing that the storm would raise the level of the waters between him and the Confederate army, which might perhaps cut off his retreat, resumed his march, taking the way he had come. His return was effected in safety, and on the 23rd he recrossed the Rappahannock. His loss was trifling. He brought back 300 prisoners, of whom the greater part were officers, some belonging to Pope's staff.

The precious despatch-book was immediately delivered to the general-in-chief. In it Pope informed his government that he was afraid he should be unable to retain the line of the Rappahannock, and begged for new troops. This book made Lee aware of the number and position of the different corps of the enemy, as well as of the projects of his adversary. He likewise learnt that MacClellan had left Westover, that a part of his army was on the road to join Pope, that the remainder were getting ready to follow, and that General Cox's army was recalled from the valley of the Kanawha (Western Virginia), in order to swell Pope's forces. If, therefore, these different corps joined the Federal chief, he would be at the head of nearly 200,000 men. The Confederates had only 70,000. Prompt action was therefore necessary.

Certain now that MacClellan was retiring from before Richmond,

Lee immediately summoned to the Rappahannock all the forces he had left behind on the James. The Confederate general had conceived a bold plan, one which seemed to promise the defeat of the enemy. Jackson was to cross the Rappahannock beyond Pope's right wing, pass to the rear of that wing, and, by gaining it, cut off its communications with Washington. Longstreet meanwhile would menace Pope, to divert his attention from Jackson's movement, then follow the latter when he was sufficiently in advance. Lee, by placing all his army between Pope and the City of Washington, hoped to make him accept battle before his reinforcements arrived.

Thus to divide his army in the presence of the enemy, leaving one half on the Rappahannock opposite the Federals, and sending the other by a round-about way to fall on their rear at Manassas, was to violate the first and most important of the rules of the military art, which forbids the dividing of one's forces in the face of the foe. That Lee dared it shows he held in light esteem the skill of his enemy. These flank attacks undoubtedly had a great attraction for him as well as for Jackson. His preference for this manœuvre is explained by the character of the soldiers on both sides, and by the configuration of the country. In both armies, the men were often inexperienced recruits, easily stricken with panic by any sudden surprise; it was enough, therefore, for an enemy to appear on their flank or rear to throw their ranks into disorder. The woody nature of the country where they fought rendered these movements easy to execute. It was necessary that the general who undertook such a responsibility should not fail in boldness. This quality Lee had shown several times, and as he always succeeded, there can be no denying that, from a military point of view, he was justified.

To conduct the perilous operation under consideration Lee had chosen the intrepid Jackson. It was imperative to act with rapidity. On August 25th, the already celebrated division-general set out from Warrenton Springs. Skirting the southern bank of

the Rappahannock, he crossed at Hinson's Ford, and pursued his way, dragging his guns with great difficulty along the narrow and stony road. Coming to the foot of the Blue Ridge, across fields, and along roads little frequented, he marched direct for Thoroughfare Gap, where the railway of Manassas Gap passes across the mountains of Bull's Run. It was necessary to reach this defile before the enemy was aware of his movements, lest they should get in front of him. The heat was oppressive, but nobody dreamt of stopping. At midnight the indefatigable soldiers, after a forced march of 35 miles, arrived at Salem, where they passed the night. Jackson had communicated his indomitable energy to his men; there were no stragglers, and although half famished, and with bruised feet, they wished to go on. All along the route the inhabitants welcomed them with joy and astonishment. It was months since they had seen the grey jackets in their neighbourhood, and all wished to know whence they came and whither they were going. But to all their questions the soldiers had received orders to answer nothing. Stuart's cavalry marched on Jackson's right flank and parallel to it, in order to conceal the movement of the latter, and hinder the enemy from learning the object of this forced march. On the 26th of August, Jackson reached Thoroughfare Gap, which, to his exceeding joy, he found unoccupied. At sunset he arrived at Bristoe, a station on the railway from Orange to Alexandria. A train was presently heard coming at full speed from Warrenton Junction. In spite of all his endeavours Ewell had not time to throw it off the line. His troopers, however, fired into it a volley while passing. More fortunate a second and a third time, the Confederates seized two trains. But the Federals soon learnt what had happened, and the train service on that line ceased.

The first part of Lee's plan had succeeded. Jackson was in Pope's rear on the railway by which the Federals received all their supplies. At Bristoe the former learnt that the enemy had established the principal depôt of all his supplies, provisions, and

ammunition at Manassas Junction, seven miles from Bristoe. In spite of the thirty miles they had just traversed, and the darkness of the night, Brigadier-general Trimble continued his march on Manassas, followed by Stuart and the cavalry. After a short sharp struggle the Confederates mastered Manassas. They found there an enormous quantity of provisions of all kinds,—meat, flour, provender. This was a real feast for Jackson's half-starved soldiers when they arrived on the morrow. They had permission to make a good meal at the enemy's expense, and as nothing could be carried away, for want of the means of transport, all the rest was destroyed. The spectacle of a soldier with naked feet, covered with rags, eating lobster salad and drinking Rhine wine appeared somewhat comical. On the 27th, in the morning, Jackson arrived at Manassas with the rest of his troops. Ewell's division alone had been left at Bristoe Station to disturb the Federal retreat, in case they should retire from the Rappahannock. If he found himself too hotly pressed, he was to rejoin Jackson at Manassas. Shortly after General Jackson's arrival, a Federal brigade attempted to recapture the lost positions, but it was routed, and Taylor, its general, slain.

Pope, although warned by his sentinels, did not at first understand Jackson's movements, but thought the Confederates were retiring towards the mountains. But the capture of Manassas opened his eyes. His army was very numerous. The divisions of Reynolds, Porter, and Heintzelman, of the army of the Potomac (MacClellan's), had joined him, and the corps of Sumner and Franklin, belonging to the same army, were on their march to range themselves under his command. Without counting these latter he had with him 120,000 fighting men, and could hurl them in a mass against Jackson's single corps. The opportunity was not wanting. Jackson and Longstreet were apart. Pope ought to have seized the road which led from Thoroughfare Gap to the position Jackson occupied. Then Longstreet, in order to effect a junction with the latter, would have been obliged

to accept battle, and while this part of the army was held in check, Jackson might have been crushed. Consequently MacDowell's corps bore rapidly down on Gainesville, followed by the corps of Sigel, and the division of Reynolds. If this masterstroke succeeded, Pope would have placed 40,000 of his best soldiers between Longstreet and Manassas. Reno and Heintzelman's two corps and Kearney's division took the road to Greenwich, in order to be within reach of MacDowell, while the Federal chief with Hooker's divison marched straight on Manassas, following the railway. To Banks's corps was entrusted the task of covering Warrenton Junction and repairing the permanent way. General Porter was to go with all haste to Gainesville from Warrenton Junction as soon as Banks had replaced him. The Federal plan was excellent.

MacDowell occupied Gainseville on the night of the 27th. Reno and Kearney at the same time reached Greenwich. Hooker likewise got near Ewell at Bristoe Station. Pressed too close, the Confederate general, according to Jackson's direction, retired in good order, and crossed the Broad Run, burning the railway bridge. The same night he rejoined his chief at Manassas. His determined resistance led Pope to believe that the conflict would begin again next day. Consequently the march of Porter's corps on Gainesville was countermanded, and he was ordered to join Hooker at Bristoe Station the same night.

Jackson's position was critical. The bulk of the hostile army, numbering 70,000 men, was at Greenwich and Gainesville, between him and Longstreet, and Pope was marching on him with the remainder. Every moment his scouts brought him news more and more alarming. There was no time to lose. To retire from Manassas became absolutely necessary.

Jackson had the choice between two operations:—to make a rapid detour by Aldie round Bull's Run mountain and rejoin Longstreet, which he could at present easily do. But this would be to give up Lee's plan, the essence of which was to force Pope to

accept battle on a ground chosen by the Confederate chief, while the Federals were cut off from their base of supplies, and not yet joined by their reinforcements. The other plan offered great dangers, but promised the general, who in the end adopted it, success to his plans. This was to retire towards Bull's Run, and there occupy a position nearer Thoroughfare Gap. It was plain that he could only maintain himself there by great efforts, but he was no great distance from Longstreet, menacing Pope's communications, and having continually as a last resource the power of retreating by Aldie. That evening the immense quantities of victuals and war-material accumulated by the Federals at Manassas were delivered to the flames, and by the light of the fire the Confederates marched towards Bull's Run. It was a cruel sacrifice for these poor half-famished fellows to carry away none of the good things, but had they done so their movements would have been much impeded. They, therefore, fired the provisions of which they had such pressing need, and gaily started in the night to encounter new dangers and endure new privations.

The destruction of everything magazined at Manassas was a terrible blow to General Pope. "My men," wrote he in his report, "exhausted by the marches and combats of the preceding days, and very short of provisions, slept under arms. Then for two days our horses were without provender. I telegraphed a pressing demand that rations should be sent me; but on Saturday morning, August 30th, before the battle began, I received a letter from General Franklin, dated the previous evening from Alexandria, informing me that General MacClellan wished me to know that rations for men and beasts were waiting for me, loaded in railway trucks and carriages, till I was able to send an escort of cavalry to fetch them from Alexandria. All hope of maintaining myself in the position I occupied, whatever might be the result of the battle, disappeared on the reading of this epistle. My cavalry was quite spent, in consequence of the rough work it had done for some time, and, sad as was the state to which it had been reduced, I yet

could not do without it in the presence of the enemy. I compre hended, therefore, that that day's action would be decisive, for at night it would be necessary to place Bull's Run between the enemy and ourselves, if we did not wish to perish of hunger, both men and beasts."

The excuse here offered by Pope, by which he tried to explain his defeat, is of no value. Although the Confederates had to suffer many more privations than their foes, they did not the less gain the victory. Besides, General Franklin's letter reached Pope on August 30th, the day of a decisive action, when it was already impossible for convoys of provisions to get to his army. Fitz Lee's cavalry was disposed in such a manner as to intercept all the roads.

To deceive the enemy, A. P. Hill's Confederate division, with a part of the cavalry, took the road from Centreville, but after having passed Bull's Run, defiled to the left and rejoined Jackson, who was found in position on the old field of battle of July 21st, 1861, his right a little above the village of Groveton, and his left supported on Sudley Ford. General Jackson had thus neutralized the measures, excellent though they were, that Pope had taken, and had likewise obtained a communication with General Lee, in spite of the Federal troops at Gainesville. He occupied besides a strong position, and had secured a safe line of retreat in case of misfortune; thus matters passed till the evening of August 28th. With the mountain at his back, Jackson awaited Lee.

Pope believing Jackson would endeavour to hold Manassas, conducted MacDowell and Reno's columns during the night of the 27th from Gainesville and Greenwich towards Manassas, making sure of there crushing Jackson. On the morning of the 28th, he advanced with Kearney, Hooker, and Reno's divisions, but finding that Ewell had profited by the night hours to disappear, the Federal General hastily marched on Manassas, where he arrived at midday. To his great amazement, Jackson was nowhere to be seen Pope then perceived what a blunder he had committed in

ordering MacDowell from Gainesville, leaving the road open for Lee to join Jackson.

Without losing an instant, a despatch was sent to MacDowell, countermanding his movement on Manassas, and directing him to proceed by the road from Warrenton to Centreville. Pope himself marched rapidly on the latter place in pursuit of R. P. Hill's division, which he believed to be Jackson's entire corps. But he had lost too much time; he was completely mystified, and no longer knew where to find Jackson.

On the evening of the 28th, MacDowell arrived close to Groveton. Not knowing he was so near the enemy, he imprudently presented his flank to him; perceiving which, Jackson fell on him and inflicted a heavy loss. Reinforcements arriving, the Federals maintained their position till night, and then retired to Manassas Junction. In this combat, the Confederate Generals Tagliaferro and Ewell were severely wounded.

During this time, Lee, commanding Longstreet's corps in person, had not lost a moment in his efforts to rejoin Jackson. On the 26th, he passed the Rappahannock. The night following, on the 27th, he reached White Plains, his march having been delayed by demonstrations on the part of the hostile cavalry in the direction of Warrenton, who appeared to threaten his right. Having no cavalry he could not nullify these movements, and was obliged to advance cautiously. On the evening of the 28th, he reached Thoroughfare Gap. At that moment the engagement between Jackson and MacDowell was taking place, and the noise of the cannon on the Groveton side, indicating that Jackson was at blows with his adversary, reached Lee's ears. Surely it is not surprising that he then became full of anxiety, for the disproportion of forces between Jackson and Pope was enormous. To increase his embarrassment the pass was defended by he knew not how many Federals, and even he experienced some emotion lest Jackson should be crushed before he could lend him succour. He climbed the summit of a hill at a gallop, and alighting, attentively

examined with his telescope the sombre and woody defile which barred his passage, But on his countenance nothing appeared; not a movement betrayed his emotion. Calm and collected, he shut up his telescope, remained a moment immovable, wrapt in thought, then, stepping to his horse, he remounted, and descended the hill.

This Thoroughfare Gap defile is a very strong position, and was occupied by a Federal division. The only road through the gorge and the sides of the mountain was swept by the hostile artillery. Generals Hood and Wilcox, with five brigades, received orders to turn the position. Before they could reach the right of the Federals, the latter had retired towards Manassas, and Longstreet bivouacked for the night to the east of the mountain. Next morning, August 29th, Longstreet's troops took position under Lee's eye on Jackson's right; at midday the army was ranged in order of battle.

Jackson was preparing to receive a new attack. His soldiers were tired out with this long course of exhausting marches and incessant fights; hunger also was cruelly pinching them, but morally the little army was nowise affected. They knew their commander had just received tidings of General Lee, announcing that the latter had passed the Thoroughfare Gap. All danger, therefore, was over. Jackson's skill and the men's heroism had crowned Lee's brilliant conceptions with success. The enemy was obliged to deliver battle, and that, too, not against a feeble portion of the Confederate army, but against the total mass of the Confederate forces.

On the morning of the 29th, General Sigel received from General Pope an order to attack the enemy's line; consequently, at ten o'clock, his guns opened fire. At that moment, Longstreet's troops arrived on the battle-field. Jackson's batteries smartly answered the Federal fire. At noon, Pope came to support Sigel with Reno and Heintzelman's corps. Heintzelman's corps, consisting of Hooker and Kearney's divisions, formed the Federal right; Reno

and Sigel were in the centre; Regnold's division held the left. At three o'clock, Pope ordered Hooker to bear down on Jackson's left, and crowd it back on the centre. The subordinate, better appreciating the difficulty than his superior, sought to make it understood at head-quarters; in vain; he must obey. The result of his attack, vigorous though it was, after piercing Hill's first line, was to see himself hurled back and crushed by the enemy's batteries. The opposing forces frequently exchanged shots at only ten paces distance. Kearney flew to Hooker's aid, but only to experience the same fate. At every new assault, Hill's troops thrust back the Federals, inflicting on them disastrous losses.

In the morning Porter had sought to become master of Gainesville, but had been met by Longstreet's forces. Later in the day, Pope having learnt his whereabouts, ordered him to turn the right wing and take the Confederates in the rear, still thinking he had to do with Jackson's troops only. Obliged to attack Longstreet's forces in front, Porter was vigorously repulsed. At six o'clock, the moment when he thought Porter was assaulting the Confederate right, Pope threw himself furiously on their left. Hill's men had no more ammunition. Thus the first Federal attack was crowned with success, and Hill's left thrown back towards its centre, the enemy pursuing with cries of triumph. Hill's Confederates resisted frantically, hurling pieces of rock at their foes. At this critical juncture Early's brigade ran to their succour, and the enemy, in his turn, was promptly driven back beyond the railway. Longstreet, on his side, ordered Hood to advance and make a diversion in Jackson's favour. At the moment when he was preparing to obey, he was attacked by Porter; but the latter could not maintain his ground, and was obliged to retire, hotly pursued.

Thus on all sides the Federals beat a retreat. At nine o'clock they halted in some strong positions, and the Confederates ceased pursuing. In this battle the Federals confessed having lost 8000 men.

The Northern Virginian army encamped for the night on the

ground it had occupied during the day. If General Pope had listened to the simplest laws of prudence, he would have retired into the Washington lines. His losses already amounted to 17,000 men; morally his soldiers had suffered much, owing to their reverses and extraordinary fatigues, to which were now added the pangs of hunger. Nevertheless he resolved to risk another battle.

On the morning of the 30th of August, a splendid sun illuminated the two armies. With its first rays they were ready to recommence. General Lee occupied the position of the evening before. His left was at Sudley Ford, on Bull's Run, his centre at Groveton, his right on the Manassas Gap Railway. In the centre, on a height, 32 pieces of ordnance commanded the battle-field. Longstreet's corps was disposed obliquely with reference to Jackson's, so that the Confederate line took the form of the letter V, the two wings in front. The artillery was placed so as to resist the attacks of the enemy and support the Confederate advance. The cavalry protected both flanks. The Federal line was obliged to conform to the arrangement which Lee had taken, and had the shape of a V reversed, the centre being at the angle in front, and the wings in the rear. In the morning there were several skirmishes between the outposts. MacDowell was ordered to march with three corps along the Warrenton Road. At four o'clock the head of his columns came out of the woods facing Jackson's lines. Presently the central Confederate batteries opened fire, and shortly after, all the Southern guns did likewise. The Federal troops could not stand, and disorder arose in their ranks. Still Pope sent them reinforcements after reinforcements; the fight continued, and the battle thundered all along Jackson's lines. At five o'clock, the brunt of the strife being still borne by Jackson, Longstreet was obliged to come to his aid. The Federal line, by means of extending, came within reach of Longstreet's batteries, who rained down upon it a shower of cannon-balls. Exhausted by their repeated efforts to carry Lee's

positions, and decimated by grape-shot from all the batteries, the Federals gave way and retired in disorder. Seeing which, all the Confederate army advanced briskly, pressing the enemy at all points, and menacing the Federal retreat on Bull's Run. At nightfall Pope's position became still more critical, by the taking of a series of heights occupied by Reynolds and Rickett's divisions, which an impetuous charge by Longstreet had torn from them. On one point the Federals still held out, namely, on an elevated plain, sufficiently high to command Bull's Run Ford, over which the retreat must be. If the Confederates could have gained it, it would have been all over with the Federals. But all the Northern army clung to this plateau, feeling that here was their plank of safety, and the Confederate efforts were in vain. Thanks to this resistance the remains of the Northern army were able to defile across Bull's Run towards Washington, and at ten o'clock, Pope, with the assistance of the darkness, put the watercourse between him and his adversary. The night was very black, the fords very uncertain, and Lee judged it best to await the morning.

The 31st of August saw Pope in position on the heights of Centreville. There Franklin and Sumner's corps had rejoined him. Lee had no wish to let him escape without again taking his measurement. Longstreet was charged to hold the enemy in check, remaining on the previous day's battle-field, and Jackson to repeat the old manœuvre, and, by turning Pope's right, to throw himself on his line of retreat. Jackson crossed Bull's Run at Sudley Ford, and marched all day in a deluge of rain to Chantilly, where he encamped for the night. Next morning he continued his march to Fairfax Court House. As soon as he learnt this movement of Jackson, Pope retired, and the 1st of September found him posted, his left at Fairfax Court House, and his right at Oxhill, near Germantown.

At five o'clock, p.m., Jackson arrived at Oxhill. The rain still fell in torrents. He immediately formed columns of attack. Hill and his division were on the right, the old division of Ewell

held the centre, and Jackson the left. Although the rain was full in the faces of the Confederate soldiers, they charged with their usual vigour. Received by a well-kept fire, Branch's brigade faltered a moment, but the rest of Hill's division supported him. Stevens's Federal division was repulsed, and its general killed. General Kearney, seeking to rally the Federal line, was likewise slain. Shortly after the enemy beat a retreat, and on the day following, the entire Northern army retired within the Washington lines. The campaign was over. On the 2nd of September, in the morning, Longstreet rejoined Jackson. For the first time since the taking of Manassas on the 27th of August, the soldiers received their rations. They had lived for several days on green maize and unripe apples, enduring their privations not only with patience, but with gaiety. Since the 25th of August, the day on which they left the Rappahannock, there had been nothing but marches, counter-marches, and incessant conflicts. They were utterly spent; many were shoeless, and their feet were so bruised by the rugged roads, that they could no longer drag themselves along. Few armies have had to endure more than that of Northern Virginia, during this short but brilliant campaign.

General Pope had been compelled to abandon his wounded on the night of the 30th. Next morning he begged a truce of Lee to enable him to carry off his wounded and bury his dead. Lee refused him the truce, but allowed him to fetch his wounded. The number was so great that, on the 3rd of September, there still remained nearly 3000 on the battle field.

The Confederates lost in this campaign, from the 25th of August to the 2nd of September, 1862, from the Rappahannock to the Potamac, 9112 men in all, including Generals Ewell, Tagliaferro, Field, and Trimble, dangerously wounded. The Federal losses were enormous, amounting to upwards of 30,000 men, there being 8 generals slain, and 7000 prisoners and 2000 wounded in the hands of the Confederates. 30 pieces of cannon, more than 20,000

rifles, &c., &c., many ensigns, and an immense quantity of war material and provisions remained at General Lee's disposal, without reckoning what Jackson had destroyed at Manassas Junction. This was a brilliant end to a glorious campaign, worthy in every way of the illustrious soldier who had conducted it.

Lee had escaped all the dangers of the campaign, but on the 4th of September, as he was standing near his horse, it fell sideways, struck with sudden fright, throwing Lee down, and falling violently on him. One of the bones of his left hand was broken. The accident was not only painful, but hindered him for some time from mounting a horse again.

CHAPTER IX.

SEPTEMBER 1862.—LEE'S ENTRY INTO MARYLAND.—CAPTURE OF HARPER'S FERRY.—BATTLE OF SHARPSBURG.

MacClellan's defeat had saddened the Northern population, without at all making them relax their efforts, or discouraging them. Had they not on the Rappahannock another army more numerous, better organized, under commanders who inspired confidence and hope? But when this second army also had come, mutilated and in disarray, to seek refuge under the walls of Washington, the new disaster fell on the North with crushing force. All its efforts for fifteen months had gone for nothing; all had to be done over again. The future appeared gloomy, and the people expected to hear that the Federal capital was fallen into the hands of General Lee.

Nor was this the only advantage reaped by the Confederates after this victorious campaign; it opened for them the fertile Valley of Virginia, in which, hitherto, their enemy had lived on the fat of the land. The Federals had evacuated it, and henceforth the rich harvests and all the resources of the grand valley, and of all the districts round about, would pass to the Southern army, which had so much need of them. Further, MacClellan's army having quitted the James River, all Lower Virginia was delivered from the enemy, and the Northern troops being recalled in great haste, in consequence of Lee's successes, were already leaving the different points on the coast.

Everything, therefore, counselled the South to profit by the

demoralization of the North and the disorganization of its armies, and strike further heavy blows before there was time for recovery from past disasters. The Confederate army was too ill provided with clothing, shoes, ammunition, and other necessary war-material to hope to be able, even in so favourable a moment, to conquer peace on Northern soil; but there was every reason to believe that it would succeed in enfeebling the Federals sufficiently to force them to remain north of the Potomac, and defend their own territory. Thus, perhaps, a new invasion would be spared to Virginia, till winter came, which would render all offensive evolutions on the part of the North difficult.

Pope's defeat rendered possible some movements which probably Lee had not foreseen. In advancing from Richmond on Culpepper, his design was simply to arrest his adversary's march on Gordonsville; now everything was changed, and it became important to draw the utmost profit possible from the new position of affairs.

The political situation of Maryland very naturally suggested the idea of penetrating into that state. A large part of its population were at one with the South, not only through its interests, traditions, and the ties of vicinity, but also through profound sympathy. It had been hindered from taking part and cause with the South only by strong pressure on the part of the Federal Government. All appearances were a sure indication that the people of Maryland simply awaited the arrival of the Confederate army to rise against the United States Government. In any case its rising must create a powerful diversion, and indirectly aid the South by obliging the Washington authorities to send numerous troops against the people who had revolted. There is no doubt that, in all this, General Lee reasoned soundly, that his hopes were justified by the general situation of affairs, and his conclusions based on weighty data. He was not, however, a prey to illusion. He was well aware how difficult it would be for the Maryland people, whom the anxiety of the Federal Government

had disarmed, and whose state was occupied by a multitude of Northern troops, to hold their own against superior forces. He understood perfectly that as long as the Confederates could not effectually protect them, all rising on their part was little likely and little to be desired, since the effort could only succeed with the help of the South, and its non-success would expose the unfortunate Marylanders to the vengeance of an exasperated government. At the commencement, therefore, he reckoned much more on the well-grounded fears of the Washington Government than on the active co-operation of the Marylanders.

The army itself was by no means prepared to invade a hostile country. Exhausted by the extraordinary efforts of the campaign it had just finished, it numbered a large proportion of soldiers without shoes, who had literally traced out the way to the Potomac with blood. Their uniforms were in tatters. The service of victuals was made irregularly. Their means of transport were in no way proportioned to the army's wants, and their stock of ammunition was altogether insufficient for an aggressive movement of this magnitude.

Nevertheless, as so many advantages seemed to be promised by a sudden and vigorous offensive movement, General Lee concluded that the considerations just enumerated ought not to stop him. He resolved, therefore, to cross the Potomac and enter Maryland. In order to compel the Unionists also to cross this river, he decided on fording it to the east of the Blue Ridge, so as to menace at once both Washington and Baltimore. The enemy being ousted from Virginia, Lee reckoned on taking up a position in Western Maryland, and, by establishing communications with Richmond, by the Valley of the Shenandoah, and threatening Pennsylvania, to draw the Federals after him, which would increase their distance from their base of operations. He followed the same plan in 1863, in the campaign which ended at Getteysburg.

On the 4th of September, D. H. Hill's division, which formed

the Confederate van-guard, crossed the Potomac opposite the spot where the Monocacy empties it waters into the Potomac. To oppose it there were only some Federal sentries, who took flight. The night and the days following were employed in destroying the sluices and dykes of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, by means of which Washington chiefly derived its supplies of wood and coal. On the 7th of September, all the Confederate army encamped on Northern territory. The crossing of the river had been accompanied by repeated hurrahs, to the sound of warlike strains, and with an enthusiasm unlimited. The soldiers considered themselves as the avengers of a people outraged in its earest rights, and felt proud and joyful at the prospect of carrying war into the enemy's country. They encamped between the Monocacy and Frederick City; very strict orders had been issued to treat the Marylanders as friends. Pillage and theft were severely punished. What was needed was to be paid for, in Confederate paper, it is true, but the sellers did not refuse to accept it. In proof that these orders were obeyed, it is an extraordinary fact, that during the whole sojourn of the Southern army there, not a single case of bad conduct occurred.

This regard for their enemies created astonishment in the North, where it had been expected to see the tattered rebels imitate, and even surpass, the scenes of pillage and disorder which covered Pope's army with infamy. When one thinks that the Confederate soldiers had just seen the laughing fields of Virginia devastated, their friends and relatives pillaged, insulted, and often driven from their homes, by the Union troops, and that now they themselves were in the enemy's country, still smarting under the remembrance of those outrages, and surrounded by so many things they needed, and were able, if they chose, to appropriate, then their chivalrous conduct can be duly estimated. What a proud time for Lee was that when he learnt his orders were so strictly obeyed! No doubt the affection of his soldiers for him had as much to do with it as the sentiment of right and justice. There

was no wish to tarnish either their own or their general's good fame.

The Marylanders' welcome of the Southern troops was not such as had been imagined. In Western Maryland, which Lee entered, the majority of the people remained attached to the Union, and very few recruits rallied to the Southern standards. The Confederate General-in-chief, on touching the soil of Maryland, addressed the following proclamation to its inhabitants:—

"Head-Quarters, Army of Northern Virginia,
"Near Frederickstown, Sept. 8th, 1862.

"To the people of Maryland.

"It is right that you should know the purpose that has brought the army under my command within the limits of your state, so far as that purpose concerns yourselves.

"The people of the Confederate States have long watched, with the deepest sympathy, the wrongs and outrages that have been inflicted upon the citizens of a Commonwealth allied to the States of the South by the strongest social, political, and commercial ties.

"They have seen with profound indignation their sister state deprived of every right, and reduced to the condition of a conquered province. Under the pretence of supporting the Constitution, but in violation of its most valuable provisions, your citizens have been arrested and imprisoned upon no charge, and contrary to all forms of law. . . . . The government of your chief city has been usurped by armed strangers; your legislature has been dissolved by the unlawful arrest of its members; freedom of speech and of the press has been suppressed; words have been declared offences by arbitrary decree of the Federal Executive, and citizens ordered to be tried by military commissions for what they may dare to speak.

"Believing that the people of Maryland possess a spirit too lofty to submit to such a government, the people of the South

have long wished to aid you in throwing off this foreign yoke, to enable you again to enjoy the inalienable rights of freemen, and restore the independence and sovereignty of your state. In obedience to this wish, our army has come among you, and is prepared to assist you with the power of its arms in regaining the rights of which you have been so unjustly despoiled. This, citizens of Maryland, is our mission, so far as you are concerned. No restraint on your freewill is intended; no intimidation will be allowed, within the limits of this army at least. . . . . We know no enemies among you, and will protect all of you in every opinion. It is for you to decide your destiny, freely and without constraint. This army will respect your choice, whatever it may be; and while the Southern people will rejoice to welcome you to your natural position among them, they will welcome you when you come in of your own free will.

"R. E. LEE, General-Commanding."

This proclamation was read with interest by the Marylanders, but it brought no recruits. Unhappily for the South, General Lee had had to penetrate into a part of Maryland having little love for the Confederate cause. In the east and south-east of the state it would have been different; the Southerners there had many partisans; but between these and Frederickstown a Federal army was master of all the roads by which they could have come to General Lee. Further, the Confederate invasion was a tentative one, which must become a success before the Marylanders would trust themselves to it. If Lee could reach Baltimore or Prince George County, undoubtedly many recruits would join him. The Confederate soldiers ignored all these details, and felt a lively disappointment at finding so few friends and so many enemies.

When he adopted this plan of campaign, Lee had reckoned on leading all his army with him. But, unfortunately, nothing of the kind happened. All along the road from Manassas to the

Potomac, thousands of stragglers left the ranks, the greater part not having strength to proceed. The want of rest and food, continual marches and daily battles, added to all preceding fatigues under the walls of Richmond, had completely exhausted them. Many of these stragglers had no shoes, and their feet were bruised to such a degree by the stones that they could not stand upright. Many of them remained lame for months, others never recovered the efforts they made to follow the army. But a great number, it must unfortunately be granted, yielded to meaner motives in quitting the ranks. Want of severe discipline was keenly felt in the Confederate army.

Lee was much grieved on learning the extent of this evil, and perceived the danger to which his troops would be exposed if their number became sensibly diminished. But there was no time to indulge in this grief; the Potomac had been crossed, and it would have been a moral defeat to return without attempting anything.

Harper's Ferry is a village situated at the confluence of the Shenandoah and Potomac, on the Virginian bank of the latter river, and commanding the entry into the Valley of Virginia. It was occupied by a strong Federal garrison of 11,500 men under Colonel Miles, to hinder any hostile force emerging from the valley into Maryland. But as Lee had crossed the Potomac much lower down, placing himself between Harper's Ferry and the rest of the Federal troops, all strategical rules required the post to be abandoned as useless, and as putting the garrison in danger of being surrounded and made prisoners. This at least General Lee expected. But General Halleck, who was at the head of the Federal staff, obstinately refused to retire the garrison from Harper's Ferry, and, strange to say, that which was, from a military point of view, a blunder on the Federal side, became the first cause of the want of success to the Confederate invasion. For before penetrating into the enemy's country, Lee had to await the taking of this place, and thus MacClellan had time to

interpose between him and the United States capital, and then to strike a blow under circumstances very unfavourable to the Confederate army.

The Southern commander, seeing that Colonel Miles gave no sign of withdrawing, was necessarily obliged to compel him to move, in order to preserve his own relations with the valley, whence he reckoned in part to draw his supplies. This unforeseen obstacle disarranged his original plan, which was to push forwards without losing a moment. To take Harper's Ferry, he was forced to detach a considerable body of troops, and by so much enfeeble his army, already diminished by the many stragglers spoken of previously.

On December 10th, Jackson's corps recrossed the Potomac near Williamsport; the Federals likewise evacuated Martinsburg, and became concentrated at Harper's Ferry. On the 12th Jackson took possession of Martinsburg, and on the 13th, at 11 o'clock, he arrived in view of the enemy's position around Harper's Ferry. Meanwhile, General Walker had recrossed the Potomac at the Point of Rocks, and at night, on the 13th, he occupied the heights of Loudon at the point where the Shenandoah falls into the Potomac. These heights command Harper's Ferry on the edge opposite the Shenandoah. On the morning of the 14th the town was bombarded.

General MacLaws was directed to take possession of the Maryland Heights, situated opposite Harper's Ferry, on the north bank of the Potomac. By these the town was completely commanded, and they were fortified and occupied in force by the enemy. On the 12th, MacLaws, after becoming master of all the passes of South Mountain,* by which reinforcements would have been able to reach Harper's Ferry, arrived at the Maryland Heights. Next day, after a desperate struggle among some brushwood, forests, and ravines, he succeeded at four o'clock, p.m.,

* A name given to the prolongation of the Blue Ridge chain, on the other side of the Potomac, into Maryland.

in planting his flag on the summit of the heights in question. Then his troops drew up so as to cut off the retreat of the garrison, should it attempt to descend the Potomac. The Federals had raised a series of formidable works, extending from this river to the Shenandoah. From the heights taken by MacLaws and Walker, the Confederate cannon scarce reached these advanced works. Jackson was to turn the enemy from this line into the town of Harper's Ferry. Hill, defiling along the left bank of the Shenandoah, was to attack the Federal left wing on the rear, and bear down on the town. Ewell's division was directed to support him. Meanwhile Jackson would make a demonstration against the Federal right, while the Southern cavalry watched the borders of the Potomac. On the evening of the 14th, Hill succeeded in taking a hostile position near the Potomac, on the extreme left of their line. Ewell's division, under General Lawton's command, had neared the Federal works; some guns also had been sent across from the other side of the Shenandoah, to rake the enemy's line. At daybreak, on September 15th, a terrible cannonade burst forth from all the heights, most of the pieces being about a thousand yards from the Federals. In an hour the Federal artillery ceased to answer, and soon after, at the moment when the assault was going to begin, the appearance of a white flag announced the surrender of the place.. The number of prisoners was upwards of 11,000, besides 73 cannon, 13,000 rifles and other arms, 200 waggons, and stores of ammunition: Jackson's loss was insignificant. Hardly had he succeeded, when he received a pressing order from Lee to rejoin him in all haste. Leaving General Hill to complete the surrender, and enjoining Generals MacLaws and Walker to follow him as quickly as possible, he took the road immediately. After a forced night-march he joined the commander-in-chief at Sharpsburg on the morning of the 16th of September.

Let us note what had passed in the interval. Lee, on entering Maryland, had no direct intention of attacking Washington or

Baltimore, but wished to attract MacClellan towards the Cumberland Valley, obliging him thus to leave those towns open, which would allow the Southern chief to throw himself suddenly on either of them, or force MacClellan to a battle at a distance from his base of operations. Consequently, on September 10th, crossing South Mountain, Lee marched on Boonsboro', leaving General Stuart with his cavalry east of the mountains to watch the enemy. Longstreet bore down on Hagerstown at the news that some Federal forces were approaching on the Pennsylvanian side. General D. H. Hill halted at Boonsboro', to prevent the Harper's Ferry garrison from escaping by Pleasant Valley, and to be within reach of supporting Stuart's cavalry. Harper's Ferry was expected to fall on the 13th, and the Federal army was advancing so slowly that Lee hoped to take the place and reunite all his columns before MacClellan's arrival. Then he reckoned on marching into Pennsylvania.

But all his projects miscarried in consequence of one of those accidents which reduce to nothing the best conceived plans. Since September 2nd, the Federals had lost no time. When the remains of Pope's army took refuge within the Washington lines, it became absolutely necessary to find a general who would restore confidence to the soldiers, re-establish order in their ranks, and put them in a state to re-open the campaign. MacClellan alone appeared to offer the wished-for conditions. Since his return from the James River, his duties had been limited to organising the defence of the capital. On the President's request, who offered him the command-in-chief of all the forces round Washington, MacClellan accepted, and determined to resume the offensive with vigour. The old army of the James and that of Pope were joined. General Burnside's corps was recalled from Fredericksburg, and put under MacClellan's orders. On the 5th of September, as soon as Lee's entry into Maryland was announced, the Federal chief hastened from Washington to meet him at Frederick City. The army of the Potomac marched by five

parallel roads, and was so disposed as to cover at one and the same time both Washington and Baltimore, the left wing under General Franklin being supported on the Potomac, the centre under General Sumner, and the right wing, extending to the railway from Baltimore to Ohio, obeyed General Burnside. The efficient force of this army was 87,164 fighting men. So urgent was the occasion, that the reorganisation had to be accomplished during the march. The Federal commander-in-chief showed, under these critical circumstances, an energy above all praise. It was no trifling matter to assume the command of troops demoralized and disaffected through a series of disastrous reverses, and, in ten days, to make of them a strong army, perfectly organised, and in a condition to hold their own against the enemy.

MacClellan knowing nothing of Lee's plans, advanced with caution. On September 12th, he reached Frederick, the Confederate cavalry retiring on his approach. On the 13th, by an unhoped-for chance, there was brought him a confidential order of the day, addressed by Lee to General D. H. Hill, in which the plan of the Confederate campaign was clearly traced. Hill had lost this paper, and it had fallen into the hands of one of the pickets of the Federal troops. This prize, of the greatest importance, informed MacClellan of all Lee's schemes, the forces at his disposal, the positions they occupied, and gave him such an advantage over the Northern Virginian army as ought to lead to his annihilation. In brief, this paper put the Southern army at his mercy.

To make the most of this unexpected good fortune, MacClellan advanced rapidly, in order to seize the South Mountain defiles, cross into Pleasant Valley, there attack the Confederate divisions in detail, and help the garrison of Harper's Ferry, still in difficulties with Stonewall Jackson. On the evening of the 13th, while MacLaws and Walker were taking up a position around this town, MacClellan appeared before the South Mountain defiles,

repulsing Stuart's cavalry, which endeavoured to stop him, in order that Lee might have time to occupy the defiles and dispute the passage of the Federals. On leaving the Potomac to the north of the river, the Blue Ridge chain, extending into Pennsylvania, is called South Mountain. Two miles and a half further to the west rises a range of hills, the Maryland Heights, abutting opposite Harper's Ferry, on the Potomac. Between these two chains lies Pleasant Valley, about three miles wide; the country is naturally uneven. Two roads lead from Frederick City to the western part of the State, the principal, or Hagerstown Road, crosses South Mountain through the defile of Turner's Gap, near the village of Boonsboro'; another road passes through Crampton's Gap defile, five or six miles further south. These defiles are well-adapted for defence, the nature of the ground contributing to it admirably. But they can be taken in the rear by means of footpaths leading over the heights on the mountain-sides, whence the defiles are commanded. MacClellan, thanks to what the order of the day had taught him, no longer ignorant of Lee's plans, resolved to hurl his centre and right against the defile leading to Boonsboro', while the left, under Franklin, forced Crampton's Gap, threw itself on MacLaws's rear, defeated it, and then extended its assistance to Harper's Ferry.

General Lee, on learning his enemy's presence at South Mountain, on the evening of September 13th, was much surprised, and at once comprehended, without knowing the fate of his order of the day, that MacClellan had divined his plan of campaign. General D. H. Hill immediately received orders to defend Turner's Gap at all hazards. No news had yet come from Harper's Ferry, and Lee considered the place would fall that very day, the 13th. He had calculated that after this date he would be able to reunite his forces, and hinder MacClellan's advance, and would have done so but for this unlucky paper. The South Mountain passes had been left unguarded on purpose to attract MacClellan towards the west of the State, and so to lure him from his resources; this

was a part of Lee's original plan. Thus it was to be, as provided for beforehand, on the 13th. But now all was changed. Harper's Ferry, which should have been evacuated, still held out, and MacClellan, no longer compelled to grope his way, had hastened his march. It was, therefore, necessary to stick to the defiles till the capture of Harper's Ferry, and retain MacClellan to the east of the mountains, till the whole of the Confederate army had been reunited and was ready to receive him.

Hill marched, therefore, with all his division, only 5000 strong, to the entrance of the Gap. General Longstreet received orders to march to his aid without losing a moment. A desperate struggle followed for the possession of the defile. It lasted all day with alternations of success and defeat. Night alone put an end to the combat. Longstreet, towards evening, had arrived to succour his colleague nearly crushed under the constantly increasing number of the Federals. The loss on both sides was very considerable. Lee perceiving the necessity of concentrating his army, and having received from Jackson a positive assurance that Harper's Ferry would fall next day, resolved to retire from South Mountain, and take up a position at Sharpsburg, whence he would be able to throw himself on the flank of all the hostile corps marching against MacLaws on the Maryland Heights, and would also be in a condition to reunite the various columns of his army. At Sharpsburg, too, he would be master of the fords of the Potomac, which secured, in case of misfortune, a line of retreat into Virginia. Consequently, during the night, the Confederate forces retired towards Antietam Creek, Fitz Lee's cavalry keeping the enemy at a distance.

On the whole, although MacClellan had greatly disarranged the Southern chief's plan of campaign, the resistance at South Mountain, which lasted all day, had permitted General Jackson to effect the reduction of Harper's Ferry. MacClellan, therefore, had not succeeded in saving that place. There remained to him the resource of risking a battle according to rule. He conducted his

army, on the night of September 14th, through the defiles abandoned by the Confederates. During the 15th the Northern forces slowly pursued their way, Lee's rear-guard from time to time turning round to retard their march. Towards night-fall MacClellan was suddenly in the presence of the whole Confederate army, drawn up in battle array, on the western side of Antietam Creek, a small tributary of the Potomac flowing in front of the village of Sharpsburg.

We have already indicated by what unfortunate series of events Lee had been obliged to change his original plan of campaign. The reduction of Harper's Ferry had forced him to go out of his road, losing him much precious time. The finding of his order of campaign had given the Northern commander such an advantage as ought to have enabled him to annihilate the Southern army. Hill and Longstreet's resistance before South Mountain had in part remedied matters, but every necessity existed to halt on the edge of Antietam in order to give Jackson and his lieutenants time to rejoin the army. For the rest, with the Federals at his heels, it was impossible to avoid a battle, whatever might be Lee's design, whether he thought of returning to Virginia, or of directing his course into Pennsylvania. The most urgent step demanded was to stop the Federal army. All the chances appeared against Lee. His army was much reduced in number, and already somewhat discouraged by the commencement of an unpropitious campaign. At Sharpsburg he had with him only 33,000 combatants, of which number the troops of Jackson, MacLaws, and Walker, 14,000 in all, were not on the ground when the battle commenced. The Northern army amounted to 87,000 soldiers, abundantly supplied with everything, and having suffered incomparably less than the Confederates.

The battle of Sharpsburg was one of the most eagerly contested in all the war. Taking account of the immense disproportion between the two armies, one cannot but be filled with admiration at the gallant defence of Lee's men. The Southern army

occupied all the ground between the Potomac and Antietam, whose waters united, a little below Sharpsburg, at an angle of forty-five degrees, and covered the fords of the Potomac opposite Shepherdstown in Virginia. The troops were disposed on the western bank of the Antietam, with the village at their back. Longstreet was on the right, and his line extended to the Potomac, D. H. Hill commanded the centre on both sides of the road from Boonsboro', and more immediately resting on the village. Jackson, who arrived on the 16th, took the left; the interval between him and Hill was filled up by Hood's division. At first Jackson's troops were held in reserve. The country between the extreme left and the Potomac was confided to the cavalry under Stuart. There are three bridges over the Antietam in the neighbourhood of Sharpsburg,—one opposite Longstreet's position, the next opposite the Confederate centre, the third several thousand yards higher. Lee had not enough men to guard the last mentioned, and was forced to leave it open, not doubting that MacClellan would profit by it to take his left wing in the rear.

The Federal army arrived on the banks of the Antietam at mid-day, on the 15th of September. Lee's arrangements had been so well planned, notwithstanding his numerical weakness, that MacClellan decided to await the arrival of all his troops before seeking to force the passage of the Creek. The rest of his army joined him during the close of the day and the night following. He confided his left wing to Burnside, the centre to Porter, and Hooker and Sumner had the command of all the troops which extended to the right. Hooker's corps, supported by those of Sumner and Mansfield, was, as Lee had foreseen, to cross by the third bridge, and turn the Confederate left. MacClellan passed the 16th in posting his artillery, and assigning a position to the different corps of infantry along the Creek, for he wished to force the hostile centre as soon as Hooker charged on the right. To distract attention from the movement of his right wing, in the afternoon he opened a continuous fire all along his centre and left. The Confederate

batteries, with much less calibre, were speedily reduced to silence. At four o'clock, p.m., Hooker crossed the third bridge out of reach of the Confederate guns; Lee, foreseeing this movement, had placed Hood's two brigades on his extreme left, covering his left flank, and disposed at very acute angles with reference to the rest of his army. Hooker made an attempt on them at the end of the day, but Hood had no difficulty in holding his own. Their soldiers passed the night within rifle-shot of each other. On the 17th, before daybreak, Mansfield's entire corps had joined Hooker. Sumner received orders to follow him at dawn.

Lee, on the other hand. had advanced Jackson's corps for the support of Hood, his right being posted on the Hagerstown road, his left extending to the Potomac, protected by Stuart's cavalry and the horse artillery. Walker's two brigades rejoined Long street, and on the 17th, at 10 o'clock, a.m., Hood's soldiers were relieved by Lawton and Trimble's brigades from Ewell's division. The Confederate army thus formed a semi-circle, with its wings abutting on the Potomac.

The morning of the 17th was announced by a concentrated fire from all the Federal batteries on the two banks of the Antietam. Those on the left bank raked all Jackson's line, and his men suffered cruelly. Supported by this terrible fire, Hooker precipitated on them his 18,000 men, and tried to gain the Hagerstown Road and some woods on the left of that road. To oppose him Jackson only had the two divisions of Jones and Ewell, the latter really commanded by Lawton; 4,000 bayonets in all, so much had desertion and the enemy's fire played havoc with their ranks.

The Federal assault was vigorous, and a shower of grapeshot burst over the thinly-placed soldiers of Jackson. General Jones, being wounded, was replaced by General Starke. Jackson, advancing his line, drove the enemy back towards the left and centre. Three brigades on D. H. Hill's extreme left joined him. Stuart, placed between Jackson's left and the Potomac, drove back the

Federal division at Hooker's extreme right by means of the well-directed fire of his mounted artillery. But the enemy endured the attack so obstinately that Jackson's soldiers began to tire and give way. His corps had suffered terribly. His division, properly so called, had lost successively its two generals (Jones wounded, Starke killed); General Lawton, temporary commander of Ewell's division, had just been mortally wounded. Colonel Douglas, who had replaced Lawton at the head of his brigade, was slain; the brigade had lost 354, killed and wounded, out of 1150 men, including five colonels out of six. Hayes's brigade, out of 550 men, had lost 323—and *all its officers*.—Colonel Walker was wounded, and out of 700 men in the brigade he temporarily commanded, 228 had fallen, and three colonels out of four.

In spite of these frightful losses, these heroes made a supreme effort, and succeeded in pressing Hooker's columns so briskly that signs of disorder appeared among them. On Lee's order, Hood's two brigades, having hastened to the succour of Lawton and Trimble, nobly took their part in the charge, but the Confederates paid dearly for this success. Nevertheless their assault had been so vigorous that Hooker's soldiers began to leave the ranks towards the rear. Hooker himself, struck at that moment, had to leave the battle-field, which still further increased the disorder of his men. Mansfield's corps had joined Hooker's at 7 o'clock, and charged likewise; it was repulsed at the same time, and General Mansfield mortally wounded.

It was 9 o'clock, and victory seemed to incline in favour of the South. Hooker and Mansfield's corps—30,000 strong—had just been repulsed by Jackson's divisions, and Hood's two brigades—less than 6000—and the two Federal generals were out of the combat, one seriously, the other mortally, wounded. The attempt to turn the left wing had been unsuccessful, and the Federal right wing appeared demoralized. At this critical juncture, the arrival of General Sumner with fresh troops restored order in the Northern ranks. He re-formed the line, and hurled it at the Confederate

left, embracing in his attack the hostile centre, where D. H. Hill commanded.

Jackson's soldiers were tired out with the desperate struggle they had endured all the morning. Thus, they could not resist the impetuosity of this new attack. Ammunition failed them, and they fell back in disorder. The Confederates, in their turn, appeared about to succumb, for if Sumner succeeded in turning Lee's left, the latter would see his line of retreat towards the Potomac cut off. The vigorous, although ineffectual, resistance of Jackson's corps at this critical moment, gave Lee time to send to him Walker's two brigades, which he detached from Longstreet's corps, and MacLaws's division, which arrived from Harper's Ferry. Instantly reforming his line, Jackson charged Sumner furiously, and penetrating an interval between his right and centre, pierced the Federal line, pursued it through the woods beyond Hagerstown Road, and regained the position he had occupied at the beginning of the battle. But Jackson had suffered too much, and his troops were too few, for him to drive Sumner beyond the Antietam. It was noon. The enemy had failed in all his efforts to turn Lee's left.

Placed in the centre of his army, the Confederate commander had conducted the action so well, sending reinforcements at the opportune moment, and foreseeing each hostile movement, that he had maintained his position against all the assaults of his enemy. Jackson, with less than 12,000 men (including here the reinforcements received during the action), had held his own, and ended by repulsing the 40,000 of Hooker, Mansfield, and Sumner, wounding the first, and killing the second. Sumner's soldiers were so tried in their last assault, that they did not stir for the remainder of the day. But in the centre the conflict continued. The Confederates were partly driven back to an old road, where Hill re-formed them and arrested the enemy's progress. General Anderson arrived on the ground with 3,000 men. Hill placed him in reserve. At this moment an order, misunderstood, caused several regiments to think they must retire, which allowed the enemy to rush into

intervals left vacant. Generals Anderson and Wright were seriously wounded while trying to repair this disaster. General Hill, who at that moment was assisting in moving one of his aides-de-camp, who had been wounded, under shelter, so strongly did he believe his line safe, threw himself in front of his soldiers, rallied some hundreds of them, and at their head charged the enemy. They were now supported by the Confederate artillery, which made great ravages in the Federal ranks. The latter had so often got so near the Confederate positions, that their own cannon ceased firing, fearful of slaying soldiers on its own side. At one time, General Longstreet, observing a gun with nearly all the artillerymen dead, dismounted, and he, with General Drayton, Adjutant-General Major Sorrel, and Major Fairfax, served the piece till the danger was past. At length Hill, by heroic efforts, succeeded in arresting the enemy, who, about two o'clock, retired, and no more renewed his attack that day. Lee ordered Jackson to drive the Federal right wing beyond the Antietam, by taking it in the rear, but Franklin's corps having meanwhile joined Sumner, Jackson had to give up the attempt.

On the Federal left, General Burnside had massed 15,000 men, facing the stone bridge opposite Longstreet's guarded position. He was, simultaneously with the attack on the Confederate left, to take the stone bridge, pursue the enemy from the Sharpsburg Heights, drive him into the road, and cut off Lee from the Potomac fords at Shepherdstown, which would have led to the destruction of the Southern army. In the morning he made various attempts, but without success. Lee was obliged successively to detach from the troops under Longstreet, the divisions of Hood, MacLaws, and Walker, to succour Jackson, while Longstreet remained with Jones's division only, numbering 2500 fighting men. This handful of soldiers had to defend the Confederate right against Burnside's entire corps. General Toombs, with only 400 men, was left in charge of the bridge. He succeeded in holding Burnside in check nearly all the day. At four o'clock, however, the latter, under the

repeated orders of MacClellan, led his troops in a body against the bridge, took it, passed over the bodies of Toombs and his few men, and, arriving on the crest of the heights defended by General Jones, charged him, and, in spite of his resistance, compelled him to give ground. Burnside at this late hour seemed on the point of seizing the victory.

It was now that General A. P. Hill arrived from Harper's Ferry. His division, only 2000 strong, had marched since morning. Lee ordered him immediately to the help of Jones. He joined him just when the latter, pressed by his foes, had left four pieces of cannon in their hands. Hill, uniting the two divisions, less than 5000 in all, rushed against Burnside's centre with so much force, that he swept back the Federal corps, re-captured the battery, and likewise all the ground lost, obliging the enemy to take refuge under the protection of his guns ranged on the other side of the Antietam.

Thus terminated this important battle. At sunset the Confederates still occupied the positions they had held in the morning, all the efforts of the enemy to dislodge them having been in vain. Their losses amounted to 8790 killed and wounded. The Federals lost 12,469, including 13 generals.

It was nearly night when Burnside was repulsed. The enemy, waiting for Lee to profit by his success, and cross the river, placed their artillery on some heights commanding the bridges. But Lee was too wary to run fresh risks. His triumph was sufficiently great in that he was able, with so feeble a force, to resist victoriously one so superior in numbers.

During the night reinforcements arrived to him, chiefly of soldiers sick and wounded in the early months of the year, who came to rejoin their regiments, or stragglers, who were continually coming in. On the 18th MacClellan had the choice, either to renew the attack at once, or put it off till the morrow, in order to allow time for the arrival of reinforcements from Washington. He decided to wait, although it was very probable Lee would

cross into Virginia in the night between the 18th and 19th. During all the 18th the Confederate army remained in the same positions they had so valiantly offensive the previous eve. Although too weak to take the offensive, the Confederate commander felt sure of being able to repulse any new assault. On the night of the 18th he determined to recross the Potomac. He had nothing to gain by remaining where he was, and the dangers of his situation in Maryland were augmented hourly. His adversary was incessantly receiving reinforcements, while he himself could hope for no addition to his forces. It was only with the greatest difficulty he was able to feed his soldiers, and renew their supplies of powder and ammunition. If he returned to Virginia he could, on the contrary, hope to see the number of his troops increased. Stragglers, and the sick and wounded of the Peninsular campaign in the springtime, would continually return to his standard, the Government also would assemble reinforcements, and it would be much easier for them to join him in Virginia than in Maryland. All the wants of the army would not be difficult to satisfy south of the Potomac. In the night of the 18th Longstreet, who was nearest the river, crossed it close to Shepherdstown; he was followed by the rest of the army, the cavalry bringing up the rear. At eleven o'clock, a.m., on the 19th of September, the entire army was in position on the Virginian bank, ready to receive the enemy in case of pursuit. Lee carried with him everything of value, victuals, provisions accumulated in Maryland, and the rich spoils of Harper's Ferry.

As soon as MacClellan knew of Lee's retreat, on the morning of the 19th, he dispatched Porter's corps in pursuit, which had been held in reserve during the battle of the 17th. But the latter did not reach the Potomac till the Confederates had effected their crossing. Lee had left General Pendleton to watch the fords. Porter succeeded during the night in throwing on the southern bank a force sufficiently large to get possession of four Confederate cannon, to disperse Pendleton's feeble corps, and to establish

himself strongly under the protection of the batteries raised on the Maryland bank.

The Confederate army was already some distance from the river, but hardly had Lee heard what had happened, before he directed A. P. Hill to drive back Porter across the Potomac. On the morning of the 20th Hill took the position from the Federals, and inflicted on them a rough chastisement. He literally threw them into the river, where many were drowned. 200 prisoners were taken. The Federals confessed having lost more than 3000 men, slain and drowned. Hill's loss amounted only to 261 men.

MacClellan persisted no further. His army had as much need of rest as that of his foe. He remained, therefore, north of the Potomac, while the Confederates established themselves in the vicinity of Winchester.

Lee's troops, since the 25th of June, had marched more than 280 miles, living on half rations, with uniforms in rags, and feet naked. In twelve pitched battles and numerous conflicts, they had met and defeated three formidable armies, inflicting on the enemy a loss of 76,000 men, of whom 30,000 were prisoners, and taking 155 guns and nearly 70,000 rifles, while seizing or destroying also victuals and war-material representing a value of several million piastres.

The battle of Sharpsburg was not a victory for MacClellan. He had attacked an army numbering scarce a third of his own, and been repulsed with a loss one third greater than that of his adversary. So rough had been the experience of his army that, had the 30,000 Confederate stragglers been present on the 17th of September, there is no doubt Lee would have driven the Federals before him to the east of the mountains. MacClellan, indeed, confessed the state to which his army had been reduced: "The next morning (i.e., after the Battle of Sharpsburg)," he says, "I found that our loss had been so great, and there was so much

* The value of a piastre varies in different countries. A Spanish piastre is worth about 3*s.* 1*d.*

disorganization in some of the commands, that I did not consider it proper to renew the attack that day."

With this battle the invasion of Maryland terminated, but it was not the battle alone which caused this termination. The unforeseen delay caused by the necessity of taking Harper's Ferry, and especially the enormous gaps produced in the Southern army by the unusual number of stragglers, had so much deranged Lee's projects, that he could no longer think of succeeding in a campaign in Maryland. The fate of the campaign, therefore, was really decided before the Battle of Sharpsburg, and Lee's only wish in accepting battle, was to arrest MacClellan's march, and reunite the scattered divisions of his own army.

In this Maryland campaign both adversaries had given proof of great military talent. After the Northern defeat at Manassas, MacClellan had assembled an army with marvellous rapidity, thanks chiefly to the influence of his own name, had conducted it against Lee and succeeded in stopping him, thus not only affording safety from invasion to the fertile province of Pennsylvania, but also disarranging, for the time, the plan which Lee had formed for the capture of the Federal capital. It is not, therefore, an exaggeration to say that he had saved the Northern cause, for to defend Washington there was only his own army, and if Lee had been able to get the better of it, Washington or Philadelphia would have been at his mercy, enabling him to dictate peace, and secure the acknowledgment of Southern independence. All hope of seeing this magnificent project realised, vanished before the rapid march and prompt attack of MacClellan. In a few hours, on an autumn day, the triumphant march of the Confederates was arrested on the borders of the Antietam. Let us, therefore, do justice to the Federal general's skill.

But Lee's merit was no less, and his want of success was due to circumstances over which he had no control. His plan now, as always, had been maturely considered and perfectly combined. But three causes, which he could not foresee, spoiled everything. The

first, his great loss of men, caused partly by his rapid movements and an uninterrupted succession of conflicts; the second, the reluctance of the Marylanders to come to his ranks; and the third, and most important, the finding by MacClellan of that unlucky despatch, which revealed to him all Lee's plan. From that moment the Northern commander advanced so rapidly, that he gave no time to the Southern stragglers to rejoin the army. The gaps in the Confederate ranks, therefore, could not be filled up, and Lee was obliged to retreat, in order not to be too far away from Jackson, who was retained by the unexpected resistance at Harper's Ferry. Hence the impossibility of finding his way to Hagerstown, the forced concentration at Sharpsburg, and consequently the necessity of delivering battle in its neighbourhood.

The loss of Lee's despatch to Hill was a true fatality which exercised a preponderating influence over following events. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Southern chief was responsible for the failure of the Maryland campaign: he had, as far as possible, provided for everything. He was right to hope for great reinforcements, whether in Maryland or in Virginia; thus his flanks would have been protected, and he would have been able without delay to invade Pennsylvania. Contrary to his expectations, he was obliged to retire and give battle at Sharpsburg. Here, again, he revealed talents of the first order. The enemy, at least twice as numerous as his own army, never displayed more energy and eagerness at any period of the war. If the Federals were repulsed, it must be attributed to Lee's skill and his soldiers' valour. He manœuvred his army with admirable rapidity and precision, multiplying his soldiers at the most exposed points. Indeed, at Sharpsburg, the precision of view and promptitude of action of which the Confederate commander gave proof, were most remarkable. An undecided or unforeseeing general would have experienced a complete defeat, for at the beginning of the action the Confederate left wing numbered but 4000 men, while

the columns that rushed on it consisted of 18,000, and afterwards of 40,000 men. To resist such masses not only was there wanting to the soldiers courage to be relied on, but also great skill and extraordinary rapidity in the management of troops to the general.

CHAPTER X.

STUART'S RAID INTO PENNSYLVANIA.—BURNSIDE SUPERSEDES MACCLELLAN.—BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG, DECEMBER 13TH, 1862.

GENERAL LEE'S first care, on arriving at Winchester, was to procure his soldiers shoes and clothing. The citizens of Richmond on their part hastened to contribute to the needs of their heroic defenders. Stragglers were likewise looked up. They came in from all sides, well rested and recovered from their fatigues. In less than a fortnight the army was increased by 30,000 new men. The district in which they were was admirably adapted to restore to the soldiers health of body and elasticity of mind. Rest, mountain air, abundance of food, brought back life to these warriors, exhausted by the glorious fatigues of the two preceding campaigns. In the evening, after the day's drill, numerous groups were often seen, assembled under the trees, singing some religious hymn, a recollection of their infancy and family. The young chaplain talked in convincing terms of his holy mission, then another hymn was heard, and, by the glare of the half-extinguished torches, the groups of soldiers dispersed, silent and reflecting.

The Confederates, far from being discouraged by later events, acquired an increase of faith in themselves, looking reasonably on the battle of Sharpsburg, where the enemy was so superior in numbers, as a feat of arms altogether honourable. Their confidence in their officers, especially in General Lee, was

much augmented. Thanks to this sentiment, which, later, was developed to a point unheard of, Lee did extraordinary things. His men felt that he was a man to bear no matter what test, and in such cases the soldier is rarely deceived: he judges for himself. Lee had already been able to inspire them with a profound admiration for his military talents; his goodness, the care which he took of them, his simplicity soon caused him to be adored. In all this campaign not an impatient word had escaped him. Always in the front rank, indifferent to danger, he displayed a paternal sweetness towards all his subordinates; his soldiers regarded that firm and upright form with a constantly increasing feeling of affection, robed in its simple uniform of grey, that quiet countenance, that expression full of dignity and serenity, impassive alike amid the tiresomeness of the march and in the tumult of battle. "*There is Uncle Robert,*" they would exclaim one to another, as he passed, crowding round him, cheering him, and shaking his hands.

The country generally shared this feeling. Everywhere where he pitched his camp the neighbours came in crowds to see him. An English officer who passed some time in the Confederate camp near Winchester, speaks of it thus:

"In visiting the head-quarters of the Confederate generals, but particularly those of General Lee, any one accustomed to see European armies in the field cannot fail to be struck with the great absence of all the *pomp and circumstance of war* in and around their encampments. Lee's head-quarters consisted of about seven or eight pole-tents, pitched with their backs to a stake fence, upon a piece of ground so rocky that it was unpleasant to ride over it, its only recommendation being a little stream of good water, which flowed close to the general's tent. In front of the tents were some three four-wheeled waggons, drawn up without any regularity, and a number of horses roamed loose about the field. The servants, who were, of course, slaves, and the mounted soldiers, called *couriers*, were unprovided with

tents, and slept in or under the waggons. Waggons, tents, and some of the horses, were marked *U.S.*,—showing that part of that huge debt in the North has gone to furnishing even the Confederate generals with camp equipments. No guard or sentries were to be seen in the vicinity; no crowd of aides-de-camp loitering about, making themselves agreeable to visitors. . . . A large farmhouse stands close by, which, in any other army, would have been the general's residence *pro tem.*; but, as no liberties are allowed to be taken with personal property, in Lee's army, he is particular in setting a good example himself. His staff are crowded together, two or three in a tent; none are allowed to carry more baggage than a small box each, and his own kit is but very little larger. Every one who approaches him does so with marked respect, although there is none of that bowing and flourishing of forage caps which occurs in the presence of European generals; and while all honour him, and place implicit faith in his courage and ability, those with whom he is most intimate feel for him the affection of sons to a father. Old General Scott was correct in saying that, when Lee joined the Southern cause, it was worth as much as the accession of 20,000 men to the *rebels*. Since then, every injury that it was possible to inflict, the Northerners have heaped upon him. His house on the Pamunkey River has been entirely destroyed, and his beautiful estate on Arlington Heights pillaged of all it contained. All the relics of George Washington—such as pictures, books, plate—have been stolen, to be exhibited in the galleries of Northern towns. Notwithstanding all these personal losses, however, when speaking of the Yankees, he neither evinced any bitterness of feeling, nor gave utterance to a single violent expression, but alluded to many of his former friends and companions among them in the kindest terms. He spoke as a man proud of the victories won by his country, and confident of ultimate success, under the blessing of the Almighty, whom he glorified for past successes, and whose aid he invoked for all future operations."

The Confederate Government, profiting by the experience of the later military operations, divided the different armies into *corps*. The army of Northern Virginia, with which we are specially occupied, was divided into two corps, the first placed under the command of Major-General Longstreet, the second under that of Major-General Jackson. The first corps consisted of the divisions of MacLaws, Hook, Picket, and Walker; the second those of A. P. Hill, Ewell, and the division formerly under Jackson, now under General Tagliaferro. General D. H. Hill was at the head of the reserve, the cavalry remained under Stuart, and the artillery under Pendleton. At the end of October the army reckoned between 55,000 and 60,000 fighting men; but Lee had many difficulties to surmount in order to fill up gaps, and retain soldiers under his flags. The Confederate troops were badly paid when the depreciation of paper money is taken into account. Their patriotism was so much the more glorious. While the Federal soldier's pay was higher than it has ever been in any country or time, the average of the Confederate's, from May 1861 to April 1865, was $38\frac{9}{10}$ cents, worth, so much was paper money depreciated, about 2 francs (*i.e.* about 1*s.* 7*d.*). A soldier who sells his life at this price cannot be suspected of mercenary motives. Likewise, in consequence of the many hardships and conflicts, the number of wounded and sick was very high. Most of these were sent to Richmond, Petersburg, and Lynchburg. The Southern hospitals were too few and ill-provided; of necessity, therefore, many were allowed to return to their own hearths to be taken care of; convalescents also, leaving the hospitals, received leave to go home and recover themselves more rapidly. A great number of these never returned to their standards.

Placed at Winchester, the key of the lower Shenandoah Valley, General Lee was in position to watch the line of the Potomac in his front, where the army of MacClellan was, and also the Blue Ridge passes on his right, by which the enemy might, by a rapid movement, march on his flank or rear. Posted in this advantageous

position he let more than a month pass, the two armies watching one another. When the Confederates retired on Winchester, General Jackson was directed, as far as possible, to destroy the railway from Ohio to Baltimore, the principal way of communication between the West and East, of which the enemy made great use for revictualling. He completely fulfilled his mission, cutting away the bridges over an extent of thirty-seven miles, rendering the road utterly impracticable for a long time.

MacClellan, having left, for purposes of observation, at Harper's Ferry and on the neighbouring heights, two corps under General Sumner, was occupied in reorganizing his troops, and putting them in a condition to undertake a new campaign against the Southern capital. For that matter, his resources were ten times those of his adversary. During this interval nothing happened of importance, except a cavalry skirmish, in which Colonel W. H. F. Lee, son of the commander-in-chief, distinguished himself, and which terminated in the retreat of the Federal cavalry. On the 8th of October, in order somewhat to ascertain what was passing with the enemy, and to know something of his movements and position, Lee directed Stuart to conduct a reconnoitring expedition into Pennsylvania.

On the 9th, at the head of 1800 horse and 4 pieces of artillery, under the command of General Hampton and Colonels W. H. F. Lee and Jones, he began his march. Very strict orders had been given to the soldiers to conduct themselves with prudence, and abstain from acts of violence. Their errand was limited to the taking of horses or other legitimate prizes, and, above all, to obtaining every sort of information about the enemy's forces and movements. On the morning of the 10th the Confederate column crossed the Potomac at MacCoy's, above Williamsport. Some Federal sentries took flight. A large corps of Federal troops had just passed on the road to Cumberland. Stuart would have liked to march on Hagerstown, where he knew the Federals had amassed a good deal of war-material, but he

feared giving them warning; consequently, he hastened onwards. At night he reached Chambersburg, in Pennsylvania, and summoned it to surrender on pain of bombardment: the municipal authorities did not appear. Stuart took possession of the town. All he had from individuals was paid for in paper money. Everywhere the soldiers demanded permission to have the benefit of fire and water. The officers begged for coffee, and conducted themselves with the utmost politeness, asking to be allowed to warm themselves at the fireside while their repast was preparing. This method of procedure was in striking contrast to that of the Federal troops in the South. At Williamstown, in South Carolina, these latter respected not a house, whether the owners were present or not. They forced the doors, carried off what they could, and destroyed the remainder. Frequently the houses were burnt. Many a time the sick and bed-ridden were maltreated and deprived of all they had. One of the diversions of these brave warriors was to leave nothing to eat in a house. Naturally enough all they could take was carried off,—horses, arms, clothing. They even broke open locked coffers and emptied them in sight of their owners. The citizens' pockets were searched without scruple. All this took place without the least effort on the part of the officers to stop the pillage. Often, indeed, these gentlemen did not disdain to appropriate pianos, pictures, plate. How many families, whom terror caused to flee at the approach of the Northern soldiers, found, on their return, that clothing, bedding, plate, books, had disappeared; that furniture, dishes, gates, windows, harness, carriages, had been carried off or broken; partitions and fences burnt; all the corn, vegetables, provisions, carried off or spoilt —in a word, ruin, absolute, complete! The Southerners in Pennsylvania conducted themselves differently.

Next day, the 11th of October, the Confederates destroyed a great quantity of arms and ammunition; the telegraph wires were cut, and the railway-station, tool-houses, engines, and several railway waggons loaded with war-material, were delivered to the

flames. In a military hospital 275 invalids were made prisoners on parole.

The telegraph had promptly spread the news of Stuart's movements in the North. It caused there lively discontent and great agitation. MacClellan, fully resolved not to let him escape now, as on the Chickahominy, took every precaution to cut off his retreat towards the Potomac. General Pleasanton with his cavalry set off in pursuit, with orders to spare neither men nor horses. General Crook, whose division was loaded in waggons at Hancock, kept ready to march in case Stuart returned to cross the river in that neighbourhood. General Burnside posted two brigades in railway carriages at Monocacy, with engines alight prepared to start to no matter what part of the line, on receipt of signals that the Confederate troopers were there. At Harper's Ferry and all the fords of the river the greatest vigilance was adopted. The approaches of Frederick, on the Chambersburg Road, were scoured in every direction by Colonel Rush's lancers, in order to warn Burnside at the earliest moment of Stuart's coming. General Stoneman was stationed at Poolesville with his division, to watch the fords below the mouth of the Monocacy, and had orders to prevent the Confederate column from recrossing the river at all hazards.

Stuart, although he knew nothing about all the hostile cavalry and four or five divisions of infantry being in pursuit of him, little doubted that the enemy would seek to intercept his retreat by the upper Potomac. So he determined to return by Leesburg, the most direct road. Leaving Chambersburg on the morning of the 11th, he marched first towards Gettysburg, to deceive the inhabitants of the district, then, the Blue Ridge being passed, he returned on his own steps towards Hagerstown for six or seven miles, and then changing his route, marched direct on Emmetsburg, in Maryland, where he was enthusiastically received. Shortly before, a squadron of Rush's lancers had passed there in search of him. Without halting he went on to Frederick, getting possession of a

carrier of one of Rush's despatches. The reading of this paper, while telling him the enemy knew not where he was, gave him a hint of the preparations to intercept him.

The Federal cavalry under Averill and Pleasanton followed him swiftly; but Stuart, aware of the dangers which surrounded him, redoubled his efforts, and directed his march towards the Potomac. Crossing the Monocacy a little above Frederick, he went on all night by Liberty, Newmarket, and Monrovia, on the railway between Baltimore and the Ohio. At daybreak on the 13th, the column was at Hagerstown, on the high road from Washington, which connected MacClellan's camp with the capital. Here they found only some waggons, and the retreat was continued to Barnesville, which a Federal squadron of cavalry had just quitted. During his march, Stuart had learnt something more of MacClellan's plan besides what Colonel Rush's despatch informed him of; indeed, all the plan was revealed to him, namely, that a division of 5000 men watched the fords in his front.

Convinced that the boldest course was at the same time the safest, he marched rapidly, straight for the Potomac, resolved to force his way across in spite of the enemy. Without losing a moment, he started for Poolesville. Shortly before arriving there, he turned to the right into the woods, and gained the road which leads from Poolesville to the mouth of the Monocacy. The squadron at the head of the column soon descried General Pleasanton's column also marching towards Poolesville. Stuart charged and defeated it, forcing it back on the infantry. The latter advanced to recapture the ground lost by the cavalry. Just then Colonel Lee's skirmishers leaped from their horses, and held the enemy in check, till Pelham was able to get a gun into position. Under protection of its fire, and sheltered behind the elevation on which it stood, Stuart made his column defile towards White's Ford, putting to flight, by the aid of his other guns, nearly two hundred Federal foot soldiers posted on the Virginian bank. Happily there was little water in the Potomac, and the Confede-

rates crossed without inconvenience. Scarcely was he in Virginia when General Stoneman's cavalry and infantry arrived in hot haste from Poolesville, but Pelham's two cannon, which had been taken across the river, opened a fire brisk enough to stop all pursuit. In the evening Stuart retired from the Potomac, and, on the 14th of October, rejoined the army at Winchester, having lost but five men, though bringing back many horses, and some valuable information as to the disposition of the hostile forces. In twenty-four hours Stuart's column had marched about eighty miles.

This raid astonished and irritated the Federals much. They in their turn made several unimportant reconnoitrings; but MacClellan was obliged to end his immobility, accomplish his preparations in haste, and obey an order telegraphed by President Lincoln to this effect: "Cross the Potomac, and give battle to the enemy, or drive him southwards."

The Federal army now under arms numbered 110,000 men. The season was very favourable for offensive operations, and the Federal Government eagerly desired to profit by it, and carry the war into Southern territory.

MacClellan had the choice of two plans: to ascend the Shenandoah Valley directly, and attack Lee from the front; or enter Virginia to the east of the Blue Ridge, and endeavour to place himself between the Confederate army and Richmond. President Lincoln preferred the latter plan, and promised to make MacClellan's army up to 140,000 men. The Federal commander-in-chief would have liked better to enter by the Shenandoah Valley, because he feared Lee would recross the Potomac if the Federals ceased their watch. The approach of the rainy season soon quieted him on this subject, for at such times the fords of the Potomac are impassable. Therefore he decided finally to enter Virginia to the east of the Blue Ridge, but he delayed beginning his march so long, that, on the 6th of October, the President transmitted to him a formal order to open the campaign. Consequently, on the 26th of October, the Federal army crossed the

Potomac at Berlin, five miles below Harper's Ferry. On the 2nd of November all the army was on the other side of the river.

The Shenandoah Valley, where Lee was encamped, is separated from Piedmontese Virginia, into which MacClellan was about to advance, by the inferior wooded heights of the Blue Ridge Mountains, which can only be crossed by certain defiles termed *gaps;* these are the natural gates of the Valley. So long as the Federal commander occupied these defiles with sufficient forces, he was sure his rear would not be disturbed, and he could at any time enter the Valley and throw himself on the Confederate flank.

Although the Federal general had taken the precaution of seizing all these defiles or passes of the Blue Ridge as he advanced, the better to mask his march, the real end of the movement of the Northern army did not escape Lee. He broke up his camp on the banks of the Opequan, and began to follow, on a parallel line, the march of his foe. A division of Longstreet's corps was detached to Upperville, to watch, from a nearer point, the movements of the enemy. Jackson was posted between Berryville and Charlestown, to prevent the Federals from emerging into the Valley, whether from Harper's Ferry or by the mountain passes. On the last day of October Lee, ascertaining that the Northern army was marching from the Blue Ridge in the direction of Warrenton, brought up Longstreet's entire corps to Culpepper Court House, which was reached on the 3rd of November. In order to disquiet MacClellan about the safety of his communications, Jackson still remained at Millwood; at the same time one of his divisions advanced to the east of the Blue Ridge. Assuredly, thus to divide his army into two parts was to expose himself to great danger, but so necessity dictated to the Confederate commander. Little by little the Confederate troops were concentrated at Warrenton. Every day the cavalry outposts skirmished with varying success. The Southern cavalry under Stuart rendered immense services, notwithstanding the jaded state of most of their horses; they never left the flanks of the hostile army, and its slightest movements

were immediately signalled. Suddenly, when Lee awaited anxiously his opponent's plan of campaign, the Washington Government, on the 7th of November, without previous warning, withdrew MacClellan from the command of the army of the Potomac. The Radicals, fearing lest at a later period he would be nominated as the Conservative candidate for the Presidency, and not wishing to let him acquire fresh claims to the gratitude of his fellow countrymen, obtained his recall, under pretence that he had not accomplished all that might reasonably be expected of him; he had, however, done too much to deserve such an excess of ingratitude. Thus finished the military career of the best general the North had. General Burnside, his old division-general, succeeded him, after hesitating some time before accepting the high position offered to him, as well because of his friendship for MacClellan as from a conviction of his own insufficiency.

In retiring from the Valley, Lee had given proof of that mixture of audacity and prudence which marks the true warrior. He could either throw himself with all his army on MacClellan, and, which seemed to be his object, on Gordonsville, or manœuvre in such a manner as to retard and embarrass his adversary. It was the latter plan he adopted, although by it he ran a great risk. Jackson remained in the Valley, and Longstreet marched on Culpepper. MacClellan could thus, at his choice, crush one or the other of the two Confederate corps; but Lee knew his adversary's character, and felt he need not fear so hardy a step on his part. Nevertheless he had taken his precautions even in this event. Jackson, in case of attack, was to retire by Strasburg and rejoin his chief. Thus Lee, by leaving his lieutenant in the Valley, far from having committed a blunder, gave a striking proof of ability, and put his adversary in a dilemma, for Jackson, prompt as a flash of lightning, could at any moment march on the enemy's rear. By causing one of Jackson's divisions to advance to the east of the Blue Ridge, Lee did but accentuate his threat. Therefore MacClellan relinquished all idea of attacking one of the

two Confederate corps, and only employed himself in establishing a new base, whence he could march direct on Richmond.

The Confederate commander in all this had another object in view, namely, to gain time to render all attack upon Richmond impossible, regard being had to the season of the year. This, indeed, happened. Had MacClellan remained at the head of the Federal forces, and the battle of Fredericksburg not taken place, it is probable that the two armies separated by the upper Rappahannock would have remained in each other's presence during the whole winter, and that the Confederate forces, exhausted by the long marches and sanguinary combats of 1862, would at length have tasted a repose so well deserved, and been prepared for the struggles yet to come.

MacClellan's supersession by Burnside, who had, in spite of the nearness of winter, conceived the idea of crossing the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, and marching on Richmond, gave quite another direction to events.

The new commander-in-chief's first act was a blunder. He lost ten days in reorganising his army into six corps. On the 17th of November there was no time left to march on Richmond; the season of rain and bad roads was near, and would put an end to any extensive military operations. Burnside could have attempted a decisive blow by taking advantage of the disposal of the Confederate army, Jackson being still in the Valley two days' march from Longstreet. But, on the contrary, he resolved to march on Fredericksburg, and take up a position on the south bank of the Rappahannock before Lee could be aware of it; second blunder. It was nowhere in his intention to make use of Fredericksburg as a base of operations against Richmond, but simply to pass the winter there, to be able in the spring to proceed easily by water to the James River. Mr. Lincoln having confirmed his authority, on the 15th of November the Federal army began its march along the north bank of the Rappahannock towards Falmouth opposite Fredericksburg. There it found some pontoon-bridges

sent from Washington, which would serve for sending the troops across to the other side. Then Burnside reckoned on posting himself strongly on the heights behind Fredericksburg.

Lee, on ascertaining the movement of the hostile army, was much tempted to attack it, and drive it back towards the Orange and Alexandria railway, but his numerical weakness paralysed him. Shortly before, he had told his government that he had too few troops to risk a pitched battle, and was limiting himself to strategic movements, not meaning to deliver battle unless Burnside exposed himself very imprudently. On November 15th, divining that Fredericksburg was the Federal object, he reinforced the garrison there with a regiment of infantry and a battery of artillery. On the 17th, two divisions of Longstreet's corps and W. H. F. Lee's cavalry brigade were made to follow. Jackson received orders to retire from the Valley and occupy Orange Court House. Stuart, reconnoitring in force as far as Warrenton, where he arrived directly after the departure of the enemy's rearguard, put Burnside's intentions beyond doubt. On the 19th, Lee marched towards Fredericksburg with the other divisions of Longstreet's corps.

It will be asked, perhaps, why Lee did not repeat against Burnside the manœuvre he had so successfully tried against MacClellan. A look at the map will suffice for an answer. Burnside took a new base, Acquia Creek, on the lower Potomac. The configuration of the country neutralised all efforts to cut him off from it. The Federals would have been able to fall back on the Potomac, and render useless all Jackson's manœuvres, or those of any other Confederate corps whatever. Lee was a first-rate tactician. He manœuvred admirably, himself watching the most trifling details. When the battle day came, feeling he had done all he could, and that, humanly speaking, all necessary precautions were taken, he usually allowed a certain latitude to his division generals.

If General Sumner, when he arrived with the Federal van

opposite Fredericksburg on the 17th of November, had immediately crossed the Rappahannock, the feeble Confederate garrison would have been unable to hinder him from getting possession of the heights behind Fredericksburg. But Burnside's orders were peremptory, and no detachment was to attempt the passage before all the army had arrived. On the night of the 20th, all the Federal forces were concentrated in the neighbourhood of Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg.

Lee had not lost a moment, and on the 21st he occupied the heights behind Fredericksburg in person, having with him all Longstreet's corps, D. H. Hill's division, and all the cavalry. Jackson's corps was at Orange Court House, and had orders to join the rest of the army on the 26th. Burnside, in refusing to cross the Rappahannock, had declined the only opportunity of becoming master of the heights. On arriving, the first object which met his view was the adversary, whom he had hoped to baffle, tranquilly established on those same heights, and ready to dispute his passage across the river. He found himself obliged, therefore, to establish his communications with Acquia Creek, on the Potomac, and to prepare to take the new Confederate positions by sheer force. His first care was to reconstruct the railway connecting Acquia Creek with the Rappahannock. He drew up his army along the latter river, from a point above Falmouth to a point opposite Port Royal.

Lee profited by this respite to fortify himself carefully. To prevent the Federal gunboats from ascending the river and supporting the land forces, he constructed, four miles below Fredericksburg, on the right bank, a strong battery, protected by intrenchments. Strong cavalry detachments guarded the fords above the town, and W. H. F. Lee's brigade was directed to watch the enemy on this side. Behind the town, the Southern army occupied a very formidable defensive position, the left being supported on the river, one and a half miles above Fredericksburg, the right extending beyond the railway which leads to Richmond.

This position, it is true, was commanded by the Stafford Heights, in the hands of the Federals. To obviate this disadvantage as much as possible, the Confederates raised some ramparts and earth-works on the summit of the heights they occupied. The plain in which the town was situated was also commanded by the fire of the batteries on the opposite side, and the narrow stream, confined between steep and woody banks, offered so many facilities to throw bridges across out of the reach of the Confederate artillery, that Lee was obliged to renounce all idea of preventing the enemy from crossing the river. His sole aim, therefore, was so to place himself as to be able to arrest the Federals when once they had effected their passage. He contented himself with placing troops along the bank, sheltered by houses and trees, to retard the enemy's attack as much as possible.

For two days the weather was very dirty, and rain was falling in torrents, when, on the 21st of November, at five o'clock, General Sumner sent a flag of truce to demand the surrender of Fredericksburg, threatening, in case of refusal, to bombard the town next day at nine o'clock. Seeing, however, that it was defenceless, and could not, from a military point of view, be of any use to the Confederates, since the Federal batteries swept all the streets, Sumner, be it said to his praise, did not execute his menace. Most of the inhabitants took Lee's advice, and sought refuge in the neighbourhood. The cold was severe; they had much to endure, but not a murmur was heard, and every one was ready to sacrifice all he possessed for the triumph of the Southern cause. The Confederate army, although itself short of victuals, did all it could to relieve the unfortunate fugitives. Burnside would have liked to postpone the resumption of hostilities till the spring, but neither the government nor people of the North would cease demanding of him to take the offensive against Lee immediately. They desired that Richmond should be taken before Christmas. He had nothing, therefore, to do but be resigned and obey. He had it within his power to cross the Rappahannock above or below

the position occupied by the Confederate army, and, by threatening to turn it, compel it to abandon the heights where it was so strongly intrenched. This, indeed, was the thought he had when he began to concentrate his army twelve miles below Falmouth, at Shenker's Neck; but, perceiving D. H. Hill's division on the opposite side, and all Jackson's corps ready to support it in case of need, he gave up his project. Believing Lee had withdrawn his garrison at Fredericksburg to send forces to Shenker's Neck, he determined to profit by it, and march on the front of Lee's position before the latter was able to reunite his troops. Burnside's calculation supposed on the part of the Confederate general a want of foresight altogether foreign to his character.

General Hampton, having reconnoitred on the 28th of November, was able to re-assure Lee as to any hostile designs on his left flank. He could, therefore, give all his attention to the Federal movements at Falmouth.

On the night of the 10th December, General Hunt, the commander of the Federal artillery, ranged, on the Stafford Heights, opposite Fredericksburg, and at some distance below, 147 cannon of huge calibre, to cover the passage of the river, and command the town and surrounding plain. The Federal columns were formed on heights several hundred feet from the bank, and the engineers began to throw five bridges over the Rappahannock, three connecting Falmouth with Fredericksburg, two others about one and a quarter mile lower down, where the watercourse called Deep Run falls into the Rappahannock. All preparations were combined with the greatest care, and at two o'clock on the morning of December 11th the engineers silently put themselves to work.

Three or four Confederate regiments, under the orders of General Barksdale, were posted as skirmishers on the edges of the southern bank. A thick mist covered the river during the night, and the Federals hoped, thanks to this veil, their works would not be noticed. But, shortly after two o'clock, an unusual movement on the bank opposite attracted the attention of the

Confederate sentinels, and, at three o'clock, two cannon shots announced that the alarm had been given. About four o'clock, the rays of the moon piercing the fog indistinctly revealed the shadowy outlines of the engineers energetically at work to fix their floating-bridges. A brisk and well-directed fire, which the Confederate riflemen opened, put them to flight, leaving several dead and wounded behind. Two fresh Federal attempts to renew the work met with the same result. Two Northern regiments, sent to cover the workmen, lost in a few minutes 150 men. It was, therefore, necessary to try and dislodge the Mississippians sheltered behind their stone walls.

At ten o'clock in the morning, the Federal batteries opened for an hour a tremendous fire on the south bank, but without doing the Confederates much harm;—for Lee's army was too far off to suffer from it, and Barksdale's skirmishers, thanks to the hostile artillerymen finding it impossible to incline their guns sufficiently to fire their shells at them, were too near the water's edge to be reached. But the rest of the town, in which were huddled together women and children, was soon in flames. Not a house but was struck; the poor inhabitants took refuge, some in their cellars, others in the country round, making their way through a shower of cannon balls. Nothwithstanding this cruel and useless act Burnside did not attain his end, and from the opposite bank Confederate carbines carried off all his engineers whenever they presented themselves to resume their work. He then decided on throwing three regiments across the water. In spite of Barksdales's resistance this movement succeeded; the Confederates were obliged gradually to retire into the upper part of the town, the bridges were constructed, and during the night of the 11th and daytime of the 12th, the Federal army crossed the river; on the morning of the 13th, it was drawn up in order of battle in front of the Confederate position. Thanks to a thick fog, the Northern army was not disturbed in these movements,—General Lee, out of regard for the town, not wishing to open an artillery fire at hazard. Generals

D. H. Hill and Jackson having been recalled from Port Royal, all the Northern Virginian army found itself reunited on the heights of Spottsylvania. The position which the Confederate generalissimo had chosen was very strong. The range of hills held by him starts from the river, 550 yards above the town. The ground rises nearly perpendicularly, without trees or bushes to afford shelter to attacking columns. Here was the Confederate left under Longstreet. Hence the heights extended in a semi-circle to the right, being crossed by the Richmond railway at a place nearly two miles behind the town, giving to the Confederate line an extent of nearly five miles. Between the river and these hills the country is uneven, but very open. As the heights recede from the river, their elevation decreases, and their sides become furnished with trees. At their base flows a little stream, the Deep Run, which falls into the Rappahannock close to Fredericksburg, and whose abrupt banks offer to an attacking column admirable shelter. All the heights were furnished with artillery. Jackson's corps occupied the centre and right, and extended to Massaponnax Creek. Stuart's cavalry formed the extreme right in the plain, where the marshes of the Massaponnax stretch away to the Rappahannock.

Great was the joy in both armies at the prospect of a conflict; both sides were full of hope, and there had been time to prepare for a struggle which, to all appearance, would be decisive.

Not having succeeded in surprising Lee, the Northern commander proposed to carry the Southern position by assault. General Franklin, who commanded the Federal left, was to try and pierce the enemy's line at Hamilton's Crossing, a passage level with the railway. Jackson had charge of the defence at this point, which was reasonably regarded as the weakest and most exposed part of the Confederate line. Franklin was at all hazards to become master of the road and railway leading to Richmond. Then, if success crowned his colleague's efforts, Sumner, with the rest of the army, was to carry by assault the heights on the Confederate left.

On the morning of the 13th of December, all the country around Fredericksburg was covered by a dense fog. Quite early, the hostile batteries on Stafford Heights opened their fire on the Confederate position commanded by Longstreet. Already Generals Franklin and Sumner were forming their columns of attack.

At eight o'clock, Lee left his head-quarters, and went with Generals Jackson and Stuart to inspect the portion of the line at Hamilton's Crossing. Received everywhere with enthusiasm, the Confederate commander, after having passed along the front of his army, placed himself on the hill which has since borne his name, and from thence witnessed the successive checks given to the Federals in their desperate efforts to get possession of the heights where he was. Shortly after nine o'clock the fog cleared. Franklin's columns advanced in the plain against Hamilton's Crossing. Arrested a moment by the raking fire directed on them by Stuart's mounted artillery, those in the front retreated, when Franklin opened a fire from all his batteries. The Confederate line made no reply. Emboldened by this silence, the Federal infantry, 10,000 strong, (according to General Meade, who commanded it,) advanced against the hostile position, defended at this point by 14 guns under Colonel Walker, and supported by two brigades of infantry. The Confederates let them approach to within less than 800 yards. But there a shower of grape-shot threw them into disorder.

About one o'clock Franklin made his chief attack; with three lines of infantry in close order he vigorously assailed A. P. Hill's position at Hamilton's Crossing; the fire of the Confederate cannon could not arrest the impetuosity of the Federals, who were soon in hand-to-hand conflict with the Southern infantry. Profiting by a gap between two of the hostile brigades, the Federal General Meade made two divisions charge by this opening, and threw back Jackson's front line on the second. At this critical juncture Jackson, with the three divisions of Early, Trimble, and Tagliaferro, from his second line of defence, rushed in front

of the Federals, and the latter, being taken in front and flank, were thrown back beyond the railway and pursued into the plain. General Early pressed them very hard, not giving over the pursuit till he found himself under the fire of the Federal batteries. Franklin did not again seek to cut the Confederate line; he was content with throwing some shells, while his outposts did some skirmishing during the afternoon. It was while beholding the quick retreat of the Federals, pursued by his soldiers, and the aspect of the ground, strewn with dead and dying, that Lee, posted on the hill whence he had directed the action, murmured in a low tone: "It is well this is so terrible; we would grow too fond of it."

While what we have been describing was passing on the Confederate right, General Sumner was exerting himself to accomplish the task which had fallen to his lot. At eleven o'clock, forming his columns under the protection of the houses of Fredericksburg, he hurled the divisions of French and Hancock on Marye's Hill and Willis's Hill. The assault was repulsed, and his soldiers, decimated by a terrible fire, were finally obliged to take shelter in the houses. One half of the men remained on the battle-field. In fifteen minutes Hancock lost more than 2000 men out of 5000. Although exposed to the fire of the Federal batteries on the other side of the river, the Confederate artillerymen did not cease to concentrate all their efforts on the hostile infantry as long as the struggle lasted. Sumner renewed his attack with the divisions of Howard, Sturgis, and Getty. Thrown back in disorder by the crushing fire of Longstreet, these divisions were replaced by the Federal reserve, consisting of three divisions. General Hooker, who was at their head, received orders to capture the heights, no matter at what cost. Six times the Northern infantry threw itself valiantly on the Confederate positions, and six times was hurled back again, its ranks ploughed by grapeshot. Some of the dead were found within pistol-shot of the enemy's line. The last assault took place a little before night. These successive defeats had put General Burnside in a state of despair and excitement impossible

to describe. He walked backwards and forwards, exclaiming from time to time: "These heights must be ours this evening."

At night the battle ceased. All the Federal army, upwards of 100,000 men, had taken part in it, while, on the Confederate side, 25,000 men alone had been engaged, the rest remaining simple spectators. In his report, General Lee estimated his losses at 4101 dead and wounded. The Federals owned to a loss of 12,321 killed, wounded, or prisoners. The Southern commander-in-chief announced his success to his Government in these words:

"December 13th.

"To General Cooper, A. A. G.

"At nine o'clock this morning the enemy attacked our right wing, and as the fog lifted, the battle ran along the whole line, from right to left, until six, p.m., the enemy being repulsed at all points. Thanks be to God! As usual, we have to mourn the loss of many of our brave men. I expect the battle to be renewed at daylight to-morrow morning.

"R. E. LEE."

During the night the Confederate army raised some earthworks at the most exposed points, and occupied itself in rendering its position more formidable. The enemy's attack had been so easily repulsed, and with such a weak portion of the forces, that General Lee was persuaded the battle would be renewed on the morrow. At daybreak, on the 14th, all his troops were under arms, ready to resist the anticipated attack.

Lee's conduct in this instance has been severely criticised. He has been blamed for not having followed Jackson's advice, who wished him to attack Burnside on the night of the 13th. To reason after the event is very easy. Lee was naturally ignorant of the losses the Northern army had undergone, and had no wish to expose his soldiers uselessly to the fire of 200 pieces of cannon, ranged on the Stafford Heights. It must be never lost sight of that the South repaired its losses with great difficulty, and that

behind this army there was no other to take its place. Waiting, therefore, to be attacked, Lee did not desire to renounce the advantages of his position by issuing from his lines and advancing into the plain.

He did not possess the war-material and means of transport which his adversary had. Numerically inferior, with troops badly fed, he judged that to make a night attack on an enemy, beaten, it is true, but not demoralized, would be the height of imprudence. He did not know the situation of the Northern army, nor what impression the defeat it had just experienced had made on it.

As to General Burnside, his duty was clear: he ought without delay to have placed the Rappahannock between himself and his foe. Far from that, however, he conceived the foolish idea of putting himself at the head of the 9th corps, which he had formerly commanded as division-general, and leading it to assault the Confederate position on Marye's Hill. But on the urgent advice of all his generals he abandoned his design at the last moment, when orders had been already issued, and the attacking columns formed.

During the whole of the 14th, the Northern batteries on the north bank of the river at intervals directed their fire on the Southern line. The 15th passed similarly without the Federal army making any other hostile demonstration. That night a tempest of wind and torrents of rain burst over the country, and Burnside profited by it to recross the river, abandoning the town, and carrying off his bridges. On the morning of the 16th, the Confederates learnt the Federal retreat. But Lee, still convinced the battle would be renewed, telegraphed to Richmond:

"Head-quarters, near Fredericksburg.
"16th December, 1862.

"As far as can be known on a morning so stormy, the enemy has disappeared from our front, and recrossed the Rappahannock. I think he intends to make his appearance at some other point.

"R. E. LEE."

But the Federal general gave no sign of life, and the battle of Fredericksburg finished the campaign.

As soon as he became certain that General Burnside had given up all thought of continuing hostilities, Lee led his army into winter-quarters; it was cantoned along the Rappahannock, from Fredericksburg to Port Royal. Some troops were detached to watch the ford higher up the river. The cold soon became severe, and the soldiers were glad to shelter themselves in their huts and tents. On the last day of the year, the general-in-chief addressed a proclamation to the Northern Virginian army. After recapitulating the events of the campaign which had just terminated so gloriously, he thanked them for their magnificent conduct, and expressed his confidence in the final triumph of the Southern cause, thanks to the visible protection of the Almighty, a protection for which he showed himself humbly grateful.

The winter was felt acutely. In the middle of December several Federal sentries were found frozen at their post. The Confederate troops, badly clothed and badly furnished, suffered even more than their adversaries from this exceptional temperature. General Lee, about the 1st of December, addressed a report to the war minister, asserting that several thousands of his soldiers were bare-foot.

The general himself shared the lot of his soldiers. He constantly refused to establish his head-quarters in a house, even in the depth of winter; he slept under a tent, like the commonest of his men. This self-denial on the part of their chief produced its effect, and nobody was heard to complain.

Thus ended the memorable year of 1862. During its whole continuance, in a succession of campaigns following each other almost without interruption, Lee had directed the movements of the principal Southern army. It was to his military talents, quick-sightedness and skill, that the brilliant successes were due which illuminated the Confederate cause, and acquired to the Separatist

chief a reputation of the first order, which following campaigns only contributed to increase.

A rapid recapitulation of the events of the year that had flowed away will put the services rendered by Lee in a better light.

Four Federal armies had been charged to invade Virginia and meet at Richmond, that being the head and heart of the rebellion. The most numerous and formidable of these armies, that of MacClellan, had arrived in sight of the Confederate capital when Lee assumed the command. The Southern chief marched against this army of 150,000 men, and pushed it back 30 miles from the city, rendering it impossible for it to renew its attack on Richmond. Meanwhile a new army advanced from the North. Lee was watching MacClellan when the news of this new danger came to him. Leaving a sufficient force to hold his adversary in check, he marched rapidly to the place where, henceforth, the real danger was, drove General Pope before him, took him on the flank, and lastly, in the sanguinary battle of Manassas, put his army to the rout, and forced him within his lines at Washington.

Thus two armies, in the short space of five months, had been driven from Virginian soil. Then the Confederate commander entered Maryland, in order to attract the enemy thither, and, if possible, to transport the scene of war into Pennsylvania. Events which could not be foreseen had prevented the realization of the second part of this programme. Lee was obliged to concentrate his forces at Sharpsburg, and there deliver one of the most hotly contested of all the battles. Without undergoing a defeat, he was obliged to abandon the idea of entering Pennsylvania, and recrossing into Virginia, still continued to face his enemy. This was the first check Lee had experienced in the campaigns of that year. It is only to weigh the circumstances attentively, and he will not be considered responsible for what happened. Accidents over which he was powerless set his combinations at nought, and compelled him to give way. An impartial judge might even think

that his having withdrawn his soldiers safe and sound out of so perilous a predicament, was a greater proof of ability than the gaining of the battle of Manassas. The relief felt in the North, on learning that he had recrossed the Potomac, is the proper measure of the consternation he had spread among the Federals.

A little later, during MacClellan's offensive movement on Warrenton, the arrangements of the Confederate commander to delay the Federal march deserve our attention. With very inferior forces he much embarrassed his adversary, fronting him on the upper Rappahannock, cleverly stopping his offensive attempt in that direction, and then, when the Federal army marched rapidly on Fredericksburg, quick as lightning, he crossed the Rapidan, and appeared on the heights commanding the town, thus blocking the passage of the river. The battle which followed went far to indemnify the South for the failure of the Maryland campaign and the indecisive battle of Sharpsburg. The Federal army experienced a complete defeat. This stormy year, so full of great events and bloody encounters, was finished by a battle in which the enemy was repulsed with frightful loss.

In less than six months Lee had fought four pitched battles,—all victories except Sharpsburg. This result was promising for the future of the Southern cause. Had the army of Northern Virginia had its ranks renewed like those of the Northern army, the successes of the year 1862 would have led subsequently to the triumph of the Southern cause. Unfortunately, Lee's army, which had to sustain the conflicts up to a point where the result would of necessity decide the issue of the whole war, never had a numerical force sufficient to allow it to draw the whole advantage from its victories. In the battles on the Chickahominy, the army reckoned, at the most, 75,000 men; at the second battle of Manassas, nearly 50,000 men; at Sharpsburg, less than 40,000 men; and at Fredericksburg, about 50,000 men. The following year, the number of his soldiers scarcely rose above the figures given, and in time such a diminution took place, that in the

month of April, 1865, all the forces of which he had the disposal at Petersburg hardly exceeded 30,000 men.

The enemy, however, had wherewith to oppose him on the Chickahominy, 150,000 men, of whom 115,000 were efficients; 100,000 under Pope, at the second battle of Manassas; 87,000 actually in line at Sharpsburg; and at Fredericksburg, from 110,000 to 120,000.

Certainly, therefore, it could only be to the great superiority of their commander's military genius that the triumphs of the Confederates were due. But little known beyond the ranks of the old United States' army at the moment when he assumed the command in June, 1862, Lee, before the end of the year, acquired a great reputation. From the first he conciliated the confidence and respect of all. Everybody rendered justice to the elevation of his character, to his perfect sincerity and entire disinterestedness in the accomplishment of his duty. Without the least personal ambition, he was devoted, body and soul, to the cause for which he fought. Although nobody, either in the army or in the country, had ever penetrated his true character, although he was supposed to have more reserve and less warmth and dash than he really possessed, he finished by winning the admiration even of those who were angry at his supposed hesitation in April, 1862, and who then had criticised his strategic operations; they in the end recognized in him a great man, and a military genius of the highest order.

All classes in the South beheld with pride the dignity of their cause nobly represented in the person and character of the commander of their most important army. While so many others in the Separatist ranks, as brave, as patriotic as Lee, but of a different temperament, allowed themselves to indulge in violent language against the North, he remained calm and moderate, in spite of all provocations. His reports are without emphasis, without exaggeration, his language always modest. The day after his most brilliant successes, he rendered an account of his victories

with a tone of such moderation, that in reading them at this distance of time, it appears almost impossible he could have written them in the burning atmosphere of a war which displayed the most ardent passions of the human heart.

This was a very remarkable side of his character. Perhaps this rare moderation and this elevated sense of justice are answerable for the general idea, widely spread, that Lee was cold and unimpressionable. On the contrary, nobody more than he had a heart susceptible of emotion, nor experienced a more profound indignation at seeing the South invaded. But he knew how to control himself, and was never drawn beyond what was compatible with the dignity of the supreme military commander of a people struggling for its independence.

The South had come to regard Lee in his private and public character with an admiration that soon knew no bounds, and there was placed in him, as general, the most absolute confidence, a confidence never withdrawn, even in the hour of the greatest disasters.

The army first set an example of blindly trusting to him ; it saw him always at work, and in each of the terrible blows which he struck at the enemy, his brave soldiers had a further proof that their confidence was justified. The extreme care which he took on every occasion not to expose them without necessity, (especially at Fredericksburg, where an ambitious commander would not have hesitated to shed torrents of blood to complete his triumph,) singularly contributed to increase their affection.

In spite of the reserved air which seldom left him, Lee received with kindness the humblest of his soldiers. Naturally very simple in his manners, and kind, endued with great sweetness and much patience, he made no difference in his fashion of receiving those of all ranks who came to him. He often used to say that the common soldiers, who fought without being enticed by the allurement of rank, pay, or glory, but only from a sense of duty and love of country, were the most deserving class in the army, and had a right to the utmost consideration and best treatment.

This extreme simplicity of life and manners rendered him peculiarly dear to the troops.

Let us narrate one example from among a thousand. Once Lee had fallen asleep beneath a tree, on the roadside, over which 15,000 Confederates were defiling. On learning that their chief was tasting a repose of which he had so much need, there was the most absolute silence suddenly in their ranks, and the entire corps was able to pass without waking him.

The inside of his tent, which he would never leave for the shelter of a house, although often entreated to do so, afforded no object of luxury. The covering of the commander-in-chief was the same as that of the soldier, and his food often inferior to that of the majority of his officers and men.

Everywhere he was presented with dainties, cases packed with turkeys, hams, wines, spirits, and other things very tempting in the rough life of a soldier: he sent them nearly always to the sick and wounded.

His guiding principle was that of setting his officers an example of not faring better than their soldiers.

For the rest, to lie hard, to eat little, and that little of poor quality, to drink only water, were not to him privations. It was the life he had led for years on the frontiers of Texas and Mexico. He liked neither wine nor spirits, and made no use of tobacco under any form; very rarely did he allow himself a moment's relaxation. When not traversing his camp to note that the soldiers were not in want of anything, or when not inspecting the outposts, his time was spent in his tent at work, going through reports, corresponding with the authorities at Richmond, and occupying himself about all that touched the well-being of the army under his orders.

Sometimes, also, if in the neighbourhood of country houses, he would pay a visit to the ladies there, and caress the children, thus revealing an unexpected side of his character. His goodness, sweetness, and affectionate smile, singularly attracted children, and

inspired them with a touching confidence. One day a little girl, in the neighbourhood of Fredericksburg, confided to him as to her best friend, trembling all the while, that she would like to kiss General Jackson. The brave Stonewall blushed like a young girl, when Lee, with a mischievous smile, told him of the child's wish. In such moments Lee was charming. The pleasure he felt was true and unalloyed; he forgot himself, and one found it difficult to believe that this officer, in a simple grey uniform, so affectionate and childlike, was the commander-in-chief of the Confederate army.

But these moments were rare. Hard work, incessant pre-occupation, took again possession of him. With the exception of such occasions as these already cited, he permitted himself no distraction. Indeed, he recalled, in an extraordinary manner, the traditional idea which we have of General Washington. What tended to the fulfilment of his duties alone had the power to influence this noble soul: he gave himself up entirely to the incessant labour which the cares of governing a great army brought with them, and that, too, with grave and systematic self-denial.

But, in fine, the most beautiful and interesting feature of his character, was his humble and profound piety. Generally in this respect justice has not been done him. At the time of the war, indeed, he passed for a sincere Christian; his noble character and the purity of his morals left no opening for criticism; but this once recognized, no eye had sounded the depth of his feelings with regard to the most august, the grandest, the most terrible subject that has been given to man to meditate on. Nevertheless it was faith in Divine Providence alone, and trust in the support of the Almighty which guided and sustained him so marvellously in hours of trial. Here was the secret of his unalterable calm in the midst of disasters. His slight effusion, his extreme reserve, explain the difficulty there has been in estimating his religious feelings. The depth of his soul would only display itself by a flash, as when he learnt that the army chaplains were praying for him: "I thank you sincerely," said he, with tears in his eyes; "all I can say

is that I am a poor sinner, having faith in Christ alone, and that I have great need of all your prayers."

He expressed himself in like manner one day in an interview with several members of the clergy, who had met to discuss with him the subject of measures to be taken to cause the sanctity of the Sabbath to be better observed in the army. "His eye brightened, and all his countenance sparkled with joy," said one of his interlocutors, "when we conversed with him on this subject."

On the morrow, an urgent order of the day called the particular attention of officers and soldiers to the respect due to the sacred day, recommending them to assist at divine service in their respective camps, and forbidding on that day all official work and duty, except what was necessary in reference to the nourishment or safety of the army. He himself never failed to attend a religious service when he found it possible. Very often he took part in the meetings of his chaplains, and interested himself much in all that could contribute to spread religious ideas among his soldiers. He never let an opportunity escape of showing publicly to his men that he was a sincere Christian. On one occasion, when General Meade had come to Mine Run, and the Southern army was marching to meet him, Lee, riding on horseback in front of his army through the woods, found on his road a group of soldiers assembled to pray before entering into battle. Such was the custom among certain sects, and the most eager to fight were often men of great piety. But this time, this spectacle, although sufficiently frequent, appeared to move Lee profoundly. He stopped, dismounted,—his staff did the same,—uncovered his head, and stood respectfully attentive as long as the impassioned and moving prayer lasted, a prayer accompanied by the growling of the enemy's cannon, and the bursting of their shells.

We find, dated November 24th, 1862, a letter from him, in which his religious sentiments are clearly shown.

" . . . . The death of my dear A——, (one of his daughters who had just died far from him,) was indeed to me a bitter pang.

But the Lord gave and the Lord has taken away: blessed be the name of the Lord. In the quiet hours of night, when there is nothing to lighten the full weight of my grief, I feel as if I should be overwhelmed. I had always counted, if God should spare me a few days of peace after this cruel war was ended, that I should have her with me. But year after year my hopes go out, and I must be resigned."

One of Lee's first cares, during the enforced rest of winter, was to give his artillery a better organization, to partly replace his batteries by others taken from the enemy, and to get the Confederate Government to recast a great number of guns. Thanks to these measures, the Southern army, in the spring of 1863, was better provided with artillery than it had ever been.

In the course of January, 1863, Burnside, burning to take his revenge, conceived the plan of crossing the Rappahannock above Fredericksburg, and turning the Confederate right wing, thus obliging Lee to abandon his line of defence, or see himself cut off from Richmond. The weather was beautifully dry, and everything at the beginning went well. The grand secret was jealously kept. On the 20th, the whole army was ranged at different points on the north bank, ready to cross the river. During the night the pontoons were to be fixed. But a frightful tempest happened shortly before nightfall; torrents of rain caused a considerable rise, and the clayey soil, sodden by the water, reduced the general's plans to nothing. Lee's vigilance had not blundered. Notwithstanding the strife of the elements, the Confederate general had massed his troops opposite the points of passage. On the Federal side the roads were in a most deplorable state; the pontoons, buried in the mud, resisted all efforts to move them. All day, on the 24th, and the night following, the tempest and rain continued without ceasing. A chaos of pontoons, carriages, ammunition waggons, and guns, impossible to describe, encumbered all the roads: tumbrils upset, pieces of cannon stuck in the mud, trains of war-material engulfed in a sewer, thousands of horses and mules

immersed in yellow masses of slush—such was the spectacle offered to the view on all sides. There was no further thought of an advance—it was necessary to consider how best to get out of this plight. The three days' rations, brought by the soldiers, were exhausted; there was no means of bringing up supplies of victuals. The whole army was compelled to be occupied in remedying the roads, thus, they cut down trees, and laid them symmetrically across the roads, so as to create a solid bottom, one which did not sink. Thanks to these efforts, next day, most of the army could gradually re-enter their cantonments. Such are some of the difficulties on which an army must reckon in a winter-season in Virginia.

If, however, the Federal general had succeeded in crossing the river, Lee was ready to receive him, and, as he sent word to Richmond: "Nothing was more fortunate for the Federals than not to cross the Rappahannock." Shortly after, Burnside sent in his resignation. He was replaced by one of the most distinguished of his division generals—Hooker.

The Confederate soldiers had sometimes to suffer this winter from scarcity of provisions. The country was little prepared for a war of so long duration, and those who were charged with providing for the wants of the army were not always able to fulfil satisfactorily their arduous and complicated duties.

Another subject which gave much cause for anxious reflection to the Confederate general-in-chief, was that of recruitment. The population bent with difficulty to this new law, so full of antipathy to the American nature. General Lee proposed to the Government to make the governors of each state responsible for a certain number of soldiers; the conscription would thus have been worked through the local authorities, and perhaps by that means would have ceased to be odious.

But the Richmond Cabinet did not judge it advisable to give effect to this proposition, and no change was made in the method of enlistment.

Nothing was done for some time, except that Longstreet's corps

was detached in February, and sent to the south of the James to oppose the attempts at revictualling there made by the enemy along the coasts and in the most exposed counties of Southern Virginia and North Carolina.

Lee took all precautions against the enemy's passing the Rappahannock. All the fords were guarded. His army was so disposed that it could easily be concentrated, if necessary, on a given point. Earthworks and redoubts were raised in places most easily accessible to the enemy, and the time was passed in watching the spots most in danger, and in getting ready to repulse the first offensive movement of which the spring would necessarily be the signal.

CHAPTER XI.

EXASPERATION IN THE NORTH.—GENERAL HOOKER CROSSES THE RAPPAHANNOCK.—BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE, MAY, 1863.—VICTORY OF THE CONFEDERATES.—DEATH OF JACKSON.

BURNSIDE'S defeat, and his unfortunate efforts to cross the Rappahannock, exasperated the people of the North to the last degree, but only rendered them more than ever determined to push on the war with vigour till final triumph was assured. In order to make a diversion, and excite troubles in the interior of the Confederacy, which, for their suppression would necessitate the employment of troops detached from the army, President Lincoln, on January 1st, 1863, published a proclamation in which he declared all the slaves of the South free. But it did not produce the effect expected; the blacks did not stir.

As General Hooker had severely criticised his two predecessors, MacClellan and Burnside, the country expected him to prove his superiority over them, and justify the choice the President had just made. So the new Federal commander put himself to work and tried at first to restore the confidence of the army of the Potomac, so much disturbed. His first care was, by severe measures, to stop the desertions which for some time had been very frequent. He reorganized his army, and particularly applied himself to combine the cavalry, which hitherto had been dispersed among the different divisions of the army, into a single corps; this would permit it to act with greater unity and vigour. From this time the Federal cavalry, being better mounted and better

equipped, rendered the greatest services, while the Southern cavalry, exhausted by fatigues, and having no further facilities for remounting, owing to the impoverishment of the country, no longer contended with advantage against its enemy, possessing, as the latter did, all that was wanting to the Confederates. The Northern Government refused Hooker nothing; it was but for him to ask and have; thus, at the approach of spring, he was at the head of an army of 120,000 men (infantry and artillery), with a corps of 12,000 cavalry, perfectly equipped, and 400 guns. This fine army, divided into seven corps, inspired such confidence in its commander, that he looked upon the destruction of Lee's army as certain.

On the 16th of March, General Averill for the Federals reconnoitred in force; with six regiments of cavalry and a battery of artillery he started in the direction of Gordonsville. A telegram from Lee warned Stuart to watch the fords of the upper Rappahannock. In spite of this, however, on the morning of the 17th Averill surprised the Confederate sentries, crossed briskly, and continuing his road, was suddenly arrested by Fitz-Lee's cavalry brigade. A long and eager conflict lasted all the afternoon, nor did the Federals retire till they had themselves sustained, and inflicted on the Confederates, heavy loss. A period of repose followed this alarm. It was not till the middle of April that the roads appeared dry and hard enough for military operations.

The Southern army, not having at its disposal the millions of the North, and the inexhaustible resources of America and Europe, was far from presenting a flourishing aspect. Lee had been compelled, at the urgent direction of the Richmond Government, to detach from his army 24,000 men under Longstreet, and send them to the south of the James River, which reduced the forces at his disposal on the Rappahannock to 47,000 men. Hooker, perfectly aware of the great numerical inferiority of his adversary (he himself had just three times as many soldiers as Lee), wished to attack before the reinforcements, urgently asked for by Lee,

could arrive. During the month of April, the Federal cavalry often sought to penetrate through the Confederate lines, and get information about the forces of the enemy, and the positions they occupied, but at each ford Stuart's cavalry was found ready to receive it.

Tired of this, Hooker conceived the plan of crossing the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford, twenty-seven miles above Fredericksburg, and marching thence on Chancellorsville, which he hoped to occupy before Lee could concentrate his forces. Thanks to this turning movement, he counted on taking Lee on the flank, and forcing him either to accept battle or retire on Richmond. In order to mask this operation, General Sedgwick was, at the head of 22,000 men, to cross the river below the town, and so deceive the Confederates, making them believe that Hooker intended to attack the heights of Fredericksburg. 10,000 cavalry were to precede the Federal army, and cut off all the railways which connected the Southern camp with Richmond. On the 27th of April, the Union army began to march. On the night of the 28th, the river was crossed at Kelly's Ford, and the Confederate sentries dispersed. On the evening of the 29th, the Northern army crossed the Rapidan likewise.

General Sedgwick, on his part, crossed the Rappahannock on the 29th at daybreak, on three bridges, three miles below Fredericksburg. During the 29th and 30th, he made several demonstrations, as if he had the intention of assaulting the Confederate position.

Hooker's plan was skilfully conceived and skilfully executed. Still there was room for criticism. The Northern chief divided his army in two, and sent all his cavalry to a distance, in the face of an adversary who was the man to profit by this blunder. The result proved it.

For Lee was not taken in by the *ruse*. Convinced that his right, thanks to its position, was sheltered from every attempt, he expected an attack on his left. He had, therefore, placed for observation nearly 8000 of the troops under General Anderson,

without reckoning Stuart's cavalry, all along the river, enjoining on them the strictest vigilance. On the 29th, he learnt the crossing of the Rappahannock by the Federal army. On the 30th, Hooker was at Chancellorsville. General Anderson had at first retired before the enemy's superior forces to Chancellorsville, and then to Tabernacle Church, where he found Wright's brigade, which Lee had sent to him. Before coming to a final resolution, the Confederate commander wished to assure himself that Sedgwick's movement was not serious, and leave Hooker's plan time to develop itself.

On the evening of the 30th, he learnt that Sedgwick was positively sending a part of his forces to Hooker, and, therefore, that the chief effort of the enemy would be directed against his left. General Jackson consequently received an order to join Anderson immediately. Early's division alone remained to keep Sedgwick in check, should the latter decide on taking the offensive. Starting at midnight, Jackson, the next day, the 1st of May, arrived, at nine o'clock, at Tabernacle Church, a mere isolated church in the heart of the district.

Hooker perceived everything succeeding according to his wish, and already exclaimed to those about him: "The army of the insurgents is ours; its destruction is certain!" Hitherto he had manœuvred well, and his numerical crushing superiority justified his hopes.

Chancellorsville, five miles beyond and to the west of Tabernacle Church, and ten miles to the south-west of Fredericksburg, is a large square house, built of brick, with various outbuildings. It is an inn, situated in a four-cross way. The country, somewhat flat, is everywhere covered by thick brushwood, dwarf pines, and stunted oaks. In many places the ground sinks,—it is marshy. The road from the north, which comes from Ely's Ford and United States Ford, the two fords by which the Federal army had crossed, and which are but a few miles apart, leads to Chancellorsville through this dismal and uninhabited district, known under

the name of the Wilderness. The Orange Court House road comes from the west, and here joins the road, which, towards the east, communicates with Fredericksburg. All this country, the roads, the dwellings sparsely scattered, the silence, the interminable brushwood, produce, in this horrible desert, a dreary effect. Everything is wild, sombre, desolate. For miles and miles there is nothing but an uninterrupted course of woods, of stunted oaks; here and there a road, where one meets nobody. It was madness to fight a battle there. The hostile armies were not visible to each other. As to cannon, it could not be manœuvred, the cavalry could not deploy, even foot-soldiers could hardly thread their way through the woods. That an army of 120,000 men should have chosen such a place to fight another of 40,000 in, still appears the height of absurdity.

It is, however, to be said in the Federal general's favour, that the idea of allowing himself to be shut up in this horribly impracticable country, where all hope of manœuvring so great an army was forbidden him, did not proceed from him. It was Lee who made choice of the Wilderness about Chancellorsville as the field of battle. Hooker, indeed, tried not to be thus enclosed by woods. Driving before him the feeble Confederate columns which had opposed his passage, and pursuing them in the direction of Fredericksburg, he emerged into the plain, and hastened to form up his troops in order of battle on a spot very favourable to the development of a numerous army. His left—the wing nearest the river—commanded all the fords, even that of Banks, and was five miles in front of Chancellorsville, thus shortening, by one half, the road which Sedgwick would have to travel in order to rejoin him at Fredericksburg. His centre and right likewise were out of the woods in the open country.

Thus passed the 1st of May, 1863. Hooker had in front of him only Anderson's 8000 men. Nothing, therefore, hindered him from massing his entire army in the advantageous positions formed by an elevation of ground, sufficiently high, at the point

where he had arrived. Once master of this position, it would be easy for the Federal chief to emerge into the plain behind Fredericksburg. A pretty good road connected these heights of Banks Ford with the Rappahannock. It was of the last importance for the Federals to cover it, and maintain themselves there, for it was the most direct line of communication with their base.

Lee was persuaded that Hooker, without stopping at Chancellorsville, would get hold of this position, and not leave his army in the Wilderness, where it could not deploy, while, if he mastered this position, he commanded all the country round, and secured his communications with Sedgwick.

Jackson had received orders, on quitting his chief, as soon as he had joined Anderson to attack the enemy and drive him back. Notwithstanding Anderson's obstinate defence, in seeking to defend these heights with the feeble forces at his disposal, Hooker, on the morning of the 1st of May, when Jackson appeared on the ground, had already got possession of them. The arrival of the latter saved everything. He marched four brigades to Anderson's aid, and Hooker, who should have defended this line at any cost, beat a retreat, withdrawing to the side of Chancellorsville, and strongly intrenching himself in expectation of a Confederate attack. Jackson pressed on after the Federals, and did not give over the pursuit till the enemy had recoiled quite back to Chancellorsville. Not wishing to expose himself single-handed to the whole hostile army, he awaited the coming of Lee, who, the same evening, appeared on the ground with two divisions.

The Federal general at Chancellorsville had ranged his army nearly parallel with the road from Orange Court House, which goes east and west. His centre was at Chancellorsville, at the point where the road coming from Fredericksburg, and going to United States Ford, on the Rappahannock, intersects the Orange Court House Road. Around Chancellorsville there was a small plain without timber, about three hundred yards broad, then right and left the brushwood of the Wilderness recommenced. The

Federal left was posted a little behind, towards the river, and the right, also in the Wilderness, extended towards Orange County, two-and-a-half miles west of Chancellorsville. The river covered the left wing, but the right was without support. To fortify it, Hooker constructed strong earth intrenchments, rendered still more inaccessible by parapets and trunks of trees, heaped up over the whole length of the line. His centre was very strong; the right was the feeble point. General Howard commanded there. The corps of Generals Slocum and Sickles were in the centre, and the left obeyed General Meade. Hooker's army reckoned nearly 100,000 fighting men, and 200 pieces of artillery. It was at the head of such an army that he concentrated himself to receive the attack of 40,000 Confederates. He had counted that Lee would retreat on Richmond. The boldness of the Southern chief in accepting battle seemed to have paralysed Hooker.

The Federal position had been reconnoitred by Jackson before Lee's arrival. There could be no doubt in the mind of the latter as to what he should do. The thing was with 35,000 men to thrust 100,000 back to the other side of the Rappahannock. On pain of being crushed, if the two Federal armies, that of Hooker in front and Sedgwick behind, united, it must be done, and done immediately. Lee had at Chancellorsville only 40,000 men, and the heights of Fredericksburg were defended by only 6000 under General Early, while Hooker disposed of more than 90,000 combatants, and General Sedgwick had before Fredericksburg from 28,000 to 30,000. If the latter drove Early from his positions, he could, at his leisure, fall on Lee's rear, while Hooker attacked him in front.

Now note the plan proposed by Jackson and agreed to by Lee. The two divisions of MacLaws and Anderson, under the general-in-chief, were to amuse Hooker by feints, and make him believe the Confederates were thinking of attacking him in front. Meanwhile, Jackson, turning the Federal right wing, was to march on the centre, taking the hostile line in the rear, and so cut off

Hooker's line of retreat on United States Ford. The plan was bold and brilliant, worthy at once of the general who conceived and of him who approved it.

On the morning of the 2nd of May, Lee, who had kept only 13,000 men with him, began to disturb his adversary, sometimes attacking General Crouch's corps on the left, sometimes Slocum in the centre, and gradually extending his attacks from left to right, completely deceiving Hooker, who remained convinced that Lee was going to do exactly what he desired—attack the formidable army in front. Perfectly calm in this supreme moment, Lee waited for the noise of Jackson's cannon to announce the success of his turning movement.

The same day, early, General Jackson began his march with his 22,000 veterans. At a certain distance from Chancellorsville, leaving the road, he took the direction of the Foundry, lying nearly two miles to the south-west. Here he left the 23rd regiment of Georgia as scouts, to watch the road from Chancellorsville, and continued his march. He could not manage it secretly enough to keep it from an enemy holding such elevated positions. General Sickles, advancing with two divisions to reconnoitre, captured the regiment left for purposes of observation. But, having seen the rest of the column defile in what they thought to be the direction of Richmond, the Federals remained persuaded that the enemy was retiring on the capital. An attack on Jackson's train was repulsed. The troops continued to defile into the woods, through a thousand obstacles which delayed their march, so uneven and woody was the country, while the narrow foot-paths were ill-adapted for the passage of artillery. At length, arrived at a certain point, General Fitz-Lee pointed out to Jackson a hillock, whence there was a view embracing the whole of the Federal position. Having reconnoitred the hostile lines, Jackson conducted his columns in such a manner as to find himself on the rear of the Federal intrenchments. At four o'clock, p.m., the movement had succeeded, and he made all his preparations for

an immediate attack. His intention was to envelope the Federal right wing, drive it back on the centre at Chancellorsville, and establish himself on the road from United States Ford. To realise this plan, it was necessary to plunge again into the thickest of the Wilderness brushwood, where it was impossible to form in column. But this prospect had in it nothing formidable for soldiers like his.

When the foremost Confederate companies, under General Rodes, issued from the woods and charged the Federal encampments, the consternation of the Unionist troops just left them time to flee. They were occupied in preparing their supper. Colston's Confederate brigade followed Rodes's, and, with it, took the Federal intrenchments. At this moment Jackson's artillery opened fire: division after division took flight, till it came to this, that all the 11th Unionist corps was in complete disorder. Jackson was himself at the head of his troops. He seemed carried away with excitement. Leaning forward on his horse, he pointed with his finger to the Federal lines, as if to urge on his men, exclaiming every moment, "Forward! forward!" When the fever of the combat did not master him, he lifted his arm straight towards heaven, with that gesture become so familiar to his soldiers, as if he were praying the God of battles to give him victory.

It was six o'clock when the first rifle-shot sounded. At eight o'clock, Jackson had driven the 11th corps upon the 12th, which formed the centre. He was within 550 yards of Hooker's head-quarters. The night intervening, during the darkness the Southern line became embarrassed in the felled trees, with which the Northern chief had furnished his works of defence about Chancellorsville. A halt was therefore necessary for the establishment of order. A. P. Hill's division took the place of the soldiers of Rodes and Colston. At that moment the Federal batteries, ranged in the bare space around Chancellorsville, opened their fire.

All around the Federal head-quarters there was the most

terrible and insane confusion possible. Men, beasts, cannons, waggons, ambulances, soon formed an infatuated mass, rushing with the violence of a hurricane towards the Rappahannock. In vain the officers tried by threats, prayers, blows, to stop the torrent of fugitives. All was of no avail. It seemed that the career of Hooker's army was ended, when the forced halt of which we have just spoken changed the aspect of affairs. If that had not taken place Jackson would have passed the night at Chancellorsville, and his life, so precious to his country, would not have been sacrificed.

Hooker profited by that moment of respite. Firing all the guns he had at hand, twenty-two in all, he directed volley after volley into the woods occupied by the Confederates. Meanwhile, he hastily reformed his troops to resist new attacks. Putting himself at the head of his old division, he posted it at the extremity of the little plain around Chancellorsville, to face the enemy. Reinforcements of artillery arrived, and presently he was able to put in line fifty pieces, which rained down on the woods a shower of iron.

It was ten o'clock. The moon illuminated the woods with a feeble light, which grew pale before the glare of the cannonade. In spite of the advanced hour, Jackson wished to recommence the attack, and get possession of the road leading to the fords. While his troops were preparing to make a fresh assault, the general himself, trusting to no one the task of reconnoitring the Federal position, went on in advance, leaving orders with his soldiers not to fire unless they saw cavalry approaching from the side of the enemy. He was accompanied by two of his staff-officers, several aides-de-camp, and their orderlies. Unfortunately, although the enemy was only 150 or 200 yards off, no sentries had been placed there, and Jackson found himself outside the Confederate line, with nothing between him and the Federals. But for this criminal negligence there would have been no occasion to deplore the fatal consequences of that reconnoitring.

Having finished his inspection, Jackson told one of his aides-de-camp to return to the camp and order General A. P. Hill to advance. Going quietly back towards his lines, without any warning whatever from his troops, whom he had recommended to give an eye to hostile cavalry, he received the fire of a brigade of his own soldiers. Struck twice, in the left arm and right hand, he saw all his escort fall around him except two persons. A heartrending scene followed. The two survivors assisted the general to dismount. He was so feeble from the loss of blood that they were obliged to lay him under a tree. A messenger had been sent in search of a surgeon and ambulance, but before they could arrive General Hill joined the sad group. He learnt the sad calamity which had just befallen the army, and received orders to assume the command. Hill hastened to his post. A few minutes after, it was said the enemy was approaching, and was only a hundred yards from the place where the wounded general was lying. An effort was, therefore, made to get within the Confederate lines. Supported by two of his officers, who had joined him, he had slowly returned on foot, under a terrible artillery fire, which had just opened from the Federal batteries. On his way he was met by several of his own soldiers, who were marching to the encounter. His aides-de-camp did all they could to hinder the men from recognizing him, but this group of officers necessarily attracted attention, and several times the soldiers asked who was wounded. Each time the answer was, "A Confederate officer;" but presently, when a ray of moonlight illumined the general, who was walking bare-headed, one of his veterans recognised him, and exclaimed with anguish, "Good God! it is General Jackson!"

A moment after, General Pender approached to inform him he feared he could not maintain his stand; Jackson's eye lighted up suddenly: "You *must* maintain it, general," said he quickly; "you *must* keep your position, sir!" This was his last order!

The poor wounded general had hardly been able to drag himself twenty paces; his feebleness soon became so great, that they

laid him on a hand-barrow. The little group had just recommenced its march when a volley of grape-shot reached them, wounding one of the bearers. They were obliged to stop. For some minutes the fire was terrible, and they all lay on their faces on the ground. The cannonade ceasing somewhat, they hastened to carry the general into a place of safety, where he could receive for the first time the care so necessary in his state.

This shower of grape-shot, to which Jackson had been exposed, caused great ravages in the Confederate ranks, wounding, among others, General A. P. Hill, who was thus obliged to resign his command. General Stuart replaced him. The rest of the night passed quiet enough, the two armies preparing to renew the conflict on the morrow.

During the night, the Federal first corps, under General Reynolds, arrived from Fredericksburg to reinforce Hooker. The latter, seeing the danger of his being turned, sent Sedgwick orders to carry the heights of Fredericksburg without losing an instant, and bear down on Chancellorsville by the direct road, combatting everything that opposed his passage. He was to be at Chancellorsville next day,—Sunday, the 3rd of May.

As soon as possible, Jackson informed Lee of the misfortune that had happened. The bearer of this sad news arrived at headquarters at four o'clock, a.m., and found the commander-in-chief lying on a litter of straw, under some fir-trees, covered by an oil-cloth, as a protection from the dew. Around him were lying the officers of his staff, wrapped in their cloaks. On learning the evil tidings, Lee exclaimed with emotion: "God be praised! the misfortune is reparable. He lives still!" Then he added: "Any victory is a dear one which deprives us of the services of Jackson, even for a short time."

The aide-de-camp observed to General Lee, that Jackson's intention had been, on the preceding night, or, at latest, this morning, to become master of the United States Ford Road, on Hooker's rear, and so cut off the retreat of the Federal army.

Lee, rising hastily, said the pursuit should begin. He dressed, took his simple breakfast of ham and biscuit, and prepared for the fight. He wrote in pencil the following letter to Jackson,—a letter which filled the wounded hero with joy and pride:

"GENERAL,

"I have just received your note, informing me that you were wounded. I cannot express my regret at the occurrence. Could I have directed events, I should have chosen, for the good of the country, to have been disabled in your stead. I congratulate you upon the victory which is due to your skill and energy."

He added also a word to General Stuart, giving him orders to take the command, and press briskly upon the enemy. Stuart had decided not to risk a night attack, inasmuch as the ground was unknown to him, and he had but few troops in hand. But he arranged matters to begin the fight again on the morrow. The corps was posted in three lines: Hill's division in the front rank, then Colston's, and lastly that of Rodes. The report of Jackson's wound had spread among his soldiers, but in place of cowing them, as was expected, the news only added to their ardour and thirst for vengeance. At sunrise Stuart commenced the attack, the infantry marching on the hostile works with cries of: "Remember Jackson!" Seizing an elevated spot, and posting there 30 guns, Stuart rained down on the Federal centre a shower of grape-shot, which thus suffered severely. To stop the Confederate advance, the enemy briskly attacked Stuart's left, and the contest went on with alternations of success and defeat.

Meanwhile, Lee closed on Hooker's right and centre. Presently Anderson's division, by driving back the enemy's centre, was able to assist Stuart. As soon as Lee saw his army reunited, he gave orders to carry the Federal works around Chancellorsville by assault. All the Confederate line advanced, and, after a hand-to-hand conflict, mastered the hostile intrenchments. Hooker's

soldiers re-formed, and recaptured what they had lost. Three times the works were taken and retaken. At length, on the fourth attempt, supported by the fire of all their artillery, the Southern troops swept everything before them, took the Federal lines, and drove their adversaries towards the river. At ten o'clock, a.m., the Confederate flag floated triumphantly over Chancellorsville.

The spectacle now was horrible to behold. The shells had set fire to the woods, filled with wounded, and devouring flames roared with a terrible noise all around those unfortunates, incapable of saving themselves. Many perished a frightful death. The Chancellorsville house was burning, and all around there was nothing but fire and smoke. The cries of the combatants, the noise of the firing, the discharges of cannon, and the sinister cracking of the flames, afforded an appearance of wild and terrible grandeur to a scene seldom witnessed, even on a field of battle.

Hooker seemed to have foreseen his defeat, for during the night of the second he had constructed a line of intrenchments behind his first line. These new works covered the crossing at United States Ford. They formed the third side of a triangle, whose other two sides were the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, which there united. The Federal right was supported on the latter river, the left on the Rappahannock. Heavily armed, these lines were to serve as a refuge for the Federal army.

Notwithstanding the strength of this new position, Lee determined to carry it by assault, and force Hooker into the river. He disposed his troops accordingly, his centre being at Chancellorsville, and towards nightfall, he was on the point of signalling the attack, when news was brought him that Sedgwick, after defeating Early, was coming from Fredericksburg to take him on the flank.

Sedgwick, about midnight, had received orders from Hooker to march to his aid. At three o'clock, a.m., on Sunday, he occupied Fredericksburg, easily driving before him some small Confederate detachments. The first assault on Early's lines, before daybreak,

did not succeed. He had 22,000 men against Early's 6000, and recommenced the attack at eight o'clock, when, although several times repulsed, thanks to his superior numbers, he managed to crush his foe. At noon, the Northern general pierced the Confederate centre, and remained master of all the positions which Lee had occupied since the battle on the 13th of December, 1862. Early being driven southwards, the Chancellorsville road was open to Sedgwick. Generals Barksdale and Wilcox, Early's two lieutenants, being separated from their chief, retired by the Chancellorsville road, and did all they could to delay Sedgwick's march.

Such was the news which surprised Lee when preparing to attack Hooker's new positions on Sunday afternoon. At the moment of victory his peril was greater than it had ever been. But Lee was not a man to be beaten. Without hesitation, he resolved to leave a part of his small army to hold Hooker in check, and, with the rest, face Sedgwick, whom he promised himself to hurl back beyond the Rappanannock. The latter crushed, he then proposed to turn back upon Hooker, and make him share the fate of his subordinate. There was no time to lose, for if Sedgwick succeeded in taking Salem Heights, and he was very near them, he would command Lee's positions.

Leaving Jackson's corps, therefore, under Stuart's orders, to watch Hooker, in the afternoon of the same Sunday, Lee marched to meet this new enemy, with MacLaws's division, and one brigade of Anderson's division. His march was so rapid that, at four o'clock, p.m., he had already reached Salem. He was just in time. Wilcox was defending Salem Chapel heroically, the building being on the culminating point of the height; but his soldiers, all that remained to him of his own and Barksdale's brigades, 2000 men against 20,000, could not long continue so unequal a struggle. MacLaws's division formed to march to his succour, when Sedgwick made a vigorous assault with his two divisions, and got possession of the summit. He could now sweep, with the fire of

his batteries, the Confederate lines. But this success was of short duration: Lee, in his turn, formed his army in order of battle, and precipitating his whole force on the enemy, recaptured the heights, and drove the Federals into the woods. Night finished the combat. Sedgwick was suddenly arrested. This battle cost him 4925 men. Next day, May 4th, Lee, having been joined by the rest of Anderson's division, directed this general to turn Sedgwick's left wing, and cut him off from the river. Sedgwick was still at the head of 21,000 men, while Lee disposed of only 14,000, all Jackson's corps having remained in front of Hooker.

Anderson's turning movement was accomplished with difficulty, and the Federal resistance lasted till night, although they yielded all along the line. Unfortunately for the Confederates, night was already falling on the two armies when the Federals gave way. Their retreat was on the point of being intercepted: profiting by the darkness, Sedgwick retired during the night, and crossed the Rappahannock by a bridge which he had had the precaution to throw over it the previous evening; the Confederates pressed him close, and Lee's artillery opened its fire on him at the moment when the hindmost of his soldiers were crossing the river.

Hastily confiding the keeping of Fredericksburg to Early's division, Lee set out again at five o'clock, a.m., to give a decided blow to Hooker. He rapidly travelled the sixteen miles, and arrived, in the afternoon, at Chancellorsville, with the divisions of Anderson and MacLaws. He soon arranged his forces so as to assault the Federal lines next morning.

But Sedgwick's defeat had demoralized Hooker; he had prepared his bridges, and during the night, between the 5th and 6th, he sent his artillery, trains, and army across the Rappahannock. On the 6th, at dawn, the Confederate scouts preceding Lee's army, which was advancing in order of battle on the enemy's positions, discovered that they were abandoned. The Southern troops hastened their march through the Federal lines, but were soon under the fire of the batteries which Hooker had erected on

the opposite bank, whence, from an elevated spot, he commanded the bank occupied by the Confederates. Lee was triumphant along the whole line.

The Confederates had, therefore, put to flight two armies, and the campaign ended gloriously. But their losses were serious. Out of an army of less than 50,000 men, the dead, wounded, and disappeared amounted to 10,281. Those of the enemy were still greater; they had lost 17,197 men, of whom 5000 were prisoners. The Federal wounded had most of them fallen into the hands of the Confederates, who had thus gained 14 cannon, 19,500 arms of different kinds, 17 standards, and a quantity of ammunition.

This campaign, brilliantly conceived and admirably directed, had cost the life of General Jackson, who died on the 10th of May. This was to pay very dearly for victory.

This is the order of the day in which the general-in-chief announced this loss to the army:

"Head-quarters, Army of Northern Virginia,
"May 11th, 1863.

"GENERAL ORDER, No. 61.

"With deep grief the commanding general announces to the army the death of Lieutenant General T. J. Jackson, who expired on the 10th inst., at a quarter-past three, p.m. The daring, skill, and energy of this great and good soldier, by the decree of an all-wise Providence, are now lost to us. But while we mourn his death, we feel that his spirit still lives, and will inspire the whole army with his indomitable courage and unshaken confidence in God as our hope and strength. Let his name be a watchword to his corps, who have followed him to victory on so many fields. Let his officers and soldiers emulate his invincible determination to do everything in the defence of our beloved country.

"R. E. LEE, General."

In another order of the day he thanked his soldiers for their

brilliant conduct, and specially recommended them to assemble among themselves on the following Sabbath, to give the God of battles the glory due to His holy name.

The column of cavalry which Hooker had detached at the beginning of these later military operations, to cut off Lee's communications with Richmond, did some damage to the railway, destroyed several houses, pillaged several farms; but here its exploits ended. The news of Hooker's defeat caused it to return in all haste, hotly pursued and harassed by the Southern cavalry. General Lee, however, profited by the confusion which this raid had raised, to call Government's attention to the relative feebleness of the Confederate cavalry, decimated by fatigue. He urgently requested that horses should be brought from Texas to remount his men while communications with that district were still open.

What especially strikes us in this short and glorious campaign at Chancellorsville is, Lee's extreme boldness, as well as Hooker's extraordinary blunders.

On May 1st, when the latter issued from the Chancellorsville woods, every plan of his had succeeded, and every plan ought to succeed, for his measures were admirably taken. He had brought his army, 100,000 strong, and posted it in an excellent position east of Chancellorsville, on the Fredericksburg road. General Sedgwick remained in the latter town, it is true, but the principal army covered the crossing at Banks's Ford, which was only twelve miles from Fredericksburg; it would have been easy, in the afternoon of that same day, to have quite concentrated the whole army. According to all appearance Lee was lost. Further, his forces, altogether inferior, were dispersed, and exposed to be attacked in detail. Sedgwick menaced his right at Fredericksburg; Hooker at Chancellorsville was preparing to fall on his left. Nothing, therefore, appeared easier than to crush one of its wings before the other could come to its succour. But Hooker seems to have doubted himself, and when Lee took the offensive, marching against him with the bulk of his forces, he retired from the strong

positions which he occupied in the open country, to take refuge in the woods surrounding Chancellorsville.

No doubt this was a serious error. This retrograde movement of the Federal general not only discouraged his soldiers, hitherto confident in the certainty of a victory promised them in the triumphant orders of the day issued by their chief, but also took from him all the advantages an open country gave, where his numerous army could manœuvre and deploy with facility.

Lee immediately profited by the blunder of his adversary, and vigorously driving the Federals before him into the Wilderness, he, on May 1st, in the evening, shut Hooker and his army up there. This unexpected result changed the aspect of affairs; the Federal army, which should have closely pursued Lee to Richmond, had just retrograded, and the latter, who was supposed to be in full retreat, pursued Hooker instead, and offered him battle.

It was at this moment that Lee took a step of unheard of boldness. Dividing his little army into two, he threw himself on the Federal right. It would be unfair to make General Hooker responsible for the success of a movement he could not foresee, for in coming to this decision, contrary to all military rules, Lee's only justification was the truly critical state of affairs for the South. In the impossibility of undertaking anything against Hooker's left or centre, so strongly were they intrenched, it was absolutely necessary either to beat a retreat or make an assault elsewhere. A Confederate retreat would have given up to the enemy a large extent of fertile country, and the moral effect would have been most disastrous. Hence the compulsion to attack the Federal right. The success of this manœuvre was extraordinary, and its results overwhelming. The Northern army was only saved from complete rout by Sedgwick's attack on the Confederate flank, which obliged Lee, at the moment when he was about to pursue Hooker's demoralized troops, and throw them into the river, to return against this new adversary. But on learning

that his lieutenant was also repulsed, the Federal commander appeared to lose courage completely, and without a moment's delay put the river between himself and the Confederates.

While confessing that Hooker's blunders contributed much to Lee's success, the impartial historian will also confess that never in all his career did the Southern chief give greater proofs of his ability. He cannot be reproached with a single strategic fault, from the moment when Sedgwick crossed the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg to that in which Hooker recrossed the same river. Perhaps it will be objected that he lost time, on the 5th of May, in not attacking the Federals in their second line of intrenchments; but this forced inaction of his is explained in different ways: the fatigue of his soldiers, exhausted by four days of fighting, and several consecutive days' marching; the necessity of reforming his lines before the final effort; and the very natural conviction that Hooker, having still more than 100,000 men under his orders, would not so easily give up his enterprise, but would defend himself with energy—all amply suffice to explain this delay. One cannot but be convinced that there was much to make a commander who had but 35,000 men, all told, hesitate, and who felt that his army was the principal hope of the South.

This rapid campaign is unique in itself from beginning to end It is a model to be studied by those who are interested in the art of war. Lee's movements throughout were remarkable for rapidity and audacity. On April 29th, Hooker crosses the Rappahannock. Lee at once advances towards the menaced point, orders the feeble detachments posted on this side to retire, and concentrates them at Chancellorsville. Learning that Sedgwick had likewise crossed at Fredericksburg, the Confederate chief, after a hasty conference with Jackson, resolves to conduct the bulk of his forces against Hooker. On May 1st, the enemy is driven back on Chancellorsville; on the 2nd, his right is crushed and his army thrown into disorder; on the 3rd, he is driven from Chancellorsville, and but for Sedgwick's advance, which Lee, from his want of men could not

hinder, Hooker, that same day, would have experienced an overwhelming defeat. Thus, in the space of four days, Lee had rapidly taken the offensive, had first stopped, then attacked, and finally repulsed with immense loss, an army three times his own. On the last day of April, a hostile mass of 120,000 men held him surrounded; on the 3rd of May, the chief corps of the enemy was retreating in the greatest disorder, and on the morning of the 6th, not a Federal soldier, prisoners excepted, was to be found south of the Rappahannock.

In the midst of these critical scenes, when the stake played for was not only the Confederate capital, but also the very cause of the South, Lee remained unalterably calm. Without descending to the clamorous and jeering brags of Hooker, as testified in the orders of the day, and in conversations held with his officers by this latter, Lee, by a kind of instinctive reaction, had become almost merry. When one of Jackson's aides-de-camp came in great haste to Fredericksburg to tell him that the enemy was passing the river with imposing forces, the Confederate commander said with a sly smile: "Well, I *heard* firing, and I was beginning to think it was time some of you lazy young fellows were coming to tell me what it was all about. Say to General Jackson that he knows just as well what to do with the enemy as I do."

The most important incident of the battle of Chancellorsville, was the mortal wound which Stonewall Jackson there received. This illustrious lieutenant of Lee had become his right hand, and Lee felt his loss cruelly. Since the opening of hostilities, no name had won so much upon public favour as that of Jackson. In the short space of two years the brilliant manner in which he executed the missions with which he was charged, and the continual triumphs which he gained, rendered his name, previously utterly unknown, famous. He came out of an early struggle, difficult and unequal, in the Valley of Virginia, a conqueror, although he had to do with forces very superior to his own. These victories, at a time so critical, and on

a frontier so important, contributed not a little to electrify the inhabitants of Richmond, and, indeed, of all the Confederacy. He then took a very important part in the Seven Days' Battle against MacClellan, in 1862, on the Chickahominy. Sent towards the North, he defeated Pope's van at Cedar Mountain, commanded Lee's left wing in the turning movement against Pope's flank, destroyed Manassas, maintained himself till the arrival of his chief, and largely contributed to the victory which followed. Hence he crossed into Maryland, marched on Harper's Ferry, and mastered it; he was by Lee's side in the battle of Sharpsburg, and there kept his ground without stumbling before the rude assaults of the enemy. If this contest remained indecisive, instead of being a defeat for the South, the merit is chiefly due to Lee as general and Jackson as soldier. When the Confederates retired, Jackson remained in the Valley to embarrass MacClellan. In this, he perfectly succeeded,' then suddenly re-appeared at Fredericksburg, where he received and repulsed one of the two great Federal attacks. In the following spring was fought the sanguinary battle of Chancellorsville, the last battle of the heroic Jackson. With this glorious conflict finished the career of him who had become Lee's *alter ego.*

It is not difficult to estimate what the general-in-chief felt on losing a man who was at once the soldier on whom he most relied, and the friend he most dearly cherished. The connection between Lee and Jackson had, from the first, been most cordial. Never had a shadow arisen to disturb the reciprocal feelings of affection and admiration which they had for one another. Never had they asked of each other what place they occupied in the public esteem, which of the two had the greatest share in the respect and love of their fellow-citizens. On the contrary, it was impossible to please Lee better than by setting forth the splendour of Jackson's services. He was, under all circumstances, the first to acknowledge publicly how much was owing to his illustrious lieutenant, to express in high terms all the admiration which he felt for his military talents,

and to attribute to him, as, in fact, he wrote after the battle of Chancellorsville, all the merit of the victory.

The spectacle of two soldiers loving and admiring each other, without any mental reservation, without a shadow ruffling their self-respect, is a beautiful one. As for Jackson, his love for his chief was more profound; it contained as much of veneration as of admiration. To give birth to such feelings in such a man, Lee must not only have been a military genius of the highest rank, but also a man endued with great moral qualities and great piety. Jackson's opinion never varied, and his confidence and attachment remained unshaken to the end. He invariably defended his chief against criticism. Some one, one day, reproached Lee with being slow. Jackson, who was present, habitually very silent, this time could not restrain himself: "General Lee," exclaimed he, "is *not slow*. No one knows the weight upon his heart—his great responsibilities. He is commander-in-chief, and he knows that if an army is lost, it cannot be replaced. No! there may be some persons whose good opinion of me may make them attach some weight to my views, and, if you ever hear that said of General Lee, I beg you will contradict it in my name. I have known General Lee for five-and-twenty years. He is cautious; he ought to be. But he is *not slow*. Lee is a phenomenon. He is the only man whom I would follow blindfolded!"

Such an encomium, from such a man, speaks for itself. Time only increased these sentiments with Jackson. He submitted his whole will to his chief. The least word of Lee was sacred to his lieutenant; all he did could not be otherwise than right. Only once was he of a different opinion, when, after his wound and victory at Chancellorsville, he received from Lee that little word of congratulation: "General Lee," said he, "is very kind; but he should give the glory to God!"

Lee returned this affection fully; he consulted Jackson always, and regarded him as his bosom friend. Rarely was there a question

between them as to the relations of superior to subordinate, except when, in his quality of commander-in-chief, Lee had to come to a decision. In details, he depended entirely on Jackson, certain that he would always act for the best.

Lee's affection showed itself in a striking manner after Chancellorsville. Jackson, seriously wounded, was at an inn in the Wilderness. Lee, retained on the battle-field by the critical state of the situation, rendered still more so by Jackson's absence, could not steal away for a moment to press the invalid's hand. Not looking upon the wound as dangerous, and, indeed, it did not become so till the last moment, he unceasingly sent for news of him, and forwarded these words of friendship: "Give him my affectionate regards," said he to one of his aides-de-camp: "tell him to make haste and get well, and come back to me as soon as he can. He has lost his left arm, but I have lost my right."

When, shortly after, the symptoms grew worse, and it began to be whispered that the end would be fatal, Lee was deeply moved, and exclaimed: "Surely General Jackson must recover! God will not take him from us, now that we need him so much. Surely he will be spared to us, in answer to the many prayers which are offered for him!"

He became silent for a moment, an evident prey to violent and sorrowful emotion. Then, addressing an officer whom he was sending to the wounded general, he said: "When you return, I trust you will find him better. When a suitable occasion offers, give him my love, and tell him that I wrestled in prayer for him last night, as I never prayed, I believe, for myself."

The grief which Lee felt at Jackson's death was too profound for tears. God alone knows what that order of the day cost him, in which he imparted the tidings of this loss to the army!

CHAPTER XII.

LEE'S SECOND ENTRY INTO MARYLAND.—MOVEMENTS LEADING TO THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.

THE defeat of General Hooker at Chancellorsville marks one of the decisive moments of the Civil War. For the first time it appeared to be perhaps possible that the Washington Government would come to the conclusion to recognise the independence of the South. Although hitherto the Federal authorities had regarded as utterly inadmissible the creation of a distinct Confederation in the South, the two defeats which the Northern troops had just experienced on the Rappahannock, had given rise to many serious doubts with many Unionists of the possibility of repressing the Confederates by force. Besides, the proclamations in which President Lincoln declared the slaves in the South free, and in reality put the United States in a state of siege, exasperated the democratic party, who complained bitterly that all constitutional liberties were disappearing.

Hence came a violent reaction in opinion: from all sides protestations arrived against a continuation of the war. Many journals in New York and elsewhere declared themselves against the politics of the Government. A convention of the friends of peace met at Philadelphia to deliberate on the measures to be employed in the realization of their wishes. Judge Curtis, of Boston, formerly one of the associate-judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, vehemently inveighed against the violation,

by the President, of the Federal pact. "I do not see," wrote he, "that it depends upon the executive decree whether a *servile* war shall be invoked, to help 20,000,000 of the white race to assert the rightful authority of the constitution and laws of their country over those who refuse to obey them. But I do see that this proclamation (emancipating the Southern slaves) asserts the power of the executive to make such a decree! I do not perceive how it is that my neighbours and myself, residing remote from armies and their operations, and where all the laws of the land may be enforced by constitutional means, should be subjected to the possibility of arrest, and imprisonment, and trial before a military commission, and punishment at its discretion, for offences unknown to the law,—a possibility to be converted into a fact at the mere will of the President, or of some subordinate officer, clothed by him with this power. But I do perceive that this executive power is asserted. . . . It must be obvious to the meanest capacity that, if the President of the United States has an *implied* constitutional right, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, in time of war, to disregard any one positive prohibition of the constitution, or to exercise any one power not delegated to the United States by the constitution, because, in his judgment, he may thereby *best subdue the enemy*, he has the same right, for the same reason, to disregard each and every provision of the constitution, and to exercise all power *needful in his opinion* to enable him *best to subdue the enemy*. . . . The time has certainly come when the people of the United States *must* understand, and *must* apply those great rules of civil liberty, which have been arrived at by the self-devoted efforts of thought and action of their ancestors during 700 years of struggle against arbitrary power."

Such were the echoes which Lee's cannon at Chancellorsville awakened. All in the North, and their number was great, whom hitherto the military necessities of the situation had drawn into accepting the continuation of the war, or whom the very extent of the usurpations of the executive power had intimidated, rose and

declared themselves partisans of an understanding with the South on the basis of a separation.

A thrill of relief and joy overran the whole country at the prospect of a speedy peace. This was the moment chosen by Mr. Stephens, Vice-President of the Confederate States, to submit to the Government of Richmond a proposition tending to open up negotiations with the North. He offered his own services as negotiator. He particularly desired to be able to arrive at Washington before any fresh military operations, by re-awakening the warlike spirit, had added to the already great difficulties of his task. Mr. Stephens's letter was dated the 12th of June. Mr. Davis, consequently, called him to Richmond by a telegram, but he did not arrive till the 22nd of June. Lee's troops were then entering Maryland, and the time was gone.

The plan of a new invasion of Maryland by a Confederate army owed its birth to several causes. The two great victories of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville had filled the South with joy and confidence. Hence it was demanded on all sides that Lee should take the offensive against an enemy apparently incapable of resisting the Confederates. The army, whose ranks were renewed by the return of many men on furlough or invalided, by the re-entry of many conscripts, and the recall of Longstreet's two corps, shared the universal enthusiasm. Public opinion thus exercised a strong impression on the Government and on General Lee, and influenced them to take the offensive, which, according to all appearance, would in a brief space bring about an illustrious victory and glorious peace.

This mode of looking at things squared sufficiently with Lee's inward thought, who regarded it as very important to keep the enemy as far as possible from the interior of the country, and to shift the theatre of war to the frontier on Federa soil. In this way the South would be as little as possible exposed to the ravages of the enemy, and Richmond, the capital, would remain sheltered from all danger. This last consideration was one of much importance,

as the future proved. As long as the Federals could be kept at some distance north of the Rappahannock, Richmond and its network of railways, which connected it with all the South, were in safety, and the Confederate Government, quiet in its capital, continued to affirm itself as an independent power in the eyes of the world. But if the enemy succeeded in approaching the capital, and menacing its lines of communication, the Government could no longer remain there in safety. This was one of the motives which continually influenced Lee to manœuvre in such a way as to keep the enemy off Virginian soil. The question of provisions also intervened. At all times they had specially failed the Confederates; it was, therefore, essential to be master of the greatest possible extent of country to draw provisions from. Besides, the Confederate commissariat was always at its last shifts. It is even said that when, in May or June, Lee sent a requisition to Richmond for victuals, the commissary-general would have written on the margin: "If General Lee wants rations, let him go and get them in Pennsylvania."

Such were the chief reasons which persuaded the Richmond Cabinet to take the offensive, after the battle of Chancellorsville.

There was likewise another. If victory had hither crowned the efforts of the Northern Virginian army, it was not the same as to the other Southern armies in the West and South-West of the Confederate States.

General Bragg's army in Tennessee had experienced nothing but reverses. General Pemberton had permitted himself to be shut up in Vicksburg on the Mississippi, and beyond that river the Confederates were losing ground rapidly. For a moment there was an idea of detaching a division from Lee's army (which would then of necessity have remained on the defensive), and sending it to raise the siege of Vicksburg. But this would have been to enfeeble the most exposed part of the frontier, and sacrifice Virginia to save Vicksburg. Lee himself counselled against this plan, adding, however, that if the measure appeared absolutely

necessary, he would send off Pickett's division immediately. It was, therefore, given up, and instead of it, a new invasion of the North was contemplated.

The tone of Lee's army was excellent. His veterans were ready to undertake anything. On the other hand, the commissariat had much ado to feed the army, and naturally enough the idea presented itself of going into Pennsylvania, and living at the expense of the enemy. As to the Federals, the departure of soldiers enrolled who had finished their service, and desertions, becoming more and more frequent, enfeebled Hooker's army. Generally in the North the discouragement following the reverses in Virginia went on increasing. All these considerations encouraged the South to seize the favourable opportunity for resuming the offensive by striking a great blow in Pennsylvania, and by making a diversion for the armies of the West, to obtain for the South that advantage which it was beginning to lose.

This invasion of the North by Lee has been severely criticised. What, however, does he himself say in his report?—"The enemy's positions at Fredericksburg being too formidable for him to be dislodged by force, it was necessary to bring about the desired result by other means. It was likewise urgent to rid the Shenandoah Valley of the Federal troops, who had occupied the lower part of it during the winter and spring, and, if occasion offered, to transport the theatre of war to the north of the Potomac. On the other hand, it was probable that the movements of the enemy,—movements which would be the inevitable consequences of our operations, would offer us an opportunity to smite General Hooker's army unawares, and, in any case, this army would be compelled to evacuate Virginia, and, indeed, to summon to its aid all such detachments as were operating in other parts of the country. So that it was permitted us to hope that the Federal plan for their summer campaign would be frustrated, and the fine weather would have, in good part, gone, before they were able to design another. Besides, if we were to gain some—even trifling

—successes, the result could not be otherwise than favourable to us."

Hooker, indeed, occupied at Fredericksburg a position carefully fortified. He was but a short distance from the Potomac, and this magnificent river, whose entire course was in his hands, brought him unlimited provisions, ammunition, and reinforcements. The Confederate commander had the choice between two plans only. To remain where he was, and wait for his foe to take the offensive when it seemed good to him, was simply to permit Hooker to repair his losses, and turn the Confederate position with altogether superior forces, obliging Lee either to retire, or give battle in the plain to an army much more numerous than his own. This would bring about the successive abandonment of all the Confederate strongholds and magazines. The other plan, on the contrary, offered all possible advantages. By marching to the North, Lee forced the Federals to quit their Fredericksburg positions, and give battle, or retire on Washington. If they resigned themselves to the latter course, by hastening a little his march towards the North, Lee constrained Hooker to manœuvre in such a manner as to cover Baltimore and Philadelphia.

It was thus very natural to suppose that more than once these complicated operations would offer to the Confederate commander an opportunity of inflicting harm on his adversary without necessarily engaging in a pitched battle. For some time, at least, Virginia would not be crowded with hostile armies; its population would have a breathing space, after having been so long overwhelmed by a foreign occupation. Provisions would flow in in abundance, instead of the meagre rations which had been served out to the soldiers for months: the Federal project of marching on Richmond must necessarily be abandoned, and Lee would have the choice of delivering battle where and when he pleased.

The great general who had so admirably conducted military operations in Virginia did not hesitate. He, however, had no

illusions on the possibility of maintaining himself permanently, with an army of 60,000 men, in the midst of provinces filled with hostile and energetic populations, having around him armies of the enemy twice as numerous as his own, and nearly 200 miles from his base of operations. But he promised himself to profit by all the advantages which chance, or the folly of his adversaries, might offer him; though, as to conquering Pennsylvania, or long maintaining himself there, he knew too well the enormous inequality between the forces of the two belligerents to be lulled into so false a hope. Nobody more than he had it at heart to spare the lives of his men, and economise his resources. It was only by force of skill and strategy that he could hope to struggle with his foe. If he marched to the North, it was in order there to play for the great stake at issue on the best conditions. Had the battle of Gettysburg never taken place, or had Lee on that day remained master of the Federal position, he would still have been obliged, in case negotiations for peace were not commenced, or in case the time favourable for military operations were passing away, to retire to a point more within reach of his convoys of provisions and ammunition.

Thus fall of their own weight all the plans which lend a colour to the arguments of those writers on Lee, who have not sufficiently studied the relative situation of the two combatants at this period of the war. Thus are reduced to nothing those hopes which these critics suppose Lee to have harboured of dictating peace on Northern soil. His views were not so ambitious.

The only composition which Lee published on the Gettysburg campaign, the official report already quoted, establishes the fact that he wished to attract Hooker to the north of the Potomac; to rid the Valley of the Shenandoah of the enemy's presence, in order to draw from this fertile region the victuals of which he had so much need; to force the Federals to recall to the aid of their principal army the troops which were devastating the coasts of the Confederacy; and, at a favourable moment, by attacking and

beating Hooker, work a reaction in the opinion of the North in favour of a termination of the war. It is hardly doubtful that a decisive defeat of the Federals at this moment would have brought about a peace. A third disaster for its armies would have shaken the resolution of the Federal Government. If Lee's cannon had thundered at the gates of Washington or Philadelphia, the peace party in the North would have felt sufficiently strong to intervene in an efficacious manner, and it would have been impossible for the strife to continue.

We ought to add that, in his report, Lee said, "It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance from our base, unless attacked by the enemy." He, therefore, wished to compel General Hooker to attack him on a ground of his own choosing, and at the moment when he judged most opportune.

The foregoing observations will give a clear idea of Lee's projects and intentions in his last offensive campaign. We shall continue our narrative, and relate the movements which preceded and led to the battle of Gettysburg.

The resolution to take the offensive once arrived at, the Confederate Government lost not a moment in preparing for its execution. Longstreet's corps had rejoined Lee shortly after Chancellorsville. Jackson's death having rendered it necessary to replace him in the command of the 2nd corps, General Ewell was promoted to it, with the approbation of all. A third corps was organised and placed under the orders of General A. P. Hill, who, as well as Ewell, was nominated lieutenant-general. The law of enlistment, rigorously applied, brought many conscripts to the Confederate ranks. The soldiers, better armed and better equipped than they had ever been, were submitted to a rigid discipline; they were practised daily in the management of arms; numerous reviews and inspections were not long in producing excellent results. The artillery in particular was the object of special care. About the end of May, the army counted 70,000 men, of whom 10,000 were in the cavalry! Longstreet's corps

comprised the three divisions of MacLaws, Hood, and Pickett; Ewell's corps, the divisions of Early, Rodes, and Johnson; and Hill's corps, the divisions of Anderson, Pender, and Heth.

The North was not ignorant of any of the preparations which the South was making to invade its soil. Northern journals could not exhaust the subject in accounts and details transmitted by Unionists from border-counties.

On the 3rd of June, just a month after the battle of Chancellorsville, Longstreet's corps, which had been in cantonments at Fredericksburg and on the Rapidan, marched to Culpepper Court House, and was followed, on the 4th and 5th, by Ewell's corps. A. P. Hill remained at Fredericksburg to deceive Hooker, by making him believe that all the Confederate army was still occupying its old positions.

The Federal general still (according to a despatch of the 13th of May to President Lincoln) commanded 80,000 men. This refers only to his infantry. It was the only and last occasion during the whole war on which the South could put on foot an army anyway approaching that of the North.

Hooker, persuaded that something was hatching in the enemy's camp, and fearing to be mystified, like Pope, in the year preceding, sent Sedgwick's corps across the Rappahannock, on the 6th, at Deep Run, to get information about the strength and arrangements of the Confederates.

General Hill placed his troops so as to receive Sedgwick's attack, should one happen, and sent word to his general-in-chief. But, as it was evident from Sedgwick's movements that he only intended to reconnoitre in force, Lee allowed Longstreet and Ewell to pursue their march, and, on the 8th, both these corps were concentrated at Culpepper Court House, where Stuart awaited them with the cavalry.

Hooker, nowise enlightened by Sedgwick's reconnoitring, learning that Stuart was at Culpepper Court House, sent two divisions of Federal cavalry under General Pleasanton, supported

by two brigades of infantry, to dislodge him. The Federals attempted the passage of the Rappahannock at two crossings, Kelly's Ford and Beverley's Ford. Received promptly at Beverley's Ford by General Jones, supported by the cavalry under W. H. F. Lee, while Stuart himself and Robertson defended the other crossing, Pleasanton's troops, towards evening, were obliged to re-ford the river, leaving 400 prisoners in the hands of their foes. Their losses in killed and wounded amounted to several hundred men. The Confederates acknowledged a loss of 500 men, and among them General W. H. F. Lee, seriously wounded.

This affair, in which 20,000 cavalry had taken part, revealed to Hooker the presence of hostile forces more numerous than he had thought at Culpepper. Fearing for his communications with Washington, he marched back his third corps to the upper Rappahannock, and redoubled his vigilance to guard the line of that river.

Having thus succeeded in hunting out his adversary, Lee hastened his advance march. General Imboden, who commanded on the Maryland frontier, received orders to make a demonstration on Romney and destroy the Baltimore and Ohio railway, in order to turn attention from Ewell's movements, and hinder the Federal troops, who were watching the safety of this railway, from going to the aid of the town of Winchester, in the Valley of Virginia.

On the 10th of June, Ewell left Culpepper Court House, marched rapidly by Little Washington, entered into the Valley, and passed the Shenandoah at Front Royal. He was preceded by General Jenkins's cavalry, who, by intercepting all the roads which led towards Winchester, hindered the news of Ewell's approach from coming to the knowledge of the threatened town. General Milroy occupied Winchester with 6000 Federal troops. He had made himself detested, and had pushed his inhumanity so far, that the Confederate Government had put him beyond the

pale of the law. Thus the inhabitants of this part of Virginia were filled with joy at the approach of the Southerners.

Ewell lost not a moment. Detaching Rodes's division towards Berrysville, with orders to get possession of Martinsburg, and cut off the Federal retreat in the lower part of the Valley, he marched in person with his two other divisions on Winchester. Arrived before this town on the 13th, he employed the rest of the day in fixing his batteries, and next morning commenced the bombardment. In the evening an assault was made. Although the town was surrounded by formidable redoubts, the Southerners speedily became masters of it. The greater part of the garrison were made prisoners. Milroy escaped, and reached Harper's Ferry. On the 13th, General Rodes took possession of Berrysville, where he made 700 prisoners; on the 14th, he occupied Martinsburg, and took 200 Federals, some cannon, and a considerable quantity of provisions and ammunition.

Ewell, thanks to the rapidity of his movements, had effectually surprised the enemy; in three days he had marched 70 miles, taken three towns, made 4000 prisoners, without counting 29 pieces of artillery, 270 waggons, and abundance of provisions and ammunition. His soldiers were full of enthusiasm, and said aloud that Jackson had found a worthy successor. Halting scarcely long enough to rest his men, Ewell quitted Winchester, and, marching on the Potomac, seized the fords of this river, and the entire Valley thus was restored into the power of the South.

Hooker learned Ewell's march by telegraph, and understood he had been played with by his skilful adversary. The first effect of this news was, that the whole Federal army fell back on Centreville. General A. P. Hill, whom Sedgwick's retreat set at liberty, then received orders to cross into the Shenandoah Valley.

The Federal general-in-chief, always persuaded that Lee intended to cut off his communications with the capital, was so posted as to cover Washington. Lee, having with him only Longstreet's corps and Stuart's cavalry, watched the Federal

retreat, in hopes that an opportunity would be given to him of an unexpected attack. But Hooker remained constantly and strictly on the defensive.

In order to attract the Federal army further from its base, and mask Hill's march, who was going from Fredericksburg into the Valley, Longstreet, leaving Culpepper Court House on the 15th of June, went along the side of the Blue Ridge, and occupied Ashby's Gap and Snicker's Gap. This movement having, indeed, attracted Hooker far from Washington, and towards the mountains, A. P. Hill passed the Blue Ridge, entered the Valley, and took position at Winchester.

By these admirably combined strategic movements, General Lee had, in less than a fortnight, compelled the Federal army to fall back from the Rappahannock on the upper Potomac, and had accomplished the placing of his three corps in strong positions, mutually supporting each other, securing leisure for them to enter the enemy's country at their will, without forthwith risking an opportunity to Hooker to embarrass them on their march.

At first sight one might tax Lee with excessive rashness for extending his lines so far that his extreme left, under Ewell, in view of Winchester, was 98 miles from his extreme right, under Hill, opposite Fredericksburg, Longstreet being half way between them at Culpepper; besides, a river, the Rapidan, flowed between Hill and Longstreet, and the Blue Ridge chain separated the latter from Ewell. Hooker's army, at least equal in number to that of Lee, was concentrated on the southern bank of the Rappahannock, and the opportunity appeared tempting for the Federal general to strike a blow, and profit by the dispersion of his adversaries.

As to that, the idea had occurred, both to General Hooker and President Lincoln, to attack the Confederate army while it was effecting this dangerous change of front. But they did not at the moment understand each other, nor the object of an attack. Hooker, foreseeing his adversary's movement, wished to execute

a counter evolution, and by this threat arrest Lee's march. This Lincoln refused. "In case you find Lee coming to the north of the Rappahannock," President Lincoln wrote to General Hooker, "I would by no means cross to the south of it. I would not take any risk of being entangled upon the river, like an ox jumped half over a fence, and liable to be torn by dogs, front and rear, without a fair chance to gore one way or kick the other."

When the news reached Washington that the heads of Lee's columns were emerging on the upper Potomac, while the rear guard was still to the south of the Rappahannock, the president wrote to General Hooker in his figurative style: "If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg, and the tail of it on the plank road between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere,—could you not break him?"

It has been suggested that Lee's temerity came from the contempt which he had for his foe, whom he knew to be incapable of energetically assuming the offensive. This is, perhaps, a somewhat exaggerated view. Assuredly without a certain amount of boldness a general is but half a soldier: a certain proportion is necessary for success in war. But did Lee truly expose himself to serious disaster, if we suppose his adversary to have been the man to profit by the occasion given him? Perhaps he would have been obliged to renounce his campaign of invasion if Hill at Fredericksburg, or Longstreet at Culpepper, had been attacked, for in this case Ewell's corps of necessity must have fallen back. But a defeat of the united corps of Hill and Longstreet, sufficiently within reach to help each other, was not a success on which Hooker had a right to count. These two corps numbered 50,000 men, two-thirds of the Confederate army; Hooker had but 80,000. It was not, therefore, likely that 80,000 Federals would be able to beat the Confederates, when, at Chancellorsville, a much less number of Confederates had routed 120,000 Federals.

No doubt such was Lee's opinion; he reckoned that Longstreet and Hill, united if necessary, could repulse any attack whatever,

while Ewell might continue to penetrate into the enemy's country. We do not deny that the whole strategic movement was a hardy one, but it does not follow that Lee conceived it out of contempt for his adversary.

To return to our subject. In order to penetrate the mystery which veiled the Confederate plans, Hooker sent his cavalry against Stuart, whose horse, ranged before Blue Ridge, effectually masked Longstreet's position. After several reconnoitrings, Hooker, better informed, marched his 12th corps to Leesburg, supported by the 5th at Aldie, and the 2nd at Thoroughfare Gap.

Meanwhile Ewell had already entered Pennsylvania, and Lee was obliged to support him. Consequently, on June 24th, Longstreet and Hill crossed the Potomac, the first at Williamsport, the second at Shepherdstown, and directed their course towards Hagerstown. Stuart had to remain in Virginia to watch the mountain passes, observe the enemy, and worry him as much as possible, when, in his turn, he would go to the other side of the Potomac. As soon as the Federal army had re-entered Maryland, he was to cross the river to the east or west of the Blue Ridge, and cover Lee's right wing, taking care to post up his chief in the movements of the enemy. The Confederate commander-in-chief had good reason to regret the absence of his cavalry during his forward march and the strategic operations following it. Had he had it at his disposal, the result of the Pennsylvania campaign would probably have been different.

General Imboden, according to orders, had destroyed the Baltimore and Ohio railway at several important points, and, on June 17th, took possession of the little town of Cumberland, in Maryland. Already, on the 14th, General Jenkins's cavalry brigade had pushed on to Chambersburg, in Pennsylvania, and after having made an abundant requisition there, returned to Virginia with a great number of horses, herds of cattle, and a large quantity of victuals. This audacious dash, and the presence of Lee's army on the upper Potomac, threw the North into a state of

consternation. A lively agitation spread through all the country to the City of New York; but except that some militia hastily assembled at Harrisburg, the capital of Pennsylvania, no serious effort was made to dispute the territory.

It was in the midst of this feverish agitation that Ewell crossed the Potomac on the 22nd of June, entered Pennsylvania on the 23rd, and the same day became master of Chambersburg. Lee had given very strict orders that the estates of individuals should be respected; the Confederate soldiers were to pay for whatever they took. If the inhabitants objected to Confederate paper, they were to be offered a receipt for everything furnished by them. On the 27th, all the Confederate army was reunited at Chambersburg.

In an order of the day of the same date (June 27th), Lee, after having testified his satisfaction at the good behaviour of his soldiers, added that there were nevertheless some exceptions, recalled to them on this subject that the reputation of the whole army was at stake, and that, as citizens of a civilised and Christian nation, they were bound to observe certain laws, as well in a hostile country as in their fatherland. "The commanding general," said he, "considers that no greater disgrace could befall the army, and through it our whole people, than the perpetration of the barbarous outrages upon the innocent and defenceless, and the wanton destruction of private property, that have marked the course of the enemy in our own country. Such proceedings not only disgrace the perpetrators and all connected with them, but are subversive of the discipline and efficiency of the army, and destructive of the ends of our present movements. It must be remembered that we make war only upon armed men, and that we cannot take vengeance for the wrongs our people have suffered without lowering ourselves in the eyes of all whose abhorrence has been excited by the atrocities of our enemy, and offending against Him to whom vengeance belongeth, without whose favour and support our efforts must all prove in vain."

The army showed itself worthy of the noble appeal addressed to

it by the commander. The conduct of the Confederate army in Pennsylvania offers a striking and beautiful contrast to that of any Federal army in the South.

In order to maintain his communications with the Valley of Virginia by Hagerstown and Williamsport, Lee sent Early's division to the east of South Mountain; his intention was, by disquieting the enemy on that side, to draw him further from the Potomac. Early pushed on, therefore, to York, which he occupied, while the rest of Ewell's corps reached Carlisle.

As soon as he was sure that Lee had entered on Federal soil, Hooker also crossed the Potomac, at Edwards's Ferry, on the 25th of June. He took up a position at Frederick, whence he could cross South Mountain, and cut off Lee's communications, or bear to the north towards the Susquehannah, if the Confederate general marched towards Harrisburg. Hooker's opinion was in favour of the first plan, and he wished to plant himself on Lee's line of retreat. For this purpose he advanced his left wing to Middleton, and detached the 12th corps, under General Slocum, to Harper's Ferry. This corps was to join the garrison there, and threaten Lee's flank by a movement on Chambersburg. General Hallock, Generalissimo of the United States armies, was opposed to Harper's Ferry being abandoned. Owing to this difference, Hooker sent in his resignation. On June 28th, General Meade was nominated in his place.

Many authors in the North seem to think that if Hooker's plan had been followed it would have had a powerful influence on the issue of the campaign. But note the facts which constitute an answer. That same day, on the 25th, the two corps of Longstreet and Hill were between Hagerstown and Chambersburg, and if Hooker's demonstration towards Hagerstown had happened, he would have found there two-thirds of the Confederate army.

Since the crossing of the Potomac, Lee had had no news about the Federal army, and for want of cavalry he knew nothing of its movements. He was even ignorant that Hooker had crossed the

river and was so near him, for Stuart, who had received orders in this case to rejoin him, gave no sign of life. The few cavalry regiments which remained with the bulk of the army formed, under Jenkins, Ewell's advanced guard towards Harrisburg. The others, under Imboden, scoured the country to the west of the Confederate line of march as scouts.

Stuart had pushed his reconnoitring expeditions to Fairfax Court House, and finding the enemy had crossed the river, he himself also crossed it lower down, at Seneca Falls, on the 29th. Passing by Westminster, he arrived at Carlisle, after having made the circuit of the Federal army, only to learn there the concentration of Ewell's troops at Gettysburg.

The northern direction taken by the Federals was the cause why Stuart could be of no use to his chief; he did not rejoin him till the very day of the battle of Gettysburg, having constantly had Meade's army between him and the Confederates.

This was the only time Stuart was in fault, but his absence led to fatal results. Lee found it impossible to hide his movements, according to his custom, behind a cloud of flying squadrons, and to penetrate the designs of his adversary, thanks to the ubiquity and audacity of his cavalry.

Supposing, then, that Hooker had not yet passed into Maryland, Lee was preparing to march on Harrisburg, when his scouts, on the night of June 29th, brought him the news that the Federal army was on this side the Potomac, and that its advanced-guard threatened to cut off the Confederates from their base of operations. Lee was obliged immediately to change his arrangements. A glance at the map sufficiently indicates the urgency of this course. Without a moment's loss the Southern army was concentrated at the east of the mountains, so as at the same time to menace the Federal flank and Baltimore, should the enemy march to the west of these same mountains. On the 29th, Hill and Longstreet were to advance from Chambersburg to Gettysburg, whilst Ewell was recalled from Carlisle and directed to the same

village. The Confederate columns advanced but slowly, owing to the uncertainty which hovered over the Federal movements. Lee could not, because of Stuart's absence, be sure the enemy was so near him. Had Stuart remained with the bulk of the army, the Southern chief would have known of the Federal march, and hastened to occupy Gettysburg before Meade could outstrip him. However this may be, the latter marched northwards to cover Baltimore, and hinder Lee from crossing the Susquehannah.

Meanwhile the Federal general intercepted a despatch from President Davis to Lee. The latter had suggested that Beauregard could make a demonstration in the direction of Culpepper, thus threatening Washington, and so singularly embarrass the movements of the Northern army. Davis answered that he had not enough troops to execute this plan. The seizure of this despatch, furnishing Meade with a proof that he had nothing to fear for Washington, permitted him to act more vigorously. Strange fatality! a second time the Confederate cause lost so much through an intercepted despatch!

The Northern army, on the authority of its commander, consisted of from 95,000 to 100,000 men, and it had 300 guns. Lee, after deducting detachments left to protect his communications, had only 60,000 men.

Learning, on the 29th, that Lee was east of South Mountain, Meade sent his right wing to Manchester, on a plateau which separates the basin of the Monocacy from that of the Chesapeake, his head quarters being at Taneytown, his centre at Two Taverns and Hanover, and his left at Emmetsburg. The same day the Federal cavalry, under General Buford, acting as scouts, occupied Gettysburg. Two Confederate divisions, under Hill, bivouacked, on the night of the 30th of June, six or seven miles from Gettysburg, on the road from Baltimore to Chambersburg, and Ewell passed the night at Heildersburg, on the road from Carlisle, eight or nine miles from Gettysburg. By hastening somewhat, the Southern army would have been able to seize the heights of

Gettysburg, and events would have taken another turn. Had the Confederate cavalry been there to enlighten Lee's march, and indicate the vicinity of the enemy, Hill or Ewell could have easily been at Gettysburg twenty-four hours sooner, to occupy those fatal heights, before which their most valiant efforts were used in vain two days later.

Thus each of the two armies, without suspecting that its adversary was marching to the same place, bore down on Gettysburg: Lee to occupy it as a strategic point of the highest importance, which covered his line of retreat; and Meade to maintain himself there with his left, till he should be able to dispose the remainder of his army on Pipe Creek, where he was preparing to receive Lee's blow. A great battle was about to take place, in spite of the two men who had to play the principal characters in it. Lee had no intention to risk the hazard of a pitched battle. Far from his base, having less soldiers and cannon than his adversary, knowing that in case of misfortune it would be impossible for him to fill up the gaps, it was his aim only to occupy temporarily the Federal territory, in order to economize the resources of exhausted Virginia, and, by the activity of his strategy, to keep on the alert the various Unionist corps, whether by compelling them to cover their principal towns, or by taking unawares their isolated detachments, or, finally, by surprising the badly guarded points of their long line of defence. He was ignorant that the enemy was so near him. According to the last news the Federals were at Frederick, intending to march on Hagerstown. It was to arrest this movement that he was concentrating his army at Gettysburg. His orders had been so admirably obeyed that Ewell, coming from Carlisle on the north, Early from York on the east, and Hill from Chambersburg on the west, all reached Gettysburg at intervals on the same day, July 1st.

Meade, abandoning the project of his predecessor of marching by Boonsboro' Pass on the western slope of the mountains,

on the contrary, was pushing his columns to the north, in order to keep Lee from the Susquehannah, and with the intention of fighting, should the Confederate general offer battle. An order of the day which he published on July 1st, at Taneytown, before he knew that his advanced-guard was already seriously engaged at Gettysburg, is a proof of this.

CHAPTER XIII.

BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG, JULY, 1ST-3RD, 1863.—LEE'S RETREAT.—RESULTS OF THE CAMPAIGN.

BUT the great struggle had already commenced. The fortuitous meeting of the two advanced-guards had brought about a collision which soon assumed the dimensions of a great battle. Lee was driven to an unwonted course by a combination of unforeseen circumstances. He had no more wish to fight than General Meade; unless, at least, on a ground of his own choosing, and yet now, these two commanders, in spite of themselves, for neither had a design of selecting Gettysburg as the place of their rencontre, were about to measure their strength with each other, and commit to the hazard of an unforeseen battle, the destinies of their respective causes.

Gettysburg is a small town in Pennsylvania, situated in a valley where several roads cross. A short distance off, south of the town, rises a height, running north and south, but inclining suddenly to the east on approaching Gettysburg. On its summit is a cemetery; whence it bears the name of Cemetery Hill. Opposite and to the west of the town, another flight of hills extends, parallel to the former, but lower, named Seminary Ridge. Further still to the west, in a country somewhat uneven, flows a little water-course, Willoughby Run. In the same direction, nearly ten miles distant, the blue peaks of South Mountain branch off. On the morning of July 1st, General Lee had just emerged from these mountains by the village of Cashtown, marching direct on

Gettysburg, when Hill, who commanded the van, found himself suddenly in the presence of the hostile columns at Willoughby Run. It was the cavalry of General Buford, who preceded the 1st corps of Federal infantry. Hill had no difficulty in driving it before him to the first houses in Gettysburg. At 10 o'clock, a.m., General Reynolds marched his cavalry to Buford's assistance, and occupied Seminary Ridge. A ball struck him as he was ranging his men in order of battle. In him Meade lost one of his best and most energetic division generals. His soldiers, led by General Doubleday, avenged the death of their commander by a well-conducted charge, making the Southern General Archer a prisoner, together with a part of his brigade.

Hill, however, coming to the succour of his side, put in line 14,000 men, and drove back the Unionists. To both parties reinforcements flowed in. Howard, with the Federal 11th corps, arrived on the ground at midday, and took the command. The Federals had at least 20,000 infantry. Ewell, who was coming from Carlisle, hastened forward at the report of cannon, and emerged on the ground from the north, shortly after noon, with Rodes's division; Early's followed. The arrival of these reinforcements increased the Confederates to 22,000 men. Rodes assaulted the Federal flank, and the combat was very sharp. Hill at the same moment attacked the enemy's front. It already began to waver when Early appeared, and, by a magnificent charge, completed the work, as regarded the 11th corps, the whole Federal line being thrown into disorder. Howard was driven through and beyond the village. The general had had the prudence to leave one of his divisions in reserve on the top of Cemetery Hill. Thanks to this intact nucleus he could rally his troops; and thanks in particular to the falling night the battle ceased.

Against Early's opinion, who wished to take the heights without losing a moment, Ewell and Hill judged it most prudent to await the morning. Johnson and Anderson's divisions, each forming

one-third of their respective corps, had not yet come; the positions occupied by the enemy seemed formidable, and it was not known whether there were any reserves behind the Federal troops they had just fought. Further, the success they had gained in the conflict had cost them dear.

They resolved, therefore, to be content with having completely defeated two corps of the Union army, with having taken 5000 prisoners and several guns. It is easy for us, after the event, and with our knowledge of all that had passed, to see that they let their one great opportunity escape. But having only the facts under their eyes to guide them, the resolution they came to was wise and sensible.

General Lee had sent orders to Hill to continue the pursuit; but when he arrived in person he found Hill had left off, and recalled his troops; the general-in-chief, therefore, at that advanced hour was compelled to postpone any further movement till the next day.

As for General Meade, he had just ordered a concentration on Pipe Creek, when he heard of the Confederate attack on Gettysburg and the death of Reynolds. He at once sent General Hancock to take the command, enjoining him to let him know whether, in his opinion, the Gettysburg position was one in which to accept battle. Hancock arrived on the spot after the fight had ended. He placed his troops, examined the position, and sent Meade a report counselling him to concentrate all his army at Gettysburg. Truth to speak, after what had just happened, there was nothing else to do, except he chose to give up the palm of victory to his adversary without further resistance. Generals Sickles and Slocum arrived on the ground at night, and occupied the positions there assigned them, while Meade hastened the arrival of the rest of his army in the night between the 1st and 2nd of July, and in the morning of the 2nd.

Whatever may have been Lee's original plan, he was now in the presence of all the Federal army, and had come to blows with

it. It was hardly possible to refuse battle. To withdraw from it would have been to leave to the enemy all the moral results of a victory. To beat a retreat before an enemy superior in numbers was not an easy thing; to maintain his stand and feed his army in a hostile country, without getting the mastery of so formidable an adversary, presented great dangers. On the other hand, the Northern Virginian army had never been in a better condition; the struggle of the preceding day, which had destroyed the fourth of the Federal forces, appeared to augur favourably, and in case of a decisive triumph the fruits of victory promised to be greater than ever. The North and its great cities would be at the mercy of the conqueror, who would thus neutralise the Federal successes in the west, and throw the Washington Government into a state of consternation. There was no room to hesitate; he must fight.

During this evening and the following night, Lee made use of all the means at his disposal to get an account of Meade's force and the positions he occupied. Unfortunately, Stuart and his cavalry had not yet come. To the south of Gettysburg, where the last houses end, and overhanging the little town, the ground rises abruptly, and stretches in a southern direction, terminating suddenly with a height called Round Top. The cemetery on the elevation nearest Gettysburg has given its name to this range of hills. Just where it touches the village the elevated ground turns sharply west, nearly at right angles to its former direction. On this part of the heights, termed Cap Hill, the Federal right was drawn up. The 12th corps there took position, then the 1st and 11th corps behind the town. On their left were the 5th, 2nd, and 3rd corps. The 6th did not appear till late next day. These positions were taken by Meade in the order in which his troops arrived on the battle-field, in the night between July 1st and 2nd, and in the morning of the latter day. His army numbered 100,000 fighting-men.

The Confederate commander was joined, during the night, by Johnson's division, which he placed to the extreme left of Ewell's

corps, and facing Slocum's. Ewell's corps, forming the Confederate left, was prolonged through the village, and was to assist Hill in the centre; Anderson's division was on Hill's right. Beyond came Longstreet's corps, with the divisions of MacLaws and Hood, forming the right of Lee's army. Stuart, who at length arrived from Carlisle with his cavalry, had to station himself on the left.

More than half of July 2nd had passed before Lee had finished all his preparations. During the morning nothing of importance took place, except an artillery duel towards the left, between Johnson and the troops opposed to him. Neither of the two adversaries cared to begin the attack. Lee had said in his report that, unless attacked, he would not deliver battle so far from his base. Meade has since confessed that he wished to remain on the defensive. But the Federals had this great advantage—an easy communication with the rest of the country, while Lee was surrounded by a hostile population, at a distance from his magazines, and the districts whence he drew his supplies. He must therefore attack or retreat. The latter course, as already indicated, was inadmissible. He saw himself, therefore, compelled to attack.

General Meade, it would appear, thought of taking the offensive against the Confederate left, but gave up this idea on the advice of Generals Warren and Slocum. On the Confederate right Longstreet was preparing to attack. On this side the Federal lines were posted in advance, 1100 yards at the most, beyond Cemetery Ridge, and occupied heights less elevated than the principal chain. Here was stationed Sickles's corps, the 3rd; it thus formed the Federal left. Longstreet, supported by a part of Hill's corps, made on it a vigorous assault. The conflict was sharp, and, although Sickles was supported by Hancock on his right, and Sykes, with the 5th corps, on his left, he was compelled to yield, and retire with great loss. Sykes, however, was able to maintain his ground at Round Top, while Meade, hastily summoning the 6th corps, with detachments from the 1st and 12th,

re-formed his line on the crest of the principal chain, and arrested Longstreet's progress.

The whole Federal left had been driven from its position, which the Confederates occupied. Meanwhile, Ewell, with the left wing, was preparing to make a vigorous onset on the enemy fronting him, but the attack came too late to hinder Slocum sending reinforcements to Sickles. Thus it happened that, for want of united action, the Confederates obtained no serious advantage, although the fight did not end till night, when Johnson had carried a part of the hostile works by assault, and Early had driven the Federal lines to Cemetery Hill.

Darkness overtook the two armies, and though Lee's successes were not so marked this day as the evening before, they were still considerable. A wing of the Federal army had been driven back with immense loss; his own troops were actually placed so as to be able to attack the principal positions of the enemy, the very key of the field of battle, and if they became masters of it, the Federals were done for. His own loss, though great, had in nowise weakened his soldiers' moral force. General Meade has confessed that in those two days he had already lost 20,000 men. The Confederate loss amounted to 12,000 at the most. Everything seemed to indicate that the Southerners would finally triumph, notwithstanding the strong position held by the Northern army, its numerical superiority, and its much more powerful artillery. The best proof of this is, that that same night the Federal commander held a council of war, in which the question was seriously discussed whether or not to retreat. Several members of the council voted for retreat, and General Butterfield testifies that Meade was far from approving the decision of the majority, who voted for the maintenance of their position, at the risk of having to renew the conflict on the morrow.

Lee made but little change in his order of battle for July 3rd. Pickett's division of Longstreet's corps, having arrived during the night, brought him 4000 soldiers who had not yet been engaged.

The Confederate line was of great extent, which rendered it difficult to make an assault of all the combined forces on the Federal positions. The absence of unity had already prevented Lee, on the 2nd, from seizing the victory which seemed within his reach. He therefore directed all his efforts and took all precautions to hinder the same thing from being reproduced on the morrow, but, as the event proved, with little success. The enemy occupied Round Top, and thus his flank was strongly protected. Consequently, Longstreet's attack was to be directed against that part of the heights between Round Top and Cemetery Hill, which formed the left centre of Meade's position. It was there that Hancock commanded. Meanwhile, Ewell was to pursue the advantage gained by Johnson on the right flank of the Federals. Heth's division, and two brigades under Wilcox, from Hill's corps, were directed to support Longstreet, while to the rest of the Confederate forces was confided the care of engaging the attention of those troops of the enemy facing them.

At dawn, Ewell was to follow up his success of the previous evening by attacking the Federal right anew. But he was anticipated. The troops detached the evening before from Slocum's corps, to go to the help of Sickles and Sykes, returned during the night, and fell on the advanced works of which Johnson had become master the day previously. An eager contest ensued, and lasted several hours. Johnson repulsed their assaults without being able to subdue the enemy. Twice he charged the Federal line, and twice he had to recoil.

While this was being transacted on the left, where the combat went on till noon, nothing was stirring anywhere else along the line. This unlooked for assault on Ewell undoubtedly deranged Lee's plan, according to which the two wings were to attack simultaneously. Longstreet unfortunately had not yet finished his preparations for the assault, and the artillery was being massed on Seminary Ridge. It was a fine July day, the weather was warm and bright, and as the fire ceased in the front of Johnson's

division, everything became tranquil. It was difficult, when glancing over this valley and village, so peaceful, both inundated with sunlight, to believe that the quiet was but the precursor of a sanguinary tempest which would render this obscure place imperishably renowned.

Seeing the impossibility of succeeding against the Federal right, Lee changed his plan, and resolved to attack the enemy's centre. Between one and two o'clock everything was at length ready. One hundred and fifteen guns covered Seminary Ridge. Pickett's division, which Lee constituted the nucleus of his column of attack, was in position. At a given signal the artillery opened fire on the opposite heights. Meade, for want of room, had been able to bring into line only 70 or 80 cannon; but, having more than 200 in reserve, as one piece was dismounted it was easy for him to replace it by another. This artillery duel lasted incessantly for two hours. Gradually on the Federal side the fire slackened, till it ceased entirely. At this moment Lee gave the signal to attack.

General Pickett's division, supported on the left by Heth's division under the orders of General Pettigrew, and on the right by General Wilcox with two brigades, was charged to take the Federal positions. Pickett's division was composed of the *élite* of the veterans of Virginia. The attacking column altogether counted 13,000 bayonets. Thirteen hundred yards of plain and hill separated it from the hostile lines. The advance was made with admirable firmness. When the columns of attack reached the Emmetsburg road, the Confederate batteries in the bottom of the valley became silent, so as not to fire on their own infantry. The enemy received them with repeated discharges of grape-shot, which carried off entire ranks of the Confederates. Without wavering, without hesitating, the line continued to advance, forcing, even from their enemies, cries of admiration. Suddenly, when they touched the summit of the heights, all the line of Federal infantry fired. Pettigrew's division, in spite of all the efforts of its chief, left the ranks, and its officers were powerless

to rally the men. Disorder also began to appear in Wilcox's brigades, so that Pickett's division found itself alone, its flanks exposed to an oblique fire from right to left, and the head of its columns torn by bombshells and grape-shot. But nothing could arrest it. Its commander, unceasingly exciting his men by voice and gesture, led them through this shower of cannon-balls right on the enemy's works. The Federal line was broken, the guns taken, and the troops that had defended them routed. Cries of triumph announced to their comrades that they had swept all before them. In the midst of clouds of smoke, General Lee, with his telescope, could distinguish the blue flag of Virginia floating over Cemetery Ridge.

But this dearly-bought success was as short as glorious. The Federals, thrown back on their second line, re-formed there, and rained down on the works just snatched from them a terrible fire. Pickett at this supreme moment was alone; the divisions which should have supported him were not at their post. Had he at that instant been supported and seconded, this day would have added another disaster to those already so numerous of the army of the Potomac. But this heroic charge had been in vain. General Hancock displayed great courage and rare ability in repairing his repulse. He hurled on the two flanks of Pickett's division all the troops available, while on the front of this devoted band he kept up an incessant fire. The struggle was short, but terrible. All that the courage of despair could do was done. Of the three brigade-generals: Garnett was slain, Armistead mortally wounded, Kemper wounded and taken prisoner. Of fourteen superior officers, one only returned. Nearly three-fourths of the division had fallen, and Pickett at length was compelled to think about saving the rest. He sounded a retreat, and the remnants of this heroic column slowly retired within the Confederate lines. General Wilcox, who had not sufficiently supported Pickett's charge, marched in his turn to take the heights, but his men were also repulsed with loss.

The Federals likewise had dearly paid for their victory ; many of their generals, among others, Hancock and Gibbon, were wounded and several thousands of their men were disabled.

From Seminary Ridge, where he was, Lee had followed the charge. At the sight of his soldiers driven back from the heights he bit the ends of his fingers, the only sign of anxiety he ever gave. Then, an instant after, feeling the importance of the crisis, he went personally into the midst of the soldiers in disorder, to rally them, addressing to them words of encouragement and affection, without the least display of temper, without despondency.

"All this," said he, "will come right in the end. We'll talk it over afterwards, but in the meantime all good men must rally." He inquired of the wounded what were their injuries. He encouraged those who were only slightly grazed to bandage their sores, and seize a rifle at so critical a moment. Nearly all responded to this appeal, and resumed their places in the ranks with cries of enthusiasm. Many of the more seriously wounded cheered him as he passed.

"Even in this moment of anguish," said Colonel Fremantle, who took part in the battle, "with one voice the magnificent charge of Pickett was admired, and the soldiers did not cease to assure me of their unshaken faith in their general-in-chief. '*We have not lost confidence in our old man!*' '*This day's work will do him no harm!*' '*Uncle Robert will get us into Washington yet—you bet he will!*'—such were some of the exclamations which I heard round me."

The Confederate soldiers returned in a mob, pursued by the growling of hostile cannon, which swept all the valley and the slopes of Seminary Ridge with balls and shells. Although exposing himself with the utmost indifference, Lee advised Colonel Fremantle, the English officer already cited, to get under cover, adding: "This has been a sad day for us, Colonel—a sad day—but we can't always expect to gain victories."

But when General Wilcox announced to him that he also had

been repulsed, Lee showed himself truly sublime. The former could scarce speak, so much moved was he in giving an account of his losses. Lee, taking him by the hand, said sweetly, so as to console him: "Never mind, General; all this has been my fault. It is I that have lost this fight, and you must help me out of it in the best way you can." His composure, his even temper, did not fail him a moment. This imperturbable serenity communicated itself to the soldiers, who were lying under shelter from the fire, arranged in order of battle, on the reverse side of the hill, in an edge of the wood, where Lee placed them as they arrived.

Foreseeing the possibility of an attack by the Federals, Longstreet, whose two divisions, those of MacLaws and Hood, had not been engaged, held himself ready to receive them. "The preparations were made," said Colonel Fremantle, "with less noise and confusion than at a review."

But General Meade, although he had successfully repulsed the assault on his lines, had suffered too much in the battle of the 3rd, as well as in the struggles of the two preceding days, to push his advantage further. In spite of the opinion of many of his best officers, he abstained from all offensive movement, and he did well: for Longstreet awaited him with his two divisions and numerous guns, all ready to receive him. The Confederates earnestly hoped that Meade would advance against them, but he did nothing of the kind. The rest of the 3rd passed quietly, and at night the Federals were content to occupy the lines they had held all the day.

The Confederate army had suffered much the last day, and, when Pickett's assault was repulsed, Lee did not wish to risk an attack on the Federal positions. During the night Ewell's corps retired from the town and posted itself on Seminary Ridge, where, next day, all the Confederate forces were reunited. Lee thus remained on the 4th of July, hoping his adversary would attack him. But Meade kept on the defensive, and the Southern chief had leisure to occupy himself in the transport of his wounded, the collection of arms left on the field of battle, and the despatch of

his trains and baggage, as well as his 4000 prisoners, towards the Potomac. Not wishing to hazard a new assault on the Federal lines, feeling how difficult it would be for him to feed his men in a hostile country, in the presence of an enemy superior in number, and his ammunition beginning to fail, Lee determined to beat a retreat. In the night of the 4th the Confederate troops began to defile towards the Potomac. On the 6th and 7th they reached Hagerstown.

During the whole of the 4th, Meade showed no sign of disquieting his adversary. Truth to tell, the Federal army was not in a state to undertake anything. Its losses during the three days amounted to 23,190 men.[1] The Confederates had lost from 18,000 to 20,000, killed, wounded, and prisoners; among the latter many were wounded. But while the official Federal reports acknowledge a loss of 23,190 men, killed, wounded, and prisoners, their army was so demoralized and dispersed by this three days' struggle, that the commanders of corps, at a council of war held by Meade on the night of the 4th, asserted that the army scarcely presented 52,000 efficient soldiers. One of the questions discussed at this council was, *whether the Federal army should beat a retreat;* and General Biney testifies *that it was decided to wait twenty-four hours longer, merely to collect the fullest information as to Lee's movements.* And yet Gettysburg has been called a Confederate Waterloo! Lee was not vanquished, but he had not succeeded, and so far only was Gettysburg a Federal victory.

Though diminished in number, the Southern army had lost nothing of its moral energy. The proof of this is that Lee waited upwards of thirty hours before retiring, thus showing that he was ready to recommence if the enemy took the offensive.

No one can pretend to say what would have happened if the Federals had assaulted the Confederate positions, but to conclude that Lee's army would have been put to flight appears to us more than hazardous. Far from being downcast or discouraged, the Confederate soldiers burned to take an immediate revenge. Several foreign officers who took part in the battle testify that the

behaviour of the soldiers was all that could be desired. Longstreet was strong enough, at the head of his two divisions, supported by his powerful artillery, to deal the enemy, should he attack, as terrible a blow as that which General Pickett had just experienced. For that matter, General Meade's own testimony confirms our view of the case. When he appeared before the war-committee he said: "My opinion is, *now*, that General Lee evacuated that position, not from the fear that he would be dislodged from it by any active operations on my part, but that he was fearful that a force would be sent to Harper's Ferry to cut off his communications. . . That was what caused him to retire."

On the question being asked: "Did you discover, after the battle of Gettysburg, any symptoms of demoralization in Lee's army?" Meade replied: "No, sir, I saw nothing of the kind." To us, indeed, there is no reason why Lee should have had any serious fears on the subject of his army, which, after all its losses, still numbered 50,000 men, who for the most part had served several campaigns, and at whose head, as experience had proved, he could hold his own against any Federal army whatever. At Chancellorsville he had defeated an army more numerous than that of Meade with less men. It was the failure of supplies which constrained the Southern chief to retire, and especially the want of ammunition. The three days' conflict at Gettysburg had nearly exhausted his stock of powder, cartridges, and balls. The difficulty of re-victualling was becoming very great, for the enemy was approaching on all sides, and threatened his rear.

All these motives contributed to the determination which Lee took. The Confederate troops passed the evening and night of the 3rd, as well as the day of the 4th of July, drawn up in battle array on Seminary Ridge, to await the Federal attack with firm foot. They employed this time in burying their dead, gathering up arms and *débris*, and sending on in advance their carriages, waggons, and wounded. On the night of the 4th, the retreat commenced by two roads, those of Fairfield and Chambersburg,

without any haste, disorder, or confusion. The rear-guard did not leave Gettysburg till the morning of the 5th.

In spite of the dust which covered them, of the bandages which enveloped their wounds, of their fatigue, the soldiers of Lee marched resolutely, still full of fire and dash, ready, at the first order from their chief, to face about, and cross swords again with the adversary, animated by the same ardour as when they advanced as conquerors.

The task before the Southern chief was nevertheless very difficult. His army was inferior in number to that of his enemy. The Government of the North had under its control the railways coming from the East, which led to the Upper Potomac, and could thus, independently of Meade's army, place a considerable force across the line of the Confederate retreat. Further, his march was encumbered by 4,000 prisoners, and a long file of provision and ammunition waggons extending over fourteen miles. The road he had to travel was long; there was a fear that Meade would try to intercept him from the river. To lead his army through all these dangers, and conduct it safely back to the soil of Virginia, not only required very great skill, but also great moral courage. Happily the soldiers' confidence in their illustrious commander did not weaken; and, as long as they knew he was at their head, they felt assured of issuing safe and sound out of all trials.

On the morning of the 5th, as soon as Meade discovered Lee's retreat, Sedgwick's corps was sent in pursuit. The bulk of the army took the Frederick road. But Sedgwick stopped at Fairfield without pushing on further, Meade not wishing to run any risk. The Confederates slowly defiled through Cashtown and Fairfield, preceded by their conveyances, and reached Hagerstown without being disquieted. Meanwhile the Federal general-in-chief, who had been joined by several thousand new troops, fresh arrived from Washington, followed Lee at a distance by the roundabout way of Frederick, and on the 12th appeared before the Confederate positions.

The latter, arriving at Hagerstown on the 7th, found themselves stopped by a new obstacle. The drenching rains of the last few days had so increased the waters of the Potomac that it was not fordable. The bridges had been carried away by the current, or destroyed by flying squadrons of the enemy's cavalry. Being unable to cross the river, Lee selected a strong position, his right resting on the Potomac at Falling Waters, and his left at Hagerstown, so as to cover the fords at Williamsport and Falling Waters. From the 7th to the 13th, his position was critical. Ammunition failed him, and the provisions brought back from Pennsylvania were coming to an end. The rise of the waters hindered the arrival of anything from Virginia, while Meade's whole army was approaching. On the 12th the Federals appeared in sight. That day, and the next, Lee expected to be attacked. But far from that, Meade only thought of throwing up earthworks and intrenching himself, so redoubtable seemed Lee to him. At that critical moment, however anxious he might be, and there was much to be troubled about, Lee let no emotion appear. Having behind him a river that had overflowed, before him a foe to whom reinforcements incessantly came, his position was becoming truly perilous. But the Southern chief lost neither his own self-reliance nor the confidence inspired in him by his soldiers, but appeared ready for every event.

While Meade hesitated, Lee reconstructed his pontoons, and, the waters having abated and the river become fordable on the 13th, the artillery and conveyances crossed the Potomac in the night between that day and the 14th. The state of the roads was so execrable that the troops did not arrive at the bridge till after sunrise on the 14th. It was an hour past noon before they had all crossed and the last bridge was broken. During all the long hours the defile lasted, Lee, on horseback, under a deluge of rain, sometimes galloping from the ford to the bridge, sometimes returning, sometimes motionless, watched over everything; he himself remained impassive. But these days of extreme fatigue, these

nights of watching and anxiety, ended by exhausting him. When the greater part of the rear-guard had, without accident, crossed the bridge, shaken by the current, on which, for a long time, he had fixed an anxious gaze, he could not suppress a cry of relief, as if a great weight were lifted from his heart. Noticing his exhaustion, General Stuart offered him a little coffee. Lee drank it at a draught. "Never," said he, returning the glass, "have I drank anything so delicious."

The enemy in no way opposed the passage, which was successfully accomplished without any loss, except two cannon which stuck fast in the mud, and which had to be left for want of horses, and some tardy stragglers.

On the 12th, General Meade had submitted it to a council of war, whether or not to attack the Confederate army. Although General French with 8000 men, besides various corps of new levies, had reinforced the army, the council nearly unanimously pronounced against an attack, a decided proof of the state in which the Northern troops were. On the morning of the 14th, seeing the Southern works abandoned, Meade sent his cavalry in pursuit, but without result, some insignificant skirmishes excepted.

Great was the irritation in the North, when it was known that the Southern army had re-crossed into Virginia; there had been no doubt that Meade would succeed in destroying the Confederates: hence the reaction against those charged with the conduct of the campaign was very passionate.

Lee, after having passed the Potomac, halted near Winchester, where he gave his men several days' rest. On the 17th a strong detachment of hostile cavalry crossed the river at Harper's Ferry, and advanced into the neighbourhood of Martinsburg. General Fitz-Lee attacked it at Kearneysville, and drove it to the other side of the Potomac, inflicting on it great loss.

In consequence of Meade's movements, who had crossed the river at Berlin some days after, and marched along the eastern side of the Blue Ridge, Lee led his army through Front Royal

towards the line of the Rappahannock. This retreat happened without striking incidents, except an attempt made by a strong column of the enemy to surround the Confederate rear-guard, by suddenly penetrating into the Valley through Manassas Gap. But it had not the desired success, and, Meade finally abandoning a harassing course, the Confederates reached the Rappahannock on August 1st.

Shortly after, President Davis decreed, all over the country, a day of humiliation and public prayer. Lee, on this occasion, published the following beautiful order of the day:

"Head-quarters, Army of Northern Virginia,
"August 13th, 1863.

"GENERAL ORDERS, No. 83.

"The President of the Confederate States has, in the name of the people, appointed the 21st day of August as a day of fasting, humiliation, and prayer. A strict observance of the day is enjoined upon the officers and soldiers of this army. All military duties, except such as are absolutely necessary, will be suspended. The commanding officers of brigades are requested to cause divine service, suitable to the occasion, to be performed in their respective commands.

"Soldiers! we have sinned against Almighty God. We have forgotten His signal mercies, and have cultivated a revengeful, haughty, and boastful spirit. We have not remembered that the defenders of a just cause should be pure in His eyes, that *our times are in His hands*, and we have relied too much on our own arms for the achievement of our independence. God is our *only refuge and our strength.* Let us humble ourselves before Him. Let us confess our many sins, and beseech Him to give us a higher courage, a purer patriotism, and more determined will; that He will convert the hearts of our enemies; that He will hasten the time when war, with its sorrows and sufferings, shall cease, and that He will give us a name and a place among the nations of the earth.

"R. E. LEE, General."

In fact, the campaign was finished. For several weeks the two armies remained stationary, observing each other, on the two banks of the Rappahannock. In September, Lee had to detach Longstreet with one-third of the army to carry help to General Bragg in Tennessee. Meade likewise sent a part of the Federal troops into South Carolina.

Although the Federal army by this means was weakened, it still remained much superior in numbers to Lee's. Nevertheless, the latter resolved to strike a blow, the effect of which would be to drive back the enemy beyond the line of the Rappahannock, till the season of military operations was past. To this end he endeavoured so to manœuvre as to turn the right wing of his adversary, and place his own army between the Federals and their capital. He sought, according to his own words, to compel Meade to measure his strength with him in a pitched battle, but it was important to each, before coming to blows, to have the advantage in position.

Rapid though Lee's movements were, an affair between the outposts on the 10th of October, at Culpepper Court House, revealed to the Federal chief the danger he ran. On the 11th he abandoned the line of the Rappahannock, and his cavalry, under Buford, was driven back by Fitz-Lee's division to Brandy Station. General Lee followed Meade to Warrenton, where he concentrated his forces on the 13th. Meade's movements betrayed embarrassment and hesitation. For a moment he thought of disputing the passage of the Upper Rappahannock at Warrenton Springs and Freeman's Ford, but gave it up. Meanwhile, Lee kept advancing. Ewell chased the Federals before him, and drove General Warren across Cedar Run, then he hastened, by going through Auburn to join Hill at Bristoe Station. Lee thus hoped to forestall Meade and seize on the railway, and so bar the road to Washington. But the Northern commander, by marching all the 14th, arrived at Centreville, where he reckoned on delivering battle, having, should fortune not smile on him, the further resource of easily taking

shelter within the lines of the capital. At Bristoe, Hill found only the Federal rear-guard. Too feeble, in Longstreet's absence, to attack positions so strong as those of Centreville, and perceiving no advantage in making a demonstration on one of the Federal flanks, the only result of which would have been to cause Meade to retire within the lines of Washington, with no profit to the Confederates, Lee, on the 18th, withdrew, and, first destroying the railway, returned to his old positions on the Rappahannock.

On the 7th of November, Meade re-appeared on the northern bank of the river; but Lee, having no wish to engage in a pitched battle, retired behind the Rapidan, and thus Meade took again his old positions. His army amounted to from 60,000 to 70,000 men, that of the Confederates from 30,000 to 33,000 men, many of them having neither shoes, nor blankets, nor cloaks, notwithstanding the inclemency of the month of December, as Lee pointed out in a letter to the minister of war. He complained bitterly of the destitution in which his brave soldiers were left.

On the 26th of November, Meade renewed his efforts to deal the Confederate army a decisive blow. Lee's troops were dispersed over a somewhat large extent of country. The impoverishment of all this district, and the difficulty of feeding an army, had rendered such a dispersion necessary. Nevertheless, all precautions had been taken to concentrate the scattered detachments rapidly, in case of danger. Strong intrenchments had been raised in places naturally strong on the Mine Run, a tributary of the Rapidan, flowing from south to north.

It was the first time Lee had made use of a system of parapets, formed of trunks of felled trees, behind which earth was heaped up; the whole being impenetrable to cannon-balls. This system of defence became celebrated.

At the news that the enemy was preparing to cross this river suddenly, in the hope of surprising him, Lee rapidly executed his movement of concentration, and when Meade, after some skirmishes sufficiently sanguinary, found himself abruptly stopped at the

passage of the Mine Run, he perceived that Lee's position was impregnable. The provisions brought by his soldiers were nearly exhausted, and the rainy season, so disastrous to an army in Virginia, was approaching. There was nothing for it, therefore, but to beat a retreat. This he did on the night of the 1st of December. The Confederates, next morning, pursued him to the Rapidan, making some prisoners. This was the end of military operations in 1863.

Such is a recapitulation of the campaign of Gettysburg. Lee's object at its commencement has been as much misunderstood as the after consequences have been exaggerated. We have mentioned the causes which led to its conception. It has been proved that General Lee, at the beginning of the year, was necessarily compelled either to advance, or permit his adversary, after filling up the gaps in his army, to profit by the experience gained at the cost of two defeats, to throw himself on one or other of his flanks, and so repeat the campaign of the year preceding. The ever-increasing inequality between the forces of the combatants, General Hooker receiving two men for every one that came to range himself under the Confederate standards, rendered inaction dangerous. The success gained at Chancellorsville could not produce all its results unless Lee assumed a vigorous offensive.

After the strategic movements which forced Hooker to fall back at first on the line of the Rappahannock, then on that of the Potomac, the end which the Confederate army proposed to itself in penetrating to the heart of Pennsylvania has been indicated. There, in consequence of the absence of his cavalry, the Southern chief found himself unawares in the presence of the Union army, and almost compelled to give battle. The third day's assault at Gettysburg having been repulsed, the successes of the two preceding days were neutralized, and a retreat into Virginia was necessitated. As to the army of the North, it had suffered too much to pursue its advantage: it was satisfied to post itself for

observation on the Rappahannock, while Lee detached a third of his forces to the help of the Confederates in the West.

This campaign, far from being the critical moment of the war, far from having a decisive influence on the result of the struggle, decided nothing. Its importance has been exaggerated, in consequence of the very natural effect of the consternation produced by Lee's invasion of Pennsylvania. The North for some days was the prey of a universal panic, the South gave itself up to exaggerated hopes. To those who were hourly expecting to see Baltimore, Philadelphia, or even New York, succumb to the invader, the news that he had experienced a check at Gettysburg seemed to announce the downfall of Confederate power. Both views, in fact, were equally false. Lee's want of success at Gettysburg caused his army to suffer serious losses, cut short the summer campaign in Pennsylvania, and calmed the anxiety which the North felt on the subject of its great towns. But, in fine, it is no less true that, in weighing the advantages acquired by the two belligerents, the greater part was retained by the Confederates. The loss inflicted on the Federal army reduced it to inaction for the remainder of the year, permitted Lee to maintain himself without disquiet on the Rapidan, and that with only a part of his army, and hindered the execution of the projected movement on Richmond. The invasion of the North kept the enemy's troops from Virginian soil during the harvest, relieved for a time the weight of charges under which its inhabitants groaned, and brought back a comparative abundance to the badly-provided commissariat of the Confederates.

The resources and number of the two armies, as well as the positions occupied by them, did not materially differ on the 1st of August from what they were on the 1st of June; but the campaign against Richmond, which Hooker was preparing to undertake when Lee assumed the offensive, was no longer possible, and this for the South, was a positive gain of one year. If, on the contrary, Lee had remained on the defensive, he could not have reaped the

same advantages. Without speaking of the dangers resulting from inaction, and the difficulty of providing for his army, very poorly indeed, and in an exhausted country, the Federals would only have had to turn its position in order to compel it either to deliver battle in the plain, or retire to a more distant line of defence. Had he succeeded in a second battle of Chancellorsville, the situation would have been the same as after Lee's return to the Rappahannock, with this difference, that a large part of the most fertile lands of Virginia would have remained in the hands of the enemy, who would further have had leisure to disturb the Confederates at other points of the territory.

Although thus the results of Gettysburg were indecisive, it might have been otherwise. If Lee had succeeded in his bold attempt, and overthrown the Federal army, taking its many guns on Cemetery Hill, such a success would have been attended with immense consequences as regards the Confederates. With Pennsylvania and Baltimore in the power of the enemy, the Federal Government must have recalled General Grant from the West. The campaign so fortunately inaugurated in the South-west by the Federals would have been interrupted, and this course of events, the opposite of what happened, would probably have given a marked predominance to the peace party in the North, whence serious embarrassment for the administration of President Lincoln would have arisen. Such fruits would have resulted from a victory, and undoubtedly the thought of them influenced Lee's mind when the conflict occurred to him. For three long summer days victory oscillated in the balance, and fortune would have inclined in his favour had he once been able to make a simultaneous attack with all his forces on the Federal position.

If Gettysburg were, as certain Northern writers affirm, a veritable Waterloo for the Southern cause, how did it happen that General Meade, at the head of his victorious army, did not pursue and crush the Confederate army? Was he not receiving continual reinforcements? Was he not, thanks to the many forces filling

the intrenched camp at Washington, repairing his losses unceasingly? Why did he not, by river and by sea, of both of which he was master, penetrate to the heart of Virginia, and terminate the war by the capture of the Confederate capital?

It was to be otherwise: the colossal strife which for three years the army of Northern Virginia sustained against all the power of the North, with means so insufficient, and soldiers ever decreasing in number, was destined to offer another and final spectacle of incomparable grandeur. The two adversaries, exhausted at Gettysburg, took breath for a moment; then the deadly combat began anew. The eminent man whose talents had so valiantly supported the Confederate cause in the East was to give a further and greater proof of his superiority, and offer, in the marvellous campaign of 1864-65, a model of military skilfulness.

CHAPTER XIV.

BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS, SPOTTSYLVANIA, AND COLD HARBOUR.—OPERATIONS IN THE VALLEY.—COMMENCEMENT OF THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG.

THE Confederate troops had re-occupied their winter cantonments behind the Rapidan. Lee's head-quarters during the autumn and winter were established in a wood on the southern slope of a high hill, Clarke's Mountain, some miles to the east of Orange Court House. Surrounded by his staff, he there led almost a family life. Those who had intercourse with him at that time are loud in their praises of his sweetness, and the perfect equilibrium of his moral qualities.

The charm of his society was very great. Not a shade of pretension, the most perfect sincerity, the simplicity of a child; the more one saw of him, the more one loved him, for, contrary to what generally happens, Lee was greater when near than when at a distance.

During those long weeks of inaction on the Rapidan, his soldiers learned to know him better. In the rough campaigns of the past two years the old warrior had shared their fatigues, and never once had he neglected to watch over them and assist their needs. He had led them under fire, exposing himself with the most perfect indifference; but as much as possible he spared his men's lives, and often, to the displeasure of the civil authorities, he had insisted that, above all things, care should be taken of his veterans. These facts gradually came to their knowledge, and,

from the division-general to the lowest drummer, Lee was adored. The whole army felt that this man, so undemonstrative, so simply clad, sleeping like the commonest soldier in his tent, having in the midst of the wood but a single blanket, was its guide, its protector, incessantly attentive to its welfare, jealous of its dearly-purchased fame, and always ready, as its commander and friend, to defend it.

This winter there arose, among the Confederate soldiers, a movement which often occurs in the United States, especially in the parts most recently colonized, and at certain times of the year. We speak of a certain fermentation, a certain religious excitement. The trials which the Southern populations had undergone, more especially the events experienced by the Northern Virginian army, its present forced inaction, all contributed to reawaken those religious ideas, always powerful with men of the old English or Scotch race. Continually one came across the affecting spectacle of old grey-bearded soldiers, devoutly kneeling in a circle, addressing their humble prayers to Him who hitherto had so visibly protected them. A commander-in-chief educated in a European school would only have compassionately smiled at these sensational assemblies, or have paid them no attention, regarding them as beneath his notice. Lee, on the contrary, contemplated the religious enthusiasm of his soldiers with a pleasure he did not conceal. He went to see them, talking the matter over with the chaplains, and lent the support of his authority to this good work, altogether joyful at witnessing the spread of religious sentiments in his army. The most remarkable feature of this illustrious soldier, the one most deeply rooted in him, the one which regulated all others, was his love towards God. By the world this feeling was called love of duty; but with Lee the word duty was only another name for the Divine will. To search out that will and execute it,—such was, from the first to the last moment of his life, the only aim of the great Virginian.

Perhaps we delay too long in coming to the last great campaign of the war. But in order to thoroughly understand his

conduct in the last days of his public life, it is absolutely necessary to become imbued with the idea that the heart of this man of worth was profoundly convinced of the existence of a Providence whose exalted wisdom rules all things, and that he was resigned beforehand to its impenetrable decrees.

We are about to contemplate the spectacle of a courageous heart meeting adversity and disaster with perfect calm and unflinching resolution. Up to a certain point this impassivity could be attributed to the proud and valiant nature of the man. But a moment of trial approached, in which the courage of the soldier could avail nothing, in which it was no longer possible for human nature, finding its only support here below, not to lose courage entirely, and give up the struggle. In this decisive moment, Lee was still firm, and would not succumb. Few persons were in a position to explain whence came the absolute serenity of his soul, which, without illusion, could behold everything crumbling around him. Not only was it that the pride of the soldier did not yield, but he was also sustained by a sentiment much stronger than human courage: the consciousness of having done his duty, the inward assurance that he was protected by God, whose sublime goodness best knows what is for our well-being.

The final struggle between the two armies still belonged to the future. The veterans of the army of Northern Virginia kept still guarding the line of the Rapidan, and their white-haired commander from his tent in the woods attentively watched the movements of the enemy. During these long winter months his official correspondence, as was usual, occupied him much, and the minute care which he gave to the welfare of his soldiers, as well as preparations for the spring campaign, absorbed the rest of his time. Often he visited the men in their tents. As soon as the general-in-chief appeared in the distance, clad in his grey uniform, covered with a felt sombrero of the same colour, and mounted on his dapple-grey courser, *Traveller*, his old warriors ran up to him on all sides, receiving him with all sorts of tokens of respect and

affection. Sometimes his rides reached the borders of the Rapidan, the outposts, stopping sometimes with one officer, sometimes with another, conversing with all, gaining knowledge about everything, and, in particular, never forgetting to exchange kind words with the private soldiers, and by preference with those who, like himself, were no longer young. His smile, full of good nature, was irresistible, and every old soldier, with his poor tattered uniform, felt how much the general-in-chief looked upon him as a friend and comrade.

There is scarcely a spectacle more alluring, more refreshing, in the midst of the cruel trials of a fratricidal war, than that of the characteristics of a great and good man, in those daily relations which permit him to give play to the effusions of his heart. Simple and affectionate, the old Virginian gentleman has not been forgotten by his soldiers. They recollect him as he appeared to them on many a battle-field, galloping before them in the days of victory. But what above all they do not forget is old *Uncle Robert* as he was during the winters of 1862 and 1863, on the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, coming into their midst, calling each by their name, having a smile for one, a good word for another.

In the early days of May, 1864, commenced the long campaign which was to finish in the downfall of the Confederate Government. In view of this new assault of arms the North had made formidable preparations. New levies were raised to fill up the voids in the Federal ranks. Enormous supplies of provisions and ammunition were accumulated at the central depôts at Washington, and the Government ordered from the West an officer of great reputation to take the command of the Northern troops in Virginia, where, it was more than ever evident, the really decisive blow in this supreme struggle must be struck. Thus, General Grant, to whom we refer, found himself at the head of all the forces of the Republic, estimated at a million men.

In the month of February, 1864, General B. F. Butler had made a dash on the Chickahominy side against Richmond, but retired without accomplishing anything. General Kilpatrick, at

the head of a column of cavalry, had also tried, about the same time, to penetrate to Richmond on the north-west side, in the direction of the Rapidan, with the hope of delivering the Federal prisoners. All the able-bodied men being in Lee's army, it was easy for him to come by surprise pretty near the city, but there he was stopped by some militia hastily assembled. He was compelled to retire as quickly as he came. One of his officers, Colonel Dahlgren, was slain in the skirmish. There was found on him a detailed plan of the projected enterprise, also some papers which proved that, after the prisoners were freed, the city was to be given up to pillage, and the Confederate President and Cabinet put to death. Let it be hoped, for the honour of humanity, that the designs of the Federal chiefs were exaggerated.

Everything favoured General Grant from the moment he took command. His predecessors, MacClellan among others, had had to complain of the Federal authorities, who either lent them only an equivocal support, or actually counteracted them in their plans. The new commander-in-chief, on the contrary, entered on his duties cordially supported by the whole Government, with which he sympathised personally and politically. His powers were unlimited. He was at liberty to concentrate in Virginia whatever troops he liked, and to choose the *élite* of the corps of all the other Union armies. He therefore enrolled under him those regiments which counted the longest service, and that, too, at the moment when his adversary saw his troops diminish in number and vigour daily. It seemed, therefore, probable that he would crush him in the first encounter.

The Federal army on May 1st, 1864, amounted to 141,116 fighting-men. Lee's was only 52,626, a little more than one-third of the forces at Grant's disposal. Ewell's corps numbered 13,000 men, Hill's 17,000, that of Longstreet 10,000. The cavalry and artillery altogether were a trifle more than 10,000. Longstreet, as we have seen, had rejoined Lee, but the Confederates suffered

disadvantages still more serious than those resulting from such a disproportion in numbers. The Southern army was not only numerically feeble, but also half-starved, and in rags. Vainly had General Lee protested energetically against such inconsiderate treatment of an army on which the destinies of the South depended. Whether the fault is chargeable on the authorities, or whether it proceeded from circumstances over which the Government had no control, certain it is that the commissariat department was badly administered, and when the army began the campaign in the early days of May, the soldiers were but half fed, and nowise in a proper state to support the hardships about to be encountered. Things came to this pass, that the meat ration of the Confederate army during the winter season of 1863–4 was only 125 grammes (a trifle above ¼ lb.); further, the meat consisted only of fat pork, which the soldiers melted, and ate on their bread like butter. The bread served out was chiefly of maize, seldom of flour, and that in so small a quantity as to afford only a mouthful. The horses had hardly anything to live on. Several times during the winter, meat and bread were wanting entirely. Lee had even to address to his soldiers an order of the day to quiet their grumblings. He set them an example of frugality, eating meat only twice a week; generally his dinner consisted of cabbage and maize. At one time so great was the distress that Lee wrote to President Davis *that he feared he should be unable to take the field.*

The Confederate Government also was wrong in not enrolling soldiers for a longer period than twelve months. It would have been easy, amid the enthusiasm of the early days, to engage all the Southern volunteers for the whole duration of the war. Gradually the enthusiasm of the population cooled; then it was necessary to have recourse to conscription, a sad measure, but absolutely indispensable. It was hoped it would yield 800,000 men, but official reports at the end of 1863 asserted that scarcely 400,000 had been enrolled. Furloughs, sickness, and desertion reduced this figure by a good third. The terrible privations which

the Confederate army had to endure have much to answer for as regards this deplorable diminution of efficients.

However this may be, there was nothing for the South but to struggle with the energy of despair as long as its strength lasted. It was on the army of Northern Virginia, enfeebled, lessened, half-starved, as we have just seen, that all the weight of the final effort was about to fall. After it there was nothing more. With it triumphed or perished the entire Confederacy.

General Grant and General Lee did not ignore each other. The Federal commander reckoned that the struggle would be long and eager. He cherished no hope of easy and prompt success. His plan, according to the official report, was: "To *hammer continuously* against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until, *by mere attrition*, if by nothing else, there should be nothing left of him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the constitution and the laws."

The horrible sacrifice of men which this plan would entail does not appear to have presented itself for a moment to Grant's mind. But he is not to be reproached for that. In truth there remained no other course for the Federal Government to take. For three years, pitched battles, favourable or unfavourable to the Northern arms, had left the Southern troops as unshaken and dangerous as in the past. Further, this army had become inured to every kind of hardship; these soldiers, accustomed to fatigue, tried by so many dangers, no longer offered an easy prey either to the manœuvres, the assaults, or the surprises of their adversaries. Whether attacked in the front or on the flank, they retreated not a step.

General Grant, therefore, intended to adopt the mathematical and infallible procedure of sacrificing five of his own soldiers for every one of Lee's, positive that the day would come when none remained to the latter.

The Federal chief's first idea was to turn Lee's right, traverse the forest of the Wilderness rapidly, and march straight on

Richmond. This done, he meant to invest the city on the north and west, cross James River at a point above the city, and unite with the 30,000 men whom General Butler, coming from Fortress Monroe, was to lead to City Point. Thus the blockade of Richmond on three sides would be complete.

Had Grant been able to traverse the Wilderness and arrive in the plain before Lee had succeeded in crossing swords with him, his task would have been much facilitated. Thus he had no desire to meet the Confederates on his road. Lee immediately divined Grant's plan. He left the enemy to cross the Rapidan without molestation, in order to attract him into the Wilderness; he counted on falling upon him in this inextricable labyrinth, where his artillery and numerical superiority would be of no service. Further, the Confederates were well acquainted with the district. Lee defiled his army by two parallel roads coming from the west to the east, from Orange Court House to Fredericksburg, and cutting the roads by which the Federals must necessarily emerge in their march from north to south at right angles.

From that moment Lee meant to compel his adversary to execute his plan the wrong way, by placing himself resolutely before him at each step he set. The Federal chief saw himself obliged to pursue a plan which was not in his original project, and of which he had only thought as a makeshift in the last resort.

On the 4th of May, 1864, Grant crossed the Rapidan with all his army at Germanna Ford and other crossings above Chancellorsville. In the Federal army it was thought that Lee would take up a defensive position behind the South Anna. The Southern commander did just the contrary. He marched with his three corps towards the Wilderness, there to deliver battle. It was in this same region, covered with stunted and tufted trees, that General Hooker's defeat had taken place in 1863. Just a year had glided by, and another Federal army was venturing into this sombre and desolate district; another dolorous and more eager conflict was about to redden the ground already so sadly celebrated.

The heads of column of Grant's army, followed by its 4000 waggons and a host of other *impedimenta*, had already arrived at the little inn, the *Wilderness Tavern*, before which Jackson had passed in his flank march on the Federal army in May, 1863. As mentioned above, the Northern staff did not think that Lee, with his small army, would so boldly throw himself in front of the Federals. It was to be supposed that somewhere on the road to Richmond, Lee would halt and fight on a ground of his own choosing, where the chances seemed favourable to him; but the idea had never come into the adversaries' heads that he would himself offer battle.

Such was, however, the bold project of the Southern chief. Ewell, with the vanguard, marched briskly in front, and the same night bivouacked three miles from the enemy. Hill's corps proceeded in a parallel direction on the right, while Longstreet, coming from Gordonsville, conducted his columns along the right of Hill, in order to intercept the Federal van.

Grant, utterly astonished at the presence of the Confederates, whom at first he took for the rear of the Southern army beating a retreat, was exceedingly vexed to be obliged to accept a conflict in the Wilderness, where his numerical superiority was of so little avail. Thinking at first he had only to do with the Confederate rearguard, he simply marched forward three divisions, who soon came to blows, on the morning of the 5th of May, with the troops of Ewell, who commanded the Confederate left. The Federal General Warrenton having been driven back with loss, Grant perceived that the whole Southern army was barring his passage. He sent forward reinforcements, and the contest rapidly extended to the centre, where the strife was obstinate. General Hill persisted in keeping his ground, and the two armies slept on the battle-field. The advantage rested with the Confederates. They had stopped Grant's march and forced him to give battle in spite of himself, repulsing all the Federal efforts to pierce their line, and inflicting on the enemy great losses, taking 2000 prisoners.

Longstreet's corps not being yet in line, Lee did not wish to push his advantage further, preferring to await the reunion of all his forces.

On May 6th, at dawn, the two armies again engaged. The Federal centre, under Hancock, marched furiously on the Confederate centre and right, where Hill commanded. The latter was outnumbered and obliged to yield; his troops fell back in disorder. Happily at that moment Longstreet appeared on the battle-field. For a moment there was great confusion. After a sanguinary scuffle, Longstreet, getting his whole corps into line, drove back the enemy. General Hancock, who commanded the Federal left, had with him, in consequence of numerous reinforcements, nearly half the Federal army. Lee's intention in taking the offensive was to turn Grant's left, which would have obliged him to retire on the Rapidan. Ewell had already, at peep of day, commenced his attack on Sedgwick, on the Federal right wing, when Hancock came to blows with Hill.

It is impossible to describe that battle otherwise than as a blind embrace, a clutching of the body between two vast agglomerations of men hardly able to see each other, and guided rather by sound than sight; amid these shrubs, these thickets, this brushwood, these marshes, they stumbled on each other unawares. There could be no manœuvring. One threw himself on the enemy as on a wild beast, seizing him by the throat; the survivor moved on. Then the curious spectacle was seen of officers leading a charge with a compass in their hands. In such a sinister manner was the campaign of 1864 inaugurated.

'In a semi-darkness 200,000 combatants in blue or grey sought to poignard each other. Till then the war had not been so carried on. The genius of destruction, tired apparently with the old methods of slaying, had lighted on "invisible death." At five in the morning the adversaries presented body to body. Both sides had hastily raised some works in earth and wood, but trifling in all. Each tried to dislodge his foe from these lines, situated a few paces apart, whence the fire of musketry never ceased to be heard.

These lines were scarce visible under the wood; they were, however, lighted up continually by the cracking of rifles; from the depths of the forest arose clamours, cries of triumph; at each moment a column emerged, rushed on the opposing line with enthusiastic shouts, and after a short interval the bruised and crowded remains regained their point of starting. Scarce was one seen; men fell, gasped, died in the thicket, and their groans were drowned in the outrageous clamour of the strife. At ten o'clock Longstreet arrived to recapture the lost ground. Lee enjoined him to follow up his success. Longstreet pursued Hancock closely, and was preparing to drive back the hostile left and get possession of Brock Road, when a Confederate bullet, as had happened to Jackson, disabled him in the moment of triumph.

This accident brought about great disorder, which lasted till Lee's arrival. He took the command himself; but much time had been lost. It was four o'clock before the attack was recommenced, and the enemy, forewarned, had leisure to get prepared. Putting himself at the head of the Texas brigade, Lee sounded the charge. With bare head, white locks floating to the wind, the ardour of combat animating his looks, and his hand pointing to the Federal lines, Lee at that moment was sublime. His soldiers refused to let him expose himself to so great a danger. On their supplications, he had to give up leading them to the assault. Advancing, with cries a thousand times repeated, Longstreet's soldiers drove everything before them, and planted their standards on the enemy's works. The carnage was frightful, and to increase the horror, the brushwood caught fire. Smoke and flame blinded and enveloped the combatants. A part of the Federal works fell into the hands of the Confederates, but this success was without decisive result, for night fell too quickly for them to profit by it. The Confederates lost in these two days 7000 men, killed and wounded; the Federal loss amounted to nearly 20,000.

Nevertheless the indecisive battles of the 5th and 6th of May caused Grant to come to a resolution to issue as soon as possible

from these inextricable thickets, where all deploying of his forces was impossible, and where his foe had had the address to stop him. On the 7th he kept quiet, but the same night he rapidly defiled in the direction of Hanover Junction, following the road to Spottsylvania Court House.

Lee had remained completely stationary all the 7th, watching his enemy. He well perceived that Grant would not retire. Far from that; he had an instinct that he would push on; so much so, that at nine o'clock the same night, at the very moment when the Federal columns were likewise moving forward, General Anderson, with Longstreet's corps, preceded by Stuart's scouts, marched towards Spottsylvania Court House. He had fifteen miles to travel. All night these two hostile columns contended in speed. At every step Fitz-Lee's cavalry worried the Federals by means of felled trees, so stopping the columns of Hancock. Grant's van arrived at Spottsylvania after sunset: but the Confederates were already there, and rendered all General Warren's efforts to get possession of it useless. Lee still barred the road to Richmond. A second time Grant saw himself foiled in the attempt. At nightfall the two armies encamped opposite each other, separated by a watercourse, the Pô. The rapidity of the Southern chief's movements had hindered Grant from occupying the important strategic point, Spottsylvania Court House.

The Southern army had taken position on a range of heights not far from the watercourse mentioned above, one of the four tributaries of the Mattapony, which partly covered the Confederate line. All the 9th the two armies were occupied in intrenching themselves by means of felled trees all along their respective positions. These works are still to be seen. On the 9th and 10th Grant endeavoured to turn the Confederate left, but without result, although the contest lasted all day, and was very murderous. The Federal commander, after having tried the two flanks of his adversary, resolved to throw himself on his centre unawares. On the 12th, at 4 a.m., the Federal columns, in close masses of chosen

troops, profited by the unevenness of the ground to march on an advanced work situated near the centre of the Confederate line. By an error much to be regretted this point the evening before had been partly stripped of its artillery. General Johnson, in command of this part of the line, observing that the enemy was concentrating his forces in its vicinity, urgently demanded reinforcements, and above all, recalled the guns. But before there could be any response to his appeal, the Federals, at 4.30 a.m., rushed on the work, routed its defenders, became masters of the place, and took 3000 prisoners, among whom was General Johnson.

Hancock lost not a moment in taking advantage of his success, but was soon arrested by a second line of defence. Generals Gordon, Rodes, and Wilcox, hastening up with their divisions, resisted all his efforts. In spite of repeated assaults on this point, and although the two Federal wings had likewise engaged the Confederate right and left, nothing could shake the firmness of Lee's position. The combat lasted till midnight. The Confederate chief did not, indeed, succeed in recapturing the work lost by Johnson, but he nullified all his adversary's attempts to pierce his centre. The capture of Johnson's 3000 men and 18 cannon was cruelly avenged; the Federal loss amounted to upwards of 8000 men. On the 13th and 14th Grant again sought to pierce the Confederate lines; but on the 18th, the date of his last effort, he definitively abandoned his project. Since the 4th, the day on which he passed the Rapidan, the Northern army had lost 40,000 men, and its moral force suffered thereby. Grant decided, therefore, to take another road to Richmond.

Numerous reinforcements unceasingly came to join the army of the North, and raised it to the figure of 140,000 men, while Lee's little army, continually diminished by these combats, numbered less than 40,000.

On the 21st of May, Lee learnt from his scouts that Grant's army was on the move, marching towards the line of the North Anna. The same evening the Confederate commander started

with his first columns in the direction of Hanover Junction, and on the evening of the 22nd reached the southern bank of the North Anna.

When General Grant next morning arrived on the southern bank of this same river, he found there the Confederate army ranged in order of battle to dispute his passage. The position occupied by Lee was very important. Behind the river, at the distance of nearly two miles, is Hanover Junction, the place where the Central Railway of Virginia meets that leading from Richmond to Fredericksburg. It was by the Central the Confederates received most of their supplies, for this was the most direct mode of communication with the Shenandoah Valley.

Grant wished to cross the North Anna by main force, impatient at always having the same adversary before him. He began by ordering his extreme right and extreme left to cross the river. Lee allowed this to be done, confident of paralysing his adversary's movements when he chose. But Grant's difficulty was the bringing up of the bulk of his army in order to connect the two wings. Lee earnestly hoped Grant would attack him. A glance at the map will show his reason for this. The two points where the Federals had effected their passage were over five miles apart. At Oxford Mills, half-way between them, Lee had strongly posted his centre on the river itself. His right extended beyond Hanover Junction, inclining to the South; his left, going from east to west, touched Little River. His two wings were protected by swamps and watercourses, the whole being defended by earth-works. His centre, abutting on the North Anna, was thus interposed between the two Federal wings, effectually hindering them from intercommunication south of the river. Thus the Confederate lines formed the two sides of an obtuse angle, so that Grant could only attack it with a part of his forces at a time, unless, at least, he crossed the river twice, while the Confederates had the advantage of being able to concentrate themselves on any point menaced, or to mass themselves to fall on the Federal right or left, at the same

time hindering one of the enemy's wings from coming to the help of the other.

This combination of Lee's was the work of a master in the art of war. Without striking a blow, he had just reduced to nothing all Grant's plans, and endangered the Federal wings. A vigorous onset by the Federals against Lee's centre made no change in the state of affairs, and if Grant had not quickly withdrawn from the net into which he had strayed, his temerity would have ended in a disaster. Had Lee's army been sufficiently numerous to allow him at that moment to assume a vigorous offensive, the Federals would have had much difficulty in getting out of the mess. But Lee's first duty was to watch jealously the preservation of the feeble resources which remained to him. His comparative weakness, much to his regret, allowed his adversary in the night of May 26th to recross the North Anna without opposition.

Sheridan, the commander of the Northern cavalry, had been directed, at the moment when Grant moved on Spottsylvania Court House, to make a demonstration from the side of Richmond, and cut off all the ways leading to this capital. He partly succeeded, but, on trying to penetrate to Richmond, he was repulsed. The only remarkable incident of this expedition was the death of General Stuart. This brilliant commander of the Southern cavalry, being directed to pursue Sheridan, had overtaken him at *Yellow Tavern*, not far from Richmond. An eager *mêlée* took place, and it was in trying to supplement his meagre forces by the fury of his charge that the great Southern cavalier received a mortal wound. His loss was a sensible blow to Lee and the Confederate cause. Of heroic bravery, active, energetic, insensible to fatigue, devoted body and soul to the cause for which he fought, having for his commander-in-chief the love and admiration of a child, this officer was to the Southern cavalry what Jackson was to its infantry. His death, at so critical a moment, was irreparable. Lee was profoundly vexed by it. He was succeeded by General Wade Hampton.

Grant found himself again out-manœuvred in his efforts to turn Lee. He sought still another plan to place himself between the Confederates and their capital. Crossing the Pamunkey (the name borne by the North and South Anna after their junction) at Hanovertown, after a forced night march, he advanced a corps of troops towards Hanover Court House, to intercept Lee's retreat or unmask his position. But it was labour thrown away, for Lee had not gone to that side. As soon as the Federal movement was planned, he also had marched across country to Cold Harbour.

Halting in the rear of the Tottapotomoi (a marshy watercourse flowing from west to east, and falling into the Pamunkey), he formed his lines, with his left supported on Atlee Station, on the Fredericksburg railway, his centre at Mechanicsville, and his right at Cold Harbour, backed by the Chickahominy. The country is partly covered with wood, with here and there plains and fields. On the 28th, the Southern cavalry, commanded by Fitz-Lee, turned back Sheridan's, and, having made sure that all the Northern army had crossed the Pamunkey, rejoined the bulk of the Confederate army. On the 29th and 30th there were reconnoitrings on both sides; also frequent skirmishes. Grant now for the fourth time found his enemy in front of him. Each time the Northern army, hoping to get rid of its indefatigable foe, had marched by night; starting from the Wilderness on the night of the 7th of May; from Pennsylvania on that of the 21st of May; from the North Anna on that of the 26th of May. Each time Lee had regulated his movements by those of his enemy, and at the right moment was planted on his road, barring his passage, and offering him battle.

The two armies were nearly on the same spot where took place the series of battles in June, 1862. General Grant had to decide on forming a new plan of campaign; or, by hurling his whole army in a compact mass against his adversary, to force the passage of the Chickahominy, and take Richmond by assault. He chose the latter plan.

On both sides there had been considerable reinforcements. General Butler brought Grant 16,000 men from the Peninsula, Breckenridge and Pickett had joined Lee, raising his army to 44,000 men, a number too small to repair the losses it had sustained.

On June 2nd, several encounters took place between the different corps, sufficiently sanguinary; during this time the bulk of the forces on either side were getting into position. On the 3rd in the morning, the Federals charged furiously all along the Confederate line. It was a hand-to-hand conflict, in which the courage and physical strength of the soldiers played the principal part; a complete absence of manœuvres. An hour's strife decided the victory. Thirteen thousand Federals strewed the ground. When the officer sent by Lee to Hill to know the result on his side presented himself, the latter, leading him to a point in his line, and showing him the dead bodies of the enemy heaped up before his intrenchments, said, "Tell General Lee that it is the same everywhere." The Confederates lost only 1200 men. This murderous encounter bears the name of the second battle of Cold Harbour.

Lee had carefully fortified the lines occupied by his soldiers with felled trees and earth-works. The experience of the campaign of 1862 was of great use to him. This, indeed, explains the great disproportion between the losses of the two armies.

Grant, in the course of the day, wished to renew the conflict, but the officers could not get their men to advance. The check was decisive; Grant was obliged to abandon his original plan, and transport the theatre of war to the south of the James River.

Hitherto, the campaign conducted by the Federal general-in-chief had ended only in disaster. It had been commenced in the hope of turning Lee's position on the Rapidan, and of getting possession at Gordonsville of all the roads by which he obtained provisions and reinforcements. Instead of this, Grant had been

surprised when he least expected it, detained in the Wilderness, and compelled to give up his original plan. His second attempt to place his army between Lee and Richmond at Spottsylvania had succeeded no better. All his efforts to carry Lee's positions, thanks to which the latter barred the way to Richmond, were useless. His flanking movement in the direction of the North Anna once more brought him in front of the Confederate army, ready to dispute his passage. His night march along the Pamunkey was of no avail, and his attempt to force the passage of the Chickahominy at Cold Harbour met with a serious check, costing him 13,000 men.

This short campaign of a month, from May 4th to June 4th, 1864, was a very bloody one. The Northern army lost 60,000 men, of whom 3000 were officers, 19,000 more than all the Confederate army! The latter lost 18,000 efficients. This passage of arms, so honourable to Lee and his soldiers, does not at all justify the many praises which it is the custom to bestow on Grant in the North, and among certain European republicans. From the Northern point of view this short campaign is persistently spoken of as a series of successes. Had there been many more such the cause of the Union would have been ruined.

Notwithstanding these brilliant feats of arms, Lee was a prey to no such illusions as were those around him. He well knew that, however valiant his soldiers were, however admirable their conduct, however great their devotion, there was yet a limit to their strength. If new recruits did not come to increase the ranks of his veterans, exhausted by their very triumphs, if material means of feeding his soldiers, and continuing the war, failed him more and more daily, and if it was forbidden him to retreat from a position so exposed, he felt that the fatal ending could not be far distant. But around him, in the Government districts, the blindness was complete. He submitted to those whom he ought by law to obey, and prepared to continue the struggle to the bitter end, without any sign of discouragement that might be contagious.

It will, perhaps, be recollected that, concurrently with the march of the principal army of the North against Richmond, two lateral movements entered into the outline of the operations projected by Grant. The object of one was the capture of Lynchburg, in the south-west of Virginia, an important town, connected with Richmond by river, railway, and canal. The other, under General Butler, was directed by sea to the peninsula of Virginia, to co-operate there with Grant.

In May, General Siegel, who commanded the first-mentioned expedition, had been defeated at Newmarket, in the Valley, by Breckenridge; but the latter was presently obliged to rejoin Lee. General Jones, with a handful of men, remained to keep back General Hunter, who had succeeded Siegel. On the 5th of June, Jones was defeated and slain at Piedmont. Nothing then prevented Hunter from advancing into the Valley, burning and pillaging everything on his road. Having, on the 16th, arrived at Lynchburg, he came to blows with General Early, at the head of 12,000 men, whom Lee had been obliged to detach against him. Early beat him, and forced him to a rapid retreat. Instead of retiring by the road he came, Hunter marched to the east of the mountains, leaving the road of the Valley open. Early, who had received certain instructions from General Lee, hastened to carry them into execution. We shall have occasion to return to these operations of Early. Hunter had destroyed the Virginia and Tennessee railway over an extent of 135 miles, but in 60 days the mischief was repaired.

General Butler, following Grant's orders, started from Fortress Monroe, (situated, as is well known, at the mouth of the James River,) on the 4th of May, and disembarked at Bermuda Hundreds, on the James, opposite the mouth of the Appomattox, where he intrenched himself, forgetting that he had come to operate offensively. Just then he might easily have become master of Petersburg, but shortly after General Beauregard arrived from the South with a few regiments, and then Butler had to watch for his

own safety. Attacked by Beauregard, he retired to the Peninsula, and could not believe himself secure till he had taken shelter behind formidable entrenchments.

For several days after the decisive check of the Federals at Cold Harbour, Lee remained immovable in his lines, thinking his adversary would renew the attack, and convinced that it was necessary to repulse him. Grant, seeing the necessity of a complete change of tactics, resolved to give up his plan of assaulting Richmond on the north and east, and march rapidly to Petersburg, (a small town twenty-two miles south of Richmond, on the Appomattox,) get possession of it, and cut off the railways connecting Richmond with the districts of the South. By thus isolating Richmond from all the region whence it drew its means of subsistence, and the army its rations, he hoped to force Lee to increase his distance from the capital.

If the Federal commander were able to execute this project, Lee would be obliged to retire towards Lynchburg, in order to keep open his communications with the South and West, and the war would, perhaps, there have taken another character.

Consequently, on the 12th of June, Grant kept continually inclining his left flank, and crossed the Chickahominy at Wilcox's Landing on the 14th, much lower than Cold Harbour. In the absence of Early, who had been dispatched to Lynchburg, Lee did not deem it prudent to oppose this operation. He nevertheless so disposed himself as either to cover Richmond, or march to the aid of Petersburg, according to circumstances. Grant, on his side, marching to City Point, where the Appomattox falls into the James, crossed the latter river on pontoons, and, without losing a moment, marched on Petersburg, which he hoped to surprise.

The want of soldiers had not allowed the Confederate authorities to leave at Petersburg sufficient forces to protect the town against a sudden blow. Fortunately some volunteers who were at Petersburg, joined with the able-bodied population, were able to deceive the enemy as to their numerical inferiority, till Beauregard had time

to send the greater part of his corps there. Thus the town was saved, and on the 15th, at night, Lee's advanced guard reached Petersburg. The same day the bulk of the Federal army rejoined Grant.

Scarce arrived, Lee lost not a moment in raising some earth-works to the south and east of the town, and in fortifying himself. It was clear to him that Grant would not delay to strike a great blow, and that, too, before these works were firmly constructed. In effect, next day, the 16th, a furious assault on the part of the Federals drove Lee behind his second line of defence. On the 17th and 18th, Grant sought to become master of this likewise. But having lost 4000 men, he was obliged to give up the attempt. The Federal staff realized the necessity of isolating the town. Hence, on the 21st, an attempt was made further to the west, on the Confederate right, in order to gain Weldon Railroad, running southwards. Here again the Federals were repulsed, leaving in the hands of the Confederate General Hill nearly 3000 men. A corps of Federal cavalry took away the rails, and did some mischief on the three railways of Weldon, Southside, and Danville, which gave a communication to the Confederates with the South and West.

But, harassed by General A. H. F. Lee, and vigorously charged near Sapponey Church by General Hampton, with the greater part of what remained of the Confederate cavalry, (1500 horses,) the squadrons of the North retreated in disorder. Hardly escaped from General Hampton, they found themselves fighting with Fitz-Lee's brigade and General Mahone's infantry, which completed their rout. They left 12 pieces of artillery and 1000 prisoners in the hands of the Southerners, and were so disorganized as to be unable for some time to resume service.

The end of June was approaching. All efforts to pierce the Confederate lines had failed. Every day the works of the defence became more formidable. There was nothing else, therefore, for the Federal general but to sit down before this long fortified line, to

raise parallel works for his own protection against all offensive artifices, and so to undertake the regular siege of Petersburg. Such being his object, his first thought was to gain ground towards the left, and gradually lay his hand on the railways of Weldon and Southside, thus cutting of all communication between Petersburg and the west and south of the Confederacy.

During the months of June and July, the Confederates bestowed all their care on increasing the strength of their intrenchments. On the 1st of July, the Federal engineer officers declared there was no chance of taking the place by assault. It was a line of redans connected together by covered ways, while all the approaches were defended by felled tress, chevaux-de-frise, and all sorts of obstacles. Surrounding Petersburg from east to south, it extended from the Appomattox to beyond the enemy's left wing. To the north of this same river a system of similar fortifications defended that quarter of the town, and the railway going to Richmond, from all attack by Butler's army at Bermuda Hundreds. The City of Richmond had it own peculiar system of defence. Petersburg, like Sebastopol, was not besieged in the strict sense of the word, since to the north and west the ways were free.

The task before Lee was difficult and discouraging. With an army of 40,000, or 50,000 men, scattered over an extent of nearly forty miles of country, he had to defend, against three times the number of his forces, the capital, situated twenty-two miles in his rear. From the month of July in one year to that of April in the next there was not a moment when, had this line of defence been pierced, the war would not suddenly have ended. The way in which he performed this toilsome duty will always be one of his greatest titles to glory. Perhaps, from a military point of view, the defence of Richmond is the finest part of his career.

The Southern general-in-chief felt that if Grant succeeded in isolating the capital, there would be nothing for the Confederate Government to do but evacuate Richmond, and, the army's duty

being to follow it, he would have likewise to abandon Virginia. The Federal authority would thus be extended over the most ancient, the largest, the most important state of the Confederacy, and there was, in case this came about, little doubt that the other Confederate States would lose their courage, and give up defending themselves. None of these considerations escaped Lee, whose clearsightedness could not be deceived as to the probable results of so unequal a struggle as the one he was engaged in against Grant. In 1862, in a confidential conversation, he had said there was but one way of reducing Richmond, and it was that which Grant had at length adopted. As long as the enemy would only attack the north or east, Lee could justly hope, by fighting with eagerness, to repulse him, and maintain his stand at Richmond; but from the day the Federals encamped before Petersburg, and threatened all the arteries by which the capital and army were nourished, the moment would come when, sooner or later, the capital must be abandoned, and consequently Virginia.

For that matter, it was well Lee foresaw all this, when his adversary, forsaking every other system of attack, crossed the James River and marched on Petersburg. It is even said he would have then advised the evacuation of Richmond. But this opinion found no echo. A powerful party, including both friends and enemies of President Davis, regarded this idea with dismay. All the energies of the Government, therefore, were centred on the means to be employed to keep the enemy south of the Appomattox, and to this end no precaution was omitted. Some weeks were necessary for the two adversaries to complete their works of defence and attack. Grant wished to be able, at any given moment, to leave in his lines a feeble part of his army, and sally from his intrenched camp with the rest of his troops.

Not a day, however, passed without engagements between small parties. A Federal corps advanced to Charles City, on the north bank of the James, and menaced Richmond thence. The Federal lines extended from this point across the Peninsula of Burmuda

Hundreds, formed by the Rivers James and Appomattox before their junction. They embraced Petersburg to the east and south, and thence, daily gaining ground to the west, they approached nearer and nearer the railways which fed the Southern army and the capital. Lee's lines ran parallel to those of his adversary. To the east and south-east of Richmond there still existed some works of defence. To these an exterior line was added, fronting the enemy's forces placed near Deep Bottom. Beneath Drury's Bluff, a cliff overhanging the river, which had been fortified, some ruined buildings and other obstructions barred the passage to the Federal gunboats. The Confederate lines continued facing those of the enemy north of the Appomattox, then, passing this river, went round Petersburg to the north and south, stretching away to the west, accommodating themselves to those of General Grant. The two commanders felt that the decisive combat would take place to the west of Petersburg, and that a moment would come when Lee's numerical inferiority would not be able to prevent his adversary turning him.

The long struggle around Petersburg does not offer the same dramatic interest as such battles as those of Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. Under Petersburg very bloody combats followed each other without apparent result. It was a long uninterrupted battle day and night, week by week, month by month, through the heat of summer, the dismal days of autumn, and the frosty nights of winter. It was, in fact, the siege of Richmond which Grant had undertaken; and what we shall have to chronicle will be less battles, in the ordinary sense of the term, than a long series of reiterated efforts to pierce his adversary's lines, sometimes to the north of the James River, sometimes to the east of Petersburg, sometimes at a point in the continuous line of redoubts which defended the approaches of the Southside railway (southern bank), of which Grant wished to make himself master at any price. Once in possession of this railway he felt sure of victory.

It was the month of July, and every day, over the whole extent

of the lines, whether to north of the James or to the south of the Appomattox, resounded the cracking of rifles. Grant kept constantly trying the armour of his foe, and that at all points, to find some fault in his cuirass, when suddenly the telegraph from Washington flashed him the astounding news that a strong Confederate column had passed into Maryland, dispersed the troops sent against it, and appeared before the fortifications of Washington. This diversion, altogether unanticipated by the Federals, had yet been prepared by Lee with great care, and he expected great results from it.

It will be remembered that we left General Early in the Valley of Virginia. He had just driven Hunter from Lynchburg. Without losing a moment the intrepid Early, descending the Valley and crossing the Potomac, entered Maryland with the intention of threatening Washington, as Lee had directed him, in the hope that President Lincoln would recall at least a part of Grant's army for the succour of the capital. His march was very rapid, and, encountering no obstacle, he arrived at Monocacy, near Frederick City, whither the Confederate armies had penetrated twice already. There he found some thousands of men under General Wallace. Defeating them without difficulty, on the 11th of July, he appeared in sight of Washington. Great was the consternation there, and, in their terror, the Federal authorities looked upon the capture of the capital as inevitable. Grant did not allow himself to be troubled by their messages of distress. Two corps had just come by sea from Louisiana to Fortress Monroe, and were still there. Grant, without allowing them to disembark, sent them on without delay to Washington. They arrived in time to man the intrenchments of the capital.

Early was well aware that, with his 10,000 men and 40 cannon, he could not possibly take Washington by a sudden blow, as long as General Hunter, with various detachments reunited, menaced his rear. His corps had travelled 497 miles in twenty-five days, (nearly twenty miles a day on the average,) and his soldiers were exhausted.

He had, therefore, to think about his own retreat. Recrossing the Potomac, he retired into the Valley, carrying off some booty and herds of cattle. He remained in the Valley, whence, for three months, he incessantly threatened the Northern border States.

Had this bold expedition of Early succeeded it would assuredly have terminated the campaign Grant was pursuing beneath Petersburg. But although it did not secure all the success hoped for, it partly accomplished its aim, since it retarded the Federal operations, and forced the Northern Government to retain an army of 40,000 men for purposes of observation near the capital, enfeebling by so much the army of Grant.

July was drawing to a close, and Grant had not yet succeeded in forcing the enemy's lines. None of his numerous attacks had found his foe off his guard. The Federals at length seemed resigned to the task of wearying and exhausting their adversary by calculated delays, giving up great attacks. Such, at least, was the general feeling in both armies, when, at sunrise, on the 30th of July, a violent explosion, which was heard twenty-five miles off, shook the ground around Petersburg, and a vast column of smoke obscuring the heavens, seemed to indicate that a powder magazine had burst. Nothing of the kind. What had happened was this:

A Federal engineer officer had called Grant's attention to the fact that certain Confederate works being less than 200 yards from the Federal lines, it would not be impossible to work a mine in that direction. Behind this point the ground rose, and commanded the town. If, in consequence of the confusion caused by the explosion, this height could be mastered, the hostile lines could be taken in the rear, and the town would be at Grant's mercy. The Federal chief welcomed the proposal.

On July 25th all the preparations were ended. A subterranean gallery, 500 feet long, had been dug, and, on the 27th, 12,000 pounds weight of powder was introduced into it. In order to turn away Lee's attention, and force him partly to strip his lines, Grant ordered Hancock's corps to join Butler's. The two generals

were to threaten Richmond. Lee, in fact, had to send several divisions to parry this new danger. As soon as Grant became sure, by the resistance which Hancock was encountering on the other side of the James, that Lee had considerably weakened his army, he recalled Hancock as mysteriously as possible, on the 29th, in order to take part in the assault planned for the morrow.

Lee, although not exactly aware of what was passing, still had his doubts that his lines at Petersburg were aimed at. On the morning of the 30th, as we have said, a terrible explosion sent the fort into the air, together with all in it. A yawning gulf, 150 feet long, 65 wide, and 30 deep, opened in its stead. At the same moment the Federal artillery, before the clouds of smoke and dust had dissipated, opened a fire along the whole line. A Federal corps of 15,000 men rushed forward in double-quick time, in the hope of crossing the horrible pit, and climbing the height, before the Confederates had recovered from their surprise and terror. But the latter were soon recovered, and ready to receive the charge. Hardly had Grant's soldiers crossed the space covered with the smoking fragments when they were assailed by a terrible artillery fire, which raked them right and left, while in front they received from the infantry a perfect shower of bullets. Disorder and hesitation appeared in their ranks: all were soon possessed with but one idea, to take refuge in the bottom of the gulf, and over this mass of blacks and whites the Southern artillery rained down a storm of grape-shot. Those who sought to escape from this butchery, by climbing out of the yawning hole, attempted to flee to the Federal lines, and fell under the bullets of the infantry. General Mahone, who commanded on the Confederate side, eventually ordered the fire to cease, so heartrending was this scene of carnage. The Federals were at length able to effect their retreat, leaving 4000 prisoners in the hands of Lee, who, on his side, had lost very few men. He soon set up his lines in their old positions.

During August and September the Confederate chief had to

repulse numerous attacks on different points of his lines. Grant, ever seeking to gain ground on the left, in order to intercept the railways which ran towards the west, tried also at times to pierce the enemy's lines by surprise on the north of the James, and so to arrive at Richmond. Probably he did not count on much success in that direction, but his repeated attacks there offered an incontestable advantage in forcing Lee to weaken his right, and thus uncover the Southside Railway, the true object of Grant's efforts.

After an indecisive assault on the Confederate positions to the north of the James about the end of August, a considerable Federal force attempted to gain the Weldon Railway, near Petersburg. This enterprise succeeded. For a long time Lee had informed the authorities at Richmond that it would be impossible for him to defend this advanced point if the enemy seriously attacked it. But to obey the orders of his Government he was obliged to maintain himself there as long as possible. Grant wished to pursue his success and seize Ream's Station, further south on the same line, and destroy the permanent way at Hicksford. After several sanguinary encounters Lee succeeded in preventing him. The Federals retired with serious loss.

To the north of the James, General Butler took Fort Harrison, an important post, permitting him to menace the Confederate positions. But his efforts to penetrate further in the direction of the works at Chafin's Bluff were repulsed.

The Federals, however, remained masters of the Weldon line, and by means of extending further and further on the left, gradually occupying and cutting off the different roads from Petersburg to the south, they succeeded in October in making good their footing at Hatcher's Run, a little watercourse which flows southwards from the neighbourhood of Petersburg. The loss of the Weldon Railway was of no great importance to the Confederates, as long as they remained in possession of the Southside one, which went along the southern bank of the Appomattox, coming from the west; but at the point to which

they had attained the Federals were about to commence their attacks direct on this part, so important in Lee's system of defences.

Grant was the more persistent because the presidential election was approaching, and his chances as a candidate would be increased if success held him up to the admiration of his fellow-citizens. Indeed, on October 27th, three Federal corps, equipped for a campaign, leaving hardly enough men behind to man the works before Petersburg, crossed Hatcher's Run. But they soon perceived that the Confederate lines extended much further than they thought. General Hancock hesitated to attack. Lee, profiting by an interval between Hancock's corps and the one following, sent Hill's troops to the charge. Disorder arose in the Federal ranks. Hampton's cavalry made several hundred prisoners. At length, in the night, Hancock managed to retreat, giving up the prosecution of his attack. Grant was fortunate in recalling his soldiers, for Lee during the night had massed 15,000 infantry and all his cavalry in front of Hancock, and reckoned on the morrow morning, the 28th, to crush the Federal second corps. Very soon active operations were interrupted by the great rains. Each side went into winter quarters.

In November, the election of the delegates who were charged with nominating the president of the United States for the following four years took place. The choice assured the election of Mr. Lincoln, and the defeat of General MacClellan, who was regarded as more favourable to the Southerners. This was a sign there was no misconstruing. It became more and more clear, that only with their arms in their hands could the Confederates conquer their independence; there was no other way for them to issue happily out of their trials.

General Lee looked upon the gloomy prospect with firmness, The future did not appear in very encouraging colours. Every day Southern resources were diminishing, the blockade became more effective, his army was losing in number and strength,

discouragement was creeping into all hearts. Alone, in the midst of this general despondency, the commander of the army of Northern Virginia preserved an impassive behaviour. Speaking one day to a Confederate senator he said: "For myself, I hope to die sword in hand." The feeling of what he owed his country and his soldiers, hindered him later from seeking death, but it was perhaps the greatest sacrifice he could make them.

CHAPTER XV.

REFLECTIONS.—GENERAL SITUATION.—CONFERENCE OF HAMPTON ROADS.—CONTINUATION OF THE STRUGGLE.—SUFFERINGS OF THE CONFEDERATES.

BEFORE relating the last and decisive passage of arms in the war, let us say a few words on a very remarkable circumstance. We wish to speak of the equal, almost laughing, humour of General Lee, in the midst of anxieties and preoccupations sufficient to break the strongest heart.

His head-quarters were nearly two miles west of Petersburg, on the Cox Road, nearly in the centre of the army. There he lived, awaiting with calmness the events of the future. His face betrayed not a shadow of disquietude; on the contrary, it appeared full of hope, and encouraged those who surrounded him to believe in final success. We have, however, proved that he was far from really having this assurance. From the first day of the siege he seemed to have regarded the situation as desperate, unless, at least, his army received numerous reinforcements; but to the end he recollected his two favourite maxims: "*Do your duty*," and, "*Human courage ought to rise to the height of human adversity.*"

Beyond all doubt Lee saw the sad *dénouement* approaching, for all his efforts to reinforce his little army by new recruits were unavailing. Without repeating the reasons we have given elsewhere, it is incontestable that the country was exhausted, and at the end of its strength. While the Federal army was receiving numerous reinforcements in a manner so regular that it never

had less than 150,000 combatants, the entire army of Lee under Petersburg never reached the figure of 60,000 men, and in the spring of 1865, whilst still it held all its old positions, it had not 30,000 men under arms. The South had no more men to send it. "The immense hammer," as Grant called his army, that multitudinous army, powerful, and admirably organized, continually recruited, and abundantly provided with all that was necessary to it, struck with redoubled blows on the decimated, half-starved, exhausted ranks of the meagre battalions of the South. Lee saw the hour inevitably arriving when it would be compulsory on him to surrender, or force his way through the multitude of his enemies.

As the situation became more critical, all eyes in the Confederacy centred in Lee, as the only man who could save the country. Public opinion demanded that the direction of all the armies spread over the Southern territory should be confided to him. Had this measure been taken sooner, it might, perhaps, have produced other results; but towards the spring of 1865, when this wish of the population was realized, it was too late.

The Confederate cause finished by becoming personified in Lee. An almost superstitious faith in his good star spread throughout the country. At the very moment when Lee saw clearly that the final scene was near at hand, most of his fellow-citizens believed they ran no risk so long as he was at the head of the army. This deep-rooted persuasion might well be a source of grief to him, for nobody less than he was subject to illusions, or blind through an excess of confidence.

In vain Lee represented to the civil authorities, that, if the enemy succeeded in breaking his lines at any point whatever, it was all over with the Confederacy. His military experience would not allow him to be deceived; he had to sustain the weight of a universal confidence, which he did not share. Not a murmur escaped him; nothing which indicated the desperate position to which he was reduced. He asked for men to fill his gaps; if

none or but few came, he continued no less to show a bold front to his powerful adversary, with what soldiers remained to him. They were chosen men, it is true. The fire of battles had purified the metal, and all that had issued from the crucible was pure gold without alloy.

Lee was in their eyes an ideal captain. For a long time they had ceased to have towards him the respectful fear of former times; they had come to understand the treasures of goodness and simplicity hidden beneath that graveexterior. A charming incident is related as regards this subject. One day, during the latter months of the siege, in one of the trains going from Richmond to Petersburg, a young soldier, with his arm in a sling, was trying to arrange his cloak so as to keep him from the severe cold of the morning. He did the best he could with his teeth and strong arm, when an officer seated at a little distance rose, came to him, tenderly drew the cloak over the wounded arm, and then buttoned it with care. Then, after a few words of real sympathy, he returned to his place. His light-grey uniform, the three stars on his collar, and the simplicity of his behaviour, would not have been sufficient to denote his rank, had not everybody present known that it was General Lee, as gentle as he was modest and brave.

The winter of 1864 shows him to us much aged. But his step was as firm and his figure as upright as at the beginning of the war. He seemed to be of iron. All his days were passed on horseback, and half his nights in writing.

As the end approaches, which the last tragic scenes of this protracted strife unveil, it is difficult, even for those whose sympathies are of necessity with the North, not to feel attracted with sadness and respect towards that noble figure of the Confederate general-in-chief.

This great warrior was about to undergo the cruellest trial possible to a general—that of seeing his army dispersed and dismissed to their hearths, vanquished and ruined.

The last passage of arms between the two armies under Petersburg began in March, 1865. It had been preceded in other places by serious events, the result of which had been to annihilate, so to speak, the advanced works of the Confederacy, leaving only the citadel standing. In the Valley of Virginia, since the preceding autumn, the situation of the Southerners had grown much worse. In September, General Sheridan, at the head of 45,000 men, had attacked General Early near Winchester, who commanded only from 8000 to 10,000 infantry. Driven first to Strasburg, the latter was obliged to retire to Staunton, in the upper part of the Valley. In October, Early, resuming the offensive, failed completely to crush his adversary at Cedar Run; but being himself surprised by a stratagem of the enemy, he was finally obliged to beat a retreat to Waynesborough, in the Valley. There, in February, his little band was attacked and dispersed for good. Sheridan, who had gained this anything but glorious, though most important, triumph, was at liberty to descend into the plain, join General Grant, and with his numerous legions of cavalry, take part in the last combats under Petersburg.

In the west the Federal arms had won still greater successes. General Johnston, to whom, on Lee's demand, the command of the Confederate troops in this region had been given, seeing that he had not the disposal of forces sufficient to resist General Sherman, was obliged to retire before him. The Federal commander, thanks to the exhaustion of the country, and the small number of Johnston's soldiers, traversed with scarce any resistance the whole district to Savannah, on the Atlantic Ocean. Easily mastering this town, he pushed on to Goldsborough, in North Carolina, whence he could easily march on whatever line of retreat Lee might choose.

Such was the state of military affairs in February and March, 1865. In February, some delegates of the Confederate Government had had an interview with President Lincoln on board a steamer in the roadstead of Fortress Monroe, at the mouth of the

James River. But it ended in nothing. Nothing then was left but the arbitration of the sword, and every advantage was on the Federal side. Lee, who had just been nominated generalissimo of the Confederate armies, vain title, almost a derision at such a moment, saw the different hostile armies gradually forming a circle round him. He did not deceive himself with the idea that he could much longer maintain himself in the lines of Petersburg. The country, especially the civil portion, had in its general such confidence as to refuse to see the imminence of the danger. To act thus they must have closed their eyes, for Lee had in front of him Grant, with his 150,000 men; General Sherman, with forces nearly as numerous, was at that moment entering the south of Virginia. All Lee's army numbered but a little over 30,000 men, and that of Johnston, which Sherman pursued, was still less.

It was, therefore, evident that, sooner or later, but in a few days at most, the Confederate army would be annihilated. At the beginning of February, 1865, Lee foresaw that nothing but the abandonment of Virginia could save him. Consequently, before Sherman had penetrated into the heart of Carolina, he had taken steps to effect a retreat by ordering his waggons and other *impedimenta* to cross to Amelia Court House, west of Petersburg, and likewise to prepare pontoons for the crossing of the Roanoke River. His plan was to join Johnston in North Carolina, who was so to manœuvre as to help his chief, and retire with him into the districts of the West. First the Virginian mountains, and then the fertile regions of the South-west, he hoped, would permit him to prolong the struggle with the possibility of treating for better conditions. Any plan of campaign was better than a prolonged sojourn in Virginia, which would end in his being completely surrounded by the enemy, and compelled to surrender at his mercy.

It will always be a subject for regret that Lee was not permitted to realize his plan. The opposition of the Richmond Cabinet,

who much dreaded the moral effect of a voluntary abandonment of the Confederate capital, compelled him to give it up.

The suffering of the Confederates during these winter months around Petersburg cannot be described. The service of victuals was bad and irregular. As the Federal movements extended further and further over the territory of the Confederacy, the Southern commissariat was obliged gradually to contract the limits whence it could hope to draw provisions. When February came, the only ways by which supplies still reached Richmond and Petersburg, as well as the army, were the Lynchburg Canal, and the two railways leading to the west, namely, the Southside Railway, along the southern bank of the Appomattox, as its name implies, and the Danville and Richmond Railway, starting from the latter town, and leaving the James River, till it joins the first line at Burke Station, whence it branches east to Lynchburg and south to Danville.

Frequently Lee had but two or three days' provisions, so much was the country impoverished, and so difficult was it to get the few that could be procured transported. This life of continual self-denial, cruel privations, want of warm clothing, of medicines, of nourishment, rapidly diminished the efficiency of Lee's army. Some regiments had less than 200 men in their ranks. It was a phantom army; the pale and meagre visages seemed to belong to shadows without bodies. Occasionally the arrival of a vessel lucky enough to force the blockade of Wilmington, in North Carolina, the only Confederate port remaining, spread in the camp comparative plenty. But presently again one was reduced to a quarter of a pound of lard, and a little flour diluted with water. Sometimes a little coffee; this was the only stimulant to bring back a little warmth to those fainting bodies. Only at rare intervals could the Richmond Government distribute to them blankets, clothing, or shoes. Their old uniforms hung in tatters, and no longer protected them against the winter frosts. They shivered nightly under their worn-out and ragged blankets. Their

old shoes, often patched, and always in holes, in consequence of marchings and alarms, no longer protected their bare feet against the stony and frozen ground. They were literally "Lee's Miserables," as they entitled themselves in recollection of Victor Hugo's work, which had penetrated to the tents of this army at bay.

Notwithstanding all this suffering and the little hope apparent on the horizon, the greater part of Lee's veterans remained firm at their post, forming a woefully slender but well-held line, strung out over an extent of works forty miles in length, while in their front was an enemy admirably equipped, well provided with tools and food, and having forces five times their strength.

Surely impartial history will do justice to soldiers who, amid such circumstances, neither despaired nor suffered their moral force to wane. Unshaken in their patriotism, unsubdued in their military fidelity, they persisted in the struggle, although their courage was submitted to terrible trials. Day and night for months an incessant Federal fire, without one break, rained down upon them all known means of destruction. Their constancy during those dismal days of winter never failed: night came; they lay down in their trenches, where cold and the enemy's shells left them no repose. Snow, hail, wind, rain, cannon-fire, —they had to bear all, without a ray of sunlight, without a ray of hope. If, sometimes, anxiety or fatigue tended to undermine their resolution, they had but to turn their eyes to the calm, paternal countenance of their chief, to feel spring up within them a more profound and unlimited confidence in him than ever.

The naked state of his brave soldiers cut him to the heart. Yet his looks did not betray his feelings. He spared no effort, no application to alleviate their misery. But we can well believe that the Richmond Cabinet found it impossible to do anything more for its noble defenders. Lee's evenness of temper, his serene tranquillity, rendered him dearer than ever to his soldiers and his country. One after another the armies of the South and

West melted away and disappeared before the enemy; Wilmington, the last port connecting the Confederacy with Europe and the rest of the world, had just fallen into the hands of Sherman; the Richmond Congress were displaying such indecision and feebleness as we so often find in assemblies in moments of crisis; the grand figure of Lee alone stood out luminous from this gloomy and stormy background. He remained an anchor of safety to his agonising fatherland.

Informed of the bill which nominated him commander-in-chief of all the Southern armies, he did not conceal the embarrassment in which this new and undesired honour placed him. The reciprocal relations of friendship and confidence between him and President Davis made him hesitate to accept a title, vain, it is true, and henceforth useless—which seemed likely to bring about a coolness between himself and the executive power. But the unanimous wish of all carried the day; he was obliged to yield, although he felt that the nearly absolute power decreed to him could no longer save the country.

When the result of the conferences between the delegates assembled at Fortress Monroe was known, the indignation at Richmond and in the army was great. President Davis had declared that the independence of the South was the absolute basis of all ulterior negotiation. This, in the eyes of President Lincoln and his councillors, was an inadmissible condition. All parleying was therefore broken off. Many meetings at Richmond testified to a deep feeling of irritation at the humiliating propositions made by the North. This manifestation of public opinion assumed various forms; addresses signed by the army appeared in the newspapers, affirming anew an unshaken resolution to struggle to the end for the sacred cause of the fatherland.

The will was there, but the means were wanting. More defenders were necessary to the cause, which was collapsing for want of soldiers and material. How could the Government arm

and equip new levies when it could not sufficiently minister to the necessities of those already under its flags? Early in the war the arming of the negroes was discussed. The proposition was so ill-received that it had to be given up. When, however, later, it was perceived that the law of conscription, which it was hoped would give 400,000 men, did not furnish near that number, a law for the enrolment of the blacks was presented to the Chamber of Representatives at Richmond. To this General Lee was favourable, and in February he wrote on the subject a letter to a commission of the Chamber, in which, among other things, he says:—"I think the measure not only expedient, but necessary. The enemy will certainly use them against us if he can get possession of them; and as his present numerical superiority will enable him to penetrate many parts of the country, I cannot see the wisdom of the policy of holding them to await his arrival, when we may, by timely action and judicious management, use them to arrest his progress."

In his opinion they might have been made good soldiers with the help of a severe discipline. He adds, "My notion is that those of them who serve in the army ought, *in consequence*, to be declared free. It would be neither just nor wise to expose them to the greatest of all dangers, risk of losing their lives, and refuse them the finest of rewards—liberty."

The bill, which was passed in March, too late to be of any use, did not correspond to the lofty ideas enunciated by Lee. The pro-slavery party, in the narrow acceptation of the term, had dictated the terms of it.

On accepting the new position forced on him by circumstances, General Lee published an order of the day, in which he humbly invoked the support of the Almighty, and addressed a warm appeal to the patriotism of his fellow-citizens, expressing the hope that thus the end so ardently wished for would be reached—peace and independence.

The concentration of all military powers in Lee's hands, and

the evacuation of Charleston, preceded by the destruction of its works, seemed to announce a defence *à outrance*, which inspired the North with a legitimate disquietude. On this subject, a Northern writer expresses himself in terms like these: "While endeavouring to realise the signification of the recent change in the Southern system of defence, the future appears to us more gloomy and impenetrable than ever. It is to a single head, and we know how fertile that head is in resources—it is to a single heart, and we know the firmness and courage of that heart—it is to a single man, and we know to what a high degree he is endowed with intelligence to plan, to strike, to counteract, to repair errors, to profit by the blunders of his adversaries, that henceforth the military destinies of the South are confided."

But he was not permitted to put in execution the projects indicated. Had he been able to obtain the authority of the Richmond Government to evacuate both Petersburg and the Confederate capital, very probably the war would have had another issue.

CHAPTER XVI.

CONTINUATION OF THE SIEGE.—THE LAST COMBATS.—LEE'S RETREAT.—HIS CAPITULATION.

GENERAL LEE, about the end of March, perceived that preparations were making in the Federal army for some important movement,—a movement, for that matter, easy to divine. The Federal left having gradually gained ground in the direction of Southside, it became evident that Grant was contemplating an offensive movement in this direction. He hoped thus to acquire the only line of retreat open to Lee, and finish the war at a blow.

The catastrophe foreseen by the Southern chief for months was getting ready threateningly before his eyes. Unless he had recourse to some means as desperate as his situation, all struggling was at an end. Retreat appeared the only means open to him, but retreat was no longer an easy thing. His adversary had the command of forces placed not far from the roads over which Lee must necessarily pass. Without a diversion, the chances of retiring his army from the awkward position in which it was, seemed hopeless. He therefore decided on this.

His plan was, boldly to assume the offensive. It was of the utmost urgency to remedy the extreme pressure on his right wing, about to succumb to the accumulated masses of the enemy concentrated against it, and, by striking a blow elsewhere, to divert the danger threatening the Southside Railroad. By attacking the Federal centre, east of Petersburg, Lee would force Grant to partly strip his left wing. Should the Confederates succeed in introducing

themselves between the two Federal wings, and likewise in menacing the railway coming from City Point, a place on the James where the steamers disembarked their cargoes, and where Grant received his supplies, affairs would wear an altered appearance. At the worst, admitting that Lee might judge it most prudent to beat a retreat, this offensive movement would permit him, while his adversary was occupied in massing his troops on his front with the object of arresting the attack on his centre, to retire suddenly by the Southside Railway to North Carolina, as he had originally intended.

General Gordon commanded the part of the Confederate army immediately before Petersburg; it was composed of three small divisions. Longstreet had the left wing, which extended to the north of the James, and the right wing was under the orders of A. P. Hill, stationed at Hatcher's Run.

To Gordon, therefore, fell the principal part in the battle of the 25th of March. The positions to be taken were on Hase's Hill, two hundred and fifty yards atl east from the Confederate lines. The interval was defended by felled trees, trenches, and chevaux-de-frise; but should the first assault succeed, should the dash of the troops carry them on, and they be supported by sufficient reinforcements, the hill behind would fall into their hands, and, to maintain his position, Grant would be compelled to concentrate his army on the point menaced.

Before dawn, on March 25th, everything was ready. The attacking column was composed of from 3000 to 4000 men under General Gordon. In reserve enough forces were held to support him. With daylight Gordon gave the signal. His soldiers rapidly and silently crossed the space separating them from Fort Steadman, the most advanced of the Federal lines. Scrambling over the felled trees, they rushed to the parapets. The surprised garrison scarcely attempted a defence. To drive it out and turn the guns against the other Federal works, was the task of a moment. A cry of triumph announced that the Confederates

were masters of the fort. They found there 9 guns, 8 mortars, and took 500 prisoners, one a general. But after this first success, whether because the sight of the formidable works still remaining to be captured discouraged them, or because the fatigue of so long a struggle had exhausted them, or because of the delay of the reinforcements in coming to their help, Gordon's soldiers hesitated to go on. The column which assaulted Fort Haskell, did it so feebly, that it resulted in nothing. The Federals, recovered from their surprise, opened right and left an overwhelming fire on Fort Steadman. Left unsupported by his demoralized soldiers, General Gordon had all the difficulty in the world to lead back one-fourth of them. Fort Steadman fell again into the hands of the Federals. The Confederates lost 2000 men. This was the last offensive movement on the part of the army of Northern Virginia.

Nothing remained for the Southern chief but to resist, as long as possible, the immense avalanche of foes ready to crush him.

The first idea of his slow and prudent adversary was to await General Sherman's arrival before risking a general attack. This fact alone is the most eloquent tribute of praise that can be paid to Lee, when one remembers he had but 30,000 men to oppose to Grant's 150,000! Fearing, however, lest Johnston might succeed in joining Lee if Sherman quitted the banks of the Roanoke, Grant decided on a final assault without delay.

The arrival of a reinforcement at this auspicious moment confirmed his decision. General Sheridan, who had been charged to march into North Carolina in order to intercept Lee's retreat in that direction—for Grant expected day by day to see him retreat —General Sheridan, hindered by the rise of the James River, had been unable to execute this plan, and so brought back to the Federal commander his 10,000 excellent cavalry troops.

The final hour approached. On the 29th of March, Lee learnt that the enemy was directing his columns in close order towards his extreme right. He comprehended that the intention was to

turn him on the White Oak Road. This position covered the railway of Southside, the only remaining road by which the Confederates received their provisions.

Grant was effecting this movement, no longer with detached corps. A portion of his whole army was being drawn up in columns mutually supporting each other, and provisioned for several days. He hoped to hide the movement, at any rate, for some hours, but Lee penetrated it, on receiving the earliest reports of his scouts. He could not think of completely stripping all his lines of defence in the centre and on the left. Already, his army was insufficient to cover this long line of forty miles; to withdraw troops from any one point to reinforce another that was menaced, was to expose himself to certain destruction. What, then, was to be done to maintain his position with so few men and so few horses? Nothing, but to supplement the number with the energy of despair; and this he attempted.

Uncertain whether there would not be a simultaneous attack on the left wing, Lee was obliged to leave there Longstreet's whole force. He enjoined him, if he became assured that Grant did not mean to assault him, at once to march on Petersburg with all the troops not absolutely necessary for the defence.

Uniting, massing all that he could find, leaving with Gordon, in the centre, only 7000 men, to keep the nine miles of works before and around Petersburg, Lee, on the morning of March 31st, succeeded in putting in line on his menaced right 17,000 men, of whom 2000 were cavalry, under Fitz-Lee. They were cavalry only in name. General Lee, speaking of the vaunted exploits of Sheridan, said that his "victories were only gained when the South had no more horses for its cavalry, and no more men to mount what few foundered horses it could get together."

Happily for the Confederates, a frightful tempest, which lasted all the 30th, much retarded the march of the Federal columns, and the roads, on the morning of the 31st, were in such a wretched condition, that Grant hesitated to advance.

Lee posted his troops behind the works which protected the White Oak Road. Further west, four or five miles off, the Confederates occupied an important fortified position, Five Forks, a cross-way where five roads met. Towards this, a strategic point of immense consequence, all the efforts of the two armies insensibly gravitated.

The part of resisting to the bitter end, in spite of the prodigious disproportion in numbers, taken by Lee, ought not to be attributed to the desperate resolution of a man who stakes his all. He had the well-founded hope that, if he vigorously repulsed the Federal attack on his right, there would ensue a scene of confusion and disorder among his adversaries, which would permit him to retire to Lynchburg. It was not the first time all the chances had been against him, and he yet had issued triumphant. The appearance of his veterans, hardened to everything, ready to brave no matter what perils, gave him the assurance that he had in them the requisite energy to enable him to retire his army from the bad pass to which it had been brought.

The events of the following days, up to a certain point, completely justified him, and if he failed finally, still he was within the merest trifle of getting out of his enemy's clutches.

Grant's forces were not all in line near Boydton Road, beyond Hatcher's Run, when Lee, on the morning of the 31st of March, forestalled him, by marching on his heads of columns in the most furious manner. Defeating the first divisions in his path, the Southern chief appeared on the point of snatching from fortune a victory which would decide the fate of the campaign. But he was presently fighting with masses of new troops, and his meagre battalions could not struggle in the open against forces so overwhelming. It was, therefore, necessary for his soldiers to retreat behind their works of defence, but only to recommence the conflict elsewhere. Five Forks, that important point, had just fallen into the hands of General Sheridan. Lee drove him from it, and General Pickett pursued the enemy to Dinwiddie Court House.

At nightfall, Sheridan, still on the defensive, sent Grant word, that, without reinforcements, he could not renew the struggle next day. On the morning of April 1st, the 5th Federal corps, which had marched all night, joined him. But General Lee, also, having no wish to leave his soldiers so exposed, had re-entered the Five Forks' lines.

On April 1st, Sheridan, at head of 40,000 men, rapidly traversed the two miles separating him from Five Forks. The exhausted survivors of Pickett and Johnson's divisions opposed but a feeble resistance to this avalanche. Taken in front and on the two flanks, after attempting an impossible defence, more than 5000 of them were made prisoners; the rest were dispersed and hotly pursued by the Federal cavalry. All the Confederate right was compromised, and Southside Railway became the enemy's.

Although, in effect, this action was decisive, the Federal general-in-chief wished to risk nothing. All the Northern artillery received orders to bombard the Confederate lines along their whole extent, and during the remaining part of April 1st, a shower of shells and cannon-balls fell on Petersburg and its environs. The assault was not to be till the next day, April 2nd. But the Confederate lines were so badly manned, that at any point whatever the Federal chief might easily have broken through on the 1st.

Longstreet was still retained to the north of the James, in order to protect the railway leading to Richmond, as well as the approaches to the city. Seeing the enemy always in force before him, he had been unable to strip his already feeble lines in even the slightest degree. The only forces remaining to Lee to defend his centre, which rested on Petersburg, were what was left of Gordon and A. P. Hill's two corps. A splendid sun illuminated the morning of April 2nd. On all sides, and simultaneously, the Federal columns marched against the Confederate lines. Driven back into the suburbs of the town, Gordon's forces there re-formed a line of interior defence. The Federal 9th corps was stopped by this magnificent attitude. On the right, A. P. Hill, with some

remnants of regiments and a few artillerymen, seemed unable to resist. The Confederate army was on the point of being cut in two. Luckily, at this place, two fortified redoubts, commanding the approaches of the River Appomattox, offered a suitable rallying ground. One of them, Fort Alexander, was speedily taken by the ever-mounting wave of invaders. The other, Fort Gregg, must be defended at all hazards, and to the last extremity, in order to give the Confederate army time to contract its lines around Petersburg, and there concentrate what remained of its forces.

For two hours the efforts of the enemy to take it were fruitless against the desperate defence of the little garrison. At length, at seven o'clock a.m, a last charge of the Federals carried them to the ditch. The front ranks, being received with a close fire, paid for their audacity with their lives, but in the end the assailants penetrated on all sides into the fort. Of the 250 defenders, only thirty survived to fall alive into the hands of the Northerners. This precious interval of delay in the march of the Federal army permitted Lee, whom Longstreet had just joined, to concentrate his last means of resistance (15,000 men) behind his third line of defence. This line, of small extent, but very strong, commenced from the River Appomattox, higher up than Petersburg, and having gone round the suburbs, rejoined the river below the town.

Several assaults on this line were of no avail. In repulsing one of these attacks General A. P. Hill, one of the best of Lee's lieutenants, of whom we have often had to speak, met with his death. At nightfall the Confederates were still masters of Petersburg, although Grant, who had 150,000 men with him, might easily have concentrated 100,000 of them against the last defenders of this little town.

With the night Lee executed his plan of retreat. All the roads south of the Appomattox having fallen beneath the power of the Federals, it was necessary to withdraw in a direction north of the river, which thus served as a line of defence. Lee, whom nothing seemed to trouble, had by no means, as we have seen, renounced

the hope of reaching North Carolina, or, at the worst, the Alleghany Mountains, in the west of Virginia. He determined, therefore, to march quicker than the bulk of his adversaries, and rout all the detached corps who sought to bar his passage. The only outward proof which he gave of the gravity of the situation was to gird on his sword, which he very rarely did. On the morning of the 2nd, on seeing his lines forced, the Confederate chief had contented himself with saying to the commander of his staff, Colonel Marshall, in the most natural tone possible, "This is very bad for us, Colonel. As I told them at Richmond, the cord has been so stretched as to end by snapping."

In the morning he had informed the government at Richmond that Grant had forced his lines, and that he intended with night to evacuate Petersburg. Orders had been sent with the utmost haste to all the troops north of the James River to rally round him in all urgency. When night came the Confederates began to cross the Appomattox. This movement was effected without disturbance from the Federals. The bridge was then burnt.

The Southern army taking a road which, at some distance from the north bank of the river, turns to the west, began its march through the semi-obscurity. Lee himself watched the operation. On foot, with his horse's bridle in his hand, he stood at the crossing of the two roads, and gave his orders with the greatest tranquillity. His voice betrayed no trace of emotion, his behaviour was as calm as if he were taking part in a review. When the rearguard had defiled, he mounted and followed his men.

While the burning of the magazines at Petersburg, to which they had set fire, illuminated the heavens with lurid tints, and filled the air with the noise of explosions, the remnants of the Virginian army, about 15,000 men, travelled on in darkness. All along the line hitherto occupied by the Confederates, from Petersburg to Richmond, explosion followed explosion in rapid succession, shaking the ground like an earthquake.

Generals Mahone and Ewell, with the Richmond garrison,

joined Lee in the morning of April 3rd. At break of day his army was nearly sixteen miles from Petersburg. Under such circumstances one would have expected to find the Confederate troops, after the reverses they had just sustained, downcast and discouraged. Quite the contrary; the pleasure of perceiving themselves out of those abominable trenches, in the open air, in the midst of the budding woods, rendered them almost joyful.

Their commander shared, if not their confidence, at least their relief at having quitted the lines. But the question of victuals outweighed all his other cares. During the winter he had already had much difficulty in feeding his soldiers on quarter-rations. On withdrawing from Petersburg, Lee felt he would have to live as best he could in the districts through which he passed. He had consequently already taken preliminary measures by ordering that a depôt for provisions should be established at Amelia Court House. The prospect of finding there necessaries for his soldiers undoubtedly contributed to support him at this difficult moment. But this was the last ray of hope granted him. Whether his orders had been badly understood, whether there had been an involuntary error, or whether there was some other cause, the train which should have unloaded the provisions at Amelia Court House did not stop there, but carried them on to Richmond, where they fell into the hands of the Federals, who were at length masters of the city. Thus, when, after some unforeseen delays caused by the rising of the Appomattox, Lee reached Amelia Court House, upwards of thirty-seven miles from Petersburg, at the head of his soldiers, worn out by fatigue and hunger, what was the general consternation to find no victuals! All hope of bringing the retreat to a happy termination from that moment had to be abandoned!

On all faces was marked the deepest dejection. Before so cruel a stroke of fate Lee comprehended that all was over, and for the first time his countenance displayed the depth of his despondency. Hitherto he had had no doubt as to the possibility of forcing his way through, but only on condition that his men were fed; for an

army that eats not can neither march nor fight. He was obliged to halt, and send foraging parties into the country round, already quite impoverished. Meanwhile Grant's columns in close masses were gaining on him, advancing to cut off the Confederate retreat. The want of a few thousand pounds weight of bread and meat had finished the war.

The days of the 5th and 6th,—precious moments which should have been allowed to the Southern chief in order to maintain a sufficient distance between him and those who were pursuing,—were passed in getting together a little provision. Without this fatal mistake, which must be attributed to the stupidity of the Richmond Government, Lee would have been able to keep his little army together, and pass Burkesville safe and sound before the enemy could overtake him. The time lost at Amelia Court House permitted Sheridan, whose cavalry was much in advance of the rest of the Federal army, to intercept the Confederates' line of retreat. In the afternoon of the 4th he arrived with 18,000 horses at Jetersville, on the Danville Railway, about six miles south-west of Amelia Court House. Meade next day joined him with two corps of infantry.

General Lee, on perceiving this new peril, immediately abandoned his march towards North Carolina, and, turning west, tried to reach Lynchburg. Resuming his march on the night of April 5th, he directed it on Farmville, about thirty miles off, through an uneven country, whence he hoped more easily to get to the mountains. At the moment, therefore, when Grant was making arrangements to attack Lee at Amelia Court House, it was perceived he had gone off towards Farmville. A column immediately started in pursuit; two other columns took two parallel roads north and south of the Confederate line of retreat respectively, while a fourth Federal corps marched from Burkesville on Farmville to destroy the bridge at that place.

Lee, to feed his soldiers, was obliged partly to disperse them; consequently many of these foragers were made prisoners. The

sufferings of his soldiers became unbearable. Many kept themselves alive by eating buds and young shoots. The horses and mules perished by hundreds, for want of provender. The greater part of the waggons had to be burnt, and the guns buried. All around the soldiers fell from weakness, or threw away their rifles for want of strength to carry them. Every moment the enemy's squadrons became bolder, and harassed the flanks of the little army; waggons set on fire, the ammunition kept blowing up; showers of cannon-balls swept the Confederate ranks, which left behind a long train of dead and wounded.

Gradually the circle around Lee's soldiers was closing in, but they were no less resolved to struggle as long as human nature would allow them. Their general, recovered from his momentary dejection, thought only of making the best use of his acquaintance with the country and of the devotion of his heroic soldiers.

On the 6th, in the evening, at Deatonsville, Sheridan vigorously attacked with three of his divisions the train of carriages, defeating Pickett's division, reduced to 800 men, taking sixteen guns, a large number of prisoners, and destroying 400 waggons. Ewell hastened to his colleague's succour with his corps of 4200 men. But all the Federals 6th corps, more than 20,000 foot soldiers, joined Sheridan's cavalry, and had no great difficulty in overwhelming these poor exhausted fellows, so enfeebled that often, after having loaded their rifles, they let them fall, then sunk down themselves on them, and gave way to an irresistible sleep. While Ewell bravely showed a front to the Federal infantry, Sheridan's cavalry attacked him on the flank and in the rear. There was presently no other resource but to lower his arms, his adversaries being five times as numerous as his own force. The remnants of his corps, including General Custis Lee and three other generals, were made prisoners.

On the 7th, the Federals still hotly pursued what was left of the Southern army. General Fitz-Lee, who formed the rearguard with his 1500 men, mounted on screws, drove back and routed

General Gregg at the head of 6000 men, well mounted and admirably equipped, making Gregg himself a prisoner, to the great satisfaction of General Lee, who said to his nephew: "Keep your command together, and in good spirits, general. Don't let them talk of surrender. I will get you out of this."

Lee was in advance of the Federal corps of General Ord, who had been despatched to destroy the bridge over the Appomattox, at Farmville, and the remains of the Confederate army crossed this river and bivouacked around the little village. The exhaustion of the men, who for five days of incessant marchings and fights had literally *eaten nothing* except some grains of maize and bark of trees, became such, that after a council of war held by the generals, the commander-in-chief of the artillery, General Pendleton, was commissioned to communicate to the general-in-chief that the unanimous opinion of the council was, that no other course remained but to surrender. Such, however, was not Lee's view. "Surrender!" exclaimed he with a fiery glance; "I have too many good soldiers for that!"

He undoubtedly thought he should be able to reach the mountains, and as long as that chance remained he did not feel authorized to abandon the struggle. The retreat continued. Before the bridges of the railway and road could be entirely burnt, the Federal second corps arrived, and, in spite of the desperate resistance of a brigade left by Gordon to effect their destruction, it crossed, and likewise captured a good number of prisoners. The same day Grant occupied Farmville. To the north of the village, about five miles distant, Lee had intrenched himself in a defensive position, covering the road to Lynchburg and well chosen to give his men a little rest, and to maintain himself till night. The Federals attacked, but having lost 600 men, killed and wounded, and receiving no reinforcements before evening, they were compelled to suspend operations.

On arriving at Farmville, Grant sent the following letter to Lee:—

"April 7th, 1865.

"General R. E. LEE, Commanding C. S. A.

"GENERAL,

"The result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate Southern army known as the Army of Northern Virginia.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"U. S. GRANT,

"Lieutenant-General commanding armies of the United States."

Lee received this letter the same evening. He answered immediately as follows :—

"April 7th, 1865.

"GENERAL,

"I have received your note of this day. Though not entirely of the opinion you express as to the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender.

"Your obedient servant,

"R. E. LEE.

"Commanding Confederate forces."

In the interval between the two letters Lee had, by a night march, put a long distance between himself and his enemies. General Grant answered this note :—

"April 8th, 1865.

"GENERAL,

"Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date, asking the conditions on which I will accept the surrender of the

army of Northern Virginia, is just received. In reply, I would say, that *peace* being my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon, namely: That the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you might name for the same purpose (? object), at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the army of Northern Virginia will be received.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."

"To General R. E. LEE."

But the Confederates had not lost their time. On the 8th, in the evening, they entered Appomattox Court House. Lynchburg was not more than twenty-four miles off. They were not near beaten yet. The enemy did not show himself, and the Confederates began to hope that after all they would arrive at Lynchburg. The line of retreat followed the narrow tongue of land which extends between the James River and the Appomattox. This is the answer Lee made to the foregoing letter:

"April 8th, 1865.

"GENERAL,

"I received at a late hour your note of to-day. In mine of yesterday, I did not intend to propose the surrender of the army of Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. To be frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army; but as the restoration of peace should be sole object of all, I desire to know whether your proposals would lead to that end. I cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to surrender the army of Northern Virginia, but as far as your proposal may affect the Confederate States forces under my command, and tend to the restoration of peace, I should be

pleased to meet you at 10 a.m., to-morrow, on the old stage road to Richmond, between the picket lines of the two armies.

"Your obedient servant,

"R. E. LEE, General."

To this letter Grant next morning replied:

"April 9th, 1865.

"GENERAL,

"Your note of yesterday is received. I have no authority to treat on the subject of peace. The meeting proposed for 10 a.m. to-day would lead to no good. I will state, however, General, that I am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains the same feeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. By the South laying down its arms it will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed. Seriously hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself, &c.

"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."

This answer never came to General Lee. During this correspondence Sheridan's cavalry had arrived, on the evening of the 8th, at Appomattox Station, on the railway leading to Lynchburg, about five miles beyond the Court House, thus barring the only way which remained open to the Confederates. Having seized four trains of provisions coming from Lynchburg, intended for Lee's army, he planted himself on the Confederate line of march, determined to make a stand there, well assured that in the morning he would be rejoined by the army of the James, while the army of the Potomac would press upon the Southern rear. A brisk musketry fire at the outposts, announced to Lee's veterans that they were surrounded on all sides.

That same night, around the bivouac fire in the woods, the last council of war of the army of Northern Virginia was held.

There were present, Generals Lee, Longstreet, Gordon, and Fitz-Lee. The commander-in-chief indicated to them their position, and acquainted them with his correspondence with Grant. After a short conversation, it was resolved that next morning the entire army should advance: if only the cavalry of Sheridan was before it, it should sweep it out of its way and pursue the march to Lynchburg; if, on the contrary, imposing masses of hostile infantry should be encountered beyond the Court House, what was impossible must not be attempted; a flag of truce should go forward to ask General Grant to concede an interview, in order to agree upon the conditions on which the Southern army should lay down its arms.

Much against his will, General Lee was compelled to approve these arrangements. Shortly after the generals separated, each divisionary saluting the commander-in-chief, who, on his side, returned their salute with grave courtesy; then all went back to their posts.

At three in the morning, Lee sent to ask Gordon, who commanded the vanguard, what probability there was of an attack succeeding: "Tell General Lee," replied Gordon, "that my old corps is reduced to a frazzle (? zero), and unless I am supported by Longstreet heavily, I do not think we can do anything more." When this report was made to Lee, for the first time some words of discouragement escaped from his lips. After a moment's silence he said: "There is nothing left but to go to General Grant, and I would rather die a thousand deaths!" His staff was around him. One of his officers made this observation: "What will history say of our surrendering if there is any possibility of escape? Posterity will not understand it." "Yes, yes," replied Lee, "they will not understand our situation; but that is not the question. The question is, whether it is *right;* and if it is right I take the responsibility."

An expression of quiet confidence, of serenity almost joyful, had appeared in his face, instead of profound sadness: the thought

of having to capitulate was to him bitterer than death. At the moment of quitting his tent, the acclamations of the soldiers were heard: *There is Uncle Robert!* Turning to one of his officers he said to him, in a tone at once firm and sweet: "How easily I could get rid of all this and be at rest! I have only to ride along the lines and all will be over!" Then, after a moment's silence he added, with a deep sigh: "But it is our duty to live. What will become of the women and children of the South, if we are not here to protect them?"

At length the time had come when it would be decided whether retreat was still possible. To General Gordon, who had nobly distinguished himself in the later military operations, fell the command of the attacking column. The Confederate army consisted of only 8000 men, armed with rifles. Gordon's 2000 men formed the van. The remains of various corps under Longstreet were in the rear. Between the two was placed all that was left of the army trains, together with several thousands of stragglers without arms, hardly able to drag themselves along, so much had cold and hunger played havoc with them. The cavalry, 2000 sabres, mounted on gaunt lean horses, were in no condition to render any service. Such was the army preparing to pierce the lines of Sheridan.

Marching beyond Appomattox Court House, Gordon briskly attacked the enemy, supported by Fitz-Lee's cavalry and Colonel Carter's artillery. The dash of his soldiers was such that he drove all the Federal troops before him over a space of about a mile and a half. But then he found in his front a compact mass of infantry, estimated, on the authority of the Federal officers themselves, at 80,000 men! Having behind him only 5000 bayonets, there was no possibility of advancing. Already the Federal mass was moving to rush on him, when the arrival of a flag of truce spared a carnage rendered useless. General Lee, appreciating the absolutely desperate condition in which he was, had despatched this flag of truce to Grant, asking him to treat.

It was this incident which arrested the offensive movement of the Federals. Grant conceded the interview requested.

The two armies remained with their arms in their hands during the conference of their two commanders, which took place at a farmhouse near the Court House. General Lee was attended by Colonel Marshall, of his staff: several Federal officers accompanied General Grant. The latter was perfectly courteous. Lee remained impassive. The fatigues of the latter days had indeed left traces on his emaciated features. His form was erect; look, confident; behaviour, dignified and polite. He confined himself to treating of the affair for which they were assembled. Seated at a small deal table, the two generals drew up and exchanged the two following documents:

"Appomattox Court House, Virginia,
"April 9th, 1865.

"GENERAL,

"In accordance with my letter to you of the 8th inst., I propose to receive the surrender of the army of Northern Virginia on the following terms, to wit: Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. The officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the United States until properly exchanged; and each company or regimental commander to sign a like parole for the men of their commands. The arms, artillery, and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers appointed by me to receive them. This will not embrace the side arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be disturbed by United States authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General."

"Head-Quarters, Army of Northern Virginia,
"April 9th, 1865.

"GENERAL,

"I have received your letter of this date, containing the terms of the surrender of the army of Northern Virginia, as proposed by you. As they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th inst., they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"R. E. LEE, General."

The interview ended the two generals parted. Lee, remounting his courser, returned to his head-quarters. The emotion of the Confederates, on seeing their adored chief again, and learning what had passed, cannot be described. Breaking their ranks, they rushed to him, seeking to seize his hand, calling down on his head the blessings of the Most High, begging Heaven, with tears in their eyes, to sustain him in this latest trial. "God help you, General!" resounded on all sides. This spontaneous ovation touched him deeply. With eyes brimful through emotion, he cast on his men a look of inexpressible pride, and with a trembling voice said to them: "Men, we have fought through the war together. I have done the best I could for you. My heart is too full to say more!"

The victors were magnanimous. They abstained from every appearance of insult towards the vanquished. Abundant victuals were distributed to the prisoners, who were dying of hunger.

The day after the capitulation, Lee addressed to his heroic soldiers an order of the day, his final adieu to them:

"Head-Quarters, Army of Northern Virginia,
April 10th, 1865.

"After four years of arduous service, marked by unsurpassed courage and fortitude, the army of Northern Virginia has been compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources.

"I need not tell the survivors of so many hard-fought battles, who have remained steadfast to the last, that I have consented to this result from no distrust of them; but, feeling that valour and devotion could accomplish nothing that could compensate for the loss that would have attended the continuation of the contest, I have determined to avoid the useless sacrifice of those whose past services have endeared them to their countrymen.

"By the terms of the agreement, officers and men can return to their homes, and remain there until exchanged.

"You will take with you the satisfaction that proceeds from the consciousness of duty faithfully performed, and I earnestly pray that a merciful God will extend to you His blessing and protection.

"With an unceasing admiration of your constancy and devotion to your country, and a grateful remembrance of your kindness and generous consideration of myself, I bid you, soldiers, an affectionate farewell.

"R. E. LEE, General."

On the 12th of April, the Confederate army of Virginia was formed into divisions for the last time. Conducted to a place near Appomattox Court House, the soldier-prisoners had there to park their artillery, pile their rifles, lay down their accoutrements, and finally to part for ever from those flags they had so much loved. 7500 men lowered their arms, but nearly 18,000 stragglers without arms also took advantage of the capitulation. 2000 cavalry, under Fitzhugh Lee and Rosser had escaped before Sheridan's troops had closed in all the ways. Some hours later, however, they likewise surrendered. General Grant had the delicacy to delegate one of his generals to receive the prisoners. He himself abstained from appearing at the ceremony.

The melancholy details of the capitulation over, General Lee, a simple prisoner on parole, like the meanest of his soldiers, prepared to return to Richmond. Tearing himself away from the

passionate display of affection on the part of his soldiers, he departed towards the city. His veterans saw him for the last time on his faithful *Traveller*, who, without a scratch, had passed through all the dangers of this campaign. His escort was composed of a detachment of Federal cavalry, preceded by an ensign. Twenty-five Confederate officers accompanied him. Several waggons filled with baggage and personal effects followed, among other things the little open carriage of which Lee had made use over and over again during the war, when, through accident or sickness, he could not ride on horseback. It was generally in this he used to lay aside choice provisions for the wounded.

All along the road Lee appeared much more concerned about the sad state to which the unhappy inhabitants were reduced, than about his own personal situation. He was exceedingly affected at the delicate care with which these poor folk received him, preparing for him warm repasts, and evincing towards him all the tokens of loving respect. Notwithstanding hospitable offers made to him, he continued to sleep on the bare ground, wishing in nothing to be better treated than his companions on the road. Even at his brother's house he passed the night in his little carriage. On approaching Richmond he went in front of his escort, followed only by a few officers, and crossed the James on pontoons, the ordinary bridge having been burnt when the Confederates evacuated the town. The appearance of Richmond was desolate. Much of the lower part of the city had been burnt on the 3rd of April, and all around nothing was seen but blackened ruins.

A few persons having recognised the general, the report of his arrival rapidly spread; immediately the inhabitants crowded round him, welcoming him with acclamations, waving their hats and handkerchiefs. Desirous to avoid all public manifestations, the illustrious prisoner, bowing to his numerous admirers, escaped from this impromptu ovation as soon as he could, and presently reached the house where his family waited for him. The Federal

soldiers, grouped round the door, gave him a militaty salute. It was with great difficulty he dismounted, such was the crowd, everybody wishing to shake his hand, hear his voice, or touch his person: some actually embraced the faithful *Traveller* that had borne him safe and sound through so many dangers. Hastening to cross the threshold of his house, which the impassioned admiration of his fellow-citizens had the good taste to respect, he kept there constantly within doors, going out only at night, in order to avoid demonstrations as melancholy as useless, and which besides might attract the anger of the Federal authorities towards the people of Richmond, who had already had a sad experience. Nevertheless, his door continued to be besieged by the curious, and by Confederate soldiers returning to their firesides, who had a wish to see their general once more.

CHAPTER XVII.

LEE'S LAST YEARS AT LEXINGTON.—HIS DEATH, OCTOBER 12, 1870.

IN the latter years of Lee's life, the greatness and sweetness of his character, two qualities rarely combined, contributed to form an extraordinary and charming whole. The misfortune and humiliation of defeat never succeeded in drawing from him a single word of anger or impatience when speaking of the North. When, in his presence, sentiments of hatred were heard, he unhesitatingly condemned them, thus setting an example of moderation and charity which, let us hope, found many imitators. He wished, by the manner in which he bore his private misfortunes, to reconcile the Southern populations to the harshness of their lot. If he learnt of young people contemplating emigration from their country to settle with the foreigner, he reminded them that the true way of displaying their love for the South was to remain there, and assist in healing her bleeding wounds. The constant aim proposed to himself was to calm and heal ulcerated hearts. It was on the rising generation that he especially founded his hopes; it was to this he devoted the remainder of his life, refusing all the generous offers and splendid situations proposed to him, as well in various cities of the United States as in England and Ireland. "I am deeply grateful," said he, "but I cannot consent to desert my native State in the hour of her adversity. I must abide her fortunes and share her fate."

Some months after the end of the war, General Lee accepted

the presidency of the State College of Virginia at Lexington. This college—and, for that matter, all the district—found great difficulty in recovering from its disasters. The directors of Washington College (such was its name) thought of offering the presidency to General Lee, hoping thus to attract a greater number of students to it, and likewise to give the general a substantial testimony of their own admiration and of the affection borne to him by the State.

The war had engulfed all Lee's fortune, and it was absolutely necessary, since he refused all offers of aid, that he should find some occupation to earn his living at.

At first he had some scruples about accepting, as is proved by a fine letter he wrote the directors in August, 1865. He did not consider himself in a position to instruct youth, or to do anything except exercise a general surveillance and discipline. But the most serious objection in his opinion was, that, being excluded from the amnesty of the preceding 29th of May, the choice of him to superintend might cause the feelings of hostility of which he was the object to be reflected on the college.

"It is particularly incumbent on those charged with the instruction of the young," said he, "to set them an example of submission to authority. I could not consent to be the cause of animadversion upon the college." He finished by declaring that he was at the disposal of the directors if his scruples appeared to them unfounded or exaggerated.

On the 1st of October he entered on his duties. His new post was not a sinecure; it was not there he could find the repose of which his mind and body stood in so much need. The war had ruined the college. With library pillaged, building destroyed, all its professors dispersed, its allotted funds reduced to nothing; everything had to be restored. Lee devoted himself heart and soul to this new task. The celebrity of his name attracted sympathy from all parts of the world, and students flowed in in great numbers, so that in 1870 there were upwards of 500.

In spite of the most seductive offers made to him (for instance, that of 250,000 francs a-year from a manufacturing company at New York, fixed salary, if he would become the chairman), his invariable answer was: "My duties at the college take up all my time, and I cannot consent to receive a salary for which I should do nothing." At Washington College he had 25,000 francs and house-rent.

He had found a mission, that of retrieving the fortunes of the college, giving to the young people about him lessons in religion, morality, and obedience, and, through the medium of his youthful pupils, effecting a reaction against the demoralizing tendencies of the age. This mission he nobly fulfilled. He became adored by all these young men, and ended by insensibly giving to all the establishment the impress of his own personal character.

It was very rare that he officially addressed the students. On such occasions appeared what they called "one of his orders of the day," and the appeal of their much loved president was always listened to. We offer here a specimen:

"Washington College, November 26th, 1866.

"The Faculty desire to call the attention of the students to the disturbances which occurred in the streets of Lexington on the nights of Friday and Saturday last. They believe that none can contemplate them with pleasure, or can find any reasonable grounds for their justification. These acts are said to have been committed by students of the college, with the apparent object of disturbing the peace and quiet of a town whose inhabitants have opened their doors for their reception and accommodation, and who are always ready to administer to their comfort and pleasure.

"It requires but little consideration to see the error of such conduct, which could only have proceeded from thoughtlessness and a want of reflection. The Faculty, therefore, appeal to the honour and self-respect of the students to prevent any similar occurrence, trusting that their sense of what is due to themselves,

their parents, and the institution to which they belong, will be more effectual in teaching them what is right and manly, than anything they can say. . . . .

"R. E. LEE,
"President of Washington College."

He gave himself up to this work of reorganization as if he had never had any other ambition. "I am delighted with my civil duties," he wrote. This new life was at least a relief and alleviation of the cruel remembrances of the past. This college, which he had found poor, disorganized, forsaken, ruined, he left rich, prosperous, and overflowing with students.

Lee appeared in public only twice or thrice during this later portion of his life. The Congress at Washington had appointed a "Committee of reconstruction" to inquire into the state of affairs in the South. The Confederate ex-commander was summoned as a witness. The astonishment which the number and nature of the questions addressed to him must excite, can only yield to the truly extraordinary patience of which he gave proof. Not only did the Committee want to know the opinions of the Southern populations on all possible points, social and political, but it sought to make the general set forth his ideas on the actual state, the intellectual capacity, and probable future of the negro race.

The calm dignity, good sense, and frankness of his replies, formed a striking set-off to the want of tact and the unsuitableness of some of the interrogations.

He did not try in any way to extenuate his share in the responsibility of the war, or to hide his true sentiments, although he maintained a very natural reserve.

When asked by the President of the Committee whether he thought that in case of a war between the United States and a foreign power, Virginia would profit by the opportunity for a new rising, Lee replied: "I cannot answer with any certainty on that point; I do not know how far they might be actuated by their

feelings; I have nothing whatever to base an opinion upon; so far as I know, they contemplate nothing of the kind now; what may happen in the future I cannot say."

"Do you not frequently hear," continued the President, "in your intercourse with secessionists in Virginia, expressions of a hope that such a war may break out?"

"I cannot say that I have heard it; on the contrary, I have heard persons,—I do not know whether you call them secessionists or not, I mean those people in Virginia with whom I associate,—express the hope that the country may not be led into a war."

Then, on being asked, whether, in case of war, he would join the foreigner against the United States Government, his reply was: "I have no disposition now to do it, and I never had."

"Suppose," to cite another question addressed to him by the President, "suppose a jury was impanelled in your own neighbourhood, in Virginia, would it be possible to convict, for instance, Jefferson Davis, for having levied war upon the United States, and thus having committed the crime of treason?"

"I think it is very probable that they would not consider he had committed treason."

"In what light would the jury view Davis's conduct? What would be their excuse or justification? How would they escape in their own mind?"

"So far as I know, they look upon the action of the State in withdrawing itself from the Government of the United States as carrying the individuals along with it,—that the State was responsible for the act, not the individuals; and that the ordinance of secession, so called, or those acts of the State which recognized a condition of war between the State and the general Government, stood as their justification for their bearing arms against the Government of the United States. I think they would consider the act of the State as legitimate; that they were merely using the reserved rights which they were entitled to do."

"State, if you please,—and if you are disinclined to answer the

question you need not do so—what your own personal views on that question are."

"That was my view; that the act of Virginia, in withdrawing herself from the United States, carried me along as a citizen of Virginia, and that her laws and her acts were binding on me."

In consequence of an allusion made by the President, Lee observed: "I may have said, and may have believed, that the position which the two sections held to each other was brought about by the politicians of the country; that the great masses of the people, if they understood the real question, would have avoided it. . . . . But I did believe at the time that it was an unnecessary condition of affairs, and might have been avoided if forbearance and wisdom had been practised on both sides."

The President continued: "You say that you do not recollect having sworn allegiance and fidelity to the Confederate government?"

Lee replied without hesitation: "I do not recollect it, nor do I know it was ever required. I was regularly commissioned in the army of the Confederate States, but I really do not recollect that that oath was required. If it was required, I have no doubt I took it; or, if it had been required, I would have taken it."

After reading this frank and proud reply, some idea may be formed of the pain it cost Lee to transmit a demand for pardon to the United States Government. This application has been judged of in many different manners, and to many of his admirers in the South it still remains a subject of sore regret. Yet what grander proof could he have given of the greatness of his heart? Of what *personal* gain would a pardon be to him? The success or failure of the application was perfectly indifferent to him. What crueller sacrifice could there be for a soul so proud, so convinced of the justice of the cause for which he had fought, than that of presenting, so to speak, a halter for his own neck? Nevertheless he submitted to this final humiliation, supported by that sentiment of duty which, to the very end, was his master, his ruler, his guide

in everything. He felt the immense importance of the example he was about to set. All his old soldiers and thousands of his fellow-citizens were, according to the new laws, compelled to demand the benefit of the amnesty, and if they did not obtain it, they lost their civil rights. Thousands of brave veterans, if they would not leave their families to die of starvation, were reduced by stern necessity to take this mournful step. Lee thought that his duty to his old comrades required that he also should drink the bitter cup to the very dregs. Having shared their glory, he ought also to share their humiliation.

This feature in the life of the Southern commander is a brilliant one. For the rest, pardon was refused to him.

His unchangeable sweetness, the absence of all rancour, of all bitterness of feeling so natural to the vanquished, raised him high above the prejudices and hatreds of the day, and exhibited him, to all who came, as a living example of Christian charity. Although he wished everybody to remain faithful to the old traditions of the South in all that appertained to honour, virtue, and hospitality, yet he set himself to work to root up those animosities, those provincial rivalries, which led only to ruin.

To a mother, who brought him her two sons, loudly expressing her hatred of the North, he said, "Madam, don't bring up your sons to detest the United States Government. Recollect that we form but one country, *now*. Abandon all these local animosities, and make your sons Americans."

Here again is a charming incident, which will well illustrate his goodness: One of his friends, on passing by Lee's garden-gate, found him conversing with a man poorly clad, to whom he had just given something, and who appeared exceedingly happy at the general's courteous welcome. Presently the man saluted him and withdrew. "That is one of our old soldiers in want," explained Lee. Naturally enough the friend thought he meant some Confederate veteran, when Lee, lowering his voice, added: "He was not on our side, but that doesn't signify."

During the war, the religious side of his character was not so strikingly revealed as in the case of General Jackson. But in his retreat, far from the world, in the midst of his meditations on the sufferings of his country, it was very natural that this distinctive feature of his soul should strongly assert itself. Perceiving more plainly than ever the inability of man to remedy evil, is it astonishing that he should more and more concentrate his thoughts on God? Although profoundly Christian, there was no narrowness in his piety. On one occasion, when importunately questioned as to his thoughts on Apostolic succession, he replied with great simplicity: "I have never troubled myself to think about such matters, I have merely endeavoured to be a Christian."

One day, in a review near Winchester, while passing in front of the chaplain, he lifted his hat, saying: "I salute the Church of God!" In the neighbourhood of Petersburg, he was observed humbly kneeling on his knees a short distance from the high road, on which his army was at that moment defiling. When he invaded Pennsylvania, certain influence was brought to bear upon him to use reprisals, and act as the Federals had acted in Virginia. "No," replied he, "were I to permit it, I could not ask God to bless our arms."

After his death, a much used Bible was found in his room. On the first page were these words: "R. E. Lee, lieutenant-colonel, army of the United States." Thus for years, in Mexico, and in the prairies of the West, this illustrious, worthy man had sought to regulate his life according to the precepts of the Gospel.

When congratulated on the degree of prosperity which the college enjoyed under his direction: "It would be a bitter disappointment to me," said he, "if I did not attain the principal end I proposed to myself in coming here, and if the young men of whom I have charge did not become true Christians!"

The poor and necessitous he never forgot. He gave away much,—much, that is, when his very moderate resources are considered; for the vast estates he possessed before the war had been

confiscated. As regards these, this is a convenient place to quote a fragment of a letter which he wrote to a friend, who had greatly interested himself to obtain a restitution to General Lee's wife of the souvenirs and precious objects which had belonged to Washington, and which came to her from her father. These objects had been carried off by the Federals from Arlington, Lee's residence before the war.

"Lexington, February 12th, 1869.

" . . . . . Mrs. Lee has determined to act upon your suggestion, and apply to President Johnson for such of the relics from Arlington as are in the Patent Office. From what I have learned, a great many things formerly belonging to General Washington, bequeathed to her by her father, in the shape of books, furniture, camp equipage, &c., were carried away by individuals, and are now scattered over the land. I hope the possessors appreciate them, and may imitate the example of their original owner, whose conduct must at times be brought to their recollection by these silent monitors. In this they will accomplish good to the country."

Congress was opposed to the making of this restitution.

Lee respected all forms that religious feeling could take. During the latter days of the dismal struggle under Petersburg, a Jewish soldier petitioned the general for leave to go to Richmond to keep the Passover. The man's captain had written on the margin of the petition a sharp note, unfavourable to its prayer. Lee, indeed, did not grant the required leave, but he stated the grounds of his refusal in a few courteous lines, showing that the military situation was too critical for him to be able to accede to a desire in itself legitimate and praiseworthy. To the captain's note he added these words: "We should always be charitable towards those whose religion differs from ours, and, as far as we can, aid every one to fulfil the duties imposed upon him by his belief."

The last thing he did was to assist at a parochial committee, held in the church at Lexington, and this last act of his was an act of charity.

We now come to the end of this noble life,—a life spent in noble deeds, and consecrated to good actions. Death found him prepared. On the 28th of September, 1870, after a fatiguing day passed in his office, General Lee presided over the parochial committee of the Episcopal Church. He then returned home to tea. Mrs. Lee, perceiving he had a chilly appearance, told him so. "Thanks," replied he; "I am warmly clothed!" The words were the last which he pronounced distinctly. On sitting down, he opened his lips to say grace, a habit in which he never failed, even when under canvas, but now no sound issued from them. A moment afterwards he fell back in his chair, paralyzed.

The tidings of this misfortune soon spread. During those days of anguish, all the districts of the South greedily awaited news of the illustrious invalid. Throughout he continued insensible. At intervals he was heard to mutter some indistinct words of war and combat. Once he said, in a way to be understood: "Strike my tent! send for Hill!"

His health had always been so robust, and he was still so vigorous, that, at first, the physicians did not despair of him. But his family knew what the physicians were ignorant of. His heart, overwhelmed by the weight of his country's trials, had finished by breaking. Congestion of the brain was only a symptom of the moral malady that was slowly threatening him. Every messenger who came had been in the habit of bringing the most touching appeals from his old soldiers and their families, who were dying of starvation. These sufferings, which he could not relieve, were a torture to him. Year by year the hope of seeing times of perfect peace and prosperous tranquillity return became more remote. This anguish, for a long time hidden, even from his relatives, completed its work by destroying the buoyancy of that vigorous organization.

He remained in a state of insensibility till the 12th of October, when, at nine o'clock in the morning, surrounded by his family, he gave up his magnanimous soul to his Creator. He died in the sixty-fourth year of his age.

The grief in the South was universal. Everywhere the despatch announcing the death of the great Virginian fell on thousands of hearts like a funeral knell. The dismal sound of bells, the Virginian flag half-mast high, the mournful assemblies of citizens crowding the churches to celebrate a funeral service in honour of the departed hero, the addresses to his family, all testified the profound feeling which animated the South in view of this great loss. The legislature of Virginia adjourned. It was desired to give to the illustrious deceased a public funeral, and bury him at Richmond. But his friends preferred to keep him near them. He rests in the College Chapel. In accordance with his wish, there was no funeral oration over his tomb; the ceremony was limited to the reading of the magnificent Burial Service of the Church of England.

There, in the beautiful Valley of Virginia, sleeps this great victim of the most terrible civil war of modern times.

The heart becomes a prey to profound sadness, while observing that so beautiful an existence but furnishes another example of that fatal law which, between two causes equally justifiable, gives the triumph to that which is able to dispose of the most money and to sacrifice the greatest number of lives without enfeebling itself!

But before this mystery let us bow our heads, as one more to be added to those inexplicable things which surround us. The Creator, in His impenetrable wisdom, has ordained that nothing here below shall be perfect; and, inasmuch as those great men whom He lends us for our edification accept, without a murmur, defeat and humiliation as the crown of their life, let us, in our turn, be resigned, and not seek to fathom the unfathomable.

Did not Lee himself write: "I bow with resignation before the

will of Almighty God, whose omniscience cannot be deceived, whose infinite tenderness cannot desire our injury, and who knows, not only the trials that are good for us, but also the moment when it is best for us to undergo them"?

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